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CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., Docket No. 23-1201

The Supreme Court has waded into a subtle wrinkle in a law that decides when you can take a foreign government to court here in the United States. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, a country generally can’t claim immunity when the law itself lists clear exceptions—and when the papers are served properly. The question before the justices was whether you also had to prove some extra connection, or “minimum contacts,” as a separate step.

In a unanimous opinion, the Court said no. Once an exception in the law applies and service of process is done right, courts don’t get to add another hurdle. The decision removes the extra test the Ninth Circuit had imposed and sends the case back for proceedings under the straightforward rule Congress wrote.

Summary of the Case

In January 2005 Devas Multimedia Private Ltd., an Indian‐incorporated company, entered into a satellite‐leasing agreement with Antrix Corporation Ltd., the commercial arm of India's Department of Space, to obtain capacity on two new S-band satellites. When the Government of India later reallocated that spectrum for its own use, Antrix invoked a force-majeure clause and terminated the contract. Devas initiated arbitration in India; the panel unanimously found that Antrix had wrongfully repudiated the agreement and awarded Devas $562.5 million plus interest. After obtaining enforcement in France and the United Kingdom, Devas sought confirmation of the award in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's arbitration exception. The District Court confirmed the award and entered a $1.29 billion judgment. A Ninth Circuit panel reversed, ruling that Antrix lacked sufficient connections to the United States. Devas petitioned the Supreme Court to resolve whether the FSIA requires such connections for jurisdiction.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Alito, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act grants personal jurisdiction over a foreign state "whenever an immunity exception applies and service of process has been accomplished," without any additional due-process or minimum-contacts inquiry. The Court reasoned that the law imposes just two prerequisites—(1) an applicable exception to sovereign immunity and (2) proper service—and then mandates jurisdiction by the unambiguous "shall exist" language. Although the immunity exceptions themselves require certain connections to the United States, there is no textual basis to read the law as requiring a separate contacts test. To do so would undermine the FSIA's "comprehensive framework" linking immunity waivers and jurisdictional grants. Legislative history confirms that Congress viewed the exceptions as meeting due-process norms. The Court reversed and remanded.

How Foreign Sovereign Immunity Works in US Courts: No Extra Hurdles Required

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act created a clear system for determining when foreign governments can be sued in American courts. It replaced the previous case-by-case diplomatic determinations with specific exceptions to immunity (such as commercial activity, tort, property seizure, and arbitration) and gave federal courts jurisdiction when these exceptions apply and proper service is made.

The Supreme Court clarified that while traditional personal jurisdiction rules require showing "minimum contacts" with the United States, the FSIA doesn't add this as a separate requirement. Instead, the immunity exceptions themselves already define what connections to the US are necessary. The Court found that adding an extra, judge-made contacts test would disrupt the carefully designed system Congress created.

This decision respects both the law's goal of providing clear standards and the principle of international courtesy that underlies sovereign immunity. By letting the statutory exceptions themselves define when jurisdiction exists, the Court preserved the straightforward framework Congress intended.

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The Supreme Court looked at a case involving the Food and Drug Administration and a company that wanted to sell flavored e-cigarettes. The lower court had said the FDA was wrong to deny the company’s request to sell these products, calling the agency’s actions unfair and inconsistent. But the Supreme Court disagreed, saying the FDA had actually followed its own rules and guidance when it made its decision.

The justices explained that the FDA’s process for reviewing these e-cigarette products was in line with what it had told companies to expect, especially when it came to the kind of scientific evidence and comparisons it wanted to see. The Court also said that the FDA didn’t break any rules by sticking to its earlier positions. However, the Supreme Court didn’t end the case there. Instead, it sent the case back to the lower court to take another look at whether the FDA made a harmless mistake by not reviewing the company’s marketing plans. This case shows how the courts look closely at whether government agencies are following their own guidelines, and what happens if they don’t.

