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Is an agency is really the state itself, or just a separate organization the state created? That difference matters because states can sometimes avoid being sued in another state’s courts.

In Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corporation, the Supreme Court said New Jersey Transit is not an “arm of the State” of New Jersey. That means NJ Transit does not get to share New Jersey’s protection from being sued in the courts of another state.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote for a unanimous Court. The justices pointed to how New Jersey set up NJ Transit as its own legal entity with the usual powers that corporations have. In legal language, a “body corporate and politic.” The Court also noted that, under New Jersey law, the state is not formally on the hook for NJ Transit’s debts or court judgments, and the state’s control over NJ Transit didn’t change the bottom line.

The Court affirmed the New York Court of Appeals and reversed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, sending the cases back down.

Summary of the Case

Two people were injured in separate accidents involving New Jersey Transit buses. One was struck by a bus in Manhattan, and another was hit when a bus collided with his car in Philadelphia. Both victims sued NJ Transit in their home state courts: one in New York, the other in Pennsylvania.

NJ Transit asked both courts to dismiss the lawsuits. The transit agency argued it was legally an arm of the State of New Jersey and therefore protected by sovereign immunity, which generally prevents people from suing state governments.

This created a problem. The New York Court of Appeals disagreed with NJ Transit's claim and allowed the lawsuit to proceed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with NJ Transit and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court stepped in to resolve this conflict and establish clear rules for determining when a state-created entity qualifies as an arm of the state for immunity purposes.

The Court ruled unanimously that NJ Transit is not an arm of New Jersey and therefore cannot claim the state's sovereign immunity. The New York judgment was affirmed, and the Pennsylvania judgment was reversed.

Arguments Made By Counsel

NJ Transit's position rested on several grounds. First, the agency argued that formal corporate status should not be the deciding factor. What mattered was the state's intent and the entity's function. Second, NJ Transit argued it served essential governmental functions, specifically transportation infrastructure, while being heavily controlled and funded by New Jersey. Third, the agency pointed out that New Jersey's own characterization of NJ Transit as an instrumentality of the state should carry significant weight. Fourth, NJ Transit emphasized practical realities. The state provided between 15 and 46 percent of its operating budget over decades, demonstrating financial integration with the state.

The victims' counter-argument, supported by New York's highest court, emphasized formal legal structure. NJ Transit was incorporated as a body corporate and politic with traditional corporate powers: the right to sue and be sued, to contract, and to acquire property. The state's statute explicitly disclaimed liability for the corporation's debts. These formal characteristics, they argued, signaled a legally separate entity regardless of how much control the state exercised.

At stake was a fundamental tension in administrative law. Can a state use corporate form as a strategic tool to shield itself from liability while maintaining operational control? Or does the choice of corporate form carry irrevocable legal consequences?

Opinion of the Court

Justice Sotomayor's opinion traced the Court's entire history on this question back to 1824, establishing a clear framework for when an organization remains part of the state versus when it's legally separate.

The key question is whether the state has created a truly independent legal entity. The Court identified three main factors. First, legal structure: Is it set up as a corporation with standard corporate powers—like the ability to sue and be sued? This is the strongest evidence of independence, and states often deliberately choose this form to shield themselves from liability. Second, formal liability: Under state law, is the state legally responsible for the entity's debts? If the state is on the hook, it's more likely part of the government. Third, state control: While this matters somewhat, the Court warned it's an unreliable indicator since states control many genuinely independent entities like cities and counties.

Applying these factors to NJ Transit, the Court found it was clearly independent. NJ Transit is legally structured as a corporation with full corporate powers. New Jersey's law explicitly states that NJ Transit's debts are not the state's debts. Although New Jersey has substantial control through appointments and board representation, state law simultaneously requires NJ Transit to operate independently. This combination of legal separation and formal non-liability outweighed the state's control, making NJ Transit legally distinct from New Jersey itself.

When Corporate Form Determines Sovereign Immunity Status

The real sophistication in this opinion lies in what the Court rejected and why. These rejections reveal what this case is fundamentally about.

Most importantly, the Court rejected the idea that how much a state funds an entity should determine its status. New Jersey's funding of NJ Transit varied wildly over 35 years from 15 to 46 percent of the budget. Where would you draw the line? And it would be absurd if NJ Transit was part of the state in 2010 (when funding was high) but not in 2015 (when funding was lower). The relevant question is formal legal responsibility, not whether the state happens to pay its bills.

Twenty-three states urged the Court to let states decide the issue simply by labeling an entity. If New Jersey calls NJ Transit an instrumentality of the state, case closed. The Court refused because it would let states game the system. They could change an entity's status whenever convenient by rewriting their laws. Beyond that, NJ Transit's own statute used contradictory labels (calling it both an "instrumentality" and a "body corporate"), so even a label-based test wouldn't actually resolve uncertainty. Courts would still need to dig deeper.

NJ Transit argued that operating transit systems is a core government responsibility, proving it should be part of the state. The Court rejected this too. The problem is that "essential" is vague and subjective. Cities and counties perform essential functions but aren't arms of the state. The American Red Cross does essential work in disasters but has no sovereign immunity. The real question isn't whether an entity does something important. It's whether the state runs it directly or created it as a legally separate organization to do the job.

