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The Supreme Court has struck down a Hawaii law that required gun owners to get explicit permission from business owners before carrying concealed handguns into stores, restaurants, and gas stations. The 6-to-3 decision means millions of Americans with permits to carry guns have a constitutional right to bring them into private businesses, even if owners don't want them there. The ruling could invalidate similar laws in California, New York, New Jersey, and Maryland.

What Hawaii's Law Did and Why It Mattered

In 2022, the Supreme Court issued a landmark decision that made it much easier for people to carry guns in public. Hawaii responded by flipping the default rule for private businesses. Instead of allowing armed customers unless told to leave, the state required gun owners to get the business owner's explicit permission first. Supporters said this protected workers and customers from the risks of armed strangers in everyday spaces. Gun rights advocates said it violated their constitutional right to carry firearms for self-defense.

A group of Maui County residents with valid concealed carry permits sued, arguing the law blocked them from protecting themselves during routine errands. A trial court agreed and blocked the law, but an appeals court reversed that decision. The Supreme Court then took the case and sided with the gun owners.

The Two Sides Made Competing Arguments About Rights and Property

The gun owners' lawyer argued that Hawaii's law clearly restricted Second Amendment rights and that the state had to prove the law matched America's historical tradition of gun regulation. He said Hawaii's examples didn't work. Old colonial hunting laws were about preventing poaching on rural land, not about keeping guns out of grocery stores. A Louisiana law from 1865 was part of the Black Codes, a system designed to strip rights from freed slaves, and could not serve as a legitimate historical model.

Hawaii's lawyer took a different approach. He argued the case was really about property rights, not gun rights. Since no one has a constitutional right to enter private property without permission, the only question was whether states could set their own rules about how that permission works. He said Hawaii reasonably concluded that business owners would not expect their customers to be armed.

The federal government sided with the gun owners, arguing that Hawaii was using property law as a backdoor way to avoid constitutional limits on gun regulation. The justices' questions during oral arguments revealed deep disagreement. Some sympathized with Hawaii's concerns about public safety and noted that most Hawaiians opposed guns in businesses. Others questioned why the law only targeted firearms and not other weapons, suggesting the property rights argument might be a cover for something else.

The Majority Rejected Hawaii's Law on Two Grounds

Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion, applying a two-part test the Court created in its 2022 gun rights decision. First, the majority found it straightforward that Hawaii's law restricted the kind of conduct the Second Amendment protects. The majority rejected Hawaii's argument that the case should be dismissed because no one has a right to carry on private property without consent. To show the real-world burden, the majority described a woman who carries a firearm for protection against a violent ex and who could become a criminal multiple times over just by running daily errands.

Second, the majority examined every historical law Hawaii offered as a comparison and rejected them all. The hunting laws were about preventing unauthorized hunting on rural land and the harms it caused, like theft of game and stray gunfire. Those harms have nothing to do with someone quietly carrying a concealed weapon through a grocery store. The majority also rejected an 1893 Oregon law as too recent and isolated to matter. Most importantly, the majority flatly rejected the Louisiana Black Code, calling it a tool of racial oppression that cannot serve as a legitimate historical model.

A Separate Opinion Clarified the Court's Reasoning

Justice Barrett wrote separately, joined in part by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch. She made two key points. First, states cannot escape constitutional review simply by calling a gun restriction a property regulation. If a state required express permission before someone could wear religious clothing in a store, that would obviously raise First Amendment concerns. The same logic applies to guns.

Second, Barrett offered a sharper way to think about historical comparisons. States can pass focused regulations targeting specific dangers in specific places. But Hawaii's law does not target any particular danger or specific misuse of firearms. It responds to a general discomfort with guns being present at all, which is a much broader and less historically grounded justification. This distinction between targeted regulations addressing specific harms and blanket restrictions based on generalized disapproval is likely to shape how courts evaluate similar laws going forward.

The Dissenters Argued the Majority Went Too Far

Justice Kagan wrote a brief dissent saying the old hunting laws were close enough to Hawaii's law to count as valid historical comparisons. Both set a default rule against armed entry that a property owner can reverse, and both respond to dangers that armed individuals can pose on someone else's property.

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, made a longer argument. She said the case should never have reached the second stage of the test because the Second Amendment simply does not give anyone the right to carry a firearm onto private property without the owner's consent. She also argued that the majority's approach to the first stage makes it nearly useless as a filter, putting an enormous burden on governments trying to regulate guns. At the second stage, she pointed to founding era and Reconstruction era laws that required affirmative consent for armed entry onto private property, including in places open to the public like taverns and stores. She accused the majority of demanding a perfect historical match while claiming not to, and of dismissing the hunting laws too quickly.

What This Decision Means Going Forward

The ruling establishes that states cannot defeat a gun rights challenge early in the legal process by pointing to property law principles. They must go through a full historical comparison, and the burden is on them to prove their law matches historical regulations in both how it works and why it was enacted.

The decision also draws a line between targeted gun regulations and blanket restrictions. States can pass focused regulations addressing specific, identified dangers in specific places. But they cannot impose broad restrictions driven by a general dislike of firearms. This distinction is likely to be the most influential part of the decision as lower courts evaluate similar laws.

The ruling directly threatens comparable laws in California, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York. It also reaffirms that the Second Amendment sets a single national standard that applies equally in every state. Local history, local culture, and local public opinion cannot change the scope of a constitutional right.

