Listen to the episode On Spotify on Apple Podcasts or on YouTube

Children born on American soil are automatically U.S. citizens, no matter what their parents' immigration status is. The decision strikes down an executive order that would have stripped citizenship from an estimated 150,000 to 250,000 babies born annually in the United States.

The Case That Changed Everything

On January 20, 2025, President Trump signed an executive order declaring that children born to undocumented or temporarily present parents would not automatically become citizens. Parents immediately sued to block it. A lower court halted the order, and the Supreme Court fast-tracked the case. In a 5-4 decision, the justices sided with the families, ruling that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees citizenship to virtually every child born on American soil.

What Each Side Argued

The Trump administration made a simple claim that the Constitution says children must be "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States to gain automatic citizenship. The government argued this means parents need permanent legal status in America first. Without that, the administration said, children don't truly belong to the country.

The families challenging the order disagreed completely. They pointed to centuries of American law and tradition. Having been born here and under American authority means you're a citizen. Period. They said only three narrow exceptions exist: 1. children of foreign diplomats 2. children born during enemy military occupation 3. historically, children born to Native American tribes with their own governments.

No president, they argued, can invent new exceptions on his own.

The Majority's Decision

Chief Justice Roberts and four colleagues upheld birthright citizenship. They traced the concept back through English common law and American history, finding it had never been interrupted. The phrase "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" simply means being under American legal authority within U.S. borders, the majority wrote. That covers birth here, including children of undocumented immigrants.

The Court relied heavily on an 1898 case, United States v. Wong Kim Ark, where the justices ruled that a man born in San Francisco to Chinese immigrant parents was a citizen, even though his parents were barred from ever becoming citizens themselves. That case, the majority said, settled the question over a century ago.

The Dissenters' Argument

Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch saw it differently. They argued "subject to the jurisdiction" requires a permanent legal residence and allegiance to America. Parents here illegally or temporarily, they said, don't meet that standard. Thomas pointed to how the government actually handled citizenship in the decades after the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, arguing the majority was reading history wrong.

Justice Alito added another concern. If a child automatically becomes a citizen of another country at birth under that country's laws, can they truly be subject only to American jurisdiction? He also suggested some situations might justify denying citizenship, like parents who came specifically to give birth and leave.

Justice Gorsuch, notably, suggested even the dissenters' own logic might not support the executive order in all cases. Parents who've lived here for years, even without legal status, arguably have their permanent home here.

The Real Divide

The entire case hinges on how to read seven words: "subject to the jurisdiction thereof." The majority read it as simply being under American legal authority. The dissenters read it as requiring permanent, deep connection to the country. Both sides claimed to be interpreting the Constitution as originally written, but they looked at different historical evidence and reached opposite conclusions.

Justice Kavanaugh stood alone in one respect: he agreed the executive order was illegal, but he left the door open for Congress to pass a law limiting birthright citizenship in the future. Every other justice either said the Constitution permanently protects birthright citizenship or said the order was constitutional. His opinion is essentially an invitation Congress might accept.

Defining an American at Birth

This decision affects roughly 150,000 to 250,000 babies born annually in the United States. For families, it means their children born here are unquestionably American citizens. Regardless of immigration status. For the country, it reaffirms the principle that birth on American soil confers citizenship.

Listen to the episode On Spotify on Apple Podcasts or on YouTube

The President now controls dozens of federal agencies that were designed to make decisions based on expertise and evidence rather than politics. In a 6 to 3 majority, the Court ruled the President can fire the heads of independent agencies whenever he wants. For any reason or no reason at all. That means agencies like the Federal Trade Commission, which polices unfair business practices and protects consumers, now answer directly to the President instead of operating at arm's length from politics. The decision overturned a 91-year-old Supreme Court ruling that had protected these agencies from political interference.

What Happened and Why It Matters

President Trump fired FTC Commissioner Rebecca Slaughter without explaining why. She sued to get her job back, arguing that federal law protected her from being fired without good cause. A lower court agreed with her. But the Supreme Court sided with the President, saying that anyone who enforces federal law must ultimately answer to the President and can be removed at his discretion.