Underlying all these rejections is a clearer principle: sovereign immunity protects a state's control over its own budget decisions. If an entity is formally responsible for its own judgments, the money comes from that entity's budget, not the state's. The state can choose to bail it out afterward, but it hasn't automatically committed its treasury. That preserves what immunity is really meant to protect—the state's freedom to decide how to spend its resources.

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Sometimes the hardest part of a lawsuit isn’t who wins on the facts, but whether the case was ever in the right court to begin with. That’s the core of what the Supreme Court sorted out in Hain Celestial Group v. Palmquist.

In certain kinds of cases, the parties have to be completely from different states. Here, the lawsuit was removed to federal court even though Whole Foods, the defendant, broke the “complete diversity” rule at the time of removal.

The district court later dismissed Whole Foods, but the Supreme Court said that dismissal was a mistake. Because Whole Foods should have stayed in the case, complete diversity was never actually established. That means the federal court never had the power to enter a final decision in the first place.

The justices were unanimous, in an opinion written by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, with Justice Clarence Thomas also writing separately. The bottom line: the judgment for Hain Celestial has to be wiped out. The case goes back for more proceedings consistent with that ruling, including being sent back to state court.

Summary of the Case

The Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision addressing a complex question: when can a federal court overlook a jurisdictional problem, even if it made a mistake in dismissing a defendant? The case involves a heartbreaking situation. The Palmquist family sued baby food manufacturer Hain Celestial and Whole Foods after their young son developed serious neurological conditions they believe were caused by heavy metals in the baby food.

The family made a strategic choice when filing their lawsuit. They filed in Texas state court and named both an out of state defendant, Hain, and a Texas defendant, Whole Foods. This ensured that federal diversity jurisdiction would not exist. Under federal law, all defendants must be from different states than all plaintiffs for a case to be heard in federal court based on diversity of citizenship.

Hain removed the case to federal court anyway. They argued that Whole Foods had been improperly joined. This is a legal doctrine that permits federal courts to dismiss defendants whose claims lack merit, even if their presence would normally prevent federal jurisdiction. The district court agreed with Hain, dismissed Whole Foods from the case, and the case proceeded to trial in federal court. Hain won at trial.

However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the improper joinder dismissal. The appeals court found that Whole Foods should have remained in the case. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit vacated the entire judgment because the federal court never had proper subject matter jurisdiction in the first place.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision. The Court held that the district court's mistaken dismissal could not fix the jurisdictional problem because the dismissal was interlocutory. In other words, it was reversible on appeal. Therefore, the jurisdictional defect persisted all the way through the final judgment.

Arguments Made By Counsel

Hain's Core Arguments

Sarah Harrington's arguments centered on two main points. First, she drew a distinction between creating jurisdiction and preserving a judgment despite a jurisdictional irregularity. She urged that Caterpillar, the leading precedent in this area, permitted courts to preserve final judgments when complete diversity existed at the time of judgment, even if jurisdiction was questionable at removal. This was not about creating jurisdiction retroactively. Rather, it was about recognizing that the jurisdictional problem had been solved.

Second, she emphasized efficiency. After a full trial with extensive discovery, it would be wasteful to return the case to state court. The doctrine of fraudulent joinder itself, which permits dismissal of defendants with weak claims, would be rendered meaningless if courts could not rely on those dismissals to create stable federal jurisdiction.

Harrington also presented a practical incentive problem. If defendants cannot rely on improper joinder doctrine to secure federal jurisdiction, they lose a tool that Congress implicitly authorized through the removal statute.

The Palmquist's Core Arguments

Russell Post's position was fundamentally about jurisdictional integrity. Federal courts possess only the power Congress grants them, and that power cannot be created through judicial error. The critical distinction, in Post's view, was that Whole Foods was not gone for good. The dismissal was interlocutory, meaning Whole Foods remained a party to the case until the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Since the Fifth Circuit reversed, Whole Foods never actually left the litigation. At no point did complete diversity exist in a final, irreversible way.

Post also invoked plaintiff's forum choice as a constitutional principle. The Palmquists had exercised their right to select their forum by properly joining Whole Foods as a defendant. Allowing a defendant to override that choice through a dismissal would strip plaintiffs of a fundamental procedural entitlement.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Sotomayor, writing for a unanimous Court, grounded the decision in first principles about federal jurisdiction.

The opinion begins with the foundational rule. Federal courts have limited jurisdiction, and appellate courts must satisfy themselves not only of their own jurisdiction but also of the trial court's jurisdiction. The general rule is that courts assess jurisdiction based on the state of facts that existed at the time of filing. If jurisdiction was lacking then, the judgment must be vacated, unless a jurisdictional defect was cured before final judgment.

Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis from 1996 is the critical precedent. There, a defendant was properly and consensually dismissed via partial final judgment before trial commenced. The jurisdictional defect was thus cured. The Supreme Court held that finality, efficiency, and economy concerns then became overwhelming, justifying preservation of the verdict despite the District Court's earlier erroneous denial of the motion to remand.