One important question remains unresolved. The majority rejects the Louisiana Black Code because it was not widely adopted and was a tool of racial oppression. But the dissenters call for a clear rule to determine which historical laws count as evidence and which do not. Lower courts will now have to navigate this without clear guidance.

In practical terms, this decision means that gun owners with permits may now have a constitutional right to carry concealed handguns into private businesses in Hawaii and other states with similar laws, even if business owners object. The Court has decided that this right cannot be restricted based on general public safety concerns or local preferences. States can still regulate guns in specific ways to address specific dangers, but they cannot simply tell gun owners to stay out.

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The Supreme Court just made it nearly impossible for hundreds of thousands of Syrian and Haitian immigrants to challenge the government's decision to end their legal status in the United States. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court ruled that judges cannot review whether the government followed its own rules when ending Temporary Protected Status, or TPS, a program that allows people to stay in America when their home countries are too dangerous. For the people affected, this means losing the legal right to work, live, and build lives they have established over more than a decade. For the broader legal system, it means the government can now make major immigration decisions with virtually no court oversight.

What Is Temporary Protected Status and Why Does It Matter?

Congress created TPS in 1990 as a humanitarian safety valve. When a country faces armed conflict, earthquakes, epidemics, or other catastrophic conditions, the government can grant TPS to its citizens already in the United States. This lets them stay and work legally while conditions improve back home. It is not a path to citizenship. It is temporary relief.

Syria received TPS protection in 2012 after its civil war began. Haiti received it in 2010 after a devastating earthquake killed hundreds of thousands. Both countries renewed their status repeatedly for over a decade. Then in 2025, the Secretary of Homeland Security ended both designations, claiming conditions had improved. The people affected sued, arguing the government acted unlawfully. Lower courts temporarily blocked the terminations, but the Supreme Court reversed those decisions.

The Core Legal Fight: Can Courts Check If the Government Followed the Rules?

The central question before the court was simple but consequential: when the law says courts cannot review a TPS "determination," does that mean courts cannot review the final decision only, or does it mean courts cannot review anything about the process?

The immigrants argued courts should still be able to check whether the government followed required steps, like consulting with other agencies before deciding. The government countered that the law blocks all court review, period. The majority agreed with the government. The word "determination" covers the entire decision-making process, not just the final call. This means even if the government skipped required consultations or ignored its own procedures, courts cannot do anything about it.

Justice Kagan's dissent pointed out this reading makes every procedural requirement optional. A Secretary could ignore all the rules and no court could intervene. She noted the government barely consulted with other agencies about Haiti, sending only a few short emails that did not seriously address conditions there.

The Discrimination Question: Did Bias Play a Role?

The Haitian plaintiffs raised an additional argument that racial bias motivated the decision. They pointed to statements from President Trump and former Secretary Noem describing Haiti as a "shithole country" and falsely claiming Haitians were eating pets. Under established legal standards, a government decision can be struck down if racial bias was even one factor among several.

The majority assumed the toughest legal standard applied but still ruled against the plaintiffs. The statements were not explicitly about race, the Court said. And the government ended TPS for 13 countries across multiple continents and racial groups, suggesting a blanket policy rather than targeted discrimination.

Justice Kagan lodged a firm disagreement. She quoted the statements at length and argued they clearly showed racial bias was part of the picture. The legal standard does not require race to be the only reason or even the main reason. It only requires that race was a reason. She also described the real people behind the case, individuals who face life-threatening danger if forced to return home.

What This Decision Actually Changes

The ruling closes off most legal challenges to TPS terminations. The Court left one narrow opportunity that constitutional claims might still survive, though the majority did not explicitly say so. Justice Thomas wanted to close that door too, but the majority declined to directly address it.

The practical effect is stark. Hundreds of thousands of Syrians and Haitians who have built lives, started businesses, and raised families in America now have no meaningful legal protection. They can be deported even if the government violated its own procedures or acted with discriminatory intent. For the broader legal system, it means immigration decisions get special treatment. Courts defer to the government far more in immigration cases than in other areas of law.

Why This Matters Beyond the Courtroom

Real people are affected by this decision. Syrians who fled a brutal civil war face potential return to active conflict. Haitians who survived an earthquake and built stable lives now face deportation to a country with gang violence and political instability. The decision also signals that courts will have minimal power to check government immigration decisions going forward, even when the government ignores its own rules or acts with bias.

The Supreme Court's decision reflects a fundamental disagreement about how much power courts should have to oversee government agencies. The majority trusts the executive branch to police itself. The dissent argues that without court review, there is no real check on government power. For the people affected by this decision, they have lost their day in court.

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The Supreme Court just made it much harder for asylum seekers to get their cases heard. The Court ruled 6 to 3 that people waiting at the U.S. border don't have the right to request asylum unless they've already physically crossed into the country. That means border officers can turn people away at the gate without ever processing their claims, even if they're fleeing violence or persecution. The decision changes decades of immigration practice.

The Policy That Started It All

U.S. Customs and Border Protection used what it called "metering." Officers stationed at the border would limit how many people could enter for processing each day, leaving thousands stranded in Mexico for months at a time. Some waited in dangerous conditions. Some were raped, beaten, or drowned while waiting. An immigration advocacy group called Al Otro Lado sued on behalf of asylum seekers, arguing the government was breaking the law by refusing to even listen to their cases.

The lower courts agreed. But the Supreme Court reversed that decision, siding with the government.

What the Law Actually Says

The wording of the law mattered a lot in the decision. Federal immigration law says people can apply for asylum if they are "physically present in the United States" or if they "arrive in the United States." Those are two separate conditions connected by the word "or."

