Listen to the episode On Spotify on Apple Podcasts or on YouTube

In law, timing rules can matter just as much as the underlying complaint. That’s the heart of Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited versus Burton, the Chapter 7 trustee for Vista‑Pro Automotive, a case that asked whether you still have to act within a “reasonable time” even when you say a court judgment was never valid in the first place.

The Supreme Court said yes. The justices ruled that the “reasonable time” limit in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure applies even to requests made under the specific rule where a party argues the judgment is void. The Court pointed to the plain text and structure of the rule, and it affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s denial of relief. Especially because the petitioner did not argue that it met the reasonable-time requirement.

Justice Samuel Alito wrote for the Court, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Thomas, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Sonia Sotomayor agreed with the outcome but wrote separately, concurring in the judgment.

Supreme Court Rules That Even "Void" Judgments Must Be Challenged Within a Reasonable Time

The Supreme Court just resolved a major disagreement among federal appeals courts about how long someone has to challenge a court judgment that should never have been entered in the first place. In the decision, the Court held that even when a judgment is completely invalid, what lawyers call "void", you still need to challenge it within a reasonable amount of time.

Back in 2015, a bankruptcy trustee named Vista-Pro won a default judgment against Coney Island Auto Parts. A default judgment is what happens when someone gets sued but doesn't show up to defend themselves, so the court automatically rules for the other side.

Five and a half years later, in 2020, Coney Island came back to court asking to erase that judgment. They argued the judgment was should never have existed because Vista-Pro didn't properly notify them about the lawsuit in the first place. Under bankruptcy law, there are specific rules about how you have to serve legal papers, and Coney Island claimed Vista-Pro didn't follow those rules.

The lower courts said no. Even if the judgment was technically void, waiting five and a half years was simply too long. Coney Island appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case because different federal appeals courts had been giving different answers to this question.

What Each Side Argued

Coney Island's lawyer made what seemed like a logical argument: If a void judgment never legally existed in the first place, how can there be a time limit to challenge it? It's like saying there's a deadline to point out that an imaginary thing isn't real. He also raised concerns about fairness. If a court enters a judgment against you without properly notifying you, shouldn't you be able to challenge it whenever you discover it?

The bankruptcy trustee's lawyer countered with a straightforward reading of the rules. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the rulebook that governs how federal lawsuits work and it states that motions to vacate a judgment must be filed within a "reasonable time." If the rule-makers wanted void judgments to be challengeable forever, they would have said so explicitly. In fact, there's another part of the rules that do allow unlimited time for certain types of challenges, like when someone commits fraud on the court. The absence of similar language for void judgments is telling.

She also pointed out the practical problems. The trustee had relied on what appeared to be a valid judgment for years and spent money trying to collect on it. Meanwhile, the people who could have been served properly to restart the case might no longer be available. Allowing challenges decades later creates chaos and unfairness for everyone involved.

What the Court Decided

Justice Alito wrote the opinion for eight justices, and the reasoning was remarkably straightforward. The rule says "a motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time." A motion claiming a judgment is void falls under Rule 60(b)(4). Therefore, it must be filed within a reasonable time. End of story.

The Court looked at how the rules are structured to support this reading. When the rule-makers wanted to create exceptions to the "reasonable time" requirement, they did so clearly. For example, some types of challenges have a strict one-year deadline. Others, like fraud on the court, can be brought "at any time." The fact that void judgments don't have an explicit "any time" provision suggests they're subject to the default "reasonable time" requirement.

The Court rejected Coney Island's philosophical argument that void judgments exist outside of time. Justice Alito pointed out that a mistake is a mistake whether you challenge it immediately or years later. But that doesn't mean courts can't impose deadlines for raising those challenges. The question isn't whether the judgment is truly void, but whether there's some legal principle that guarantees you can challenge it forever. Since Coney Island didn't argue the Constitution requires unlimited time, the Court found no such principle.

Importantly, the Court noted that the "reasonable time" standard already provides flexibility for people who genuinely didn't know about a judgment. In cases where someone was never properly notified, it might be perfectly reasonable to wait until they learn about the judgment through enforcement efforts. This built-in flexibility addresses fairness concerns without creating an unlimited window.

Justice Sotomayor agreed with the outcome but wrote separately to criticize one aspect of the majority opinion. She thought the Court went too far by discussing whether the Constitution might require unlimited time to challenge void judgments. Since Coney Island explicitly said they weren't making a constitutional argument, and nobody briefed the issue, Sotomayor believed the Court should have stayed silent on that question. Her separate opinion reflects a philosophy that courts should decide only what's necessary to resolve the case at hand.