But Caterpillar is fundamentally different here. Whole Foods's dismissal was, first, erroneous. The Fifth Circuit found the claim against Whole Foods was plausibly stated. Second, the dismissal was interlocutory, meaning it did not dispose of the whole case and merged into the final judgment for appellate review. Under the general rule governing interlocutory orders, they are not immediately appealable but instead remain subject to review from the final judgment.

This interlocutory character proved decisive. Because the dismissal could be, and was, reversed on appeal, Whole Foods was only temporarily and erroneously removed from the case. It was not gone for good. When the Fifth Circuit reversed, it restored Whole Foods, and thus the jurisdictional defect that had lingered.

The Court rejected Hain's efficiency argument. While Caterpillar acknowledged that finality and economy concerns become compelling after a trial, those concerns apply only after a jurisdictional defect is properly cured. They do not override the jurisdictional requirement itself. To hold otherwise would permit courts to create jurisdiction through their own mistakes, a principle the Court traced back to 1809 and identified as fundamentally inconsistent with limited federal jurisdiction.

As a fallback, Hain invoked Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, which permits courts to add or drop parties on just terms. The Court distinguished Newman Green v. Alfonzo Larrain, where a plaintiff sought dismissal of a party, from this case, where a defendant seeks to dismiss an opponent. The master of the complaint principle, that plaintiffs control which defendants to sue and where, is critical. The Palmquists had purposefully and properly joined Whole Foods to avoid federal jurisdiction, and they diligently asserted that right by promptly moving to remand the case to state court. Rule 21 cannot override that choice.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion entirely but wrote separately to express deep skepticism about the improper joinder doctrine itself. His concern is that the doctrine permits federal courts to enlarge their jurisdiction by assessing the merits of claims against defendants, asking whether those claims are sufficiently weak to warrant dismissal.

Thomas argues that this represents an exercise of power beyond what federal courts are authorized to do. Federal courts must determine they have jurisdiction as a threshold matter, before proceeding to the merits. To dismiss a party based on a merits assessment inverts that principle. He distinguishes the modern improper joinder doctrine, which turns on claim strength, from the historical fraudulent joinder cases, which concerned actual fraud or bad faith, such as lying about a defendant's citizenship or conduct.

Thomas notes that other circuits adopt similar approaches, but he contends they lack support in this Court's precedents. He suggests that in a future case where the issue is fully briefed, the Court should reconsider whether federal courts can constitutionally dismiss defendants based on merits assessments. However, he agrees the case must be vacated because the Fifth Circuit correctly found the Palmquists had plausibly stated a claim against Whole Foods.

When Can a Jurisdictional Defect Be Cured?

The nuance here lies in understanding what curing a jurisdictional defect actually means, and how that doctrine interacts with the concepts of finality and interlocutory orders.

The Court's holding establishes that a jurisdictional defect can be cured only when the curative action is, first, proper, not erroneous, and second, final, not subject to reversal on appeal. In Caterpillar, the defendant was dismissed with consent via a partial final judgment. That dismissal was both correct and final. It established complete diversity, and there was no risk on appeal that the defendant would be restored to the case. The defect was cured before trial, and thus efficiency concerns could justify preserving the post trial verdict.

Here, by contrast, the dismissal was reversible because it was interlocutory. The general rule is that interlocutory orders merge into the final judgment and are reviewable from it. This created jurisdictional uncertainty. Until the Fifth Circuit affirmed or reversed the improper joinder dismissal, no one could be certain whether complete diversity actually existed.

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Sometimes the hardest part of the law isn’t the big question of guilt or innocence. The fine print about who can ask the courts to take a second look, and who gets to review is what the Supreme Court tackled in Bowe v. United States.

The Court said a rule that blocks Supreme Court review of certain “permission” decisions does not apply to federal prisoners who are trying to file a second request for post-conviction relief under a federal law called Section 2255. And the Court also said another rule, one that throws out “old claims” that were raised before, applies to state prisoner cases under a different law; not to federal prisoners using Section 2255.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Elena Kagan, Brett Kavanaugh, and Ketanji Brown Jackson. Justice Neil Gorsuch dissented, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito, and Justice Amy Coney Barrett joined part of that dissent. The Court wiped out the Eleventh Circuit’s decision and sent the case back so the lower court can decide whether Bowe should get authorization under the right legal standard.

Summary of the Case

Michael S. Bowe is serving time in federal prison. On top of his robbery convictions, he received an additional mandatory 10-year sentence for using a gun during his crime. Years after his conviction, the Supreme Court issued new rulings that suggested his gun-related sentence might not be valid anymore. One decision said part of the law used to convict him was too vague to be constitutional. Another decision said that attempting a certain type of robbery doesn't count as a "crime of violence" under the gun law.

Bowe wanted to challenge his sentence based on these new rulings. But there was a problem: he had already tried to challenge his conviction before and lost. Federal law has strict rules about when prisoners can file a second challenge to their conviction. A federal appeals court said Bowe couldn't bring his challenge again because he was repeating an old claim he'd already made.

Bowe asked the Supreme Court to hear his case, pointing out that different federal appeals courts across the country were disagreeing about whether these strict rules even apply to federal prisoners like him.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Sotomayor wrote the Court's opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. The Court made two major rulings.