Summary of the Case

In FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, LLC (No. 23-1038), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) denied premarket tobacco product applications (PMTAs) submitted by two e-liquid manufacturers, Wages and White Lion (dba Triton) and Vapetasia. Under the Tobacco Control Act of 2009 (TCA), any “new tobacco product”—including most flavored e-liquids sold after February 15, 2007—may not be marketed absent FDA authorization, which must be granted only if the product “would be appropriate for the protection of the public health.” 21 U.S.C. § 387j(c)(2)(A). The FDA concluded the applicants had not submitted sufficient scientific evidence—including randomized controlled trials or longitudinal cohort studies—to demonstrate benefits for adult smokers that would outweigh youth-initiation risks, nor did it review their marketing-plan commitments (Syllabus, pp. 2–3; App. 177a, 285a).

The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by applying standards different from those announced in pre-decision guidance concerning (1) types of scientific evidence, (2) cross-flavor comparisons, (3) device types, and (4) marketing plans, and it rejected the agency’s harmless-error defense (90 F. 4th 357, 376–384). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve conflicts among the circuits and to clarify whether the FDA’s denials complied with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

Opinion of the Court

Justice Alito, writing for a unanimous Court, vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded. The Court first declined to decide whether the FDA was required to issue notice-and-comment regulations rather than guidance. It then applied the “change-in-position” doctrine, under which an agency may change policy so long as it “provide[s] a reasoned explanation,” “display[s] awareness that it is changing position,” and considers “serious reliance interests.”

1. Scientific Evidence
   The TCA contemplates both “well-controlled investigations” and “other valid scientific evidence.” The FDA’s guidance made clear that, absent randomized trials or cohort studies, manufacturers must submit “robust” alternative evidence bridged to their specific products. The Court held the agency’s denial orders simply applied that approach: respondents offered literature reviews and surveys, but not evidence sufficiently tied to their flavored products. No unacknowledged “change” occurred.

2. Comparative Efficacy
   The TCA requires comparisons of new products to other tobacco products and the FDA’s guidance recommended comparing health risks “within the same category and … different categories as appropriate”. Its later emphasis on dessert-, candy-, and fruit-flavors over tobacco flavors naturally flowed from data showing those flavors disproportionately appeal to youth. The denial orders tracked that guidance, not a repudiation of it.

3. Device Type
   A 2020 guidance prioritized enforcement against flavored, cartridge-based products, but it also covered any products “targeted to, or whose marketing is likely to promote use by, minors”. The FDA reasonably concluded youth demand shifted from disposable cartridges to other flavored devices, justifying scrutiny of all flavored products regardless of cartridge status.

4. Harmless Error and Marketing Plans
   Although the FDA admitted it did not review marketing plans—contrary to its guidance—it did not seek plenary review of that finding. Instead, the agency asked the Court to clarify the proper harmless-error standard. Noting tension between the remand rule of SEC v. Chenery Corp. and the APA’s harmless-error directive the Court held the Fifth Circuit misread Calcutt v. FDIC by treating its sole exception to the remand rule as universal. The Court vacated and remanded for the Fifth Circuit to apply a proper blend of remand-and-harmless-error principles.

Separate Opinions

Justice Sotomayor filed a brief concurrence emphasizing that the record shows the FDA provided consistent, clear guidance on the need for rigorous product-specific evidence that benefits to adult smokers outweigh youth risks. She stressed that e-cigarette regulation under the TCA served a core public-health purpose and did not support any suggestion that the FDA “was unable or unwilling to say in clear and specific terms precisely what applicants would have to provide.”

Nuance of the Law

The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 (TCA) brought tobacco products within the FDA’s ambit for the first time while preserving the FDCA’s existing premarket approval scheme for “new drugs”. A “new tobacco product” is any tobacco product not marketed in the U.S. before February 15, 2007 and the TCA mandates FDA authorization before sale. To approve a PMTA, the agency must find the product “appropriate for the protection of the public health,” weighing “risks and benefits to the population as a whole” and the likelihood of adult cessation versus youth initiation. Those findings “when appropriate” rely on “well-controlled investigations” or “other valid scientific evidence,” but the statute leaves to the FDA’s discretion what studies or data suffice.

