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Thousands of federal prisoners serving sentences that would be dramatically shorter under today's laws have just lost their best chance at freedom. In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that judges cannot consider sentencing gaps when deciding whether to grant early release, even when Congress itself changed the law but refused to apply it to people already locked up. For men like Daniel Rutherford and Johnnie Carter, who are serving decades in prison under rules that no longer exist, the ruling means they're stuck serving sentences that could be cut in half if they were sentenced today.

What Happened and Why It Matters

Rutherford and Carter were sentenced under an old rule that forced judges to stack mandatory minimum sentences on top of each other for certain gun crimes. In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act and eliminated that stacking rule, but only for people sentenced after the law took effect. The two men asked courts to reduce their sentences under a process called compassionate release, arguing that the gap between their sentences and what someone would get today was extraordinary enough to justify early release. A federal sentencing agency agreed and said judges could consider these gaps. The Supreme Court disagreed and struck down that policy.

The case reveals a fundamental disagreement about fairness. Rutherford and Carter argued that judges should have flexibility to look at the full picture of each person's situation. They pointed out that compassionate release is already extremely rare, with only 56 approvals nationwide in all of 2025. The government countered that Congress deliberately chose not to apply the new rule retroactively, and allowing judges to grant relief case by case would quietly undo that choice.

The Court's Decision

Justice Barrett, writing for the majority, said the words "extraordinary and compelling" in the compassionate release law simply cannot cover sentencing gaps created by laws Congress chose not to apply retroactively. Since new sentencing laws routinely apply only going forward, she reasoned, the resulting gap is neither extraordinary nor compelling. The majority also rejected the argument that Congress's silence on sentencing gaps means judges can consider them. Just because Congress only explicitly banned one thing, using rehabilitation alone as a reason, does not mean everything else is automatically allowed.

The Dissent's Counterargument

Justice Sotomayor, joined by two other justices, argued the majority gave Congress's silence too much weight. Congress chose not to make the change automatic, she wrote, but that does not mean sentencing gaps can never be one factor in an individual case. She pointed out that other common experiences like aging and illness can support compassionate release, yet no one argues those are "extraordinary." The dissent also noted that the sentencing agency's rule was strict and produced only 98 grants nationwide in 2024 out of more than 130,000 federal prisoners, so there was no real danger of opening floodgates.

Early Release for Thousands Serving Outdated Sentences

The decision creates a hard line. Judges cannot even consider whether someone is serving a sentence far longer than current law would impose. This closes off one of the only remaining options for thousands of people sentenced under the old gun stacking rules. Congress could step in and fix this, but there is no guarantee it will. For now, these prisoners have no clear path to individual review, even in cases where the gap between their sentence and what they would receive today is dramatic.

The case highlights a real tension in how courts balance broad legislative choices against individual fairness. When Congress changes sentencing rules but refuses to apply them retroactively, should judges have any ability to consider that gap in individual cases? The majority said no. The dissent said judges should at least have the chance to look at the full picture. That disagreement will shape compassionate release cases for years to come.

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A man serving life in prison for murder convinced his own trial judge that serious doubts about his guilt justified cutting his sentence. But the Supreme Court just shut that door. In a decision that could affect thousands of federal prisoners, the Court ruled that even compelling evidence of innocence cannot be used to reduce a sentence through compassionate release. The decision leaves a troubling gap: prisoners who may be innocent but missed legal deadlines have nowhere left to turn.

The Case: A Conviction Built on One Witness

Joe Fernandez was convicted of murder for hire based largely on testimony from his co-conspirator, Patrick Darge. After exhausting the normal appeals process, Fernandez tried something different. He asked the judge to reduce his life sentence under a federal law allowing "compassionate release" for extraordinary circumstances. His argument was that serious doubts about whether he was actually guilty qualified as extraordinary. The judge who presided over his original trial agreed, saying he had real concerns about whether the verdict was correct. But an appeals court reversed that decision, and the Supreme Court sided with the appeals court in a 6-2-1 ruling.

The Two Sides: Safety Valve vs. Loophole

Fernandez's lawyers argued that compassionate release was designed as a safety valve, a way for judges to fix unjust results when rigid procedural rules get in the way. They pointed out that the law uses broad language and nothing explicitly bars judges from considering doubts about guilt.

The government disagreed sharply. Prosecutors warned that allowing conviction challenges through compassionate release would create an endless loophole. Congress, they argued, deliberately built strict rules into the standard post-conviction process, including tight deadlines and limits on how many times you can file. Allowing prisoners to bypass those rules through compassionate release would erase those protections entirely.

What the Court Decided

Justice Barrett, writing for the majority, held that doubts about guilt do not count as "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for compassionate release. The Court reasoned that claims about whether someone should be imprisoned at all must go through the proper post-conviction process, not through other laws. Allowing a shortcut would let prisoners dodge the strict requirements Congress deliberately created.

The majority also noted that compassionate release was designed for situations like terminal illness or old age, not for relitigating trials. Congress routed these requests through the Bureau of Prisons, an agency focused on prison conditions, not trial records. If a conviction is truly invalid, the Court added, simply reducing a sentence by a few years does not actually fix the problem.