First, the Court said it had the authority to hear Bowe's case. The government argued that a specific provision in federal law prevented the Supreme Court from reviewing decisions about second challenges. But the Court disagreed. The justices explained that this provision appears in a section of law focused on state prisoners, not federal prisoners. The law uses different terminology for state prisoners (who file "applications") versus federal prisoners (who file "motions"). The Court said that when Congress wants to close the courthouse doors to people challenging their convictions, it must speak clearly and it didn't do so here.

Second, the Court ruled on the main question: the strict rule against repeating old claims does not apply to federal prisoners filing second challenges. The key reason is straightforward: the law explicitly says this rule applies to claims in a "second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254," and that section deals only with state prisoners. Federal prisoners challenge their convictions under a different section of law.

The government argued that another provision connects federal prisoners to these state-prisoner rules. But the Court rejected this argument, explaining that the connection only borrows certain procedures—specifically, how a panel of judges certifies whether a second challenge can proceed—not all the substantive restrictions that apply to state prisoners. The Court sent the case back to the lower court for further proceedings.

Justice Jackson wrote separately to agree with the outcome but explain her reasoning differently. She focused on what Congress was trying to accomplish with the law. In her view, Congress wanted to prevent further appeals of proper decisions by panels of judges about whether second challenges can proceed. But in Bowe's case, the appeals court dismissed his case based on a rule that doesn't even apply to federal prisoners. Since the panel never actually performed the proper analysis required by law, the provision preventing Supreme Court review shouldn't apply in the first place.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Gorsuch wrote a dissent, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito. Justice Barrett joined the first part of his dissent about jurisdiction.

On jurisdiction, Gorsuch argued that federal law clearly says second challenges by federal prisoners "must be certified as provided in" the state-prisoner section, which necessarily includes the provision blocking Supreme Court review. He said the Court lacked authority to hear the case and should have used different legal procedures if it wanted to address the issue. He criticized the majority for inventing a requirement that Congress must speak with extra clarity before closing the courthouse doors.

On the main question, Gorsuch argued that the rule against repeating old claims does apply to federal prisoners. He pointed to language requiring a preliminary showing that the challenge "satisfies the requirements of this subsection," which includes the rule against old claims. He believed the majority's interpretation wrongly exempts federal prisoners from Congress's goal of preventing endless repetitive challenges to convictions.

Federal Prisoners Can Challenge Convictions More Than Once

This case revolves around a highly technical feature of federal law governing how prisoners challenge their convictions. Congress created parallel systems: one for people convicted in state court and another for people convicted in federal court. Then Congress added gatekeeping rules to prevent prisoners from filing challenge after challenge indefinitely. But Congress wrote these gatekeeping rules using inconsistent language, creating confusion about which rules apply to which prisoners.

The Court's analysis highlights three important drafting details:

First, different terminology matters. Federal law consistently refers to state prisoners filing "applications" and federal prisoners filing "motions." The Court treated this as a meaningful distinction, not just different words for the same thing. When Congress specifically said a rule applies to "applications under section 2254," the state-prisoner section, the Court took Congress at its word.

Second, when one law references another, the scope matters. The federal-prisoner law references the state-prisoner gatekeeping provisions, but only for how a panel of judges "certifies" whether a second challenge meets certain requirements. The Court interpreted this narrow reference as borrowing only the certification procedures, not every restriction that applies to state prisoners. The Court was especially reluctant to read this reference as blocking Supreme Court review unless Congress said so explicitly.

Third, Congress's drafting choices reveal intent. Throughout this area of law, Congress sometimes explicitly distinguishes between state and federal prisoners. The Court inferred that when Congress mentioned only state prisoners in one provision but not federal prisoners, it did so deliberately. In essence, the legal nuance is that these interconnected laws governing prisoner challenges aren't uniformly applicable across the board. Careful attention to the specific labels Congress used and how different provisions connect to each other determined the outcome of this case.

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Ruben Gutierrez wanted to test DNA evidence in his case after his conviction, but Texas law put up a high wall. The state said you have to prove you’re innocent before you can even ask for new DNA testing. That rule wasn’t about whether the test would show who did it, but about who gets to make the request in the first place.

Gutierrez claimed that keeping him from asking for DNA testing without first clearing himself was unfair and broke his right to due process. He sued in federal court under a law known as Section 1983, which lets people challenge government actions that violate their rights. At first, a lower court said he couldn’t bring the case because fixing the rule wouldn’t change anything for him.

But the Supreme Court disagreed. Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinion said Gutierrez does have the right to challenge that barrier in federal court. A declaration from a judge could wipe out the rule that stopped him, giving him the chance to get the testing he’s been denied.

