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In United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court zeroed in on a fine detail in bankruptcy law. Section 106(a) says you can sue the federal government in certain bankruptcy fights. But the justices made clear that waiver only applies to the federal claim created by the bankruptcy code. It does not reach the state-law claims that a trustee might borrow to build that case.

Summary of the Case

All Resort Group, a Utah‐based business, became insolvent after its shareholders diverted $145,000 of corporate funds to pay personal federal tax obligations. When the company filed bankruptcy, its trustee, David L. Miller, sued the United States under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b). Section 544(b) allows a trustee to avoid transfers “voidable under applicable law” — here, Utah’s fraudulent-transfer statute. The Government argued that sovereign immunity barred any state-law suit to invalidate federal tax payments. The Bankruptcy Court, District Court, and Tenth Circuit each held that § 106(a)’s waiver of sovereign immunity “with respect to” § 544 extended both to the federal § 544(b) cause of action and to the underlying Utah statutory elements, allowing the trustee’s claim to proceed.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Jackson, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, reversed. The Court explained that sovereign-immunity waivers are jurisdictional. They permit courts to hear suits against the United States but do not themselves create or expand substantive rights. Section 106(a)(1) therefore waives immunity only for the federal § 544(b) claim, not for nested state-law causes of action. Section 106(a)(5) unambiguously provides that nothing in § 106 “shall create any substantive claim for relief or cause of action not otherwise existing”. Moreover, § 544(b) expressly requires the trustee to identify an “actual creditor” capable of avoiding the transfer under external law—a requirement Congress omitted in § 544(a). Construing § 106(a) to obliterate that element would undermine decades of practice and run headlong into the canon that waivers of sovereign immunity must be construed narrowly.

Separate Opinions

There were no separate concurrences. The Court declined to decide an alternative theory pressed by the trustee—that an “actual creditor” under Utah law might have avoided the transfers by suing the individual shareholders rather than the United States—and remanded that question for further proceedings.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Gorsuch dissented. He argued that § 106(a)(1)’s unqualified waiver of sovereign immunity “with respect to” § 544 must permit trustees to bring any § 544(b) claim free from immunity defenses, including those to the state-law elements. Denying that remedy, in his view, conflates the defense of sovereign immunity with the merits of the underlying claim and departs from Congress’s intent to let trustees “step into the shoes” of creditors under “applicable law”.

Bankruptcy, State Governments and Immunity Claims

Section 544(b) empowers trustees to avoid transfers that unsecured creditors could void under external “applicable law,” typically state fraudulent-transfer statutes. That “actual-creditor” requirement aligns the trustee’s powers with those of private creditors and limits disruptive clawbacks. By contrast, § 544(a) allows avoidance without an actual-creditor prerequisite, reflecting a deliberate congressional design. Section 106(a) waives sovereign immunity jurisdictionally to permit avoidance actions against government-held tax liens under § 544(a) (where no actual creditor is needed) and § 544(b) suits against consenting state governments. It does not, however, alter § 544(b)’s substantive contours or negate state-law conditions for avoidance; a result compelled by the text, structure, and longstanding rule that immunity waivers must be construed narrowly.

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Wrestling with a subtle twist in federal law the high court rules on the question: Can failing to act still count as using physical force against someone?

In Delligatti v. United States, Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by six other justices, said yes. If you knowingly cause serious injury or death, even by omission, you “use” physical force under the law. So a crime like New York second-degree murder, which can happen by ignoring a legal duty, still counts as a crime of violence.

Summary of the Case

Salvatore Delligatti, a member of the Genovese crime family, was indicted for recruiting associates to murder a suspected informant and supplying them with a loaded revolver. The Government charged him under a law which imposes a mandatory consecutive five-year sentence for using or carrying a firearm “during and in relation to any crime of violence.” VICAR attempted murder was grounded in New York second-degree murder, defined as intentionally causing death. Delligatti moved to dismiss on the ground that second-degree murder, as defined in New York which can be committed by omission of a legal duty, does not “have as an element the use…of physical force” within the elements clause. The District Court denied the motion, and the Second Circuit affirmed, relying on United States v. Castleman to hold that intentional causation involves the use of physical force and thus qualifies as a crime of violence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari “to decide whether an individual who…causes bodily injury or death by failing to take action uses physical force within the meaning of the elements clause.”