The Justices Who Disagreed

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Kagan, agreed Fernandez should lose but for a simpler reason. She argued that compassionate release requires something new to have happened since sentencing. Because Fernandez's motion relied on facts known since his trial, with no new evidence, it should fail regardless of any connection to conviction challenges. She criticized the majority's approach as disconnected from what the law actually says and warned it could block legitimate requests for sentence reductions.

Justice Jackson dissented alone. She argued the words "extraordinary and compelling" describe how strong a reason must be, not what kind of reason qualifies. Congress, she noted, only placed two express limits on what counts, and neither one excludes conviction-related concerns. She raised a critical concern: under the majority's rule, a prisoner who is actually innocent but missed legal deadlines would have no path to relief whatsoever. The majority acknowledged this gap but did not resolve it.

What Qualifies as Compassionate Release

The practical impact is stark. Federal prisoners across the country can no longer use doubts about their guilt as grounds for compassionate release, no matter how serious or well-supported those doubts may be. The decision creates the troubling situation when prisoner who is genuinely innocent but has exhausted or missed the standard post-conviction process has nowhere left to go.

The deeper question the Court left unanswered may prove most important. What happens to someone who is actually innocent but cannot satisfy the strict requirements of the standard post-conviction process? The majority acknowledged the problem but offered no solution. That unresolved gap could affect real people for years to come.

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A truck driver who lost his leg in a crash just won a major victory for safety at the Supreme Court. The justices unanimously ruled that companies arranging freight shipments can be held legally responsible if they carelessly hire unsafe carriers. The decision overturns a legal shield that had protected brokers from lawsuits in much of the country and opens the door for injured workers and accident victims to seek damages from the middlemen who arrange trucking jobs.

What Happened

Shawn Montgomery was a truck driver whose parked rig was struck by another truck, resulting in the amputation of his leg. The driver who hit him worked for Caribe Transport II, a carrier hired through C.H. Robinson Worldwide, a major transportation broker. Montgomery discovered that C.H. Robinson had hired Caribe despite federal safety inspectors flagging serious problems with the company's driver training, vehicle maintenance, and crash history. He sued C.H. Robinson for negligent hiring, arguing the broker should have known better.

The case hinged on a 1994 federal law designed to create a national trucking market by preventing states from imposing conflicting rules on prices, routes, and services. But the law included an exception: states could still enforce safety rules. The question was whether that safety exception protected Montgomery's lawsuit or whether it was blocked by the broader deregulation rule.

The Arguments

Montgomery's lawyers said the safety exception clearly covered negligent hiring claims. If a broker carelessly selects an unsafe carrier and someone gets hurt, that directly affects public safety on the roads. They also pointed out that brokers could easily protect themselves by doing basic background checks before hiring carriers.

C.H. Robinson and the trucking industry countered with three main concerns. First, they argued that allowing these lawsuits would essentially eliminate the entire deregulation law. Second, they worried about the practical fallout: more litigation, higher insurance costs, and ultimately higher prices for consumers. Third, they highlighted what they saw as an absurd inconsistency in the law: under Montgomery's reading, a broker could be sued for arranging a long-distance shipment but not a local one.

The Court's Decision

Justice Barrett, writing for all nine justices, sided with Montgomery. The Court found that state negligence laws count as safety authority and that negligent hiring claims clearly "concern" motor vehicle safety. When a broker carelessly picks an unsafe carrier, the trucks that result are directly affected. The Court rejected all of C.H. Robinson's arguments, noting that many preempted state laws like price controls have nothing to do with safety, so the safety exception would not swallow the entire rule.

The Court acknowledged the inconsistency between interstate and intrastate rules but refused to rewrite the law to fix it. Sometimes statutes contain puzzles, the justices said, and courts should not invent solutions.

A Closer Look From One Justice

Justice Kavanaugh agreed with the outcome but expressed real concerns about the industry's position. He noted that federal law requires carriers to carry insurance but imposes no such requirement on brokers, which might suggest Congress never intended brokers to face lawsuits. He also called the interstate-intrastate inconsistency "rather glaring."

Yet Kavanaugh ultimately sided with the majority because the deregulation law was about economics, not safety. Federal law imposes no meaningful safety obligations on brokers when selecting carriers, making it hard to believe Congress wanted to leave them completely unaccountable. He also noted that standard legal requirements, like proving the broker's negligence actually caused the harm, would protect brokers from frivolous suits. Kavanaugh suggested Congress could address industry concerns directly if needed.

Trucking Brokers Can Be Sued for Negligent Hiring

The ruling affects roughly 28,000 brokers who arrange about one-third of all freight shipments nationwide. Before this decision, brokers in certain parts of the country were largely protected from negligent hiring lawsuits. That protection is now gone everywhere.

The decision reflects a straightforward principle: companies that hire contractors to do dangerous work have a responsibility to check whether those contractors are safe. If they do not, and someone gets hurt, they can be held accountable. The law still protects brokers in important ways. Plaintiffs must prove the broker's negligence actually caused the injury, and brokers can defend themselves by showing they acted reasonably. But the days of blanket immunity are over.

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The tricky part of the law here is what rules control when a case is in federal court: the state’s extra paperwork rules, or the federal court’s basic rules for starting a lawsuit.