Summary of the Case

In 1998, Texas prosecuted Ruben Gutierrez for capital murder in the stabbing death of Escolastica Harrison in her mobile home. The State's case relied on testimony that Gutierrez used one of two screwdrivers in the killing and on his own statements admitting participation in a planned robbery. A jury convicted and sentenced him to death. Over the next 15 years, Gutierrez twice sought post-conviction DNA testing under Texas law, arguing that favorable results would prove he was never in the trailer. Texas courts denied his requests, ruling that the state's DNA testing law applies only to challenges to convictions, not to death-eligibility, and that even favorable DNA wouldn't prove his innocence in the robbery-murder. Gutierrez then sued Cameron County District Attorney Luis Saenz under federal civil rights law, claiming that Texas's DNA-testing scheme denied him due process. The district court granted a declaratory judgment in his favor, but the Fifth Circuit vacated it, holding Gutierrez lacked legal standing to bring the case.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Sotomayor's opinion (joined by Roberts, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson) reversed the Fifth Circuit. The Court reaffirmed that state-convicted prisoners have a liberty interest in post-conviction proceedings and that federal civil rights law can address state law barriers to those procedures. Following recent precedent, the Court explained that a federal declaration that Texas's DNA testing law violates due process "would eliminate the state prosecutor's justification for denying DNA testing," thereby removing the obstacle to testing. The Court emphasized that standing analysis should focus on the complaint's challenge, not the district court's ultimate remedy. Therefore, dismissal for lack of standing was erroneous.

Separate Opinions

Justice Barrett concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, agreeing that recent precedent governs and that the Fifth Circuit misapplied it. However, she cautioned against extending standing analysis by analogy to administrative-law precedents, warning that such analogies might weaken standing doctrine.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Thomas dissented, joined by Justice Gorsuch, arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects only natural liberty—freedom from physical restraint—and not state-created entitlements to post-conviction procedures. Justice Alito also dissented, joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, applying a stricter redressability test: Texas courts have already determined that even favorable DNA would not negate Gutierrez's culpability or death-eligibility, and a declaratory judgment would not substantially increase the likelihood of testing.

How Texas Law Limits Post-Conviction DNA Testing Rights

Texas law allows post-conviction DNA testing only if the person requesting it can show that the evidence still exists in a testable condition, that identity was at issue during the trial, and that favorable results would probably have prevented conviction, without causing unreasonable delay. Texas courts have interpreted this framework narrowly, refusing to allow testing aimed solely at challenging death sentence eligibility—denying relief unless the person can also establish innocence of the underlying crime. The courts also limit review of new evidence in testing motions to the trial record's factual findings. This approach reflects Texas's legislative choice to reserve DNA testing primarily for challenges to wrongful convictions, rather than to reduce capital sentences for those who participated in the crime but may not have been the actual killer.

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When a door closes only to be cracked open again, does your first knock still count? In Parrish v. United States, the Court said it does. A man filed his notice of appeal after the official deadline but before a judge agreed to reopen the time limit. He never filed a second notice. The Fourth Circuit said that meant his case was off the table. But the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, held that the original notice reaches forward to the moment the court reopens the clock, so no new filing is needed. Chief Justice Roberts and four others agreed, while Justice Neil Gorsuch disagreed in dissent. This subtle shift in timing rules shows how a small wrinkle in court procedures can make all the difference.

Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Inmate's Appeal Rights

Donte Parrish, a federal inmate, spent 23 months in segregated confinement based on suspicions of involvement in another prisoner's death. After administrative hearings cleared him of misconduct, Parrish sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for wrongful disciplinary confinement. The District Court dismissed portions of his suit on March 23, 2020. Parrish, by then transferred to state custody, did not receive that judgment until June 25, 2020, and filed a notice of appeal immediately upon receipt—well after the standard 60-day deadline. The Fourth Circuit recharacterized his late filing as a motion to reopen the appeal window, which the District Court granted for 14 days. However, Parrish did not file a new notice during this reopened period. The Fourth Circuit held it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed his appeal.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision. The Court held that a notice of appeal filed after the original window but before a reopening order is not "late" with respect to the reopened period but merely "premature." Under long-standing legal precedent dating back to the 1800s, a premature but adequate notice "relates forward" to the date the court makes the appeal possible. The Court observed that the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure codify this principle and that nothing in the rules or their purpose of ensuring "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" suggests otherwise. Accordingly, Parrish's single filing was sufficient to establish jurisdiction for his appeal.

Separate Opinions

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred only in the judgment. They agreed that Parrish's appeal should proceed but based their reasoning on different grounds. In their view, Parrish's original submission functioned simultaneously as a reopening motion and as the proposed notice of appeal. Once the District Court granted reopening, that filing should simply have been docketed as a timely notice, eliminating the need for any second filing.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Gorsuch dissented, arguing that the Supreme Court should not have decided the case at all. He would have dismissed the petition, noting that the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules has already begun studying potential amendments to the relevant rule. In his view, resolving this question through the rulemaking process—rather than judicial decision—would better respect the separation of powers and avoid interfering with the Committee's work.

When Early Appeal Notices Can Still Be Valid

At the heart of this case is whether an appeal notice filed too early can automatically become valid when a court reopens the appeal window. The Court ruled that when someone files an appeal notice before a court officially reopens the appeal period, that early filing isn't invalid—it simply "ripens" once the court grants the extension. This builds on a well-established legal tradition that premature notices can "relate forward" to the moment they become proper, as long as no party is harmed by this approach. The Court found that federal rules support this principle and that requiring a duplicate filing would create unnecessary procedural hurdles, particularly for those without legal representation. This ruling ensures that technical timing issues won't prevent people from having their appeals heard, especially when delays in receiving court decisions are beyond their control.