Opinion of the Court

Justice Thomas, writing for a 7–2 majority, affirmed. Applying the categorical approach, the Court held that “the knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the ‘use of physical force’”. Relying on Castleman, the majority extended its two-step reasoning: (1) deliberate causation of bodily harm cannot occur without force, and (2) intentional application of force—direct or indirect—is a “use” of force. Although Castleman involved misdemeanor-level battery force and § 924(c) requires “violent force,” another case, Stokeling, established that any force sufficient to cause injury or death meets § 924(c)’s threshold. The Court then rejected Delligatti’s challenge that omissions lack “use” of force “against” another: ordinary usage permits one to “use” a preexisting force by inaction like if a parent were to with food, and “against the person” simply specifies the force’s conscious object. Finally, the historic meaning of “crime of violence,” encompassing causes-and-results offenses like murder by omission, confirmed that indictments for New York second-degree murder fall squarely within § 924(c).

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Jackson, dissented. They argued that the statute’s text—“use…of physical force against the person…of another”—contemplates only active, “violent” physical acts, not omissions. The dissent emphasized that “use” carries an active meaning, that omissions do not involve employing force, and that, contrary to the majority, a statutory definition must prevail over presumed legislative purpose or selective precedential readings.

Physical Force

Section 924(c) defines “crime of violence” through two clauses:
• Elements clause: a federal felony that “has as an element the use…of physical force against the person or property of another.”
• Residual clause: an offense that “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force…may be used.”

In Davis, the Court invalidated the residual clause for vagueness, leaving only the elements clause. Courts apply the categorical approach, comparing the statutory elements—not a defendant’s conduct—to § 924(c). Dispute centers on “use of physical force”: is it restricted to affirmative, violent acts, or does it encompass knowing causation by omission? The majority embraces a holistic reading—grounded in Castleman, Stokeling, and historical common-law definitions of violent offenses—while the dissent remains faithful to a text-first approach that sees “use” as necessarily active. This interpretive divide reflects broader tensions in criminal law between textual precision, ordinary meaning, and purposive alignment with “prototypical” violent crimes.

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When does a half‐truth cross the line into a punishable lie? That’s what the Supreme Court asked when it looked at a law banning “knowingly mak[ing] any false statement” on loan documents. The justices unanimously agreed that a statement can be misleading yet still be true, and the law only reaches statements that are actually false.

Because of that narrow reading, the Court sent the case back to the lower court to decide whether Thompson’s statements were outright lies or just clever ways to spin the facts.

Summary of the Case

Patrick Thompson borrowed three sums from Washington Federal Bank. $110,000 in 2011, $20,000 in 2013 and $89,000 in 2014 — totaling $219,000. When the bank failed in 2017, the FDIC, as receiver, sought repayment. During two debt-collection calls, Thompson disputed an invoice showing a $269,120.58 balance, telling FDIC contractors that he “had no idea where the 269 number comes from” and that he “borrowed . . . $110,000”. The Government indicted him under 18 U.S.C. § 1014 for “knowingly mak[ing] any false statement” to influence the FDIC’s handling of a loan. A jury convicted, and Thompson moved for acquittal, arguing his statements were literally true. He had in fact borrowed $110,000, albeit misleading by omitting subsequent borrowings. Both the District Court and the Seventh Circuit held that § 1014 also covers misleading statements, affirmed the convictions, and rejected the claim of literal truth. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether § 1014 reaches misleading but true statements.