The asylum seekers argued this language matters. If "arrive in" just means the same thing as "physically present," then why mention it twice? They said "arrive in" must cover people who show up at the border but haven't been allowed to cross yet. The government disagreed, saying "arrive in" simply means you have to actually enter the country.

How the Court Decided

Justice Alito, writing for the majority, sided with the government. He used everyday examples to explain his thinking. A football player tackled at the one-yard line hasn't arrived in the end zone. A letter in the mail carrier's hand hasn't arrived in your mailbox. Same logic applies at the border.

The majority also noted that Congress used different language in different parts of the immigration law when it wanted to distinguish between people who actually enter versus those who just try to. That suggested Congress knew the difference and chose its words carefully.

The Court acknowledged the asylum seekers had a point about the redundancy problem. But it said the overlap made sense because Congress added the "arrive in" language in 1996 as part of a broader overhaul, and the two provisions were simply meant to work together.

What the Dissenters Said

The three dissenting justices, led by Justice Sotomayor, pushed back hard. They pointed out that Congress uses "arrives in" and "arrives at" interchangeably elsewhere in the same law. If the majority's reading were correct, those other parts wouldn't make sense.

More importantly, they documented the practical effects of metering. Asylum seekers turned away at the border faced rape, violence, and death while waiting in Mexico. Government investigators found the policy was being used even when processing facilities were only 20 percent full. Justice Jackson added the metering policy had already been canceled nearly five years before the Court decided this case, so the justices were essentially answering a question that no longer mattered in practice.

Presidential Power in Immigration

This decision gives the government broad power to turn people away at the border without hearing their asylum claims. It also signals that at least some justices may be willing to expand presidential power at the border even further. Justice Thomas wrote separately to suggest the President might have inherent constitutional authority to exclude noncitizens that Congress cannot override. That's not the law today, but it's a warning sign about where the Court might be heading.

For asylum seekers, presenting yourself at a port of entry no longer guarantees you'll get your day in court. The government can simply keep you on the other side of the line.

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The Pung family's home in Michigan was worth nearly $200,000. They owed the county $2,242 in property taxes. The county foreclosed and sold the house at auction for $76,000. Pung sued to argue that he should have received fair market value for the forced sale of his home. The Supreme Court has ruled selling at auction price is constitutional. The decision raises urgent questions about how far government can go when collecting debts from ordinary Americans.

What Happened to the Pung Family

Isabella county assessed Michael Pung with $2,242 in additional property taxes. He disagreed, sued and had won his case in state court. But the county ignored that ruling and moved forward with foreclosure anyway. They sold his home at a public auction for $76,008. The county kept all the money from the sale at first but eventually returned the sale price minus the tax assessment.

For tax purposes, the county had recently assessed the home at $194,400.

Pung sued in federal court, arguing the Constitution requires the government to pay him the difference between the auction price and the fair market value. He pointed to the Fifth Amendment, which says the government must pay "just compensation" when it takes private property. He also cited the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits excessive fines. The lower courts agreed he deserved the auction money back, but they refused to require the county to pay him fair market value of the home.

The Supreme Court's Decision

The Supreme Court agreed the Constitution does not require the government to pay fair market value when it sells a home to collect unpaid taxes. As long as the sale is conducted fairly, returning whatever money is left over after paying the debt is enough.

Justice Alito, writing for the majority, based this conclusion on centuries of legal tradition. English common law and early American tax laws all followed the same pattern: return the surplus, but don't guarantee the homeowner gets what the property might sell for on the open market. The Court said tax sales are different from cases where the government takes your land to build a highway. In those situations, fair market value is required. But tax sales, the Court reasoned, are a debt collection tool, and homeowners have years to pay the debt, refinance, or sell the property themselves before losing it.

The Court worried that requiring fair market value would make tax sales impossible to conduct. Local governments would have to manage properties and absorb financial losses in ways that would break the system. The case was sent back to lower courts to decide whether the county's sale process was actually fair.

What One Justice Said That Matters

Justice Thomas agreed with the outcome but wrote separately with serious concerns. He described how the tax assessor in this case defied a court order, imposed an unauthorized tax, and pursued foreclosure even though the Pungs claimed they never received proper notice. The assessor reportedly said, "I don't care what he says," referring to the judge who had ruled in the family's favor.

Thomas argued that fair market value should normally be required by the Constitution, with only narrow exceptions. He believed the county's conduct was likely unconstitutional. Three other justices signaled they may agree that strong protections for homeowners are needed when these cases return to lower courts.

Can the Government Take Your Home?

The Supreme Court deliberately left the biggest question unanswered: what does "fairly conducted" actually mean? Must the government try to collect the debt another way first? Must the auction be designed to attract bidders and get the best price? Must notice to the homeowner be genuinely effective?

Those questions now go back to lower courts with almost no guidance. In the Pung case, a $2,242 debt led to the loss of a home worth nearly $200,000. Eighteen months after the sale, the new owner resold it for $195,000, almost exactly what it had been assessed for. That $118,000 difference represents a real financial loss to the Pung family.

The Constitution allows the government to keep that difference, but only if the process was fair. What counts as fair is still being decided. If lower courts adopt Justice Thomas's framework, which requires governments to exhaust other collection methods before seizing homes, tax sale practices in many states could face serious legal challenges. For now, homeowners facing tax foreclosure should know that the Supreme Court has given them less protection than they might have expected, but the fight over what "fair" means is far from over.