The FTC is no ordinary agency. It writes rules that businesses must follow, holds hearings, and files lawsuits on behalf of the government. The Court concluded that because the FTC exercises real governmental power, the President must be able to control it. The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Roberts, traced this principle back to the Constitution's original design. The Founders wanted a single President who could be held accountable for how the government operates. If agency officials could ignore the President, the reasoning goes, then no one could really be held responsible for what the government does.

The Court did hint that some agencies might be different. It suggested the Federal Reserve and specialized courts like the Tax Court might keep their independence. But it offered almost no explanation for why. That vagueness will likely spark years of legal battles as other agencies challenge whether they qualify for protection.

The Arguments on Both Sides

The government argued that the Constitution gives all executive power to the President. If agency officials carry out that power, they must answer to the President. The 1935 precedent protecting the FTC was a mistake that had been quietly abandoned by later court decisions anyway. Without presidential control, the government becomes unaccountable to voters.

Commissioner Slaughter's lawyers countered that independent agencies have existed since the nation's founding. Congress has the power to structure agencies to protect them from political pressure. They emphasized legal stability: this law had been on the books for over a century, upheld unanimously by the Supreme Court, and respected by every President until now. Why overturn it now?

The justices themselves seemed divided during oral arguments. Some worried the ruling's logic would sweep too far, threatening civil service protections and specialized courts. Others questioned why no President had challenged independent agencies for ninety years if the practice was truly unconstitutional.

What the Dissenters Said

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, argued the majority should have simply followed the 1935 precedent instead of overturning nine decades of settled law. She pointed out that the Constitution does not explicitly give the President unlimited firing power. Even some of the Founders believed the Senate should have a role in removing officials.

The dissenters also highlighted the practical chaos ahead. Congress created dozens of agencies assuming their leaders would be protected from political removal, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Consumer Product Safety Commission. Overturning that assumption will force Congress to rewrite the rules for all of them. The Federal Reserve is an exception noted by the dissenters as a logical problem. If the constitutional principle truly requires unlimited presidential removal power, what qualifies it as an exception? The majority's reasoning seems absolute in theory but full of unexplained exceptions in practice.

Presidential Authority vs. Independence

The President can fire anyone who exercises executive power. It sounds simple. But the opinion is actually muddled underneath. The Court's own reasoning would seem to apply to many agencies, yet the opinion stops short of saying so. That gap between the logic and the actual ruling will drive future lawsuits.

Every independent agency with job protections for its leaders now faces potential legal challenge. But whether any given agency will lose that protection depends on whether it falls within the Court's vague exceptions. What makes an agency similar enough to the early national banks to qualify for protection? How court-like does a tribunal need to be? The opinion raises these questions without answering them.

Justice Gorsuch highlighted a major shift this decision creates. Congress may have felt comfortable giving agencies broad authority to write rules and conduct hearings precisely because those agencies were independent. Now that independence is gone, that authority is concentrated in one person.

Listen to the episode On Spotify on Apple Podcasts or on YouTube

For the first time in 111 years, a President tried to fire a Federal Reserve Governor. The Supreme Court stopped him. The decision determines whether the President can fire officials who run independent agencies whenever he wants, or whether courts and Congress can actually limit that power.

What Happened

In August 2025, President Trump moved to remove Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook. He claimed she committed mortgage fraud before taking office by listing two different properties as her primary residence within two weeks of each other. Cook sued to keep her job. A federal judge blocked her removal while the case proceeded. When the Trump administration asked the Supreme Court to overturn that order on an emergency basis, the Court said no. The vote was 5 to 4.

That might sound like a narrow legal ruling. It was not. The Court's decision rested on four major conclusions that reshape how the President can fire federal officials. Courts can review whether the President actually had a valid reason. That reason must be substantial and genuine, not just any complaint. Courts can order an official to stay in their job while litigation continues. And most importantly, the President must give the official notice and a real chance to respond before firing them. Cook never got either.

The Court didn't comment on whether the mortgage fraud allegation actually justifies removal.

The Arguments

The government's lawyer argued the President should have broad power to fire a Fed Governor for almost any reason related to that person's conduct or fitness. No formal process needed. A social media post demanding Cook resign, plus five days to respond, was enough notice. Courts should have no power to put a removed officer back in place.