Opinion of the Court

Chief Justice Roberts, for a unanimous Court, held that § 1014’s reference to “false statement[s]” does not encompass statements that are merely misleading. First, the statute’s text uses only the adjective “false,” which unambiguously means “not true,” and omits the word “misleading”. A misleading statement can be true, and a true statement is not false; “any false statement” does not expand the category to include all misleading statements. Second, context confirms this narrow reading: other federal criminal and regulatory provisions in Title 18 expressly prohibit “false or misleading” statements, so interpreting § 1014 to cover all misleading statements would render that language superfluous. Third, precedent is in accord: in United States v. Wells, the Court declined to graft a materiality requirement into § 1014 because Congress omitted it; similarly, Williams v. United States, held that a check cannot be a “false statement” at all. Kay v. United States does not aid the Government, as its references to “misleading” describe intent, not substantive scope. Finally, the Court recognized that context is relevant to determining whether a given statement is false, and remanded for the Seventh Circuit to assess whether a reasonable jury could find Thompson’s statements false in their factual setting.

Separate Opinions

Justice Alito concurred to emphasize five key takeaways: (1) § 1014 reaches only untrue statements; (2) “false” bears its ordinary meaning of “not true”; (3) falsity must be assessed in context; (4) overlap between “false” and “misleading” does not require reference to “misleading” in jury instructions; and (5) on remand, the Seventh Circuit should apply the Jackson v. Virginia sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard. Justice Jackson also concurred, noting that because the jury was correctly instructed to find only false statements, the Seventh Circuit should simply affirm the verdict if a rational factfinder could find falsity.

False Vs. Misleading

When Congress recodified the federal criminal statutes in 1948, it consolidated eleven predecessor provisions into § 1014—all penalizing “false statements” without mentioning “misleading.” By contrast, contemporaneous statutes that targeted misleading or deceptive conduct patently used the phrase “false or misleading”. The omission of “misleading” in § 1014 is thus deliberate, not inadvertent. Further, adding “any” before “false statement” broadens only within the class of untrue statements, not to encompass true but misleading assertions. Precedents like Wells, declining to import materiality, and Williams, limiting § 1014 to assertions analyzable as true or false, reinforce that § 1014’s ambit is confined to statements that can legitimately be called false. Although contextual nuance informs whether particular words are untrue, the statute itself turns solely on falsity, not misleadingness.

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The heart of this case is a fine difference in how a veteran’s disability claim gets reviewed. When the Department of Veterans Affairs decides that evidence for a service-related injury is in “approximate balance,” that call is treated as mostly a factual finding. The Supreme Court said appeals courts must give deference to that factual decision; checking only for clear mistakes while still reviewing any legal questions from scratch. Petitioners had argued for a full, fresh look at all the evidence, but the Court rejected that. In practical terms, the VA’s tie-breaking “benefit-of-the-doubt” rule stands unless a court can point to a clear error.

Summary of the Case

Veterans Joshua Bufkin and Norman Thornton appealed adverse VA determinations of their service-connected PTSD claims. Bufkin, discharged for hardship, sought VA benefits for PTSD allegedly caused by marital distress in service; the VA denied service connection after three conflicting medical examinations. Thornton, already rated for PTSD and unemployability, sought an increase in his PTSD disability rating; the VA declined to impose more severe symptom findings. Both veterans petitioned the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, which applied the “benefit-of-the-doubt” rule and found that neither record was in “approximate balance,” so neither veteran prevailed. The Veterans Court affirmed applying a “[t]aking due account” standard. The Federal Circuit rejected arguments that “take due account” requires full de novo review of approximate-balance determinations. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the scope of the subsection defining "taking due account."