In Berk v. Choy, the Supreme Court said Delaware’s rule for medical malpractice cases, making a patient file a medical professional’s affidavit of merit along with the complaint, does not apply in federal court. The justices said that requirement clashes with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which says a complaint only needs a short and plain statement of the claim. The Court also pointed to other federal rules, like the ones tied to dismissing a case or testing the facts later on.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett wrote for the Court, and she was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson agreed with the outcome.

So what does that mean in plain terms? If you bring this kind of Delaware medical malpractice claim in federal court, you don’t have to clear Delaware’s affidavit step just to get in the door—because the federal rules set the standard for what a complaint must include.

Supreme Court Rules Federal Courts Don't Have to Follow State Requirements for Medical Malpractice Lawsuits

Harold Berk, a Florida resident, injured his ankle while receiving treatment at a Delaware hospital. He decided to sue Dr. Wilson Choy and Beebe Medical Center in federal court for medical malpractice, claiming they violated Delaware law. Because Berk and the defendants were from different states, he was allowed to bring his case in federal court under what's called diversity jurisdiction.

Here's where things got complicated. Delaware has a law that says anyone filing a medical malpractice lawsuit must attach a special document called an affidavit of merit. This affidavit must be signed by a medical professional who confirms there are reasonable grounds to believe malpractice actually happened. Berk couldn't get a doctor to sign such an affidavit before his deadline ran out. The trial court threw out his case for failing to follow Delaware's affidavit law, and an appeals court agreed, saying that federal courts had to respect this Delaware requirement.

The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed that decision by saying that Delaware's affidavit requirement doesn't apply in federal court because it conflicts with the federal rules that govern how lawsuits work.

Arguments Made By Counsel

Berk's lawyer, Andrew Tutt, argued that Delaware's affidavit requirement creates unavoidable problems with multiple federal rules, especially Rule 8 and Rule 9. These federal rules establish what's called a notice pleading system. Under this system, someone filing a lawsuit only needs to provide a short and plain statement of their claim. Tutt emphasized that Delaware's law is really about procedure, meaning it's about how you file a lawsuit, not about the underlying legal rights. He pointed out that Delaware applies this affidavit rule to all malpractice suits filed in Delaware courts, no matter which state's law actually governs the case. And Delaware doesn't require this affidavit when Delaware malpractice claims are filed in other states. This shows the law is really about regulating the litigation process itself, not the underlying right to sue for malpractice.

The defendants' lawyer, Frederick Yarger, pushed back by saying these conflicts were entirely hypothetical. He characterized Delaware's requirement as a substantive state regulation of medical negligence claims. He compared it to a 1949 Supreme Court case that upheld a state requirement that plaintiffs post a security bond. Yarger argued the affidavit could be enforced through existing federal mechanisms, like dismissing cases or granting early summary judgment. He emphasized that states must retain authority to regulate their own causes of action. He also stressed that medical malpractice reform, including affidavit requirements, has been an important way for states to respond to rising insurance costs.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Barrett wrote the opinion for eight justices. She held that Federal Rule 8 directly answers the disputed question and therefore replaces Delaware's law. The analytical framework is straightforward. When a federal rule answers the question in dispute, it governs unless it exceeds what Congress authorized or goes beyond Congress's power to make rules.

The Court framed the disputed question as whether Berk's lawsuit could be dismissed because his complaint wasn't accompanied by an expert affidavit. Rule 8 answers this by saying that a plaintiff only needs to provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing that he is entitled to relief. By requiring no more than a statement of the claim, Rule 8 establishes, implicitly but with unmistakable clarity, that evidence of the claim is not required at the pleading stage. Rule 12 reinforces this point by providing only one merits based ground for dismissal, which is failure to state a claim, and by prohibiting courts from considering matters outside the pleadings.

The Court rejected the defendants' attempts to rewrite Delaware's law into a free floating evidentiary requirement that could be enforced through inherent authority or summary judgment. Such creative rewriting found no home in the federal rules, which already prescribe the mechanism for putting plaintiffs to their proof. That mechanism is Rule 56 summary judgment, which requires adequate time for discovery.

The Court also rejected the argument that Rule 11 incorporates state affidavit laws. Rule 11 includes language stating that a pleading need not be verified or accompanied by an affidavit unless a rule or statute specifically states otherwise. But the Court said Rule 11 governs the conduct of attorneys and people representing themselves, not third party affidavits from medical professionals.

Finally, the Court said Rule 8 satisfies the Rules Enabling Act because it really regulates procedure. It determines what plaintiffs must present to the court at the beginning of litigation, regulating only the process for enforcing those rights, not the rights themselves.

Separate Opinions

Justice Jackson agreed with the outcome but disagreed about which federal rules create the conflict. She would have found the primary conflict with Rule 3, which states that a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court. Delaware's law answers the same question, which is what is required to start a medical malpractice case, but demands an affidavit or extension motion before the clerk can file or docket the complaint. This creates a direct collision regarding commencement requirements.

She also identified an internal inconsistency. The majority's Rule 12 analysis treats the affidavit as a matter outside the pleadings, yet its Rule 8 analysis treats the affidavit requirement as governing pleading contents. A coherent conflicts analysis cannot have it both ways, she wrote.