Cook's lawyer countered that removing a Fed Governor should require serious cause, similar to the standard used for other protected officials. He pointed to a 1903 Supreme Court case establishing that when Congress creates a fixed term for an office, the President must give notice and a hearing before removal, even if the law does not say so explicitly. He also noted that in over a century, no president had ever tried this before.

The oral argument revealed the real stakes. Justice Kavanaugh warned that the government's position would seriously damage the Federal Reserve's independence. Once one administration uses these tools, others will follow. Justice Sotomayor questioned whether a social media post could ever count as fair notice. Chief Justice Roberts challenged that if courts cannot order reinstatement, why was the case before them at all?

The Court's Decision

Chief Justice Roberts built the majority opinion by rejecting each of the government's core arguments. First, courts can review whether the President had a valid reason to fire a Fed Governor. The government had already admitted that firing someone for no reason at all would be reviewable. That admission only makes sense if courts get to decide what counts as a valid reason.

Second, the Court rejected both sides' definitions of cause. The government's was too loose. Cook's was too narrow. Instead, the Court held that cause must be substantial, reasonable, and just. The real question is whether the stated reason genuinely suggests the Governor is unfit for the job, or whether it is simply a cover for replacing her with someone more agreeable to the President. The Federal Reserve's unique role in American economic life matters here. Congress designed the Fed to be independent, so the bar for removal should be higher than for other agencies.

Third, the Court held that the President must give notice and a real hearing before removal. A social media post does not qualify. Cook was entitled to know what evidence was being used against her, have a genuine opportunity to respond, and be given a deadline for doing so.

Fourth, courts have the power to order an official to stay in their job while litigation proceeds. This is a long-standing practice in disputes over public offices.

What Comes Next

Justice Kavanaugh wrote separately to emphasize that this decision does not settle whether Cook can ultimately be removed. That depends on facts still being examined. But he stressed that the Federal Reserve can remain independent even after a companion decision the same day eliminated similar protections for most other independent agencies.

Justice Jackson also concurred but argued the case could have been decided more simply. The government showed no real harm from leaving Cook in place. The only injury was the abstract frustration of having an officer serve against the President's wishes.

Justice Thomas filed a sweeping dissent challenging nearly every part of the majority's reasoning. He argued that mortgage fraud plainly qualifies as cause for removal, that the statute's silence on process means Congress did not intend to require any, and that the law protecting Fed Governors from removal without cause is itself unconstitutional. He warned that the majority's procedural rule would apply broadly across hundreds of federal statutes.

Justice Alito objected to the Court issuing a sweeping opinion on an emergency application when the record was still thin. The case was only three weeks old. Justice Barrett focused on the scope of the majority's opinion, troubled that the Court ruled on the Fed's independence protections even though the government had not raised that argument.

Why This Matters

The law protecting Federal Reserve Governors is deceptively simple. They serve fourteen-year terms and can only be removed for cause. Those few words carry enormous weight. This case forced the Court to work through what cause actually means, what procedural rights the President must follow, and whether Congress can protect the Fed from presidential control at all.

The Court said Congress can. It grounded that answer in the historical tradition of the First and Second Banks of the United States, which Congress similarly insulated from direct presidential control. But that answer sits in tension with the companion decision issued the same day, which struck down similar protections for other agencies. Other institutions might someday claim the same historical protection.

The Federal Reserve sets interest rates and manages the money supply. Those decisions affect your mortgage, your savings, and your job. The Court just said the President cannot simply replace Fed officials who disagree with him. Without that independence, the Fed could become a tool of whoever sits in the White House.

Listen to the episode On Spotify on Apple Podcasts or on YouTube

The Supreme Court has ruled that federal agencies like the FCC can issue hefty fines to companies without giving them a jury trial first, as long as the companies can eventually get that jury trial if the government actually tries to collect the money. The decision affects how billions of dollars in government penalties work across the country, and it means companies will have a much harder time challenging agency fines in court.

What Happened: Two Companies, One Big Question

The FCC investigated AT&T and Verizon for mishandling customer location data and fined them roughly 57 million and 47 million dollars respectively. Both companies paid the fines but then sued, arguing the FCC had no right to punish them without a jury deciding the case first. The companies pointed out that the FCC acted as investigator, judge, and jury all rolled into one, which they said violated the Constitution.

