Thompson v. United States, Docket No. 23-1095

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When does a half‐truth cross the line into a punishable lie? That’s what the Supreme Court asked when it looked at a law banning “knowingly mak[ing] any false statement” on loan documents. The justices unanimously agreed that a statement can be misleading yet still be true, and the law only reaches statements that are actually false.

Because of that narrow reading, the Court sent the case back to the lower court to decide whether Thompson’s statements were outright lies or just clever ways to spin the facts.

Summary of the Case

Patrick Thompson borrowed three sums from Washington Federal Bank. $110,000 in 2011, $20,000 in 2013 and $89,000 in 2014 — totaling $219,000. When the bank failed in 2017, the FDIC, as receiver, sought repayment. During two debt-collection calls, Thompson disputed an invoice showing a $269,120.58 balance, telling FDIC contractors that he “had no idea where the 269 number comes from” and that he “borrowed . . . $110,000”. The Government indicted him under 18 U.S.C. § 1014 for “knowingly mak[ing] any false statement” to influence the FDIC’s handling of a loan. A jury convicted, and Thompson moved for acquittal, arguing his statements were literally true. He had in fact borrowed $110,000, albeit misleading by omitting subsequent borrowings. Both the District Court and the Seventh Circuit held that § 1014 also covers misleading statements, affirmed the convictions, and rejected the claim of literal truth. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether § 1014 reaches misleading but true statements.

Opinion of the Court

Chief Justice Roberts, for a unanimous Court, held that § 1014’s reference to “false statement[s]” does not encompass statements that are merely misleading. First, the statute’s text uses only the adjective “false,” which unambiguously means “not true,” and omits the word “misleading”. A misleading statement can be true, and a true statement is not false; “any false statement” does not expand the category to include all misleading statements. Second, context confirms this narrow reading: other federal criminal and regulatory provisions in Title 18 expressly prohibit “false or misleading” statements, so interpreting § 1014 to cover all misleading statements would render that language superfluous. Third, precedent is in accord: in United States v. Wells, the Court declined to graft a materiality requirement into § 1014 because Congress omitted it; similarly, Williams v. United States, held that a check cannot be a “false statement” at all. Kay v. United States does not aid the Government, as its references to “misleading” describe intent, not substantive scope. Finally, the Court recognized that context is relevant to determining whether a given statement is false, and remanded for the Seventh Circuit to assess whether a reasonable jury could find Thompson’s statements false in their factual setting.

Separate Opinions

Justice Alito concurred to emphasize five key takeaways: (1) § 1014 reaches only untrue statements; (2) “false” bears its ordinary meaning of “not true”; (3) falsity must be assessed in context; (4) overlap between “false” and “misleading” does not require reference to “misleading” in jury instructions; and (5) on remand, the Seventh Circuit should apply the Jackson v. Virginia sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard. Justice Jackson also concurred, noting that because the jury was correctly instructed to find only false statements, the Seventh Circuit should simply affirm the verdict if a rational factfinder could find falsity.

False Vs. Misleading

When Congress recodified the federal criminal statutes in 1948, it consolidated eleven predecessor provisions into § 1014—all penalizing “false statements” without mentioning “misleading.” By contrast, contemporaneous statutes that targeted misleading or deceptive conduct patently used the phrase “false or misleading”. The omission of “misleading” in § 1014 is thus deliberate, not inadvertent. Further, adding “any” before “false statement” broadens only within the class of untrue statements, not to encompass true but misleading assertions. Precedents like Wells, declining to import materiality, and Williams, limiting § 1014 to assertions analyzable as true or false, reinforce that § 1014’s ambit is confined to statements that can legitimately be called false. Although contextual nuance informs whether particular words are untrue, the statute itself turns solely on falsity, not misleadingness.