Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, Docket No. 23-1039
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Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, Docket No. 23-1039
This case is a perfect example of how a small twist in the law can change the playing field for those who believe they've been treated unfairly at work. The Supreme Court looked at a rule from the Sixth Circuit that said people in the majority group had to show more proof than others to win a discrimination case under Title VII.
In a unanimous vote, the justices said that Title VII doesn't draw that line – it protects anyone from discrimination, no matter what group they belong to. They wiped out the old ruling and sent the case back so it can be judged by the right standard.
Summary of the Case
Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, has worked for the Ohio Department of Youth Services since 2004. In 2019 she applied for a newly created management position but the agency instead hired a lesbian candidate. Days later, Ames was demoted from her program-administrator role—at significant loss of pay—and a gay man was hired to fill that vacancy. Ames sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging disparate treatment on account of her sexual orientation.
Both the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio and the Sixth Circuit granted summary judgment for the State. Relying on Sixth Circuit precedent, they held that a plaintiff who belongs to a so-called "majority group" must also show "background circumstances" indicating the employer is the "rare" one to discriminate against the majority. Because Ames presented no such evidence, her Title VII claim failed. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve disagreement among different federal courts over this heightened burden.
Opinion of the Court
Justice Jackson, writing for a unanimous Court, vacated the lower court's decision and sent the case back for reconsideration. The opinion holds that Title VII's disparate-treatment provision—which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual because of their sex—draws no distinction between majority-group and minority-group plaintiffs. As the Court explained, the law focuses on individuals, not groups, and Congress provided a uniform standard for all. The Court also noted that judges shouldn't rigidly apply inflexible formulas when evaluating discrimination claims. The Sixth Circuit's "background circumstances" requirement has no basis in the law or in the Supreme Court's previous decisions. Because that extra burden dictated the decision in Ames's case, it must be reconsidered under the proper standard.
Separate Opinions
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, concurred. He emphasized the broader risks of judge-created rules that aren't based on the actual text of laws. Beyond rejecting the "background circumstances" doctrine, Thomas noted that the framework courts use to evaluate discrimination claims itself lacks a textual foundation and has generated decades of confusion. He suggested that, in an appropriate future case, the Court should reconsider and possibly overrule this framework as it's applied in summary judgment decisions.
Equal Protection Under Employment Discrimination Law
Title VII bars intentional employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Under the standard legal framework, a plaintiff must first establish a basic case—typically by showing they applied for a job for which they were qualified, were rejected, and that rejection occurred under circumstances suggesting discrimination. If that minimal burden is met, the employer must provide a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, after which the plaintiff may prove that reason is just a pretext for discrimination.
Importantly, Title VII's text makes no distinctions among protected-class members; it forbids discrimination "against any individual." Previous Supreme Court decisions affirm that Title VII prohibits discriminatory preference for "any group, minority or majority," and that courts should avoid rigid formulations when evaluating discrimination claims. The Sixth Circuit's extra "background circumstances" hurdle for majority plaintiffs thus conflicted with both the law's text and the Supreme Court's guidance for flexible standards when evaluating evidence of discrimination.