Justice Jackson emphasized that federal rules should be interpreted with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies, and that five justices in a previous case endorsed this approach.

When Federal Rules Trump State Procedural Requirements

This decision clarifies and reinforces the framework for determining when federal rules displace state procedural requirements in cases involving parties from different states. The analysis bypasses complicated questions entirely when a federal rule is on point. Courts first ask whether a federal rule answers the question in dispute using ordinary interpretive methods, giving the rule its plain meaning. If it does, the federal rule governs unless it exceeds what Congress authorized.

The validity test remains modest. The question is whether the rule really regulates procedure by governing the manner and the means by which rights are enforced. Critically, the substantive nature of a state law, or its substantive purpose, makes no difference to this analysis. The Court has rejected every statutory challenge to a federal rule that has come before it.

The disagreement between the majority and Justice Jackson highlights an important methodological tension. How broadly should courts interpret federal rules when checking for conflicts? The majority's broad reading of Rule 8, as addressing all information about the merits at the beginning of litigation, creates conflicts with any state law requiring evidentiary support before pleading closes. Justice Jackson's narrower reading, confining Rule 8 to pleading contents, would permit more state procedural requirements to coexist with federal practice.

For lawyers and litigants, this case confirms that the notice pleading system established by the 1938 federal rules sets a ceiling on what federal courts can require at the complaint stage. States cannot condition access to federal court on evidentiary showings that contradict this fundamental design, regardless of how they label such requirements or what substantive purposes they serve. Medical malpractice reform through affidavit requirements remains available in state courts, but federal courts remain governed by their own procedural system.

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This ruling hinges on a carefully hidden part of a law passed back in 1789. It asks whether judges can block a government order for everyone, or only for the people who brought a lawsuit.

The Supreme Court said judges probably go too far when they issue “universal injunctions.” Those are orders that halt an action against anyone, not just the parties in the case. So the three lower court orders that had stopped President Trump’s rule on birthright citizenship will now apply only to the named plaintiffs.

The Justices did not weigh in on whether the executive order is good or bad. They focused only on the narrow question of how far a court’s power to issue remedies goes.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett wrote the decision, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Justice Sotomayor, with Justices Kagan and Jackson, disagreed.

Summary of the Case

President Trump's Executive Order No. 14160, titled "Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship," directed federal agencies to withhold or revoke documentation of birthright citizenship for certain people born in the United States based on their parents' status. Three different groups—individual people, associations, and States—filed separate lawsuits claiming that the Order violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause and the Nationality Act of 1940. Each District Court found the Order likely unconstitutional and issued nationwide injunctions preventing its application to anyone in the country. The Government asked the Supreme Court for emergency relief, requesting that these injunctions apply only to the actual plaintiffs in the cases, not to everyone potentially affected. The Supreme Court granted partial stays, limiting the injunctions to protect only the plaintiffs themselves and sending the cases back to lower courts to craft narrower relief if needed.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Barrett, writing for the majority (which included Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh), ruled that nationwide injunctions likely exceed the authority federal courts have under the Judiciary Act of 1789. The Court explained that this Act only allows federal courts to grant remedies similar to those available in English courts at the time of America's founding. Looking at historical practice, the Court found that injunctions were typically limited to the specific parties in a case, not extended to everyone nationwide.

The majority criticized nationwide injunctions for several reasons: they bypass the procedural protections built into class-action lawsuits, they encourage "forum shopping" (where plaintiffs seek out favorable courts), and they intrude on the Executive Branch's authority. The Court emphasized that injunctive relief must be "no more burdensome than necessary" to provide "complete relief" to each plaintiff. Finding that the Government would likely suffer irreparable harm from overly broad injunctions, the Court granted partial stays limiting the injunctions to the actual plaintiffs.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Gorsuch) agreed that universal injunctions lack statutory authority and urged courts to carefully tailor remedies. Justice Alito (joined by Justice Thomas) emphasized the importance of enforcing limitations on third-party standing and strict requirements for class certification. Justice Kavanaugh noted that the Supreme Court often serves as the final decision-maker for emergency relief in high-stakes cases and cautioned against leaving such authority solely to lower courts.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Sotomayor (joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson) dissented, emphasizing that birthright citizenship is a clear constitutional guarantee and arguing that courts have historically had the power to universally enjoin unlawful executive actions. She warned that limiting nationwide injunctions undermines courts' ability to defend fundamental rights and enables unlawful Executive action. Justice Jackson wrote separately to argue that the Judiciary's core function is to command universal compliance with the law, not just provide relief to specific parties. She contended that allowing the government to enforce potentially unlawful policies against non-plaintiffs undermines the rule of law and separation of powers.

The Battle Over Court Authority to Issue Nationwide Injunctions

At the heart of this case is a fundamental question: How far can federal courts go in blocking government actions they deem unlawful? The majority ruled that courts' power to issue injunctions comes from the Judiciary Act of 1789, which authorized remedies similar to those available in English courts at the nation's founding. These remedies included flexibility to handle group actions and prevent multiple lawsuits, but were typically limited to the parties directly involved in a case.