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The Supreme Court has fundamentally weakened one of the most important tools for protecting minority voting rights. In a 6-3 decision, the Court made it nearly impossible for Black voters to challenge congressional maps that split their communities into pieces, even when those maps were drawn specifically to dilute their voting power. The ruling will reshape how states can draw election districts and could affect which party controls Congress for years to come.

What This Case Was About

Louisiana redrew its congressional map after a federal court said the old one violated the Voting Rights Act by failing to create a second district where Black voters made up the majority. The state created that new majority-Black district, stretching roughly 250 miles from Shreveport to Baton Rouge. But then a different group of voters sued, claiming the state had made race the dominant factor in drawing the lines. A lower court agreed, and Louisiana appealed to the Supreme Court, which sided with the challengers.

The Court's New Rule

Justice Alito's majority opinion changed how courts evaluate voting maps in three major ways. First, the Court said that states can only use race in redistricting if the Voting Rights Act actually requires it. But then the Court narrowed what the Voting Rights Act requires. The law says minority voters cannot have less opportunity than other voters to elect their preferred candidates. The majority now interprets this to mean minority voters are only entitled to whatever voting power results from the state's other goals, like helping one political party win or protecting politicians already in office.

Second, the Court made it much harder to prove that a map dilutes minority voting power. Voters challenging a map must now show that their alternative maps satisfy all of the state's goals, including partisan ones. They must also prove that racial divisions in voting cannot simply be explained by party differences. And they must focus on present-day intentional discrimination rather than historical patterns.

Third, the Court found that Louisiana's original map did not actually violate the Voting Rights Act, which meant the state had no good reason to draw the new majority-Black district in the first place.

What the Dissenters Said

Justice Kagan's dissent, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, warned that the majority has gutted the Voting Rights Act. She painted a stark picture: imagine a neighborhood that is 90 percent Black, sliced like a pie into six pieces, with each piece attached to a mostly white district so Black voters are always outvoted. That is exactly what the Voting Rights Act was designed to prevent, she argued.

The dissenters made a crucial point: Congress specifically amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982 to stop requiring proof of intentional discrimination, because that was nearly impossible to prove. The majority's new rules bring that nearly impossible burden back. The dissenters also noted that the Court had reaffirmed the old framework just three years ago in a similar case involving Alabama. Most importantly, they warned that because Black voters and Democratic voters overlap so heavily in most Southern states, any state can now simply claim it was drawing maps for partisan advantage and shield itself from challenge.

Diluting the Voting Rights Act and Creating Substantial Barriers of Proof

The practical effect is striking. States can now announce they are drawing maps to help one political party, and because that party's voters and minority voters often overlap, minority voters will struggle to propose alternative maps that both achieve the state's partisan goals and give their communities a fair shot at electing their preferred candidates. The door to using race in redistricting is now open, but there is almost nothing left behind it.

This decision does not ban states from considering race when drawing maps. It simply makes it far harder for voters to prove that a map unfairly dilutes their power. For everyday citizens, this means the maps that determine which party controls Congress and state legislatures just became much harder to challenge, even when they appear designed to weaken minority voting strength.

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In law, timing rules can matter just as much as the underlying complaint. That’s the heart of Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited versus Burton, the Chapter 7 trustee for Vista‑Pro Automotive, a case that asked whether you still have to act within a “reasonable time” even when you say a court judgment was never valid in the first place.

The Supreme Court said yes. The justices ruled that the “reasonable time” limit in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure applies even to requests made under the specific rule where a party argues the judgment is void. The Court pointed to the plain text and structure of the rule, and it affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s denial of relief. Especially because the petitioner did not argue that it met the reasonable-time requirement.

Justice Samuel Alito wrote for the Court, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Thomas, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Sonia Sotomayor agreed with the outcome but wrote separately, concurring in the judgment.

Supreme Court Rules That Even "Void" Judgments Must Be Challenged Within a Reasonable Time

The Supreme Court just resolved a major disagreement among federal appeals courts about how long someone has to challenge a court judgment that should never have been entered in the first place. In the decision, the Court held that even when a judgment is completely invalid, what lawyers call "void", you still need to challenge it within a reasonable amount of time.

Back in 2015, a bankruptcy trustee named Vista-Pro won a default judgment against Coney Island Auto Parts. A default judgment is what happens when someone gets sued but doesn't show up to defend themselves, so the court automatically rules for the other side.

Five and a half years later, in 2020, Coney Island came back to court asking to erase that judgment. They argued the judgment was should never have existed because Vista-Pro didn't properly notify them about the lawsuit in the first place. Under bankruptcy law, there are specific rules about how you have to serve legal papers, and Coney Island claimed Vista-Pro didn't follow those rules.

The lower courts said no. Even if the judgment was technically void, waiting five and a half years was simply too long. Coney Island appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case because different federal appeals courts had been giving different answers to this question.

What Each Side Argued

Coney Island's lawyer made what seemed like a logical argument: If a void judgment never legally existed in the first place, how can there be a time limit to challenge it? It's like saying there's a deadline to point out that an imaginary thing isn't real. He also raised concerns about fairness. If a court enters a judgment against you without properly notifying you, shouldn't you be able to challenge it whenever you discover it?

The bankruptcy trustee's lawyer countered with a straightforward reading of the rules. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the rulebook that governs how federal lawsuits work and it states that motions to vacate a judgment must be filed within a "reasonable time." If the rule-makers wanted void judgments to be challengeable forever, they would have said so explicitly. In fact, there's another part of the rules that do allow unlimited time for certain types of challenges, like when someone commits fraud on the court. The absence of similar language for void judgments is telling.