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Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Comm’n., Docket No. 24-154

This case turns on a subtle point in the law: can a faith-based charity get the same tax break as any other charity even if it doesn’t push its faith or limit help to fellow believers? On June 5, the Supreme Court said yes. It unanimously found that Wisconsin ran afoul of the First Amendment by treating Catholic Charities differently just because they didn’t proselytize or serve only Catholics. The state court’s rule drew a line between religions based on how they practice their beliefs, triggering the toughest review—and Wisconsin couldn’t show a strong enough reason. The decision sends the case back to state court and leaves open big questions about how far government can go when it comes to faith-based service groups.

Summary of the Case

In 2016, Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc., and four affiliated nonprofit organizations (collectively "Catholic Charities") applied to Wisconsin's Department of Workforce Development for an exemption from state unemployment-compensation taxes. Wisconsin law allows nonprofits that are "operated primarily for religious purposes" and "operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church" to opt out of the state unemployment system. However, the department—and ultimately the Wisconsin Supreme Court—denied the exemption, reasoning that Catholic Charities, though under the Diocese of Superior's authority, didn't engage in "distinctively religious" activities like proselytizing or limiting services to fellow Catholics. Catholic Charities challenged this denial as a violation of the First Amendment's Religion Clauses.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Sotomayor, writing for a unanimous Court, reversed the Wisconsin decision. The Court held that Wisconsin's interpretation of its law imposed an impermissible denominational preference by differentiating religious organizations based on theological lines—specifically, by making the exemption contingent on proselytization or exclusive service to fellow Catholics.

Such distinctions "touch inherently religious choices," not neutral criteria with incidental religious impact, and therefore trigger strict scrutiny. Wisconsin failed to justify its approach:

• Its claimed interest in universal unemployment coverage wasn't advanced by theological distinctions. Catholic Charities already operates its own comparable benefit system, and Wisconsin exempts other religious entities providing identical services simply because they directly employ clergy.

• Wisconsin's argument about avoiding government entanglement with religion also failed. The exemption covers all employees of qualified organizations—many who don't teach or practice doctrine—while excluding identical charities under the same church umbrella unless they proselytize or limit service.

The Court reversed the Wisconsin Supreme Court's judgment and remanded the case.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas concurred but on broader church-autonomy grounds. He argued the Wisconsin Supreme Court also violated the First Amendment by treating Catholic Charities and its canonically integrated entities as separate, secular corporations rather than as an ecclesiastical arm of the Diocese.

Justice Jackson concurred in the judgment but emphasized statutory interpretation. She noted that the parallel federal exemption was designed to distinguish church-affiliated institutions by the nature of their functions (like training ministers or houses of study), not by the motivations driving them.

When Religious Tax Exemptions Cross Constitutional Lines

This case centers on when religious organizations qualify for tax exemptions and how governments can make those determinations without violating the Constitution. The federal unemployment law, which Wisconsin's statute mirrors, requires most charities to participate in state unemployment systems but exempts church-controlled entities "operated primarily for religious purposes."

The legislative history shows that "religious purposes" was meant to cover institutions performing ministerial or doctrinal functions (like seminaries or religious colleges), not merely organizations inspired by religious faith (like church-affiliated orphanages or day-care centers).

This distinction reflects broader First Amendment principles: laws that differentiate based on theological grounds—like proselytization, sacramental practice, or doctrinal content—trigger stricter constitutional scrutiny than laws applying religiously neutral criteria. When eligibility for a benefit turns on expressly religious activities, "The First Amendment mandates government neutrality between religions," subjecting such schemes to strict scrutiny. Wisconsin's approach, as interpreted by its Supreme Court, failed to maintain this neutrality and couldn't survive the demanding test the Constitution requires.

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The Supreme Court clarified an important aspect of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, or ERISA, in the case of Cunningham et al. v. Cornell University. The justices decided that when someone wants to make a claim under a specific part of this law, they only need to show that their claim meets the basic requirements laid out in that section. They don’t have to worry about other exemptions that might apply.

This ruling overturned a previous decision from the Second Circuit Court, which had added extra steps for plaintiffs. They had to prove not only that their claim was valid but also that certain transactions were unnecessary or involved unreasonable compensation. The Supreme Court's decision simplifies the process for those bringing claims under this part of ERISA, making it easier for them to seek justice.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote the majority opinion, and she was joined by several other justices. This case highlights how the law can evolve and adapt, ensuring that individuals have a fair chance to present their claims without unnecessary hurdles.

Summary of the Case

The case of Cunningham et al. v. Cornell University et al. arose from a group of current and former employees of Cornell University who participated in defined-contribution retirement plans. They alleged that Cornell and its fiduciaries engaged in prohibited transactions under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by paying excessive fees for recordkeeping services provided by parties in interest, specifically the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America-College Retirement Equities Fund and Fidelity Investments Inc. The plaintiffs contended that the fees paid were significantly higher than what would be considered reasonable. The District Court dismissed their claims, and the Second Circuit affirmed this dismissal, ruling that plaintiffs must plead that the exemptions under §1108(b)(2)(A) do not apply to their claims under §1106(a)(1)(C).