Can Time Limits Apply to Invalid Judgments?

This case highlights an important distinction that often gets confused: whether a judgment is invalid is a different question from what procedures you must follow to get relief from it.

Coney Island's argument mixed these two ideas together. They essentially said: "This judgment is void, therefore normal procedural rules don't apply to challenging it." The Court firmly separated these questions. A judgment might be completely invalid in theory, but you still have to follow the proper procedures to get a court to officially recognize that invalidity.

The "reasonable time" standard provides meaningful flexibility that a fixed deadline wouldn't. Imagine someone who genuinely never received notice of a lawsuit and only learns about the judgment years later when someone tries to collect on it. A court could reasonably find that challenging the judgment at that point is timely, even if years have passed. The standard allows judges to look at the specific circumstances rather than applying a one-size-fits-all rule.

On the other hand, someone who knew about the judgment, received demand letters, and simply sat on their rights for five years would have a much harder time arguing their delay was reasonable.

What the Court Didn't Decide

The Supreme Court left several questions unanswered. Most importantly, they didn't actually decide whether the judgment against Coney Island was truly void. That wasn't the question before them—they only decided whether the challenge came too late.

The Court also didn't address what time limits might apply to other ways of challenging judgments outside the standard motion process. The rules preserve something called an "independent action"—essentially filing a whole new lawsuit to challenge a judgment—and the Court didn't say whether time limits apply there.

Finally, while the Court hinted at its skepticism about constitutional challenges, it didn't definitively rule on whether the Constitution might require unlimited time to challenge void judgments in some circumstances. The majority noted that giving someone a "reasonable" amount of time might be all the Constitution requires, but that question remains open for a future case where it's properly raised.

Acting Within Reasonable Time

This decision brings clarity to a question that had divided federal courts: you can't wait indefinitely to challenge even a completely invalid judgment. The "reasonable time" requirement applies across the board, though what counts as reasonable will depend on the circumstances—particularly whether you knew about the judgment and had a fair opportunity to challenge it earlier.

For people facing judgments they believe are void, the message is clear: act promptly once you learn about the problem. The law provides flexibility for genuine cases of lack of notice, but it won't tolerate strategic delay or sitting on your rights for years.

Listen to the episode on Spotify

In a case that tests the fine line between a school’s curriculum choices and a family’s religious beliefs, the Supreme Court has stepped in on behalf of parents in Montgomery County, Maryland. At issue is a policy that added LGBTQ+-inclusive storybooks to elementary classrooms without telling parents or letting them opt out.

The justices said that forcing these lessons on students without notice steps on parents’ rights to guide their children’s faith and values. By granting a preliminary injunction, the Court put the Board on pause: schools must now alert families ahead of time and honor opt-out requests while the case moves forward.

This decision doesn’t decide the whole fight yet, but it shifts the power back toward parents for now. Stay tuned after the break to hear what comes next—and what it could mean for classrooms across the country.