The companies said they were in a bind. They could pay the fine immediately and lose the right to challenge it with a jury, or refuse to pay and wait indefinitely for a government lawsuit that might never come, all while their reputation suffers. Two federal appeals courts disagreed about whether this was constitutional, so the Supreme Court stepped in to settle it.

The Court's Decision: Agencies Can Fine First, Jury Trial Later

Eight of the nine justices sided with the FCC. Chief Justice Roberts explained that the FCC's fines are not actually final punishments. The agency cannot force anyone to pay on its own. No interest builds up on unpaid fines. The law even prohibits the FCC from using an unpaid fine against a company in other cases. The only way the government can actually collect the money is by filing a lawsuit in federal court, where the company gets a full jury trial from the beginning.

The Court drew a sharp distinction from an earlier case involving the SEC, where the agency could immediately seize assets and no jury trial was ever available. But here, the opposite is true. The FCC cannot touch a dime without first winning in front of a jury. The justices reasoned that the constitutional right to a jury trial only applies when an actual lawsuit is filed, and the government might never file one at all.

The Dissent: What About Companies That Already Paid?

Justice Thomas was the only dissenter, and his concern was about fairness. He did not argue that companies should never get a jury trial. Instead, he pointed out that AT&T and Verizon acted reasonably when they paid the fines. The FCC's orders used mandatory language, declared the companies liable, and demanded payment within thirty days. Courts at the time were routinely treating these orders as binding and final. Thomas argued the carriers deserved a chance to pursue their case now that the rules have been clarified, but the majority offered no such remedy.

A New Test For Agency Fines

The ruling creates a new test for when agency fines violate your right to a jury trial. The Constitution is satisfied as long as the agency's findings are not the final word. What matters is whether the order is immediately enforceable, whether the agency can seize assets on its own, and whether a jury trial is still available before any money changes hands. The specific words an agency uses matter far less than what its orders can actually do in the real world.

The Court also limited a legal argument called the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which says the government cannot force you to give up a constitutional right as a condition of something else. The justices ruled this argument has limited power in jury trial cases because the right to a jury trial only applies to actual lawsuits. If the government never files a lawsuit, the right never comes into play.

Fines May Not Be Final

The decision leaves one major question unanswered: what happens to companies that already paid fines under orders that looked binding at the time? AT&T and Verizon paid in a legal environment where courts treated agency fines as final and enforceable. The Court acknowledged this unfairness but did nothing to fix it. That unresolved tension will almost certainly lead to more lawsuits down the road, as companies that already paid demand refunds or the chance to have their cases heard by a jury.

For everyday citizens, this ruling means government agencies have more power to punish companies without a jury involved, at least initially. Whether that is good or bad depends on your view of agency power and corporate accountability. What is clear is that the practical effect of this decision will ripple through federal enforcement for years to come.

Listen to the episode On Spotify on Apple Podcasts or on YouTube

Sometimes the hardest part of the law is what a law does not say. That’s the key to this Supreme Court ruling about whether a president can slap tariffs on imported goods during a declared national emergency under a law called the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA.

In a majority opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court said IEEPA does not give the president the power to impose tariffs. The justices said that even though the law uses broad language and talks about the power to “regulate” importation, that doesn’t clearly include the power to add tariffs.

This case combined two disputes: Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump and Trump v. V.O.S. Selections. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision in the V.O.S. Selections case. In the Learning Resources case, the Court wiped out the lower court ruling and sent it back with instructions to dismiss it because that court did not have jurisdiction.

The majority included Roberts along with Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson. Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh dissented, and Kavanaugh’s dissent was joined by Thomas and Alito.

Summary of the Case

The Supreme Court has ruled that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not give the President the power to impose tariffs on imported goods. This decision places a significant limit on presidential power during national emergencies.

In 2025, President Trump declared two national emergencies. One related to drug trafficking, and the other addressed trade deficits. He then tried to impose substantial tariffs as part of his response to these emergencies. Small importers challenged these tariffs, arguing that the President exceeded his legal authority. The Court agreed with the challengers in a 6 to 3 decision. While the majority was divided on their reasoning, they were united on the outcome.