She also pointed out the practical problems. The trustee had relied on what appeared to be a valid judgment for years and spent money trying to collect on it. Meanwhile, the people who could have been served properly to restart the case might no longer be available. Allowing challenges decades later creates chaos and unfairness for everyone involved.

What the Court Decided

Justice Alito wrote the opinion for eight justices, and the reasoning was remarkably straightforward. The rule says "a motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time." A motion claiming a judgment is void falls under Rule 60(b)(4). Therefore, it must be filed within a reasonable time. End of story.

The Court looked at how the rules are structured to support this reading. When the rule-makers wanted to create exceptions to the "reasonable time" requirement, they did so clearly. For example, some types of challenges have a strict one-year deadline. Others, like fraud on the court, can be brought "at any time." The fact that void judgments don't have an explicit "any time" provision suggests they're subject to the default "reasonable time" requirement.

The Court rejected Coney Island's philosophical argument that void judgments exist outside of time. Justice Alito pointed out that a mistake is a mistake whether you challenge it immediately or years later. But that doesn't mean courts can't impose deadlines for raising those challenges. The question isn't whether the judgment is truly void, but whether there's some legal principle that guarantees you can challenge it forever. Since Coney Island didn't argue the Constitution requires unlimited time, the Court found no such principle.

Importantly, the Court noted that the "reasonable time" standard already provides flexibility for people who genuinely didn't know about a judgment. In cases where someone was never properly notified, it might be perfectly reasonable to wait until they learn about the judgment through enforcement efforts. This built-in flexibility addresses fairness concerns without creating an unlimited window.

Justice Sotomayor agreed with the outcome but wrote separately to criticize one aspect of the majority opinion. She thought the Court went too far by discussing whether the Constitution might require unlimited time to challenge void judgments. Since Coney Island explicitly said they weren't making a constitutional argument, and nobody briefed the issue, Sotomayor believed the Court should have stayed silent on that question. Her separate opinion reflects a philosophy that courts should decide only what's necessary to resolve the case at hand.

Can Time Limits Apply to Invalid Judgments?

This case highlights an important distinction that often gets confused: whether a judgment is invalid is a different question from what procedures you must follow to get relief from it.

Coney Island's argument mixed these two ideas together. They essentially said: "This judgment is void, therefore normal procedural rules don't apply to challenging it." The Court firmly separated these questions. A judgment might be completely invalid in theory, but you still have to follow the proper procedures to get a court to officially recognize that invalidity.

The "reasonable time" standard provides meaningful flexibility that a fixed deadline wouldn't. Imagine someone who genuinely never received notice of a lawsuit and only learns about the judgment years later when someone tries to collect on it. A court could reasonably find that challenging the judgment at that point is timely, even if years have passed. The standard allows judges to look at the specific circumstances rather than applying a one-size-fits-all rule.

On the other hand, someone who knew about the judgment, received demand letters, and simply sat on their rights for five years would have a much harder time arguing their delay was reasonable.

What the Court Didn't Decide

The Supreme Court left several questions unanswered. Most importantly, they didn't actually decide whether the judgment against Coney Island was truly void. That wasn't the question before them—they only decided whether the challenge came too late.

The Court also didn't address what time limits might apply to other ways of challenging judgments outside the standard motion process. The rules preserve something called an "independent action"—essentially filing a whole new lawsuit to challenge a judgment—and the Court didn't say whether time limits apply there.

Finally, while the Court hinted at its skepticism about constitutional challenges, it didn't definitively rule on whether the Constitution might require unlimited time to challenge void judgments in some circumstances. The majority noted that giving someone a "reasonable" amount of time might be all the Constitution requires, but that question remains open for a future case where it's properly raised.

Acting Within Reasonable Time

This decision brings clarity to a question that had divided federal courts: you can't wait indefinitely to challenge even a completely invalid judgment. The "reasonable time" requirement applies across the board, though what counts as reasonable will depend on the circumstances—particularly whether you knew about the judgment and had a fair opportunity to challenge it earlier.

For people facing judgments they believe are void, the message is clear: act promptly once you learn about the problem. The law provides flexibility for genuine cases of lack of notice, but it won't tolerate strategic delay or sitting on your rights for years.

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In a case that tests the fine line between a school’s curriculum choices and a family’s religious beliefs, the Supreme Court has stepped in on behalf of parents in Montgomery County, Maryland. At issue is a policy that added LGBTQ+-inclusive storybooks to elementary classrooms without telling parents or letting them opt out.

The justices said that forcing these lessons on students without notice steps on parents’ rights to guide their children’s faith and values. By granting a preliminary injunction, the Court put the Board on pause: schools must now alert families ahead of time and honor opt-out requests while the case moves forward.

This decision doesn’t decide the whole fight yet, but it shifts the power back toward parents for now. Stay tuned after the break to hear what comes next—and what it could mean for classrooms across the country.