Summary of the Case

During the 2022–23 school year, the Montgomery County (MD) Board of Education introduced five "LGBTQ+-inclusive" storybooks into its K–5 English curriculum. These books feature narratives of same-sex marriage, gender transition, and LGBTQ characters (e.g., Prince & Knight; Uncle Bobby's Wedding; Born Ready; Intersection Allies; Love, Violet). Parents from diverse religious backgrounds initially were allowed to opt their children out of lessons using the books. In March 2023, the Board rescinded that opt-out policy, citing administrative disruption and potential stigma for LGBTQ students. A group of parents and an associational plaintiff sued in federal court, arguing that withholding opt outs and mandating use of the books substantially interfered with their right to direct their children's religious upbringing under the Free Exercise Clause. They sought a preliminary injunction to restore advance notice and opt-out rights. The district court and Fourth Circuit denied relief, treating the Wisconsin v. Yoder case as unique and concluding that mere exposure to ideologically objectionable material doesn't coerce students to abandon parental religious teachings. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve whether the Board's "no-opt-out" policy unconstitutionally burdens parents' free exercise rights.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Alito, writing for a 6-3 majority (Roberts, Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett), reversed the lower courts. The Court held that parents possess a fundamental right to direct the religious upbringing of their children, which the Free Exercise Clause protects in both public and private school contexts. Under previous Supreme Court precedent, policies that "substantially interfere" with parental religious instruction or place children in an environment "hostile" to their faith and exert a "pressure to conform" trigger strict scrutiny even if facially neutral. Here, the Board's curricular mandate and denial of opt outs force parents to choose between public schooling and their religious convictions. The challenged storybooks present a normative viewpoint on same-sex marriage and gender that directly conflicts with petitioners' sincerely held beliefs and are taught in a manner fostering classroom discussion in which students who disagree may be labeled "hurtful." The Board's asserted interests—preserving classroom continuity and protecting LGBTQ students from isolation—are undermined by district policies allowing opt outs from other discrete units and extensive parallel programming for special-needs and emergent-English learners. The Board's policy is not narrowly tailored to a compelling interest. Because withholding opt outs imposes an irreparable burden on religious exercise, a preliminary injunction reinstating advance notice and opt-out rights pending full adjudication is warranted.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas concurred. He agreed that the Board's policy fails strict scrutiny but would ground the analysis in historical tradition: he argued that courts should identify whether public schooling historically included mandated instruction on the challenged subjects. Thomas would interpret Wisconsin v. Yoder to require a history-and-tradition inquiry and faulted Montgomery County for lacking any longstanding practice of teaching LGBTQ themes in early grades.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, dissented. She emphasized that "mere exposure" to ideas incongruent with parental faith does not amount to coercion or compulsion prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause. The dissent argued that the Board's curriculum and related teacher guidance were aimed at fostering mutual respect and inclusion, not at indoctrinating students or forcing them to reject parental teachings. She warned that the majority's unbounded "threat" test would saddle public schools with unworkable advance-notice and opt-out obligations for any curricular content potentially "contrary" to parents' religious views, risk persistent classroom disruption, and prompt self-censorship of public-school curricula, undermining the schools' role as "the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny."

When Does School Curriculum Cross the Line into Religious Coercion?

The key question under the Free Exercise Clause is whether government action "coerces" an individual to violate or abandon religious beliefs, not simply whether it exposes students to objectionable ideas. Under precedent, neutral, generally applicable policies that impose only incidental burdens on religious exercise survive unless they impose a substantial interference with the religious upbringing of children. When such a burden arises, strict scrutiny applies regardless of neutrality. To pass that test, the government must show its policy advances "interests of the highest order" and is narrowly tailored. Here, the Court found that the Board's no-opt-out rule, combined with the normative messaging and teacher guidance in the "LGBTQ+-inclusive" storybooks, posed a "very real threat" to parents' right to direct their children's religious development, and that the Board's asserted interests were not compellingly served by a blanket ban on religious opt outs. The decision reinforces the delicate balance between respecting parental religious liberty and ensuring an open, pluralistic public-education environment.

Listen to the episode on Spotify

Here’s a case that turns on a fine detail in immigration law. The justices decided that when the Board of Immigration Appeals says no to delaying someone’s deportation, that decision isn’t treated as a final removal order you can challenge right away.

The Court also clarified that the 30-day window to ask a court to review a removal decision is a processing deadline, not a hard limit that bars the court’s power if you miss it. In other words, missing that deadline doesn’t automatically shut the door on your review.

Because of these points, the Supreme Court wiped out the Fourth Circuit’s dismissal of Riley’s petition for review and sent the case back for another look.

Summary of the Case

Pierre Riley, a Jamaican national, entered the United States in 1995 on a tourist visa, overstayed, and later pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute marijuana and related firearms charges—convictions qualifying as aggravated felonies. Upon his release from prison in January 2021, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated expedited removal, issuing on January 26, 2021, a Final Administrative Removal Order (FARO) finding Riley deportable and ordering removal to Jamaica.

Riley didn't contest his deportability but sought relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming that a Jamaican drug kingpin—backed by corrupt officials—posed a credible threat to his life. An Immigration Judge found Riley credible and granted him protection under CAT; however, DHS appealed, and on May 31, 2022, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) vacated the Immigration Judge's decision and reinstated the removal order.

Riley filed a petition for review in the Fourth Circuit three days after the BIA's decision. That court dismissed his case, reasoning that (1) the FARO was the "final order of removal" and the 30-day deadline to appeal it had expired in February 2021; and (2) this 30-day filing deadline was jurisdictional, meaning the court had no power to hear the case.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Alito, writing for a 5–4 Court, reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision. First, the Court held that only an order determining that someone is deportable or ordering deportation may constitute a "final order of removal." The FARO of January 26, 2021, was that order. A CAT protection order is not a removal order because it neither finds deportability nor commands deportation; it "does not affect the validity" of a prior removal order. Because Riley didn't file his petition within 30 days of the FARO, he missed the deadline relative to that final order.