Arguments Made By Counsel

The Government's Position

The government argued that the emergency powers law clearly allows the President to regulate importation, and tariffs are a classic way to regulate imports. The government made several key points.

First, they pointed to dictionary definitions. The word regulate has long meant to control or adjust by rule. Tariffs are a classic tool for controlling imports. From the founding era onward, this term has included tariffs as a regulatory mechanism.

Second, they cited historical precedent. President Nixon imposed 10 percent tariffs in 1971 under the predecessor to this law. These tariffs were upheld by federal courts. When Congress passed the current law just two years later in 1977, Congress clearly understood that the same language included tariffs.

Third, they referenced a Supreme Court case from one year before the law was enacted. In that case, the Court unanimously upheld the President's tariffs under a different trade law. That law authorized the President to adjust imports. The Court held this language included monetary charges like tariffs, not just quotas. The phrase regulate importation is even broader than adjust imports.

Fourth, they argued that the major questions doctrine should not apply to foreign affairs statutes. Congress regularly gives broad discretion to the President in foreign affairs.

Finally, they made a practical argument. The law clearly allows quotas and embargoes, which are complete blockages of imports. It would make no sense for Congress to allow the President to block all Chinese imports entirely but not impose even a one dollar tariff on those imports.

The Challengers' Position

The challengers mounted several arguments against the tariffs.

First, they argued that tariffs are fundamentally taxes, not regulatory tools. Tariffs raise revenue. The Constitution assigns taxation exclusively to Congress. The word regulate appears in hundreds of statutes, yet government lawyers could not identify a single instance where regulate included the power to tax.

Second, they pointed to congressional practice. When Congress intends to authorize tariffs, it uses explicit language like duty, tariff, or surcharge. These words do not appear in the emergency powers law. The trade code contains multiple tariff statutes, all of which expressly reference tariffs and include specific caps on rates, time limits, and procedural requirements. The emergency powers law contains none of these constraints.

Third, they raised a constitutional problem. The emergency powers law authorizes regulation of both importation and exportation. But the Constitution expressly forbids taxing exports. If regulate included tariffs, it would make part of the law unconstitutional.

Fourth, they invoked the major questions doctrine. This involves an extraordinary power: unlimited tariffs on any product from any country for unlimited duration. No President has claimed this power before. This exercise of power requires clear congressional authorization.

Fifth, they distinguished the Nixon tariffs. President Nixon did not initially cite the old emergency law when imposing tariffs. He relied on other statutes. He only invoked the emergency law later in litigation as a defensive position. The court decision supporting him was a single intermediate appellate court opinion, hardly a well settled interpretation Congress would incorporate by reference.

Finally, they argued that Congress enacted the emergency powers law in 1977 specifically to constrain emergency powers after Watergate and Vietnam. The statute's careful procedural requirements and emergency declaration requirements suggest Congress intended to limit, not expand, executive authority. Using a vaguely worded emergency statute to claim unlimited tariff power contradicts this legislative purpose.

Opinion of the Court

Chief Justice Roberts delivered the lead opinion. Six Justices join parts of it, while only three Justices join other parts.

Article One of the Constitution vests the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises exclusively in Congress. The Framers deliberately withheld this power from the Executive Branch. As Roberts emphasizes, the Framers gave Congress alone access to the pockets of the people. This reflects hard won principles from the American Revolution against taxation without representation. Tariffs are unquestionably a branch of the taxing power.

For foreign affairs, the Framers gave Congress, not the President, the tariff power notwithstanding the obvious foreign affairs implications of tariffs. While the President enjoys some independent constitutional authority in foreign affairs, tariffs present no overlap with any such independent power. The government concedes the President has no inherent peacetime authority to impose tariffs. When core congressional powers are at stake, the fact that they implicate foreign affairs does not license ambiguous delegation. When Congress has delegated tariff powers, it has done so in explicit terms and with strict limits.

The President has no inherent authority to impose tariffs during peacetime and seeks authority purely from the emergency powers law. The government cannot identify any statute in the entire U.S. Code in which the definition of regulate includes the power to tax. When Congress addresses both regulatory and taxing powers, it treats them separately and expressly. The Court also identified an export clause problem. Because the emergency law authorizes regulating both importation and exportation, reading regulate to include tariffs would render the statute partly unconstitutional. The Constitution explicitly forbids taxing exports.