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sotomayor, reversed the Second Circuit's decision. The Court held that to state a claim under §1106(a)(1)(C), a plaintiff need only plausibly allege the elements contained in that provision itself, without needing to address potential exemptions under §1108. The Court reasoned that §1106(a)(1)(C) contains a categorical prohibition against certain transactions, and the exemptions in §1108 are structured as affirmative defenses that must be pleaded and proved by the defendants. The Court emphasized that requiring plaintiffs to negate these exemptions in their initial pleadings would be impractical and contrary to the statutory structure of ERISA.

Separate Opinions

Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh. Alito agreed with the Court's conclusion that §1108 sets out affirmative defenses and that plaintiffs need not plead against them. However, he expressed concern that this ruling could lead to practical issues, as it may allow plaintiffs to survive motions to dismiss by merely alleging that a fiduciary engaged in transactions that are often necessary for plan administration, potentially leading to increased litigation costs for fiduciaries.

Dissenting Opinions

There were no dissenting opinions in this case; the ruling was unanimous.

ERISA and Exemptions

The case highlights a critical interpretation of ERISA, particularly the relationship between its prohibitory and exemptive provisions. The Court's decision clarifies that the burden of proving the applicability of exemptions under §1108 lies with the defendants, not the plaintiffs. This interpretation aligns with the general principle in statutory construction that exemptions are treated as affirmative defenses. The Court's ruling underscores the importance of maintaining a clear distinction between prohibited conduct and exemptions, thereby preventing the potential for overly burdensome pleading requirements that could stifle legitimate claims. The decision also reflects a broader concern about the balance between protecting plan participants and ensuring that fiduciaries can effectively manage retirement plans without facing undue litigation risks.

A case that highlights the complexities of bankruptcy law and the role of insurers in these proceedings is the subject of Truck Insurance Exchange versus Kaiser Gypsum Company. The Supreme Court made an important ruling about who gets to have a say in bankruptcy cases.

The Court decided that insurers, like Truck Insurance Exchange, who are financially responsible for claims in bankruptcy, are considered "parties in interest." This means they have the right to raise objections and be heard during Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. The Court overturned a previous decision from the Fourth Circuit, which had said that insurers didn’t have standing to object based on something called the "insurance neutrality" doctrine.

This ruling opens the door for insurers to participate more actively in bankruptcy proceedings, especially when their financial interests are at stake. It’s a significant shift that could impact how bankruptcy cases are handled in the future, ensuring that those who might be affected by reorganization plans have a voice in the process.

Summary of the Case

The case of Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc. arose from the bankruptcy proceedings of Kaiser Gypsum and Hanson Permanente Cement, companies facing extensive asbestos-related liabilities. Truck Insurance Exchange, the primary insurer for these companies, sought to object to the proposed reorganization plan, arguing that it exposed them to fraudulent claims due to insufficient disclosure requirements for insured versus uninsured claims. The lower courts ruled that Truck lacked standing to object, deeming the plan "insurance neutral," meaning it did not alter Truck's prepetition obligations or rights under its insurance policies. Truck appealed to the Supreme Court to determine whether it qualified as a "party in interest" under §1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sotomayor, reversed the lower court's decision. The Court held that an insurer with financial responsibility for bankruptcy claims is indeed a "party in interest" under §1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court emphasized that the text, context, and history of §1109(b) support a broad interpretation that allows any entity directly and adversely affected by a reorganization plan to raise objections. The Court rejected the "insurance neutrality" doctrine used by the lower courts, which conflated the merits of an objection with the threshold inquiry of who qualifies as a party in interest. The Court concluded that Truck's financial exposure and potential liability under the proposed plan warranted its right to be heard in the proceedings.

Separate Opinions

There were no separate opinions in this case, as all justices joined in the majority opinion.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Alito did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case, but there were no dissenting opinions expressed.

Bankruptcy Code and Fair Representation

The case highlights the interpretative challenges surrounding §1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows "parties in interest" to participate in Chapter 11 proceedings. The Court's ruling underscores the importance of broad participation in bankruptcy cases to ensure fair representation of all stakeholders, particularly in complex cases involving significant liabilities like asbestos claims. The decision clarifies that insurers, who bear financial responsibility for claims, have a legitimate interest in the proceedings, regardless of whether their contractual obligations are altered. This interpretation aligns with the historical context of the Bankruptcy Code, which aims to prevent insider control and promote equitable treatment of all parties involved. The ruling also emphasizes that the potential for financial harm, such as exposure to fraudulent claims, is sufficient to establish a party's interest in the proceedings, thereby reinforcing the principle of inclusivity in bankruptcy law.

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Smith et al. v. Spizzirri et al. brings to light some interesting nuances in the law surrounding arbitration. The Supreme Court made it clear that when a district court identifies a lawsuit that can be settled through arbitration, and one party asks to pause the court proceedings while arbitration takes place, the law requires the court to grant that request.

This means that the court does not have the option to dismiss the case outright. Instead, it must issue a stay, allowing the arbitration process to unfold. This ruling emphasizes the importance of arbitration as a means to resolve disputes without going through the full court system.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote the majority opinion, and she was joined by several other justices, reinforcing a strong consensus on this issue. The decision highlights how the Federal Arbitration Act plays a crucial role in guiding how courts handle cases that involve arbitration agreements.

