Hewitt v. United States, Docket No. 23-1002

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The Supreme Court took up a subtle question about who gets the benefit of newer, lighter penalties under a law called the First Step Act. The question wasn’t a big headline grabber—it was about whether a prison term counts as “imposed” if a judge later wiped it away. The justices said that if a sentence is vacated—meaning it’s erased—it’s treated like it never happened. That little detail means anyone who had an old sentence thrown out and needs to be resentenced now gets the chance to avoid harsh “stacked” minimums that used to hit first-time gun offenders with decades behind bars.

Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, noted that this reading lets people who went back to court after the law changed get the newer rules. Four other justices joined her opinion, while three judges on the other side—led by Justice Alito—disagreed.

Summary of the Case

In 2009, Tony Hewitt, Corey Duffey, and Jarvis Ross were convicted of bank robbery and related firearm charges in Texas. Under the mandatory "stacking" rules at that time, they received extraordinarily harsh sentences exceeding 325 years. After some convictions were vacated on appeal, they were resentenced in 2012 to 285-305 years.

Following a 2019 Supreme Court decision that invalidated part of the law's definition of "crime of violence," the defendants successfully challenged additional firearm convictions. The district court vacated all their firearm convictions and ordered new sentencing hearings.

At these hearings, they argued that the First Step Act of 2018, which reduced mandatory minimums for firearm offenses, should apply to them because their previous sentences had been vacated. The Act made these reduced penalties retroactive "if a sentence... has not been imposed" as of December 21, 2018. Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit disagreed, ruling they were ineligible because they had been sentenced before the Act's effective date. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve this issue.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Jackson delivered the Court's opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch. The Court held that under the First Step Act, a sentence "has... been imposed" only as long as it remains in effect. Once a sentence is vacated, it is legally void and no longer "imposed" for purposes of retroactivity.

The Court's analysis focused on Congress's choice of the present-perfect tense ("has been imposed") rather than simple past tense, which indicates continuing legal effect. Established legal principles confirm that vacating a sentence nullifies its ongoing operation, placing a defendant in the position of someone who was never sentenced.

Accordingly, the defendants whose pre-Act sentences were vacated must be treated as if "no sentence... has been imposed" as of the First Step Act's enactment and should be resentenced under the Act's more lenient 5-year mandatory minimum. The Court reversed the lower court's judgment and remanded the case.

Separate Opinions

Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, also wrote additional sections reviewing the political and legislative context: widespread judicial criticism of the harsh "stacking" penalties, the Sentencing Commission's calls for reform, and Congress's compromise in granting limited retroactivity. These sections highlighted the statute's objectives—balancing finality with ending excessive sentences—but didn't add new legal reasoning to the binding textual holding.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Alito, joined by Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, dissented. He interpreted the phrase "a sentence... has... been imposed as of [enactment]" to refer simply to the historical fact that a defendant was sentenced before December 21, 2018, regardless of later vacatur.

Alito argued that "imposed" refers to the court's pronouncement of judgment, and "a sentence" is indefinite—meaning any sentence at all—and need not be presently valid. He rejected the majority's "vacatur" rule, noting that neither common law nor precedents treat vacated sentences as never having occurred. He would have held the defendants ineligible for relief because each had been sentenced before the Act's effective date.

How the First Step Act's Retroactivity Provision Applies to Vacated Sentences

The key legal question centered on Section 403(b) of the First Step Act, which states that reduced mandatory minimums apply to pre-enactment offenses "if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date."

The majority emphasized Congress's deliberate choice of the present-perfect tense ("has been imposed")—unlike nearby provisions using simple past tense—signaling that only sentences still in force on December 21, 2018, would prevent retroactivity. This interpretation aligns with established legal principles: a vacated sentence is legally void and has no continuing effect, treating the defendant as if never sentenced.

By limiting retroactivity to those without valid sentences on the Act's effective date, Congress balanced the general presumption against retroactivity, the interest in finality of judgments, and the bipartisan goal of ending disproportionate "stacking" of firearm sentences that had resulted in extreme prison terms.