Second, the Court held that the 30-day filing requirement is a claims-processing rule—not a jurisdictional prerequisite. Without a "clear" statement from Congress, time limits "telling aliens what to do to obtain judicial review" don't limit a court's power to hear a case. The relevant law lacks any reference to a court's "power," and its placement amid non-jurisdictional provisions shows that it governs only litigant conduct. Because the Government didn't seek dismissal on this ground, Riley's petition may proceed on remand.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment but noted that Riley's petition challenged only the BIA's CAT order, not the FARO, and that an order denying CAT relief is reviewable "only as part of the review of a final order of removal." He urged the Fourth Circuit on remand to confirm it has jurisdiction to review a CAT order when there's no petition against the removal order itself.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson (and Justice Gorsuch except for one part), dissented in part. Although she agreed that the 30-day deadline is non-jurisdictional, she would hold that a removal order doesn't become "final" for purposes of appeal until the conclusion of all related proceedings, including CAT review.

She argued that Congress's instruction to pursue CAT claims "as part of the review of a final order of removal" and the longstanding "policy against piecemeal litigation" require tying appellate finality to the BIA's disposition of the withholding claim, not to the initial FARO. Requiring immigrants to appeal removal orders before CAT relief is denied would spawn meritless "protective appeals" and conflict with precedent under other laws, she warned.

When Immigration Appeals Become Final: The Supreme Court's Interpretation of Removal Orders

Congress designed modern immigration removal provisions to "streamline judicial review" by channeling all "questions of law or fact arising from any action taken to remove an alien" into a single court of appeals petition. Under the law, that petition "must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal."

An "order of removal" is defined as one "concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation." CAT orders—which grant or deny protection from removal to a particular country—differ from removal orders: they don't determine deportability and don't "affect the validity" of a removal order, so they can't themselves be considered final removal orders.

In expedited removal cases like Riley's, the removal order becomes "final" as soon as it's issued, because there's no further opportunity for agency review. The majority treats the 30-day deadline as reflecting only the immigrant's obligation to file within 30 days of the removal order—not limiting a court's power to hear the case.

By contrast, the dissent would align finality for appeal with the policy against piecemeal litigation—and with the requirement that CAT relief be reviewed "as part of the review of a final order of removal"—so that no petition would be due until both removal and protection claims have been fully decided.

Listen to the episode on Spotify

CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., Docket No. 23-1201

The Supreme Court has waded into a subtle wrinkle in a law that decides when you can take a foreign government to court here in the United States. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, a country generally can’t claim immunity when the law itself lists clear exceptions—and when the papers are served properly. The question before the justices was whether you also had to prove some extra connection, or “minimum contacts,” as a separate step.

In a unanimous opinion, the Court said no. Once an exception in the law applies and service of process is done right, courts don’t get to add another hurdle. The decision removes the extra test the Ninth Circuit had imposed and sends the case back for proceedings under the straightforward rule Congress wrote.

Summary of the Case

In January 2005 Devas Multimedia Private Ltd., an Indian‐incorporated company, entered into a satellite‐leasing agreement with Antrix Corporation Ltd., the commercial arm of India's Department of Space, to obtain capacity on two new S-band satellites. When the Government of India later reallocated that spectrum for its own use, Antrix invoked a force-majeure clause and terminated the contract. Devas initiated arbitration in India; the panel unanimously found that Antrix had wrongfully repudiated the agreement and awarded Devas $562.5 million plus interest. After obtaining enforcement in France and the United Kingdom, Devas sought confirmation of the award in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's arbitration exception. The District Court confirmed the award and entered a $1.29 billion judgment. A Ninth Circuit panel reversed, ruling that Antrix lacked sufficient connections to the United States. Devas petitioned the Supreme Court to resolve whether the FSIA requires such connections for jurisdiction.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Alito, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act grants personal jurisdiction over a foreign state "whenever an immunity exception applies and service of process has been accomplished," without any additional due-process or minimum-contacts inquiry. The Court reasoned that the law imposes just two prerequisites—(1) an applicable exception to sovereign immunity and (2) proper service—and then mandates jurisdiction by the unambiguous "shall exist" language. Although the immunity exceptions themselves require certain connections to the United States, there is no textual basis to read the law as requiring a separate contacts test. To do so would undermine the FSIA's "comprehensive framework" linking immunity waivers and jurisdictional grants. Legislative history confirms that Congress viewed the exceptions as meeting due-process norms. The Court reversed and remanded.

