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BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, Docket No. 23-1259

When the Supreme Court steps in to sort out a tight corner of court rules, it reminds us how every word counts. In Blom Bank v. Honickman, a bank asked to reopen a closed case so it could tweak its complaint. But there’s a rule that says you can only reopen a case for really rare, compelling reasons; so rare that they call them “extraordinary circumstances.”

The bank argued it should get a break because courts usually let you fix mistakes in your papers. The Second Circuit tried to balance that friendly approach with the strict reopening rule. The high court said no. Justice Thomas, writing for all nine justices, made clear you have to clear the high bar of "extraordinary circumstances" before you even think about making changes. Since the bank couldn’t show that kind of reason, its request stayed shut.

Summary of the Case

BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman arose after victims of Hamas terrorist attacks (2001–2003) sued BLOM Bank under the Anti-Terrorism Act, alleging the bank "aided and abetted" Hamas by providing financial services to allegedly affiliated customers. The District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to plead the required "general awareness" element of aiding-and-abetting liability and denied leave to amend when plaintiffs declined opportunities to replead. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal but granted relief to reopen and amend by "balancing" finality concerns against liberal amendment policy. The Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the "extraordinary circumstances" standard yields to more lenient amendment rules when a movant seeks to amend its complaint after final judgment.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Thomas, writing for an eight-Justice majority, held that relief to reopen a case remains governed by the "extraordinary circumstances" standard even when a party seeks to reopen for amendment. The Court emphasized that this relief provision is a narrow "catchall" only for grounds not covered by other specific provisions, and that a broad reading would undermine time limitations built into the rules. It rejected the Second Circuit's approach of "balancing" different procedural rules, explaining that the liberal amendment standard applies only to pre-trial amendments and cannot dilute the stringency of reopening requirements once judgment is final. The Court reversed the Second Circuit and reaffirmed that plaintiffs must demonstrate "extraordinary circumstances" before being allowed to reopen a case for repleading.

Separate Opinions

Justice Jackson concurred in part and in the judgment, joining the majority except for one section. She agreed that the "extraordinary circumstances" standard governs motions to reopen but cautioned against reading precedent to bar reopening whenever a plaintiff previously declined to amend. Jackson emphasized that exercising a right to appeal does not automatically disqualify a movant from seeking relief to reopen and stressed that "due diligence" must be assessed in context.

When Final Means Final: The High Bar for Reopening Closed Cases

The Court's ruling reinforces that reopening a closed case is designed to preserve finality by permitting relief only in "extraordinary circumstances"—a principle established in earlier Supreme Court cases. This strict standard cannot be used to evade the one-year limit on relief for mistake, new evidence, or fraud. The Court clarified that the instruction to "freely give leave" to amend applies to pre-judgment amendments, not to cases closed by final judgment. By requiring movants to satisfy the extraordinary circumstances test before seeking amendment, the Court maintained the integrity of the Federal Rules—ensuring that a party's desire to amend does not weaken the high standard for reopening cases or render other procedural safeguards meaningless. This decision provides important guidance on the balance between finality in litigation and opportunities to correct pleadings.