This delegation reflects Congress’s judgment that tobacco products pose unique, shifting risks—particularly because of rapidly proliferating flavors and devices—requiring individualized review rather than blanket standards. At the same time, Congress bounded the FDA’s power by insisting on a public-health test rather than an outright ban and by providing judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 706 via the TCA’s review provision. In turn, the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard demands agency consistency or, if it changes course, “a reasoned explanation,” awareness of reliance interests, and consideration of serious reliance. Finally, the remand rule of SEC v. Chenery must be harmonized with the APA’s harmless-error directive to permit courts to remand when an agency “rested decision on an unsustainable reason,” but also to excuse harmless errors that “had no bearing” on the outcome.

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Here’s a case that turns on a small but important twist in the way we protect our waterways. In City and County of San Francisco v. Environmental Protection Agency, the Supreme Court took up the question of whether the EPA can issue pollution permits that simply say, “Make sure the river stays clean,” without spelling out exactly what steps a company must take. The Court said no. Under the Clean Water Act, the EPA has to give clear, step-by-step limits on how much of a pollutant can go into the water. It can’t leave a business guessing or hold it liable only when water quality slips.

Summary of the Case

In 2019, EPA renewed San Francisco’s NPDES permit for its Oceanside combined-sewer overflow facility and, for the first time, included two “receiving-water limitations.” One provision barred any discharge that “contribute[s] to a violation of any applicable water quality standard,” and the other prohibited discharges that “create pollution, contamination, or nuisance” under California law. San Francisco petitioned for review in the Ninth Circuit, arguing that Clean Water Act does not authorize these “end-result” requirements—conditions that hold permittees liable for the quality of the receiving waters rather than prescribing specific practices or numeric effluent limits. The Ninth Circuit upheld EPA, construing the legal authorization of “any more stringent limitation . . . necessary to meet or implement any applicable water quality standard” to encompass end-result provisions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether EPA may condition permit compliance on receiving-water quality.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Alito delivered a unanimous opinion reversing the Ninth Circuit. The Court held that current law does not authorize “end-result” requirements in NPDES permits. Its analysis rested on three pillars:
1. Text and structure. Subsections (A) and (B) of § 1311(b)(1) refer expressly to “effluent limitations”which are numeric or definitional caps on discharges. Whereas subsection (C) authorizes only “any more stringent limitation” that is “necessary to meet” or “required to implement” water quality standards. The ordinary meaning of “limitation,” and the verbs “meet” and “implement,” point to specific, externally imposed restrictions on quantities, practices, or methods, not open-ended liability for end results.
2. Statutory history. Congress deliberately abandoned the pre-1972 enforcement model, suing polluters after water bodies failed to meet quality standards, in favor of a forward-looking permit regime. Allowing EPA to reintroduce abatement-style, receiving-water requirements would contravene that design.
3. Permitting scheme. End-result provisions undermine the CWA’s “permit shield”, which protects permittees who adhere to all permit terms, and they offer no mechanism for allocating responsibility when multiple dischargers contribute to a water quality violation. EPA has ample alternative tools including numeric and narrative effluent limitations, best-management practices, information-gathering authority and emergency powers to safeguard water quality.
Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Barrett filed a partial dissent, joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. While she agreed with the majority that EPA laws are not confined to numeric effluent limitations, she disputed the Court’s restrictive interpretation of what counts as a “limitation.” Barrett argued that prohibitions on discharges that violate water quality standards are “limitations” in ordinary and statutory usage. She maintained that any concerns about vagueness or multiple polluters can be addressed through arbitrary-and-capricious review or by EPA crafting clearer permit terms, and she would have affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s broader reading of the law in question.