Opinion of the Court

Justice Thomas, writing for a seven-justice majority, held that "taking due account" simply directs the Veterans Court to apply established standards of review. Standards include de novo for legal issues and clear-error for factual issues, to the VA’s benefit-of-the-doubt determinations. The Court parsed the statute's language to “take due account” as an instruction to “give appropriate attention” to the VA’s work “in making the determinations under subsection (a).” Because the “approximate balance” inquiry comprises two steps—(1) assigning weight to individual pieces of evidence (a factual finding) and (2) determining whether the record as a whole meets the “approximate balance” legal standard—it is at most a mixed question. And where a question is predominantly factual, clear-error review is appropriate. The Court rejected analogies to constitutional probable-cause review or criminal sufficiency challenges, which pose principally legal questions warranting de novo review, and found this matter to have considered the essential information.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Gorsuch, dissented. She argued that § 7261(b)(1) was intended to counteract the Veterans Court’s historically deferential handling of benefit-of-the-doubt issues and to require independent, nondeferential review of those determinations. According to the dissent, deciding whether evidence is in “approximate balance” poses a mixed question of law and fact analogous to probable-cause or sufficiency inquiries and thus demands de novo review. She viewed the majority’s reading as rendering subsection (b)(1) superfluous and at odds with Congress’s amendment.

Nuance of the Law

At issue is the interplay among (1) the VA’s statutory “benefit-of-the-doubt” rule, which entitles a veteran to favorable resolution when record evidence is in “approximate balance”; (2) the Veterans Court’s basic review standards; and (3) § 7261(b)(1), which commands the Veterans Court to “take due account” of the VA’s application of § 5107(b). The Court’s holding delineates that challenges to the VA’s benefit-of-the-doubt determinations must be reviewed under the same standards used for other issues under § 7261(a): factual weight assignments are reviewed for clear error, whereas purely legal questions remain subject to de novo review. This preserves Congress’s pro-veteran policy by ensuring that Veterans Courts give due attention to the VA’s benefit-of-the-doubt work without upending the established standard-of-review framework.

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Here’s a case that turns on a small but important twist in the way we protect our waterways. In City and County of San Francisco v. Environmental Protection Agency, the Supreme Court took up the question of whether the EPA can issue pollution permits that simply say, “Make sure the river stays clean,” without spelling out exactly what steps a company must take. The Court said no. Under the Clean Water Act, the EPA has to give clear, step-by-step limits on how much of a pollutant can go into the water. It can’t leave a business guessing or hold it liable only when water quality slips.

Summary of the Case

In 2019, EPA renewed San Francisco’s NPDES permit for its Oceanside combined-sewer overflow facility and, for the first time, included two “receiving-water limitations.” One provision barred any discharge that “contribute[s] to a violation of any applicable water quality standard,” and the other prohibited discharges that “create pollution, contamination, or nuisance” under California law. San Francisco petitioned for review in the Ninth Circuit, arguing that Clean Water Act does not authorize these “end-result” requirements—conditions that hold permittees liable for the quality of the receiving waters rather than prescribing specific practices or numeric effluent limits. The Ninth Circuit upheld EPA, construing the legal authorization of “any more stringent limitation . . . necessary to meet or implement any applicable water quality standard” to encompass end-result provisions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether EPA may condition permit compliance on receiving-water quality.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Alito delivered a unanimous opinion reversing the Ninth Circuit. The Court held that current law does not authorize “end-result” requirements in NPDES permits. Its analysis rested on three pillars:
1. Text and structure. Subsections (A) and (B) of § 1311(b)(1) refer expressly to “effluent limitations”which are numeric or definitional caps on discharges. Whereas subsection (C) authorizes only “any more stringent limitation” that is “necessary to meet” or “required to implement” water quality standards. The ordinary meaning of “limitation,” and the verbs “meet” and “implement,” point to specific, externally imposed restrictions on quantities, practices, or methods, not open-ended liability for end results.
2. Statutory history. Congress deliberately abandoned the pre-1972 enforcement model, suing polluters after water bodies failed to meet quality standards, in favor of a forward-looking permit regime. Allowing EPA to reintroduce abatement-style, receiving-water requirements would contravene that design.
3. Permitting scheme. End-result provisions undermine the CWA’s “permit shield”, which protects permittees who adhere to all permit terms, and they offer no mechanism for allocating responsibility when multiple dischargers contribute to a water quality violation. EPA has ample alternative tools including numeric and narrative effluent limitations, best-management practices, information-gathering authority and emergency powers to safeguard water quality.
Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Barrett filed a partial dissent, joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. While she agreed with the majority that EPA laws are not confined to numeric effluent limitations, she disputed the Court’s restrictive interpretation of what counts as a “limitation.” Barrett argued that prohibitions on discharges that violate water quality standards are “limitations” in ordinary and statutory usage. She maintained that any concerns about vagueness or multiple polluters can be addressed through arbitrary-and-capricious review or by EPA crafting clearer permit terms, and she would have affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s broader reading of the law in question.