How Foreign Sovereign Immunity Works in US Courts: No Extra Hurdles Required

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act created a clear system for determining when foreign governments can be sued in American courts. It replaced the previous case-by-case diplomatic determinations with specific exceptions to immunity (such as commercial activity, tort, property seizure, and arbitration) and gave federal courts jurisdiction when these exceptions apply and proper service is made.

The Supreme Court clarified that while traditional personal jurisdiction rules require showing "minimum contacts" with the United States, the FSIA doesn't add this as a separate requirement. Instead, the immunity exceptions themselves already define what connections to the US are necessary. The Court found that adding an extra, judge-made contacts test would disrupt the carefully designed system Congress created.

This decision respects both the law's goal of providing clear standards and the principle of international courtesy that underlies sovereign immunity. By letting the statutory exceptions themselves define when jurisdiction exists, the Court preserved the straightforward framework Congress intended.

Listen to the episode on Spotify

The Supreme Court looked at a case involving the Food and Drug Administration and a company that wanted to sell flavored e-cigarettes. The lower court had said the FDA was wrong to deny the company’s request to sell these products, calling the agency’s actions unfair and inconsistent. But the Supreme Court disagreed, saying the FDA had actually followed its own rules and guidance when it made its decision.

The justices explained that the FDA’s process for reviewing these e-cigarette products was in line with what it had told companies to expect, especially when it came to the kind of scientific evidence and comparisons it wanted to see. The Court also said that the FDA didn’t break any rules by sticking to its earlier positions. However, the Supreme Court didn’t end the case there. Instead, it sent the case back to the lower court to take another look at whether the FDA made a harmless mistake by not reviewing the company’s marketing plans. This case shows how the courts look closely at whether government agencies are following their own guidelines, and what happens if they don’t.

Summary of the Case

In FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, LLC (No. 23-1038), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) denied premarket tobacco product applications (PMTAs) submitted by two e-liquid manufacturers, Wages and White Lion (dba Triton) and Vapetasia. Under the Tobacco Control Act of 2009 (TCA), any “new tobacco product”—including most flavored e-liquids sold after February 15, 2007—may not be marketed absent FDA authorization, which must be granted only if the product “would be appropriate for the protection of the public health.” 21 U.S.C. § 387j(c)(2)(A). The FDA concluded the applicants had not submitted sufficient scientific evidence—including randomized controlled trials or longitudinal cohort studies—to demonstrate benefits for adult smokers that would outweigh youth-initiation risks, nor did it review their marketing-plan commitments (Syllabus, pp. 2–3; App. 177a, 285a).

The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by applying standards different from those announced in pre-decision guidance concerning (1) types of scientific evidence, (2) cross-flavor comparisons, (3) device types, and (4) marketing plans, and it rejected the agency’s harmless-error defense (90 F. 4th 357, 376–384). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve conflicts among the circuits and to clarify whether the FDA’s denials complied with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

Opinion of the Court

Justice Alito, writing for a unanimous Court, vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded. The Court first declined to decide whether the FDA was required to issue notice-and-comment regulations rather than guidance. It then applied the “change-in-position” doctrine, under which an agency may change policy so long as it “provide[s] a reasoned explanation,” “display[s] awareness that it is changing position,” and considers “serious reliance interests.”

1. Scientific Evidence
   The TCA contemplates both “well-controlled investigations” and “other valid scientific evidence.” The FDA’s guidance made clear that, absent randomized trials or cohort studies, manufacturers must submit “robust” alternative evidence bridged to their specific products. The Court held the agency’s denial orders simply applied that approach: respondents offered literature reviews and surveys, but not evidence sufficiently tied to their flavored products. No unacknowledged “change” occurred.

2. Comparative Efficacy
   The TCA requires comparisons of new products to other tobacco products and the FDA’s guidance recommended comparing health risks “within the same category and … different categories as appropriate”. Its later emphasis on dessert-, candy-, and fruit-flavors over tobacco flavors naturally flowed from data showing those flavors disproportionately appeal to youth. The denial orders tracked that guidance, not a repudiation of it.