In the emergency law's nearly 50 year existence, no President until Trump invoked the statute to impose tariffs. Presidents regularly invoked the law for other purposes but consistently looked to other statutes for tariff authority. This lack of historical precedent, combined with the breadth of authority claimed, indicates the power exceeds the President's legitimate reach. Emergency powers tend to kindle emergencies, and the Framers understood emergencies could afford a ready pretext for usurpation of congressional power.

The Nixon and Ford Tariffs Distinguished

The Court rejected the government's reliance on President Nixon's 1971 tariffs and President Ford's 1975 tariffs. For the Nixon tariffs, the Court noted that a single, expressly limited opinion from one specialized intermediate appellate court does not establish a well-settled meaning that Congress would have incorporated into later legislation. Nixon did not initially invoke the emergency law to justify the tariffs; he relied on other statutes and only cited it later as a litigation defense.

For the Ford tariffs, the Court found a similar lack of precedent. The 1977 legislative history itself acknowledged that earlier Presidents had exploited the open-ended nature of the old law, transforming it far beyond its original purpose of sanctioning foreign belligerents. Congress enacted IEEPA specifically to rein in these overreaches. Reading the new law as silently preserving unlimited tariff authority would contradict the very reform Congress intended.

Does a National Emergency Unlock Unlimited Tariff Power?

This decision establishes that broad emergency language does not automatically encompass the power to tax. The Court drew a firm line: even sweeping terms like "regulate importation" do not include tariffs absent clear congressional authorization, particularly when core Article I taxing powers are at stake.

The ruling preserves presidential flexibility in other respects. The Court did not disturb the President's ability to impose sanctions, block transactions, or freeze assets under IEEPA. It also did not question the validity of tariffs imposed under other statutes that expressly grant that authority with specific procedural limits and rate caps.

However, the 6–3 split reveals a significant fault line. The dissenters argued that the plain meaning of "regulate" naturally encompasses tariffs, and that the majority imposed an artificially narrow reading on a foreign affairs statute. Justice Kavanaugh's dissent warned that the decision hamstrings presidential responses to genuine emergencies. This tension suggests future disputes over how broadly courts should read delegations of power in foreign affairs and emergency contexts.

The practical impact is immediate: tariffs imposed solely under IEEPA authority lack legal basis, and importers who paid those tariffs may seek refunds.

Listen to the episode On Spotify on Apple Podcasts or on YouTube

The Supreme Court said Congressman Michael Bost, as a candidate for office, can bring a lawsuit over Illinois’s way of counting certain mail-in ballots. Illinois allows ballots that are postmarked or certified by Election Day to still be counted if they arrive within two weeks after Election Day. A lower court had thrown the case out, saying Bost didn’t have the right to sue.

The Supreme Court disagreed and sent the case back to the lower courts to keep going. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the Court. The majority said candidates have a real, personal stake in the rules used to count votes in their own elections—even if they can’t prove the rule will make them lose, or even if it doesn’t drive up their campaign costs. The Court said this is about the integrity of the election and the democratic process itself.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson dissented, joined by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Amy Coney Barrett agreed with the result in a separate opinion, and Justice Elena Kagan joined that.

Supreme Court Rules Candidates Can Challenge Election Procedures Without Proving They'll Lose

Congressman Michael Bost and other political candidates sued over an Illinois election rule that allows mail-in ballots to be counted if they're postmarked by Election Day but arrive up to two weeks later. The candidates argued this violates federal law, which sets a single, uniform Election Day for congressional and presidential elections across the country.

Lower courts threw out the case. Not because the candidates were wrong about election law, but because the judges said the candidates hadn't proven they were harmed enough to even bring the lawsuit in the first place. This is called "standing," and it's a fundamental requirement before any federal court can hear a case.

The Supreme Court took up the case to answer one key question: Do candidates have the right to challenge election rules in court, or must they first prove those rules will cause them to lose?

The Supreme Court's Decision

Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court's majority, ruled that Congressman Bost does have standing to challenge the vote-counting rules. The Court sent the case back to the lower courts to actually decide whether Illinois's rule violates federal election law.