Dual Structures of Authority

The CWA’s NPDES program rests on carefully calibrated statutory language. Section 1311(b)(1) draws a distinction between technology-based “effluent limitations” which cap pollutant quantities, rates or concentrations and the broader authority in (C) to impose “any more stringent limitation” needed “to meet” or “implement” state or federal water quality standards. By omitting the word “effluent” before “limitation” in (C), Congress signaled that EPA may employ non-numeric measures—best-management practices, narrative restrictions, or other operational controls—to achieve water quality goals. At the same time, the 1972 amendments discarded the WPCA’s retrospective abatement actions in favor of a proactive permit regime and enshrined a “permit shield” to insulate compliant permittees from liability. This dual structure empowers EPA to balance uniform technology floors with site-specific water quality objectives, requiring clear, enforceable permit terms while respecting state standards. Where ambiguity or attribution issues arise—such as multiple dischargers—EPA and the courts can resolve them through regulatory guidance or judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.

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When the law turns on a fine point in how companies are structured, the outcome can shift by millions of dollars. In Dewberry Group versus Dewberry Engineers, the Supreme Court looked at whether a court can award a trademark winner the profits of sister companies that weren’t named in the case. The justices said no: you can only get the money made by the company you sued, not by its separate affiliates.

That ruling wiped away a $43 million award and sent the case back to the district court. Justice Elena Kagan wrote for the court, and the decision makes clear that each corporation stands on its own when it comes to counting up profits. The Court left open questions about how judges should handle accounting details and whether they can ever pierce the corporate veil to include affiliate earnings.

Summary of the Case

Dewberry Engineers Inc. sued Dewberry Group, Inc. for trademark infringement under federal trademark law. While Dewberry Group itself reported operating losses, its sister companies—all owned by the same person, John Dewberry—made tens of millions in rental profits. The trial court treated all these companies as "a single corporate entity" and ordered Dewberry Group to pay nearly $43 million in profits. An appeals court upheld this decision. The Supreme Court then stepped in to determine whether "defendant's profits" can include profits from companies that weren't actually sued, and whether courts can ignore the boundaries between separate companies without specific legal justification.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Kagan, writing for a unanimous Court, ruled that "defendant's profits" means exactly what it sounds like—only the profits of the company that was actually named in the lawsuit. The Court emphasized the well-established principle that separately incorporated businesses are legally distinct entities. Since Engineers only sued Dewberry Group, the trial court made a mistake by including the sister companies' earnings without proper legal grounds. The Court canceled the $43 million award and sent the case back to calculate profits attributable only to Dewberry Group itself.

Separate Opinions

Justice Sotomayor agreed with the main opinion but wrote separately to emphasize that respecting corporate boundaries doesn't mean courts must ignore economic realities. She suggested that courts can still look behind artificial arrangements between related companies when calculating the defendant's true profits, as long as they focus on the profits of the company that was actually sued.

When Corporate Boundaries Matter in Trademark Cases

The Court clarified that "defendant's profits" refers only to profits earned by the specific entity being sued. This reflects the fundamental legal principle that each corporation has its own separate identity. Courts cannot disregard these boundaries without proper legal justification. The decision outlines how courts should first calculate only the named defendant's profits, and then they may adjust that amount if it seems unfair. While the Court didn't provide a complete roadmap for how courts should handle non-arm's-length transactions between related companies, it left open several legal approaches that lower courts can use in appropriate cases to determine a defendant's true profits.