Dual Structures of Authority

The CWA’s NPDES program rests on carefully calibrated statutory language. Section 1311(b)(1) draws a distinction between technology-based “effluent limitations” which cap pollutant quantities, rates or concentrations and the broader authority in (C) to impose “any more stringent limitation” needed “to meet” or “implement” state or federal water quality standards. By omitting the word “effluent” before “limitation” in (C), Congress signaled that EPA may employ non-numeric measures—best-management practices, narrative restrictions, or other operational controls—to achieve water quality goals. At the same time, the 1972 amendments discarded the WPCA’s retrospective abatement actions in favor of a proactive permit regime and enshrined a “permit shield” to insulate compliant permittees from liability. This dual structure empowers EPA to balance uniform technology floors with site-specific water quality objectives, requiring clear, enforceable permit terms while respecting state standards. Where ambiguity or attribution issues arise—such as multiple dischargers—EPA and the courts can resolve them through regulatory guidance or judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.

The Supreme Court tackled a complex issue regarding immigration notices. The case involved noncitizens who argued that they should be able to challenge their removal orders because they didn’t receive proper initial notices to appear. However, the Court decided that if these individuals later received a notice of hearing that included the time and date, they could not contest their removal orders based on the earlier notice being flawed.

The justices concluded that either a compliant initial notice or a subsequent notice of hearing is enough to meet the legal requirements. This means that as long as the noncitizens were informed about when to appear, the earlier mistakes in the notices don’t give them grounds to fight their removal.

Justice Samuel Alito wrote the majority opinion, and he was joined by Justices Roberts, Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. On the other side, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson dissented, supported by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch. This decision highlights the nuances of immigration law and the importance of how notices are handled in removal proceedings.

Summary of the Case

The case of Campos-Chaves v. Garland arose from the removal proceedings of three aliens—Moris Esmelis Campos-Chaves, Varinder Singh, and Raul Daniel Mendez-Colín—who sought to rescind their in absentia removal orders. Each alien argued that they did not receive proper notice of their removal hearings as mandated by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), specifically under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). The core issue was whether the aliens could demonstrate that they did not receive notice in accordance with the statutory requirements, particularly given that the initial Notices to Appear (NTAs) provided by the government lacked specific time and place information for the hearings.

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court, in a decision delivered by Justice Alito, held that the aliens could not seek rescission of their in absentia removal orders because they had received proper notice under § 1229(a)(2) for the hearings they missed. The Court interpreted the statutory language to mean that an alien must demonstrate a lack of notice for the specific hearing at which they were ordered removed. The Court concluded that the government’s provision of a subsequent notice specifying the time and place of the hearings satisfied the notice requirements of the INA, even though the initial NTAs were deficient. Thus, the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision regarding Campos-Chaves and reversed the Ninth Circuit's decisions regarding Singh and Mendez-Colín.

Separate Opinions

Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Justice Jackson argued that the majority's interpretation undermined the statutory requirement for a compliant NTA, emphasizing that the government must provide a complete NTA that includes time and place information. She contended that the majority's ruling effectively allowed the government to bypass its obligations under the INA, thereby jeopardizing the procedural protections intended for noncitizens facing removal.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Jackson's dissent highlighted that the majority's decision misread the statutory framework by treating the notice under § 1229(a)(2) as sufficient to cure the deficiencies of the initial NTA. She argued that the law requires a compliant NTA to initiate removal proceedings, and that the lack of such a notice should allow for rescission of the removal orders. Jackson maintained that the majority's ruling could lead to significant injustices, as it would permit removals based on inadequate notice.