The Court's reasoning centered on what it means to be a candidate in an election. According to the majority, candidates have more at stake than just winning or losing. They have a personal interest in making sure the election is run lawfully and fairly, and in ensuring the results are seen as legitimate by the public.

The Court rejected the idea that candidates must show a "substantial risk" of losing their election before they can challenge election rules in court. The justices warned that requiring this kind of proof would create serious problems. It would force candidates to wait until right before an election, or even after votes are counted, to file lawsuits. The Court has repeatedly cautioned against last-minute court battles over election rules because they create chaos and confusion for voters and election officials alike.

The majority also pointed out that asking judges to predict election outcomes would put courts in an impossible position. Judges aren't political analysts, and making them guess who's likely to win an election would look more like partisan forecasting than legal analysis.

Justice Barrett's Middle-Ground Approach

Justice Barrett, joined by Justice Kagan, agreed that Congressman Bost should be allowed to sue, but for different reasons. She criticized the majority for creating what she called a "novel" special standing rule just for candidates.

Instead, Barrett argued that Bost has standing based on a more traditional legal concept: financial harm. According to Barrett, campaigns have to spend money on poll watchers and monitoring systems to protect against problems that might arise from counting ballots that arrive late. These are real, out-of-pocket costs that campaigns wouldn't have to pay if the rule didn't exist.

Barrett worried that the majority's approach strays too far from established legal principles. She emphasized that all people who sue in federal court, including political candidates, should have to meet the same basic requirements to prove they've been harmed.

Justice Jackson's Strong Dissent

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, disagreed entirely. She argued that Congressman Bost hasn't suffered any real, concrete injury and therefore shouldn't be allowed to sue at all.

Jackson's main concern is that the majority is turning standing from a requirement to prove actual harm into an automatic right based on someone's status as a candidate. She pointed out that everyone cares about fair elections and legitimate results. If caring about election integrity is enough to sue, then anyone could challenge any election rule, which would overwhelm the courts with lawsuits.

Jackson also rejected Justice Barrett's financial-harm theory. She argued that spending money to monitor an election doesn't create standing if the underlying harm you're worried about is too speculative. In her view, Bost is spending money to guard against problems that might never happen, which isn't enough to justify a federal lawsuit.

Finally, Jackson warned that the majority's decision could "open the floodgates" to candidate lawsuits about all sorts of election procedures even when candidates can't point to any specific harm those rules cause them. Candidate lawsuits like how ballots are designed to how they're transported and stored could arise.

The Core Legal Question: What Does It Take to Sue Over Election Rules?

The real legal debate in this case isn't about whether Illinois's mail-in ballot rule is legal. The Supreme Court didn't decide that question. Instead, the justices disagreed about a more fundamental issue: What does someone have to prove before they can challenge election procedures in federal court?

The majority's view: Being a candidate gives you a concrete, personal stake in how elections are run. Candidates have a unique interest in making sure the process is lawful and the results are seen as legitimate. This interest is specific enough to allow candidates to sue without having to prove they'll lose because of the rule they're challenging.

Justice Barrett's view: Candidates should have to meet the same standing requirements as everyone else, but they can do so by pointing to the real money they spend responding to potentially problematic election rules. You don't need a special "candidate standing" rule. Traditional legal principles work just fine.

The timing dilemma: The majority emphasized a practical problem: if candidates have to wait until they can prove a rule will cause them to lose, they'll file lawsuits at the last minute, creating chaos right before elections. But Jackson countered that practical concerns can't override the Constitution's limits on federal court power.

The "manufactured standing" debate: Barrett argued that campaign spending on poll watchers is a real cost that creates standing. Jackson called this "manufactured standing"arguing that voluntarily spending money in response to speculative harms shouldn't give you the right to sue.

These competing views reveal a fundamental disagreement about election cases. Should courts recognize that candidates have special, process-based injuries that allow them to challenge election rules? Or does doing so water down the requirements for bringing a lawsuit and open the door to endless political litigation?

The majority believes candidates need a meaningful way to challenge potentially unlawful election rules before it's too late. The dissenters worry this approach gives candidates—and by extension, political parties—too much power to drag election procedures into federal court without proving real harm.