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The Supreme Court recently tackled a case that dives into the nuances of how evidence is handled in court. In the case of Brenda Evers Andrew versus Tamika White, the Court looked at whether certain evidence used in Andrew's trial was unfairly prejudicial. They found that the Tenth Circuit made a mistake by not recognizing that the Due Process Clause protects defendants from evidence that could make their trial fundamentally unfair.

This ruling means that the case is being sent back for further examination. The justices emphasized that there are clear rules about what kind of evidence can be presented in court, and if that evidence is too damaging, it can violate a person's rights. The decision was made by a majority of the justices, with some additional opinions from Justice Samuel Alito, while Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch.

This case highlights the importance of ensuring that trials are fair and just, reminding us that the legal system must protect the rights of individuals, even when the stakes are high.

Summary of the Case

The case of Brenda Evers Andrew v. Tamika White arose from the conviction of Brenda Andrew for the murder of her husband, Rob Andrew, for which she was sentenced to death. During her trial, the prosecution introduced extensive evidence regarding Andrew's sexual history and perceived failings as a mother and wife, much of which was later deemed irrelevant. Andrew contended that this evidence was so prejudicial that it violated her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected her claim, asserting that no established Supreme Court ruling supported the idea that the erroneous admission of prejudicial evidence could violate due process. This led to Andrew's petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, vacated the Tenth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court clarified that the introduction of evidence that is unduly prejudicial can indeed violate the Due Process Clause if it renders a trial fundamentally unfair. The Court referenced its previous ruling in Payne v. Tennessee, which established that the Due Process Clause provides a mechanism for relief against such prejudicial evidence. The Court emphasized that the Tenth Circuit had erred in failing to recognize this principle as clearly established law, thus preventing it from properly assessing whether the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) had unreasonably applied this law in Andrew's case. The Court directed the Tenth Circuit to consider the prejudicial impact of the evidence separately for both the guilt and sentencing phases of Andrew's trial.

Separate Opinions

Justice Samuel Alito concurred in the judgment but did not express an opinion on whether the high standard for due process violations was met in this case. He acknowledged that a defendant's due-process rights could be violated when irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence overwhelms properly admitted evidence, referencing the same precedents cited by the Court.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, dissented. Thomas argued that the Tenth Circuit correctly adhered to the principles established under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) by not broadly interpreting the one-sentence caveat in Payne as establishing a general rule against the admission of prejudicial evidence. He contended that the majority's decision misapplied AEDPA by elevating a vague principle to "clearly established" law without a specific holding from the Supreme Court. Thomas maintained that the evidence presented at trial was overwhelmingly indicative of Andrew's guilt and that the introduction of certain prejudicial evidence did not warrant a finding of fundamental unfairness.

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

The legal nuance in this case revolves around the interpretation of "clearly established federal law" under AEDPA, which requires that a state court's decision must be contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court holdings. The Court clarified that the principle established in Payne—that the Due Process Clause can protect against the introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence—was indeed a holding relevant to Andrew's case. However, the dissent highlighted the importance of distinguishing between holdings and dicta, arguing that the Tenth Circuit's interpretation was consistent with established legal standards. The case underscores the tension between the need for fair trial protections and the procedural constraints imposed by AEDPA, particularly in how courts interpret and apply established precedents to new factual scenarios.

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Protecting Americans from foreign threats or First Amendment rights? That's the question the Supreme Court considered in TikTok Inc. V. Merrick B. Garland. Hear how the Court applied intermediate scrutiny to affirm the government's role in preventing China from collecting data on U.S. users.

The law in question requires TikTok to either cut ties with its Chinese ownership or stop its operations in the United States altogether. The justices decided that this law does not infringe on free speech rights. They found that the government's need to protect sensitive data from foreign adversaries, like China, is a compelling reason to enforce these restrictions.

In their ruling, the Court applied a standard called intermediate scrutiny, which means they carefully examined whether the law is appropriate and necessary for the government's important interest in safeguarding American users' information. Ultimately, they concluded that the law is well-designed to address these concerns.

This decision highlights the ongoing debate about privacy, security, and the role of foreign companies in the U.S. digital landscape. As we navigate these issues, the balance between protecting national security and upholding individual rights remains a critical conversation.