Nuance of the Law

The law governing removal proceedings, particularly 8 U.S.C. § 1229, establishes a dual notice requirement: an initial NTA under § 1229(a)(1) and a follow-up notice under § 1229(a)(2) in cases of changes to the hearing schedule. The Court's interpretation emphasized that the statutory language must be read in context, with the understanding that either form of notice can satisfy the requirements for removal proceedings. The majority's ruling hinged on the disjunctive nature of the word "or," suggesting that receipt of either type of notice suffices for compliance. In contrast, the dissent argued for a more stringent interpretation, asserting that the initial NTA's deficiencies could not be remedied by subsequent notices, thus preserving the integrity of the statutory notice requirements. This case illustrates the complexities of statutory interpretation in immigration law and the balance between procedural safeguards and the government's authority to enforce removal orders.

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The Supreme Court tackled a complex case involving the design of South Carolina's Congressional District 1. The justices looked closely at whether race played a major role in how this district was drawn. In a decision led by Justice Samuel Alito, the Court found that the lower court had made a mistake in saying that race was the main factor in the district's design.

The justices emphasized that those challenging the district needed to show clear evidence that lawmakers had put racial considerations above traditional, race-neutral rules for drawing district lines. They also pointed out that the challengers did not provide an alternative map to back up their claims. This ruling highlights the importance of proving that race was improperly prioritized in the redistricting process.

Additionally, the Court sent back to the lower court a related issue about whether the way votes were diluted in this district was handled correctly. This means that while the Court disagreed with the lower court's findings on race, they still want to ensure that all aspects of the case are thoroughly examined.

In the end, this case reminds us of the delicate balance in the law when it comes to race and representation in our political system.

Summary of the Case

The case of Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP arose from a challenge to South Carolina's congressional districting plan following the 2020 Census. The plaintiffs, including the NAACP and a voter from District 1, alleged that the newly drawn District 1 was a racial gerrymander that diluted the voting power of Black residents. The three-judge District Court found that race played a predominant role in the design of District 1, violating the Equal Protection Clause. The State appealed, arguing that the court erred in its factual findings and legal standards regarding the use of race in redistricting.

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court, in a decision delivered by Justice Alito, reversed the District Court's ruling, stating that the finding that race predominated in the design of District 1 was clearly erroneous. The Court emphasized that the Constitution grants state legislatures the primary responsibility for drawing congressional districts, and that claims of partisan gerrymandering are not justiciable in federal court. The Court held that to prove a racial gerrymandering claim, plaintiffs must demonstrate that race was the predominant factor in the legislature's decision-making, which the challengers failed to do. The Court noted that the challengers did not provide direct evidence of a racial gerrymander and that their circumstantial evidence was weak. The Court also criticized the District Court for not drawing an adverse inference against the challengers for failing to submit an alternative map that would show how the State could achieve its political objectives while maintaining greater racial balance.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, agreeing with the Court's conclusion but expressing concern that the majority's analysis in Part III-C exceeded the proper scope of clear-error review. He emphasized that the Court should not sift through factual details but should focus on the legal errors made by the District Court.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, dissented. She argued that the District Court's factual findings were plausible and should have been upheld under the clear-error standard. Kagan contended that the majority's opinion improperly favored the State's narrative over the District Court's credibility assessments and evidence presented by the challengers. She criticized the majority for imposing a new evidentiary burden on plaintiffs by requiring an alternative map, which she argued was not necessary under existing precedents.

Racial Gerrymandering

The law surrounding racial gerrymandering is complex, particularly in cases where race and partisan affiliation are closely correlated. The Supreme Court has established that while state legislatures have broad discretion in redistricting, they cannot use race as a predominant factor in drawing district lines without facing strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court's decision in this case reinforces the presumption of legislative good faith and the requirement for challengers to provide compelling evidence that race was the primary motivation behind districting decisions. The introduction of an adverse inference for failing to provide an alternative map adds a significant hurdle for plaintiffs, potentially complicating future racial gerrymandering claims. This case illustrates the ongoing tension between political considerations in redistricting and the constitutional protections against racial discrimination in electoral processes.