3. Device Type
   A 2020 guidance prioritized enforcement against flavored, cartridge-based products, but it also covered any products “targeted to, or whose marketing is likely to promote use by, minors”. The FDA reasonably concluded youth demand shifted from disposable cartridges to other flavored devices, justifying scrutiny of all flavored products regardless of cartridge status.

4. Harmless Error and Marketing Plans
   Although the FDA admitted it did not review marketing plans—contrary to its guidance—it did not seek plenary review of that finding. Instead, the agency asked the Court to clarify the proper harmless-error standard. Noting tension between the remand rule of SEC v. Chenery Corp. and the APA’s harmless-error directive the Court held the Fifth Circuit misread Calcutt v. FDIC by treating its sole exception to the remand rule as universal. The Court vacated and remanded for the Fifth Circuit to apply a proper blend of remand-and-harmless-error principles.

Separate Opinions

Justice Sotomayor filed a brief concurrence emphasizing that the record shows the FDA provided consistent, clear guidance on the need for rigorous product-specific evidence that benefits to adult smokers outweigh youth risks. She stressed that e-cigarette regulation under the TCA served a core public-health purpose and did not support any suggestion that the FDA “was unable or unwilling to say in clear and specific terms precisely what applicants would have to provide.”

Nuance of the Law

The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 (TCA) brought tobacco products within the FDA’s ambit for the first time while preserving the FDCA’s existing premarket approval scheme for “new drugs”. A “new tobacco product” is any tobacco product not marketed in the U.S. before February 15, 2007 and the TCA mandates FDA authorization before sale. To approve a PMTA, the agency must find the product “appropriate for the protection of the public health,” weighing “risks and benefits to the population as a whole” and the likelihood of adult cessation versus youth initiation. Those findings “when appropriate” rely on “well-controlled investigations” or “other valid scientific evidence,” but the statute leaves to the FDA’s discretion what studies or data suffice.

This delegation reflects Congress’s judgment that tobacco products pose unique, shifting risks—particularly because of rapidly proliferating flavors and devices—requiring individualized review rather than blanket standards. At the same time, Congress bounded the FDA’s power by insisting on a public-health test rather than an outright ban and by providing judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 706 via the TCA’s review provision. In turn, the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard demands agency consistency or, if it changes course, “a reasoned explanation,” awareness of reliance interests, and consideration of serious reliance. Finally, the remand rule of SEC v. Chenery must be harmonized with the APA’s harmless-error directive to permit courts to remand when an agency “rested decision on an unsustainable reason,” but also to excuse harmless errors that “had no bearing” on the outcome.

Listen to the episode on Spotify

Here’s a case that turns on a small but important twist in the way we protect our waterways. In City and County of San Francisco v. Environmental Protection Agency, the Supreme Court took up the question of whether the EPA can issue pollution permits that simply say, “Make sure the river stays clean,” without spelling out exactly what steps a company must take. The Court said no. Under the Clean Water Act, the EPA has to give clear, step-by-step limits on how much of a pollutant can go into the water. It can’t leave a business guessing or hold it liable only when water quality slips.

Summary of the Case

In 2019, EPA renewed San Francisco’s NPDES permit for its Oceanside combined-sewer overflow facility and, for the first time, included two “receiving-water limitations.” One provision barred any discharge that “contribute[s] to a violation of any applicable water quality standard,” and the other prohibited discharges that “create pollution, contamination, or nuisance” under California law. San Francisco petitioned for review in the Ninth Circuit, arguing that Clean Water Act does not authorize these “end-result” requirements—conditions that hold permittees liable for the quality of the receiving waters rather than prescribing specific practices or numeric effluent limits. The Ninth Circuit upheld EPA, construing the legal authorization of “any more stringent limitation . . . necessary to meet or implement any applicable water quality standard” to encompass end-result provisions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether EPA may condition permit compliance on receiving-water quality.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Alito delivered a unanimous opinion reversing the Ninth Circuit. The Court held that current law does not authorize “end-result” requirements in NPDES permits. Its analysis rested on three pillars:
1. Text and structure. Subsections (A) and (B) of § 1311(b)(1) refer expressly to “effluent limitations”which are numeric or definitional caps on discharges. Whereas subsection (C) authorizes only “any more stringent limitation” that is “necessary to meet” or “required to implement” water quality standards. The ordinary meaning of “limitation,” and the verbs “meet” and “implement,” point to specific, externally imposed restrictions on quantities, practices, or methods, not open-ended liability for end results.
2. Statutory history. Congress deliberately abandoned the pre-1972 enforcement model, suing polluters after water bodies failed to meet quality standards, in favor of a forward-looking permit regime. Allowing EPA to reintroduce abatement-style, receiving-water requirements would contravene that design.
3. Permitting scheme. End-result provisions undermine the CWA’s “permit shield”, which protects permittees who adhere to all permit terms, and they offer no mechanism for allocating responsibility when multiple dischargers contribute to a water quality violation. EPA has ample alternative tools including numeric and narrative effluent limitations, best-management practices, information-gathering authority and emergency powers to safeguard water quality.
Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Barrett filed a partial dissent, joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. While she agreed with the majority that EPA laws are not confined to numeric effluent limitations, she disputed the Court’s restrictive interpretation of what counts as a “limitation.” Barrett argued that prohibitions on discharges that violate water quality standards are “limitations” in ordinary and statutory usage. She maintained that any concerns about vagueness or multiple polluters can be addressed through arbitrary-and-capricious review or by EPA crafting clearer permit terms, and she would have affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s broader reading of the law in question.