Summary of the Case

The case of TikTok Inc. v. Merrick B. Garland arose from the enactment of the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, which prohibits U.S. companies from providing services related to TikTok unless it is divested from its Chinese parent company, ByteDance Ltd. The petitioners, TikTok Inc. and a group of U.S. TikTok users, challenged the constitutionality of the Act, arguing that it violated their First Amendment rights by effectively banning TikTok in the United States. The case was brought before the Supreme Court after the D.C. Circuit Court upheld the Act, asserting that the government's national security interests justified the restrictions imposed on TikTok.

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the D.C. Circuit's ruling, concluding that the Act does not violate the First Amendment as applied to the petitioners. The Court acknowledged that while the Act imposes significant burdens on TikTok's operations, it is justified by compelling government interests related to national security, particularly concerning data collection by a foreign adversary. The Court determined that the Act is content-neutral, as it does not target specific speech but rather regulates the operation of a platform controlled by a foreign entity. The Court applied intermediate scrutiny, finding that the Act serves an important government interest and is narrowly tailored to address the risks posed by TikTok's data collection practices. The Court emphasized the unique context of the case, given the national security concerns surrounding foreign control of a widely used communication platform.

Separate Opinions

Justice Sonia Sotomayor concurred in part and in the judgment but disagreed with Part II.A of the Court's opinion. She argued that the Act does implicate the First Amendment and that laws imposing a disproportionate burden on expressive activities should be subject to heightened scrutiny. However, she ultimately agreed that the Act survives the First Amendment challenge.

Justice Neil Gorsuch also concurred in the judgment, expressing reservations about the law's classification as content-neutral and the implications of the government's justification for the law. He emphasized the importance of free speech and the potential dangers of government censorship but acknowledged the compelling interest in preventing foreign adversaries from accessing sensitive data.

Dissenting Opinions

There were no dissenting opinions in this case. All justices either concurred with the majority opinion or provided separate concurring opinions that did not oppose the ruling.

First Amendment Rights and Using Intermediate Scrutiny to Justify the Law

The Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act represents a significant intersection of national security and First Amendment rights. The law's provisions specifically target applications controlled by foreign adversaries, particularly those that pose risks to U.S. national security through data collection. The Court's analysis highlighted the importance of distinguishing between content-based and content-neutral regulations, ultimately categorizing the Act as content-neutral due to its focus on the operational control of TikTok rather than the content shared on the platform. This classification allowed the Court to apply intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny, which would have imposed a higher burden on the government to justify the law. The Court's decision reflects a cautious approach to emerging technologies and the complexities of regulating foreign influence in digital communication, emphasizing the need for a balance between protecting free expression and safeguarding national security interests.

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The Court made an important ruling about what happens when a plaintiff decides to change their complaint after a case has been moved to federal court. The case of Royal Canin USA, Inc. versus Wullschleger is a nuanced issue regarding the jurisdiction of federal courts.

The Court decided that if a plaintiff removes all federal claims from their complaint, only leaving state law claims, the federal court can no longer handle the case. This means the case must go back to state court. Justice Elena Kagan wrote the majority opinion, and she was joined by several other justices in this decision.

This ruling clarifies how federal and state courts interact when it comes to jurisdiction, especially in cases where the nature of the claims changes after the case has been filed. It emphasizes the importance of understanding where a case should be heard based on the claims being made.

Summary of the Case

The case of Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger arose when Anastasia Wullschleger filed a lawsuit against Royal Canin in Missouri state court, alleging deceptive marketing practices related to a prescription dog food product. Her original complaint included both federal claims under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and state law claims under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act and state antitrust law. Royal Canin removed the case to federal court based on the federal claims, which allowed for supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. However, Wullschleger later amended her complaint to remove all federal claims, seeking to have the case remanded back to state court. The District Court denied her request, but the Eighth Circuit reversed this decision, leading to the Supreme Court's review to resolve a circuit split regarding the effect of such amendments on federal jurisdiction.