Summary of the Case

During the 2022–23 school year, the Montgomery County (MD) Board of Education introduced five "LGBTQ+-inclusive" storybooks into its K–5 English curriculum. These books feature narratives of same-sex marriage, gender transition, and LGBTQ characters (e.g., Prince & Knight; Uncle Bobby's Wedding; Born Ready; Intersection Allies; Love, Violet). Parents from diverse religious backgrounds initially were allowed to opt their children out of lessons using the books. In March 2023, the Board rescinded that opt-out policy, citing administrative disruption and potential stigma for LGBTQ students. A group of parents and an associational plaintiff sued in federal court, arguing that withholding opt outs and mandating use of the books substantially interfered with their right to direct their children's religious upbringing under the Free Exercise Clause. They sought a preliminary injunction to restore advance notice and opt-out rights. The district court and Fourth Circuit denied relief, treating the Wisconsin v. Yoder case as unique and concluding that mere exposure to ideologically objectionable material doesn't coerce students to abandon parental religious teachings. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve whether the Board's "no-opt-out" policy unconstitutionally burdens parents' free exercise rights.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Alito, writing for a 6-3 majority (Roberts, Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett), reversed the lower courts. The Court held that parents possess a fundamental right to direct the religious upbringing of their children, which the Free Exercise Clause protects in both public and private school contexts. Under previous Supreme Court precedent, policies that "substantially interfere" with parental religious instruction or place children in an environment "hostile" to their faith and exert a "pressure to conform" trigger strict scrutiny even if facially neutral. Here, the Board's curricular mandate and denial of opt outs force parents to choose between public schooling and their religious convictions. The challenged storybooks present a normative viewpoint on same-sex marriage and gender that directly conflicts with petitioners' sincerely held beliefs and are taught in a manner fostering classroom discussion in which students who disagree may be labeled "hurtful." The Board's asserted interests—preserving classroom continuity and protecting LGBTQ students from isolation—are undermined by district policies allowing opt outs from other discrete units and extensive parallel programming for special-needs and emergent-English learners. The Board's policy is not narrowly tailored to a compelling interest. Because withholding opt outs imposes an irreparable burden on religious exercise, a preliminary injunction reinstating advance notice and opt-out rights pending full adjudication is warranted.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas concurred. He agreed that the Board's policy fails strict scrutiny but would ground the analysis in historical tradition: he argued that courts should identify whether public schooling historically included mandated instruction on the challenged subjects. Thomas would interpret Wisconsin v. Yoder to require a history-and-tradition inquiry and faulted Montgomery County for lacking any longstanding practice of teaching LGBTQ themes in early grades.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, dissented. She emphasized that "mere exposure" to ideas incongruent with parental faith does not amount to coercion or compulsion prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause. The dissent argued that the Board's curriculum and related teacher guidance were aimed at fostering mutual respect and inclusion, not at indoctrinating students or forcing them to reject parental teachings. She warned that the majority's unbounded "threat" test would saddle public schools with unworkable advance-notice and opt-out obligations for any curricular content potentially "contrary" to parents' religious views, risk persistent classroom disruption, and prompt self-censorship of public-school curricula, undermining the schools' role as "the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny."

When Does School Curriculum Cross the Line into Religious Coercion?

The key question under the Free Exercise Clause is whether government action "coerces" an individual to violate or abandon religious beliefs, not simply whether it exposes students to objectionable ideas. Under precedent, neutral, generally applicable policies that impose only incidental burdens on religious exercise survive unless they impose a substantial interference with the religious upbringing of children. When such a burden arises, strict scrutiny applies regardless of neutrality. To pass that test, the government must show its policy advances "interests of the highest order" and is narrowly tailored. Here, the Court found that the Board's no-opt-out rule, combined with the normative messaging and teacher guidance in the "LGBTQ+-inclusive" storybooks, posed a "very real threat" to parents' right to direct their children's religious development, and that the Board's asserted interests were not compellingly served by a blanket ban on religious opt outs. The decision reinforces the delicate balance between respecting parental religious liberty and ensuring an open, pluralistic public-education environment.

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Here’s a case that turns on a fine detail in immigration law. The justices decided that when the Board of Immigration Appeals says no to delaying someone’s deportation, that decision isn’t treated as a final removal order you can challenge right away.

The Court also clarified that the 30-day window to ask a court to review a removal decision is a processing deadline, not a hard limit that bars the court’s power if you miss it. In other words, missing that deadline doesn’t automatically shut the door on your review.

Because of these points, the Supreme Court wiped out the Fourth Circuit’s dismissal of Riley’s petition for review and sent the case back for another look.

Summary of the Case

Pierre Riley, a Jamaican national, entered the United States in 1995 on a tourist visa, overstayed, and later pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute marijuana and related firearms charges—convictions qualifying as aggravated felonies. Upon his release from prison in January 2021, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated expedited removal, issuing on January 26, 2021, a Final Administrative Removal Order (FARO) finding Riley deportable and ordering removal to Jamaica.

Riley didn't contest his deportability but sought relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming that a Jamaican drug kingpin—backed by corrupt officials—posed a credible threat to his life. An Immigration Judge found Riley credible and granted him protection under CAT; however, DHS appealed, and on May 31, 2022, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) vacated the Immigration Judge's decision and reinstated the removal order.

Riley filed a petition for review in the Fourth Circuit three days after the BIA's decision. That court dismissed his case, reasoning that (1) the FARO was the "final order of removal" and the 30-day deadline to appeal it had expired in February 2021; and (2) this 30-day filing deadline was jurisdictional, meaning the court had no power to hear the case.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Alito, writing for a 5–4 Court, reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision. First, the Court held that only an order determining that someone is deportable or ordering deportation may constitute a "final order of removal." The FARO of January 26, 2021, was that order. A CAT protection order is not a removal order because it neither finds deportability nor commands deportation; it "does not affect the validity" of a prior removal order. Because Riley didn't file his petition within 30 days of the FARO, he missed the deadline relative to that final order.

