Hencely v. Fluor Corp., Docket No. 24-924

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When Army Specialist Winston Tyler Hencely threw himself in front of a suicide bomber at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan, he was trying to save his fellow soldiers. The bomber, Ahmad Nayeb, had been hired and supervised by Fluor Corporation, a major military contractor. The Army's own investigation blamed Fluor for the attack, saying the company failed to properly watch Nayeb and let him move freely around the base. Now, in a landmark decision, the Supreme Court has ruled that Hencely can sue Fluor in court, even though the injury happened during wartime on a foreign military base. The decision splits the Court and raises urgent questions about who is responsible when private companies working for the military make deadly mistakes.

What Happened

In 2016, Ahmad Nayeb, an Afghan national hired through the military's "Afghan First" program, detonated a bomb at Bagram Airfield. Hencely was seriously injured when he intercepted the attacker. The Army investigated and concluded that Fluor, the contractor running base logistics, was primarily at fault. Investigators found that Fluor had negligently supervised Nayeb by failing to escort him, allowing him to move freely around the base, and letting him obtain bomb-making materials.

Hencely sued Fluor under South Carolina law. A federal appeals court threw out the case, ruling that state law claims against military contractors cannot proceed when they arise from combat activities during wartime. The Supreme Court disagreed. In a six-to-three decision, the justices said Hencely's lawsuit can move forward because the federal government never ordered or authorized the conduct Fluor is accused of.

The Arguments

Hencely's lawyer argued that nothing in the Constitution or federal law blocks this lawsuit. He pointed to a prior Supreme Court case called Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., which said contractors are only protected from state law claims when they follow government orders, not when they violate them. He also highlighted the Army's own findings that Fluor broke its contractual duties.

Fluor's lawyer framed the case as a constitutional question about war powers. He argued that the Constitution gives the federal government exclusive authority over combat operations, and that allowing state courts to apply state law to events on a foreign battlefield would interfere with military decision-making. He asked the Court to block all such claims arising from combat activities, regardless of whether the contractor broke its contract.

The federal government sided with Fluor and proposed a middle ground. It suggested that claims should be blocked if they arise from combat activities and fall within the scope of the contract, even if the contractor violated the contract's terms. The government worried that holding contractors liable for breaking their contracts would damage the military-contractor relationship.

The Court's Decision

Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson. The Court made four key points:

First, no part of the Constitution or federal law expressly blocks this lawsuit. A federal law called the Federal Tort Claims Act does carve out an exception for combat activities, but that exception applies only to the government itself, not to private contractors.

Second, the Boyle case does not support a sweeping rule blocking all wartime contractor lawsuits. Boyle protects contractors only when the government directed them to do the very thing they are being sued for. Here, Fluor was sued for doing something the Army said it should not have done. There is no conflict between state law and federal policy when the contractor went off script.

Third, the mere fact of a wartime setting is not enough to wipe out all state law claims. State law is only displaced when the conduct being challenged can reasonably be understood as the military's own choice.

Fourth, the Constitution's structure does not silently bar this lawsuit. Contractors are private companies, not government agencies, and states have always been able to regulate them. Historical cases confirm that lawsuits could proceed even against military officers who exceeded their authority during active hostilities.

The Dissent

Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh, disagreed. He argued that the Constitution gives war powers exclusively to the federal government and takes them away from the states. This structural arrangement alone, he contended, is enough to block state law from applying here.

Alito also raised practical concerns. Fluor plans to defend itself by blaming the military for approving Nayeb's access to the base. If that defense is allowed, courts could end up second-guessing wartime security decisions, requiring military commanders to testify, and forcing the government to hand over sensitive national security documents. Alito also noted that under South Carolina's rules for choosing which law applies, Afghan law might technically control the case, creating an extraordinarily difficult problem.

Alito did not argue that Hencely has no legal recourse. He argued only that state tort law should not apply to wartime contractor disputes. He left open the possibility that federal law could provide a path forward.

War Powers Boundaries

This decision matters as much for what it preserves as for what it changes. The Court did not overrule the Boyle case. It simply drew a distinction. Boyle involved a contractor that built a product exactly as the government ordered. This case involves a contractor providing ongoing services and accused of violating the government's own instructions.

The Court also rejected the idea that any lawsuit arising from a wartime setting is automatically blocked. Even when the federal government has a strong interest, there still must be a real conflict between state law and a specific federal policy. When a contractor violates the military's own instructions, there is no such conflict.

The decision makes clear that the federal government's war powers belong to Congress and the President, not automatically to every private company working in a combat zone. Contractors remain private entities subject to state law unless Congress passes a law saying otherwise.

The dissent's strongest argument is about real-world consequences. If Fluor's defense involves blaming the military for approving Nayeb, the case could become a courtroom examination of wartime security decisions, which is exactly what the war powers framework is meant to prevent. The majority responded by noting that the appeals court had already found that resolving Hencely's claims would not require second-guessing military judgments.

The case also leaves one significant problem unresolved. The majority noted that both sides had argued under South Carolina law, but the question of which law actually governs could resurface on remand. The Court may be signaling that Congress should step in and create a uniform federal rule if it wants one.

In plain terms: the Supreme Court has said that when a private military contractor makes a deadly mistake, injured soldiers can sue in state court, just as they could sue any other private company. But the Court has also left room for Congress to create different rules if it believes wartime situations require special protection for contractors.