Dual Structures of Authority

The CWA’s NPDES program rests on carefully calibrated statutory language. Section 1311(b)(1) draws a distinction between technology-based “effluent limitations” which cap pollutant quantities, rates or concentrations and the broader authority in (C) to impose “any more stringent limitation” needed “to meet” or “implement” state or federal water quality standards. By omitting the word “effluent” before “limitation” in (C), Congress signaled that EPA may employ non-numeric measures—best-management practices, narrative restrictions, or other operational controls—to achieve water quality goals. At the same time, the 1972 amendments discarded the WPCA’s retrospective abatement actions in favor of a proactive permit regime and enshrined a “permit shield” to insulate compliant permittees from liability. This dual structure empowers EPA to balance uniform technology floors with site-specific water quality objectives, requiring clear, enforceable permit terms while respecting state standards. Where ambiguity or attribution issues arise—such as multiple dischargers—EPA and the courts can resolve them through regulatory guidance or judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.

The Supreme Court tackled a complex issue regarding immigration notices. The case involved noncitizens who argued that they should be able to challenge their removal orders because they didn’t receive proper initial notices to appear. However, the Court decided that if these individuals later received a notice of hearing that included the time and date, they could not contest their removal orders based on the earlier notice being flawed.

The justices concluded that either a compliant initial notice or a subsequent notice of hearing is enough to meet the legal requirements. This means that as long as the noncitizens were informed about when to appear, the earlier mistakes in the notices don’t give them grounds to fight their removal.

Justice Samuel Alito wrote the majority opinion, and he was joined by Justices Roberts, Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. On the other side, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson dissented, supported by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch. This decision highlights the nuances of immigration law and the importance of how notices are handled in removal proceedings.

Summary of the Case

The case of Campos-Chaves v. Garland arose from the removal proceedings of three aliens—Moris Esmelis Campos-Chaves, Varinder Singh, and Raul Daniel Mendez-Colín—who sought to rescind their in absentia removal orders. Each alien argued that they did not receive proper notice of their removal hearings as mandated by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), specifically under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). The core issue was whether the aliens could demonstrate that they did not receive notice in accordance with the statutory requirements, particularly given that the initial Notices to Appear (NTAs) provided by the government lacked specific time and place information for the hearings.

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court, in a decision delivered by Justice Alito, held that the aliens could not seek rescission of their in absentia removal orders because they had received proper notice under § 1229(a)(2) for the hearings they missed. The Court interpreted the statutory language to mean that an alien must demonstrate a lack of notice for the specific hearing at which they were ordered removed. The Court concluded that the government’s provision of a subsequent notice specifying the time and place of the hearings satisfied the notice requirements of the INA, even though the initial NTAs were deficient. Thus, the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision regarding Campos-Chaves and reversed the Ninth Circuit's decisions regarding Singh and Mendez-Colín.

Separate Opinions

Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Justice Jackson argued that the majority's interpretation undermined the statutory requirement for a compliant NTA, emphasizing that the government must provide a complete NTA that includes time and place information. She contended that the majority's ruling effectively allowed the government to bypass its obligations under the INA, thereby jeopardizing the procedural protections intended for noncitizens facing removal.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Jackson's dissent highlighted that the majority's decision misread the statutory framework by treating the notice under § 1229(a)(2) as sufficient to cure the deficiencies of the initial NTA. She argued that the law requires a compliant NTA to initiate removal proceedings, and that the lack of such a notice should allow for rescission of the removal orders. Jackson maintained that the majority's ruling could lead to significant injustices, as it would permit removals based on inadequate notice.

