Delligatti v. United States, Docket No. 23-825

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Wrestling with a subtle twist in federal law the high court rules on the question: Can failing to act still count as using physical force against someone?

In Delligatti v. United States, Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by six other justices, said yes. If you knowingly cause serious injury or death, even by omission, you “use” physical force under the law. So a crime like New York second-degree murder, which can happen by ignoring a legal duty, still counts as a crime of violence.

Summary of the Case

Salvatore Delligatti, a member of the Genovese crime family, was indicted for recruiting associates to murder a suspected informant and supplying them with a loaded revolver. The Government charged him under a law which imposes a mandatory consecutive five-year sentence for using or carrying a firearm “during and in relation to any crime of violence.” VICAR attempted murder was grounded in New York second-degree murder, defined as intentionally causing death. Delligatti moved to dismiss on the ground that second-degree murder, as defined in New York which can be committed by omission of a legal duty, does not “have as an element the use…of physical force” within the elements clause. The District Court denied the motion, and the Second Circuit affirmed, relying on United States v. Castleman to hold that intentional causation involves the use of physical force and thus qualifies as a crime of violence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari “to decide whether an individual who…causes bodily injury or death by failing to take action uses physical force within the meaning of the elements clause.”

Opinion of the Court

Justice Thomas, writing for a 7–2 majority, affirmed. Applying the categorical approach, the Court held that “the knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the ‘use of physical force’”. Relying on Castleman, the majority extended its two-step reasoning: (1) deliberate causation of bodily harm cannot occur without force, and (2) intentional application of force—direct or indirect—is a “use” of force. Although Castleman involved misdemeanor-level battery force and § 924(c) requires “violent force,” another case, Stokeling, established that any force sufficient to cause injury or death meets § 924(c)’s threshold. The Court then rejected Delligatti’s challenge that omissions lack “use” of force “against” another: ordinary usage permits one to “use” a preexisting force by inaction like if a parent were to with food, and “against the person” simply specifies the force’s conscious object. Finally, the historic meaning of “crime of violence,” encompassing causes-and-results offenses like murder by omission, confirmed that indictments for New York second-degree murder fall squarely within § 924(c).

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Jackson, dissented. They argued that the statute’s text—“use…of physical force against the person…of another”—contemplates only active, “violent” physical acts, not omissions. The dissent emphasized that “use” carries an active meaning, that omissions do not involve employing force, and that, contrary to the majority, a statutory definition must prevail over presumed legislative purpose or selective precedential readings.

Physical Force

Section 924(c) defines “crime of violence” through two clauses:
• Elements clause: a federal felony that “has as an element the use…of physical force against the person or property of another.”
• Residual clause: an offense that “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force…may be used.”

In Davis, the Court invalidated the residual clause for vagueness, leaving only the elements clause. Courts apply the categorical approach, comparing the statutory elements—not a defendant’s conduct—to § 924(c). Dispute centers on “use of physical force”: is it restricted to affirmative, violent acts, or does it encompass knowing causation by omission? The majority embraces a holistic reading—grounded in Castleman, Stokeling, and historical common-law definitions of violent offenses—while the dissent remains faithful to a text-first approach that sees “use” as necessarily active. This interpretive divide reflects broader tensions in criminal law between textual precision, ordinary meaning, and purposive alignment with “prototypical” violent crimes.