The majority emphasized that court orders must be tailored to provide complete relief to plaintiffs without unnecessary breadth. While modern class-action lawsuits remain a vehicle for group litigation, the Court held that they don't give judges unlimited power to block government policies nationwide.

The dissenters argued that courts have historically had broader authority to stop unconstitutional government actions entirely, not just as applied to specific plaintiffs. They warned that limiting this power could undermine the judiciary's role in protecting constitutional rights and allow potentially unlawful policies to continue against people who haven't filed lawsuits.

This ruling significantly impacts how courts can respond to controversial executive actions, potentially requiring more individuals to file their own lawsuits rather than benefiting from broad injunctions obtained by others.

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Sometimes a single phrase in a law can change everything. In this case, the Supreme Court looked at the rule that lets “any person adversely affected” by an FDA decision ask a judge to review it. The FDA had said no to a new tobacco product, blocking not only the maker but also the shops that wanted to sell it.

The Court said those shops count as “adversely affected” and can challenge the FDA’s denial in court. It also agreed that the case can stay in the home circuit where the stores are located. Seven justices, led by Justice Barrett, sided with the retailers and allowed the challenge to move forward. Two justices, including Justice Jackson joined by Justice Sotomayor, disagreed and felt only the product maker should have that right.

Summary of the Case

In 2016 the FDA determined that e-cigarettes are "new tobacco products" under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA) and deferred enforcement while manufacturers sought premarket approval. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. (RJR Vapor) applied to market its Vuse Alto e-cigarettes but the FDA denied the application for failure to show that marketing the product would be "appropriate for the protection of the public health." RJR Vapor joined with Texas and Mississippi retailers to petition the Fifth Circuit for judicial review under the TCA's "any person adversely affected" clause, thereby invoking Fifth-Circuit venue. The FDA moved to dismiss or transfer the petition, contending only the denied applicant has a statutory right to sue. A divided Fifth Circuit denied that motion, and the FDA sought certiorari.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Barrett, writing for a 7-Justice majority, held that the phrase "any person adversely affected" must be construed consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act's similarly worded cause of action, which the Court has interpreted to grant review to anyone "arguably within" a statute's zone of interests. Retailers who lose the opportunity to sell a denied product and risk enforcement penalties plainly fall within that zone. The FDA's structural argument—that only manufacturers have statutory rights to participation and notice—cannot override the TCA's grant of review to any adversely affected person. Moreover, Congress's use of the narrower term "holder of [the] application" in one section and the broader "any person adversely affected" in another signals differing scopes. Because at least one proper petitioner had venue in the Fifth Circuit, the Court affirmed the denial of dismissal or transfer.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissented. They argued that the TCA's premarket-approval regime establishes an adjudicatory process exclusively between the FDA and the manufacturer, who alone bears the burden to submit detailed product studies, components lists, manufacturing controls, and samples. Retailers have no procedural rights to comment, receive notice, or develop the record; when the FDA withdraws an existing approval, only the "holder of [the] application" may sue, reflecting Congress's intent to limit review to manufacturers. The dissenters would confine "any person adversely affected" to those within the regulated class—in this case, denied applicants—and would bar retailers from invoking the judicial review provision.

Who Can Challenge FDA Decisions: Manufacturers, Retailers, or Both?

This dispute centers on who has the legal right to challenge FDA decisions about tobacco products. The Court needed to determine whether retailers, not just manufacturers, can sue when the FDA denies approval for products they want to sell.

The majority ruled that the phrase "any person adversely affected" should be interpreted broadly, consistent with similar language in other laws. When retailers lose the ability to sell a product and face potential penalties for selling unapproved items, they clearly fall within the group of people Congress intended to protect.

The Court found it significant that Congress used different language in different parts of the law—specifically choosing broader language ("any person adversely affected") in the section about who can seek judicial review, while using narrower language ("holder of the application") elsewhere. This deliberate word choice suggests Congress intended to allow a wider group of affected parties to challenge FDA decisions.

The venue provision in the law further reflects Congress's judgment about where these challenges should be heard, though the Court didn't address whether each individual challenger must independently satisfy venue requirements.

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The law often draws fine lines that can mean the difference between freedom and prison, and the Supreme Court just drew one of those lines in a case called Esteras versus United States. Here's what happened and why it matters for anyone who's ever been on probation or supervised release.

When someone gets out of prison early on supervised release, they have to follow certain rules. If they break those rules, a judge can send them back to prison. But what should the judge think about when making that decision? Should they focus on punishing the person for their original crime all over again, or should they think about helping that person stay on the right track?

In a 7-to-2 decision written by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, the Court said judges cannot use the desire to punish someone for their original crime when deciding whether to revoke supervised release. The majority explained that supervised release is supposed to be about rehabilitation and moving forward, not about looking backward and seeking revenge for old crimes.

Summary of the Case

Edgardo Esteras pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute heroin and received 12 months in prison followed by six years of supervised release. While on supervised release, he was arrested for domestic violence. At his revocation hearing, the court found he violated his release conditions and sentenced him to 24 months in prison—higher than the recommended 6-12 months—citing his criminal history and a need "to promote respect for the law." Esteras's lawyer objected that using "retribution" as a factor was improper, though acknowledged existing precedent allowed it. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision, and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve disagreements among different circuit courts.