Nuance of the Law

The law governing removal proceedings, particularly 8 U.S.C. § 1229, establishes a dual notice requirement: an initial NTA under § 1229(a)(1) and a follow-up notice under § 1229(a)(2) in cases of changes to the hearing schedule. The Court's interpretation emphasized that the statutory language must be read in context, with the understanding that either form of notice can satisfy the requirements for removal proceedings. The majority's ruling hinged on the disjunctive nature of the word "or," suggesting that receipt of either type of notice suffices for compliance. In contrast, the dissent argued for a more stringent interpretation, asserting that the initial NTA's deficiencies could not be remedied by subsequent notices, thus preserving the integrity of the statutory notice requirements. This case illustrates the complexities of statutory interpretation in immigration law and the balance between procedural safeguards and the government's authority to enforce removal orders.

---

Podcast audio provided by:

RescopicSound

"Catch Me If You Can" by OCFM

The Supreme Court tackled a complex case involving the design of South Carolina's Congressional District 1. The justices looked closely at whether race played a major role in how this district was drawn. In a decision led by Justice Samuel Alito, the Court found that the lower court had made a mistake in saying that race was the main factor in the district's design.

The justices emphasized that those challenging the district needed to show clear evidence that lawmakers had put racial considerations above traditional, race-neutral rules for drawing district lines. They also pointed out that the challengers did not provide an alternative map to back up their claims. This ruling highlights the importance of proving that race was improperly prioritized in the redistricting process.

Additionally, the Court sent back to the lower court a related issue about whether the way votes were diluted in this district was handled correctly. This means that while the Court disagreed with the lower court's findings on race, they still want to ensure that all aspects of the case are thoroughly examined.

In the end, this case reminds us of the delicate balance in the law when it comes to race and representation in our political system.

Summary of the Case

The case of Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP arose from a challenge to South Carolina's congressional districting plan following the 2020 Census. The plaintiffs, including the NAACP and a voter from District 1, alleged that the newly drawn District 1 was a racial gerrymander that diluted the voting power of Black residents. The three-judge District Court found that race played a predominant role in the design of District 1, violating the Equal Protection Clause. The State appealed, arguing that the court erred in its factual findings and legal standards regarding the use of race in redistricting.

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court, in a decision delivered by Justice Alito, reversed the District Court's ruling, stating that the finding that race predominated in the design of District 1 was clearly erroneous. The Court emphasized that the Constitution grants state legislatures the primary responsibility for drawing congressional districts, and that claims of partisan gerrymandering are not justiciable in federal court. The Court held that to prove a racial gerrymandering claim, plaintiffs must demonstrate that race was the predominant factor in the legislature's decision-making, which the challengers failed to do. The Court noted that the challengers did not provide direct evidence of a racial gerrymander and that their circumstantial evidence was weak. The Court also criticized the District Court for not drawing an adverse inference against the challengers for failing to submit an alternative map that would show how the State could achieve its political objectives while maintaining greater racial balance.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, agreeing with the Court's conclusion but expressing concern that the majority's analysis in Part III-C exceeded the proper scope of clear-error review. He emphasized that the Court should not sift through factual details but should focus on the legal errors made by the District Court.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, dissented. She argued that the District Court's factual findings were plausible and should have been upheld under the clear-error standard. Kagan contended that the majority's opinion improperly favored the State's narrative over the District Court's credibility assessments and evidence presented by the challengers. She criticized the majority for imposing a new evidentiary burden on plaintiffs by requiring an alternative map, which she argued was not necessary under existing precedents.

Racial Gerrymandering

The law surrounding racial gerrymandering is complex, particularly in cases where race and partisan affiliation are closely correlated. The Supreme Court has established that while state legislatures have broad discretion in redistricting, they cannot use race as a predominant factor in drawing district lines without facing strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court's decision in this case reinforces the presumption of legislative good faith and the requirement for challengers to provide compelling evidence that race was the primary motivation behind districting decisions. The introduction of an adverse inference for failing to provide an alternative map adds a significant hurdle for plaintiffs, potentially complicating future racial gerrymandering claims. This case illustrates the ongoing tension between political considerations in redistricting and the constitutional protections against racial discrimination in electoral processes.