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Kagan, held that when a plaintiff amends her complaint to eliminate federal claims that provided the basis for federal jurisdiction, the federal court loses its supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims. The Court emphasized that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the jurisdictional analysis must be based on the amended complaint. The Court interpreted 28 U.S.C. §1367, which governs supplemental jurisdiction, to mean that if federal-question jurisdiction is lost due to the removal of federal claims, then supplemental jurisdiction over state claims also ceases. The Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's decision to remand the case to state court, concluding that Wullschleger's amendment effectively reconfigured her suit to be solely about state law.

Dissenting and Separate Opinions

There were no dissenting or separate opinions in this case; the ruling was unanimous.

Federal vs. State Jurisdictions

The case highlights the nuanced relationship between federal and state jurisdiction, particularly in the context of amended pleadings. The Court's interpretation of §1367 underscores that jurisdiction is determined by the current, operative complaint rather than the original filing. This principle is significant because it allows plaintiffs to control the jurisdictional landscape of their cases by choosing which claims to assert. The ruling clarifies that once federal claims are removed, the federal court cannot retain jurisdiction over state claims, reinforcing the idea that federal courts are not a default forum for all disputes. This decision also addresses a circuit split, providing a clear precedent that aligns with the established principle that jurisdiction follows the amended complaint, thereby ensuring consistency in how federal courts handle similar cases in the future.

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In E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera the Supreme Court tackled an important question about how employers prove that their workers don't qualify for minimum wage and overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Court decided that employers only need to meet a lower standard of proof, known as the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. This means they have to show that it’s more likely than not that their employees are exempt from these protections.

Previously, the Fourth Circuit had set a higher bar, requiring a clearer and more convincing level of evidence. The Supreme Court disagreed with that approach and sent the case back for further review. This ruling could have a big impact on how employers and employees navigate wage and hour laws in the future.

Summary of the Case

The case of E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera arose from a dispute regarding the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), specifically concerning the standard of proof required for employers to demonstrate that employees are exempt from minimum wage and overtime pay requirements. E.M.D. Sales, a food distribution company, employed sales representatives who claimed they were entitled to overtime pay, arguing that they did not qualify as "outside salesmen" under the FLSA's exemption. The District Court ruled in favor of the employees, applying a "clear and convincing evidence" standard, which E.M.D. contested on appeal, asserting that the standard should be the less stringent "preponderance of the evidence." The Fourth Circuit upheld the District Court's decision, leading to the Supreme Court's review to resolve a circuit split on the applicable standard of proof.

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Kavanaugh, held that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies when an employer seeks to prove that an employee is exempt from the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime provisions. The Court reasoned that the FLSA does not specify a heightened standard of proof for exemptions, and the default standard in civil litigation is preponderance of the evidence. The Court noted that heightened standards are only applicable in specific circumstances, such as when mandated by statute or constitutional requirements, none of which were present in this case. The Court emphasized that the FLSA's silence on the standard of proof indicates that Congress did not intend to impose a heightened burden on employers. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Separate Opinions

Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, filed a concurring opinion. Gorsuch emphasized the importance of adhering to the default standard of proof unless Congress or the Constitution specifies otherwise. He reiterated that courts should not choose sides in policy debates but should apply the law as it is written.

Dissenting Opinions

There were no dissenting opinions in this case, as the ruling was unanimous.

Applied Standards of the Law

The nuance in this case lies in the interpretation of the FLSA and the standards of proof applicable in civil litigation. The Court's decision underscores the principle that, in the absence of explicit statutory language requiring a heightened standard, the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard should prevail. This aligns with the historical context of civil litigation standards in the United States, where the preponderance standard has been the default. The Court also addressed the employees' arguments for a heightened standard based on public interest and the non-waivability of FLSA rights, clarifying that these factors do not inherently necessitate a different standard of proof. The ruling thus reinforces the balance of interests in labor law, ensuring that employers are not unduly burdened while still protecting employee rights under the FLSA.

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