Opinion of the Court

In a 7-2 decision, Justice Barrett ruled that courts may not consider retributive purposes when deciding to revoke supervised release. The law governing sentencing (Section 3553(a)) lists ten factors for courts to consider. However, the section dealing with supervised release (Section 3583(e)) only references eight of those factors, notably excluding the retribution factor. Using the legal principle that specifically listing certain items implies the exclusion of others, the Court determined Congress intentionally left out retribution from supervised release decisions.

This interpretation aligns with the rehabilitative purpose of supervised release, as confirmed in previous Supreme Court cases. The Court rejected the government's arguments that the omission merely made consideration optional or that considering the "nature and circumstances" of violations inevitably involves considering their "seriousness." For future cases, the Court clarified that standard review principles apply: unpreserved claims face a higher bar for reversal, while properly preserved objections receive more favorable review.

Separate Opinions

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Jackson, agreed with the main ruling but emphasized that retribution should play no role in supervised release decisions—whether related to the original crime or the violation itself. Justice Jackson wrote separately to note that the Court didn't need to define "offense" in the relevant statute, as the key question was simply whether retribution was excluded from supervised release considerations.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Alito, joined by Justice Gorsuch, disagreed with the majority. They argued that omitting factors from the list doesn't prohibit courts from considering them—it just means they aren't mandatory. The dissenters pointed to other parts of the Sentencing Reform Act where Congress explicitly forbids certain factors, noting no such prohibition exists here. They highlighted practical problems with the majority's approach: courts must consider the "nature and circumstances" of violations and "adequate deterrence," yet cannot account for the "seriousness" or "respect for the law"—concepts that often overlap. They warned this would create unworkable practices and micromanage how judges explain their decisions.

When Punishment and Rehabilitation Collide: The Supreme Court's Supervised Release Decision

The Supreme Court's ruling clarifies an important distinction in federal sentencing. When judges initially sentence defendants, they consider ten factors, including both forward-looking goals (deterrence, public safety, rehabilitation) and backward-looking punishment (retribution). However, supervised release serves a different purpose. When deciding whether to revoke someone's supervised release, judges should focus only on rehabilitation and preventing future crimes—not on punishing past behavior.

This distinction matters because it affects how courts handle violations of supervised release conditions. The Court determined that Congress intentionally excluded retribution from these decisions, consistent with supervised release's rehabilitative purpose. This interpretation maintains sentencing uniformity: punishment for the original crime happens at the initial sentencing, while supervised release decisions focus on helping the person reintegrate into society and preventing new offenses.

For defendants, this means courts cannot extend their imprisonment after a supervised release violation simply to punish them more for their original crime. For judges, it means focusing on whether additional prison time serves rehabilitation or public safety—not retribution. The ruling doesn't create technical traps for judges but ensures they apply the law as Congress intended, with appropriate review by appellate courts when mistakes occur.

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At the heart of this decision is when the Tax Court can step in. Under federal law, the Tax Court can only review an IRS determination about whether it may seize assets to cover unpaid taxes — a process called a levy. In Commissioner v. Zuch, the IRS stopped its levy because the taxpayer’s debt was wiped out by earlier overpayments. The Supreme Court held there was no longer any “determination” for the Tax Court to review once the levy lost its basis.

That ruling reverses a Third Circuit decision that had sent the case back to the Tax Court. Now the dispute returns to the IRS without that extra layer of review. Stay with us to find out what this means for people who thought they still had a chance to challenge the IRS in Tax Court.

Summary of the Case

In 2012, Jennifer Zuch and her then-husband Patrick Gennardo each filed late tax returns for 2010. Gennardo submitted an offer-in-compromise to settle his tax debt, which prompted the IRS to apply $50,000 in estimated tax payments to his account. Later, Zuch amended her return to report additional income that generated $28,000 in tax liability. She claimed that the $50,000 should have been credited to her account instead, which would have entitled her to a $22,000 refund.

The IRS disagreed with Zuch's position and issued a levy to collect the unpaid taxes. Zuch requested a collection due process hearing, where the appeals officer rejected her argument about how the payments should be allocated and determined the levy could proceed. Zuch then appealed this decision to the Tax Court.

During the years-long legal proceedings that followed, Zuch overpaid her taxes in subsequent years. Rather than refunding these overpayments, the IRS repeatedly applied them against her 2010 tax liability. Once these offsets completely eliminated her 2010 balance, the IRS moved to dismiss the case as moot, arguing there was no longer any basis for a levy. The Tax Court agreed and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Third Circuit reversed this decision, but the Supreme Court ultimately granted review to resolve disagreements among circuit courts.

Supreme Court Limits Tax Court's Authority in Levy Cases

In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Barrett, the Supreme Court held that the Tax Court's jurisdiction in these cases is strictly limited to reviewing whether a levy may proceed. The Court explained that once Zuch's tax liability reached zero and there was no longer any levy to enforce, the Tax Court lost its jurisdiction over the case.