Second, the Court held that the 30-day filing requirement is a claims-processing rule—not a jurisdictional prerequisite. Without a "clear" statement from Congress, time limits "telling aliens what to do to obtain judicial review" don't limit a court's power to hear a case. The relevant law lacks any reference to a court's "power," and its placement amid non-jurisdictional provisions shows that it governs only litigant conduct. Because the Government didn't seek dismissal on this ground, Riley's petition may proceed on remand.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment but noted that Riley's petition challenged only the BIA's CAT order, not the FARO, and that an order denying CAT relief is reviewable "only as part of the review of a final order of removal." He urged the Fourth Circuit on remand to confirm it has jurisdiction to review a CAT order when there's no petition against the removal order itself.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson (and Justice Gorsuch except for one part), dissented in part. Although she agreed that the 30-day deadline is non-jurisdictional, she would hold that a removal order doesn't become "final" for purposes of appeal until the conclusion of all related proceedings, including CAT review.

She argued that Congress's instruction to pursue CAT claims "as part of the review of a final order of removal" and the longstanding "policy against piecemeal litigation" require tying appellate finality to the BIA's disposition of the withholding claim, not to the initial FARO. Requiring immigrants to appeal removal orders before CAT relief is denied would spawn meritless "protective appeals" and conflict with precedent under other laws, she warned.

When Immigration Appeals Become Final: The Supreme Court's Interpretation of Removal Orders

Congress designed modern immigration removal provisions to "streamline judicial review" by channeling all "questions of law or fact arising from any action taken to remove an alien" into a single court of appeals petition. Under the law, that petition "must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal."

An "order of removal" is defined as one "concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation." CAT orders—which grant or deny protection from removal to a particular country—differ from removal orders: they don't determine deportability and don't "affect the validity" of a removal order, so they can't themselves be considered final removal orders.

In expedited removal cases like Riley's, the removal order becomes "final" as soon as it's issued, because there's no further opportunity for agency review. The majority treats the 30-day deadline as reflecting only the immigrant's obligation to file within 30 days of the removal order—not limiting a court's power to hear the case.

By contrast, the dissent would align finality for appeal with the policy against piecemeal litigation—and with the requirement that CAT relief be reviewed "as part of the review of a final order of removal"—so that no petition would be due until both removal and protection claims have been fully decided.

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CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., Docket No. 23-1201

The Supreme Court has waded into a subtle wrinkle in a law that decides when you can take a foreign government to court here in the United States. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, a country generally can’t claim immunity when the law itself lists clear exceptions—and when the papers are served properly. The question before the justices was whether you also had to prove some extra connection, or “minimum contacts,” as a separate step.

In a unanimous opinion, the Court said no. Once an exception in the law applies and service of process is done right, courts don’t get to add another hurdle. The decision removes the extra test the Ninth Circuit had imposed and sends the case back for proceedings under the straightforward rule Congress wrote.

Summary of the Case

In January 2005 Devas Multimedia Private Ltd., an Indian‐incorporated company, entered into a satellite‐leasing agreement with Antrix Corporation Ltd., the commercial arm of India's Department of Space, to obtain capacity on two new S-band satellites. When the Government of India later reallocated that spectrum for its own use, Antrix invoked a force-majeure clause and terminated the contract. Devas initiated arbitration in India; the panel unanimously found that Antrix had wrongfully repudiated the agreement and awarded Devas $562.5 million plus interest. After obtaining enforcement in France and the United Kingdom, Devas sought confirmation of the award in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's arbitration exception. The District Court confirmed the award and entered a $1.29 billion judgment. A Ninth Circuit panel reversed, ruling that Antrix lacked sufficient connections to the United States. Devas petitioned the Supreme Court to resolve whether the FSIA requires such connections for jurisdiction.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Alito, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act grants personal jurisdiction over a foreign state "whenever an immunity exception applies and service of process has been accomplished," without any additional due-process or minimum-contacts inquiry. The Court reasoned that the law imposes just two prerequisites—(1) an applicable exception to sovereign immunity and (2) proper service—and then mandates jurisdiction by the unambiguous "shall exist" language. Although the immunity exceptions themselves require certain connections to the United States, there is no textual basis to read the law as requiring a separate contacts test. To do so would undermine the FSIA's "comprehensive framework" linking immunity waivers and jurisdictional grants. Legislative history confirms that Congress viewed the exceptions as meeting due-process norms. The Court reversed and remanded.

How Foreign Sovereign Immunity Works in US Courts: No Extra Hurdles Required

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act created a clear system for determining when foreign governments can be sued in American courts. It replaced the previous case-by-case diplomatic determinations with specific exceptions to immunity (such as commercial activity, tort, property seizure, and arbitration) and gave federal courts jurisdiction when these exceptions apply and proper service is made.

The Supreme Court clarified that while traditional personal jurisdiction rules require showing "minimum contacts" with the United States, the FSIA doesn't add this as a separate requirement. Instead, the immunity exceptions themselves already define what connections to the US are necessary. The Court found that adding an extra, judge-made contacts test would disrupt the carefully designed system Congress created.

This decision respects both the law's goal of providing clear standards and the principle of international courtesy that underlies sovereign immunity. By letting the statutory exceptions themselves define when jurisdiction exists, the Court preserved the straightforward framework Congress intended.

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The Supreme Court looked at a case involving the Food and Drug Administration and a company that wanted to sell flavored e-cigarettes. The lower court had said the FDA was wrong to deny the company’s request to sell these products, calling the agency’s actions unfair and inconsistent. But the Supreme Court disagreed, saying the FDA had actually followed its own rules and guidance when it made its decision.