As we continue to see more cases involving arbitration, this ruling sets a clear precedent for how similar situations should be handled in the future.

Summary of the Case

The case of Smith et al. v. Spizzirri et al. arose from a dispute involving the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Petitioners, who were delivery drivers for an on-demand service, filed a lawsuit in state court against their employer, alleging violations of federal and state employment laws, including misclassification as independent contractors and failure to pay minimum wages. The respondents removed the case to federal court and sought to compel arbitration, which the petitioners conceded was appropriate. However, the petitioners contended that under Section 3 of the FAA, the district court was required to stay the proceedings pending arbitration rather than dismissing the case entirely. The district court compelled arbitration but dismissed the case without prejudice, a decision that was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court was asked to resolve whether a district court has the discretion to dismiss a case when a party requests a stay pending arbitration.

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sotomayor, held that when a district court finds that a lawsuit involves an arbitrable dispute and a party has requested a stay, Section 3 of the FAA mandates that the court must issue a stay and lacks the discretion to dismiss the case. The Court emphasized that the statutory language, particularly the use of "shall," imposes an obligation on the court to stay proceedings. The Court rejected the respondents' argument that "stay" could be interpreted to include "dismiss," noting that the legal meaning of "stay" is a temporary suspension, not a termination of proceedings. The Court also pointed out that allowing dismissal would conflict with the FAA's structure, which is designed to facilitate arbitration and allow parties to return to court if arbitration fails. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

One Word Creates a Binding Obligation

The case highlights the interpretative challenges surrounding the FAA, particularly Section 3, which governs the stay of proceedings in cases subject to arbitration. The Court's interpretation underscores the mandatory nature of the statutory language, emphasizing that the use of "shall" creates a binding obligation for courts. This interpretation aligns with the FAA's overarching purpose of promoting arbitration as a means of resolving disputes efficiently. The Court's ruling clarifies that district courts do not possess inherent authority to dismiss cases subject to arbitration when a stay is requested, thereby reinforcing the statutory framework designed to facilitate arbitration. This decision also addresses a circuit split regarding the interpretation of the FAA, providing a clear directive for lower courts on how to handle similar cases in the future. The ruling thus serves to enhance the predictability and consistency of arbitration proceedings in federal courts.

The Supreme Court issued their opinion involving Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation and Moab Partners. The decision, issued on April 12, 2024, clarified important rules about financial disclosures.

The Court decided that simply not sharing information, known as "pure omissions," does not violate SEC Rule 10b-5(b). This means that if a company fails to disclose certain information, it can only be held accountable if that omission makes other statements they made misleading. In other words, if a company says something that sounds good but leaves out important details, that could be a problem.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote the majority opinion, and she was joined by several other justices. This ruling helps define what companies need to disclose to investors and sets a clear standard for when they can be held responsible for not sharing information.

This case is a reminder of the importance of transparency in the financial world and how companies must be careful about what they say and what they leave out.

Summary of the Case

The case of Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners, L.P. arose from allegations that Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation failed to disclose material information regarding the impact of the International Maritime Organization's (IMO) 2020 regulation on its business. Specifically, the regulation capped the sulfur content of fuel oil used in shipping, which significantly affected the market for No. 6 fuel oil, a product stored by Macquarie's subsidiary. Following a substantial drop in contracted storage capacity and a subsequent 41% decline in stock price, Moab Partners sued Macquarie, claiming violations of SEC Rule 10b-5(b) for omitting material facts that rendered their public statements misleading. The District Court dismissed the complaint, but the Second Circuit reversed, asserting that Macquarie had a duty to disclose the implications of the IMO 2020 regulation under Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K.

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court held that pure omissions are not actionable under Rule 10b-5(b). The Court clarified that Rule 10b-5(b) prohibits making untrue statements of material facts or omitting material facts necessary to make statements made not misleading. However, it distinguished between "pure omissions"—where no statement is made—and "half-truths," where a statement is made but is misleading due to the omission of critical information. The Court concluded that a failure to disclose information required by Item 303 can only support a Rule 10b-5(b) claim if it renders affirmative statements misleading. The Court emphasized that silence, in the absence of a duty to disclose, is not inherently misleading under Rule 10b-5(b). Thus, the judgment of the Second Circuit was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Separate Opinions

Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, which was unanimous. There were no separate concurring opinions noted in the provided text.

Pure Omissions and Half-Truths

The ruling in this case highlights a critical distinction in securities law between pure omissions and half-truths. The Court's interpretation of Rule 10b-5(b) underscores that liability for omissions is contingent upon the existence of misleading statements. This interpretation aligns with the statutory context of the Securities Act of 1933, which explicitly provides for liability for pure omissions under Section 11(a). The absence of similar language in Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b) indicates that Congress did not intend to impose liability for pure omissions in the same manner. The Court's decision reinforces the principle that while companies have a duty to disclose material information, that duty is not absolute and must be linked to the context of statements made. This nuanced understanding of disclosure obligations is essential for interpreting the regulatory framework governing securities transactions and investor protections.