The majority emphasized that Congress established a default rule requiring taxpayers to pay their taxes first and then sue for a refund later. The special collection due process hearing provision is narrowly focused on issues related to proposed levies. The Court noted that the law doesn't authorize the Tax Court to award refunds or issue declaratory judgments beyond stopping a levy.

Because Zuch's liability had been paid in full through the IRS's application of her later overpayments, no levy remained at issue. The Court concluded that the Tax Court correctly dismissed the case, and that Zuch's proper remedy would be to file a separate refund lawsuit in a different court.

Justice Gorsuch was the lone dissenter. He argued that the Tax Court should have broader authority to review all aspects of the appeals officer's determination, including whether Zuch had any underlying tax liability at all. He warned that the majority's interpretation allows the IRS to escape judicial review simply by abandoning levies after receiving unfavorable determinations.

How Tax Collection Due Process Works Under Federal Law

The Supreme Court's decision clarifies the limited role Congress created for collection due process hearings. The law provides taxpayers with one hearing before the IRS can levy (seize) their property to satisfy unpaid taxes. These hearings are specifically focused on issues related to the proposed levy or, in certain cases, the existence or amount of the underlying tax if the taxpayer hasn't had a previous opportunity to dispute it.

Appeals officers must consider specific factors during these hearings—including whether the IRS followed proper procedures, any issues raised by the taxpayer, and whether the collection action is unnecessarily intrusive. After considering these factors, the officer makes a single determination: whether the levy may proceed.

The Tax Court can review this determination, but its power is limited to stopping the levy. It cannot transform these proceedings into refund cases or declaratory judgment actions. For taxpayers who want to dispute their tax liability outside the context of an ongoing levy, the traditional path remains: pay the tax first, then file a refund lawsuit.

This structure ensures that collection due process hearings remain focused on their intended purpose—providing taxpayers with procedural protections before the IRS seizes their property—rather than becoming an alternative route to challenge tax assessments more broadly.

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You might think fraud only matters if someone loses money, but the Supreme Court dug into a finer point of the law. In this case, a painting company and its owner, Stamatios Kousisis, were tried for wire fraud after they persuaded a customer to start a deal with false promises. The Court said it doesn’t matter whether the customer ended up losing cash. What counts is that important lies were used to get them into the deal.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett and six other justices agreed that tricking someone into a transaction itself meets the federal fraud law. They said it’s enough that the lie was “material,” meaning it was big enough to matter to the deal. No proof of real financial harm is required.

Summary of the Case

In December 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Kousisis v. United States to resolve a disagreement among federal courts about wire fraud convictions. The key question: Can someone be convicted of wire fraud when they trick a government agency into paying them money, even if the agency doesn't suffer a financial loss?

The case involves Stamatios Kousisis and his company, Alpha Painting and Construction. They won two Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) contracts worth about $86 million. These contracts, funded with federal money, required subcontracting with disadvantaged business enterprises (DBEs). When bidding, Kousisis falsely claimed that a qualified DBE called Markias would supply over $6 million in paint. In reality, Markias was just a "pass-through" for Alpha's non-DBE suppliers, violating both regulations and a material contract term.

After completing the work and making $20 million in profit, Kousisis and his company were convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy under a "fraudulent-inducement" theory. They argued for acquittal, claiming PennDOT suffered no financial loss and therefore couldn't have been defrauded "of money or property." The Third Circuit rejected this argument, and the Supreme Court agreed to review the case.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Barrett, writing for a 7-Justice majority, affirmed the conviction. The wire fraud statute punishes any "scheme for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses." The Court found that the law's text doesn't require proof of net economic loss. To "obtain" simply means "to gain or attain possession," even if the victim receives something in return.

The Court noted that common law didn't generally require pecuniary loss in all fraud actions. Some fraud remedies focused on whether the victim received "property of a different character or condition than promised," not whether they suffered a net loss. The wire fraud statute's "money-or-property" requirement therefore covers fraudulent-inducement schemes as long as money or property was an object of the fraud.

Previous Supreme Court cases like Carpenter v. United States and Shaw v. United States confirm that wire fraud liability doesn't depend on causing economic loss. False statements that induce payment—even if the victim receives value—fall within the statute, provided they are "material" (meaning important to the transaction). The Court emphasized that materiality remains a "demanding" element and held that the Third Circuit correctly applied the law in affirming the convictions.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, agreeing that a net loss isn't required but taking no position on the case's outcome under a more demanding materiality test. He wrote separately to emphasize that materiality deserves rigorous analysis but declined to define its exact boundaries here.

Justice Gorsuch also concurred in part and in the judgment. He agreed that the statute doesn't require victim economic loss but objected to the majority's suggestion that any "obtaining" of money or property is sufficient regardless of whether the victim received what they bargained for. He urged adherence to the common-law rule that fraud requires proof that the victim lost "what he bargained for."

Wire Fraud and the "Fraudulent Inducement" Theory Explained

The wire fraud statute prohibits schemes to "obtain money or property by means of false pretenses." It has three key elements: (1) a scheme to defraud; (2) an objective to obtain money or property; and (3) use of interstate wires to further the scheme.

Under the "fraudulent-inducement" theory upheld by the Court, a person violates the law by making important misrepresentations to induce someone to pay them—even if they deliver value and don't intend to cause financial loss. The Court clarified that "obtain" simply means "gain possession," without considering exchange value.