The justices explained that the FDA’s process for reviewing these e-cigarette products was in line with what it had told companies to expect, especially when it came to the kind of scientific evidence and comparisons it wanted to see. The Court also said that the FDA didn’t break any rules by sticking to its earlier positions. However, the Supreme Court didn’t end the case there. Instead, it sent the case back to the lower court to take another look at whether the FDA made a harmless mistake by not reviewing the company’s marketing plans. This case shows how the courts look closely at whether government agencies are following their own guidelines, and what happens if they don’t.

Summary of the Case

In FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, LLC (No. 23-1038), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) denied premarket tobacco product applications (PMTAs) submitted by two e-liquid manufacturers, Wages and White Lion (dba Triton) and Vapetasia. Under the Tobacco Control Act of 2009 (TCA), any “new tobacco product”—including most flavored e-liquids sold after February 15, 2007—may not be marketed absent FDA authorization, which must be granted only if the product “would be appropriate for the protection of the public health.” 21 U.S.C. § 387j(c)(2)(A). The FDA concluded the applicants had not submitted sufficient scientific evidence—including randomized controlled trials or longitudinal cohort studies—to demonstrate benefits for adult smokers that would outweigh youth-initiation risks, nor did it review their marketing-plan commitments (Syllabus, pp. 2–3; App. 177a, 285a).

The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by applying standards different from those announced in pre-decision guidance concerning (1) types of scientific evidence, (2) cross-flavor comparisons, (3) device types, and (4) marketing plans, and it rejected the agency’s harmless-error defense (90 F. 4th 357, 376–384). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve conflicts among the circuits and to clarify whether the FDA’s denials complied with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

Opinion of the Court

Justice Alito, writing for a unanimous Court, vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded. The Court first declined to decide whether the FDA was required to issue notice-and-comment regulations rather than guidance. It then applied the “change-in-position” doctrine, under which an agency may change policy so long as it “provide[s] a reasoned explanation,” “display[s] awareness that it is changing position,” and considers “serious reliance interests.”

1. Scientific Evidence
   The TCA contemplates both “well-controlled investigations” and “other valid scientific evidence.” The FDA’s guidance made clear that, absent randomized trials or cohort studies, manufacturers must submit “robust” alternative evidence bridged to their specific products. The Court held the agency’s denial orders simply applied that approach: respondents offered literature reviews and surveys, but not evidence sufficiently tied to their flavored products. No unacknowledged “change” occurred.

2. Comparative Efficacy
   The TCA requires comparisons of new products to other tobacco products and the FDA’s guidance recommended comparing health risks “within the same category and … different categories as appropriate”. Its later emphasis on dessert-, candy-, and fruit-flavors over tobacco flavors naturally flowed from data showing those flavors disproportionately appeal to youth. The denial orders tracked that guidance, not a repudiation of it.

3. Device Type
   A 2020 guidance prioritized enforcement against flavored, cartridge-based products, but it also covered any products “targeted to, or whose marketing is likely to promote use by, minors”. The FDA reasonably concluded youth demand shifted from disposable cartridges to other flavored devices, justifying scrutiny of all flavored products regardless of cartridge status.

4. Harmless Error and Marketing Plans
   Although the FDA admitted it did not review marketing plans—contrary to its guidance—it did not seek plenary review of that finding. Instead, the agency asked the Court to clarify the proper harmless-error standard. Noting tension between the remand rule of SEC v. Chenery Corp. and the APA’s harmless-error directive the Court held the Fifth Circuit misread Calcutt v. FDIC by treating its sole exception to the remand rule as universal. The Court vacated and remanded for the Fifth Circuit to apply a proper blend of remand-and-harmless-error principles.

Separate Opinions

Justice Sotomayor filed a brief concurrence emphasizing that the record shows the FDA provided consistent, clear guidance on the need for rigorous product-specific evidence that benefits to adult smokers outweigh youth risks. She stressed that e-cigarette regulation under the TCA served a core public-health purpose and did not support any suggestion that the FDA “was unable or unwilling to say in clear and specific terms precisely what applicants would have to provide.”

Nuance of the Law

The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 (TCA) brought tobacco products within the FDA’s ambit for the first time while preserving the FDCA’s existing premarket approval scheme for “new drugs”. A “new tobacco product” is any tobacco product not marketed in the U.S. before February 15, 2007 and the TCA mandates FDA authorization before sale. To approve a PMTA, the agency must find the product “appropriate for the protection of the public health,” weighing “risks and benefits to the population as a whole” and the likelihood of adult cessation versus youth initiation. Those findings “when appropriate” rely on “well-controlled investigations” or “other valid scientific evidence,” but the statute leaves to the FDA’s discretion what studies or data suffice.

This delegation reflects Congress’s judgment that tobacco products pose unique, shifting risks—particularly because of rapidly proliferating flavors and devices—requiring individualized review rather than blanket standards. At the same time, Congress bounded the FDA’s power by insisting on a public-health test rather than an outright ban and by providing judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 706 via the TCA’s review provision. In turn, the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard demands agency consistency or, if it changes course, “a reasoned explanation,” awareness of reliance interests, and consideration of serious reliance. Finally, the remand rule of SEC v. Chenery must be harmonized with the APA’s harmless-error directive to permit courts to remand when an agency “rested decision on an unsustainable reason,” but also to excuse harmless errors that “had no bearing” on the outcome.