Historical context supports this interpretation. At common law, certain fraud prosecutions and contract cancellations focused on schemes that deprived victims of promised property, not on proving financial loss. The only common-law fraud action requiring economic loss was the tort of misrepresentation, not the criminal offense of false pretenses.

The Court's decision, consistent with previous cases, rejects requiring proof of net financial loss in wire fraud cases. However, the "materiality" requirement remains important—it distinguishes actionable misrepresentations from minor ones. The fraudulent inducement theory doesn't extend to mere interference with regulatory power, nor does it blur distinctions with other federal fraud statutes. It protects only money or property, not intangible interests.

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When it comes to the rules around Medicare and hospital funding, the details can get pretty tricky. In the case of Advocate Christ Medical Center v. Kennedy, the Supreme Court looked at how hospitals get extra money for treating low-income patients. The question was about who counts as "entitled" to certain government benefits—specifically, supplementary security income, or SSI—when hospitals figure out how much extra funding they should get.

The Court decided that a patient is only considered "entitled" to SSI benefits if they’re actually eligible to receive a cash payment during the month they’re in the hospital. This might sound like a small detail, but it changes which patients hospitals can count when they ask for more money to help cover the costs of caring for people with lower incomes. The decision means that only those patients who could get an SSI payment that month will be included in the hospital’s calculations for extra Medicare funding.

Summary of the Case

Advocate Christ Medical Center v. Kennedy concerns the calculation of the "disproportionate share hospital" (DSH) adjustment under Medicare, which provides additional funding to hospitals serving a high percentage of low-income patients. The DSH adjustment is determined by a formula that includes the "Medicare fraction," which counts the number of hospital patient days attributable to Medicare patients who are also "entitled to [Supplemental Security Income (SSI)] benefits." The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) interpreted this to mean only those patients eligible to receive an SSI cash payment during the month of hospitalization. Over 200 hospitals challenged this interpretation, arguing that all patients enrolled in the SSI system at the time of hospitalization should be counted, even if they did not receive a payment that month. The hospitals claimed HHS’s approach undercounted low-income patients and led to underfunding from 2006 to 2009. The lower courts sided with HHS, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the statutory interpretation of "entitled to [SSI] benefits" (see Syllabus, pp. 1–3).

Opinion of the Court

Justice Barrett, writing for the majority, held that for purposes of the Medicare fraction, an individual is "entitled to [SSI] benefits" only when eligible to receive an SSI cash payment during the month of hospitalization. The Court reasoned that SSI benefits, as defined by statute, are cash benefits determined on a monthly basis (42 U.S.C. §§1381a, 1382(b), 1382(c)). The Court rejected the hospitals’ broader reading, which would have included non-cash benefits or all SSI enrollees regardless of monthly eligibility. The majority emphasized that the statutory language and structure focus on monthly eligibility for cash payments, not broader program enrollment or ancillary benefits. The Court also distinguished this case from its prior decision in Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation, noting that the entitlement structure of SSI (monthly, means-tested, and not automatic) differs from Medicare Part A (automatic and ongoing). The Court concluded that Congress chose a specific, administrable formula, and the judiciary must respect that choice, even if it is imperfect (Opinion, pp. 6–16).

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissented. The dissent argued that the majority misunderstood the nature of SSI, which is designed as a safety net guaranteeing a minimum income for low-income individuals. Justice Jackson contended that "entitlement" to SSI should be understood as program enrollment, not just monthly payment eligibility, because the benefit is the security of coverage, not merely the receipt of a check. The dissent criticized the majority’s approach as arbitrary, noting that it could exclude low-income patients from the DSH calculation based on the timing of their income fluctuations, rather than their overall economic status. Justice Jackson also argued that the majority’s interpretation undermines Congress’s intent to support hospitals serving the neediest populations and is inconsistent with the Court’s prior reasoning in Empire Health, which focused on program eligibility rather than payment receipt (Dissent, pp. 2–18).

Determining Poverty Status

The legal nuance centers on the interpretation of "entitled to [SSI] benefits" in 42 U.S.C. §1395ww(d)(5)(F)(vi)(I). The statute’s language is technical and embedded in a complex reimbursement scheme. SSI is a means-tested program providing monthly cash payments to eligible individuals, with eligibility determined each month based on income and resources (42 U.S.C. §§1381a, 1382(a)-(c)). The DSH adjustment formula uses the Medicare fraction to approximate the share of low-income Medicare patients, but Congress chose to use monthly SSI payment eligibility as a proxy for poverty status. This choice reflects a legislative compromise balancing accuracy, administrability, and resource allocation. The majority’s interpretation adheres closely to the statutory text and structure, emphasizing the importance of monthly eligibility and the cash nature of SSI benefits. The dissent, by contrast, reads the statute in light of its broader remedial purpose and the practical realities of poverty, advocating for a more inclusive approach that would better capture the population Congress intended to benefit. This case illustrates the tension between textualist and purposivist statutory interpretation, especially in the context of complex social welfare legislation (see Opinion, pp. 6–16; Dissent, pp. 2–18).