Listen to the episode on Spotify

When does sending legal papers by email count as proper notice? The Supreme Court has now answered that in the Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization case. A family in Washington, D.C., sued the PLO over the tragic death of a loved one in a terror attack. They tried handing the complaint to the PLO’s U.S. office but came up empty. So the judge said, “Okay, you can mail it and even email it to their New York representative.” The PLO argued that wasn’t a real way to serve papers, but the Supreme Court disagreed. It said that under the law governing suits against foreign entities, courts can allow these alternate methods when personal service isn’t possible.

This ruling sends the case back to lower court and means the family’s lawsuit can move forward. It also sheds light on how judges balance the right to fair notice against victims’ need for access to justice.

Summary of the Case

American citizens (and their estates) who were injured or killed in terrorist attacks abroad sued the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990. After winning jury verdicts worth over $650 million in one case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals overturned these victories, ruling that US courts lacked personal jurisdiction over these organizations because their alleged support for terrorism occurred overseas and didn't create sufficient connection to the United States.

In response, Congress passed the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 (PSJVTA). This law specifically names the PA and PLO and establishes that they are considered to have consented to US court jurisdiction in terrorism cases if they either: (1) pay salaries or death benefits to convicted terrorists or their families, or (2) maintain any offices, facilities, or conduct any activities in the United States.

Lower courts found this law unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, but the Supreme Court has now reversed that decision.

Opinion of the Court

Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court in judgment, made three key rulings:

First, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause (which applies to federal power) doesn't incorporate the same "minimum contacts" test used for state courts under the Fourteenth Amendment. This is because the Fourteenth Amendment concerns relationships between states, while the Fifth Amendment deals with federal authority, which can extend beyond US borders.

Second, Congress acted within its constitutional authority when creating the PSJVTA, which links jurisdiction over the PLO and PA to conduct that meaningfully relates to the United States and involves critical foreign policy decisions made by the political branches of government.

Third, even if applying a "reasonableness" standard from Fourteenth Amendment cases, the PSJVTA easily passes constitutional muster. The Court noted the strong interest of American victims in having a US forum, the nation's compelling interest in fighting terrorism, and the absence of any unfair burden on the defendants.

The Court reversed the lower court's decision and sent the cases back for further proceedings.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas (joined partly by Justice Gorsuch) agreed with the outcome but offered different reasoning. He argued that the Fifth Amendment, as originally understood, places no territorial limit on Congress's power to extend federal jurisdiction. In his view, the Due Process Clause never imposed substantive restrictions on extraterritorial federal jurisdiction in the first place.

How Congress Tailored the Law to Combat Terrorism Financing

The PSJVTA carefully amends the Anti-Terrorism Act's jurisdictional rules in two specific ways.

First, it targets "incentive" programs like salaries paid to terrorists serving prison terms in Israel and benefits paid to families of terrorists killed while carrying out attacks. Congress had previously condemned these payments in the Taylor Force Act.

Second, the law subjects the PLO and PA to US court jurisdiction if they maintain any offices, facilities, or physical presence in the United States. This provision builds on existing restrictions on PLO/PA operations on American soil.

Importantly, the law applies only to terrorism claims and specifically excludes the Palestinian mission to the United Nations. Unlike broader jurisdictional provisions, Congress crafted the PSJVTA to target two specific non-sovereign organizations already involved in US counter-terrorism policy. The law gives clear notice that continuing these specific activities will be treated as consent to being sued in American courts.

The statute reflects a careful legislative balance between deterring support for terrorism, respecting diplomatic and foreign policy concerns, and ensuring fairness to defendants who have known connections to the United States.

Listen to the episode on Spotify

With a sharp focus on where law meets medicine, the Supreme Court upheld Tennessee’s ban on puberty blockers and hormones for minors seeking care for gender dysphoria or to live as a gender different from their birth sex. The justices said this law doesn’t single out transgender kids but sets rules based on age and medical treatment. Chief Justice Roberts wrote that, in situations where scientists and doctors still debate, courts should give room for states to protect young people’s health.

Several justices added separate notes to explain parts of their agreement, while Justices Sotomayor and Kagan issued a strong dissent, warning that this ban risks harming vulnerable children and cutting off their access to care.

Summary of the Case

In 2023, Tennessee passed a law called SB1, which prohibits healthcare providers from giving puberty blockers or hormones to minors for gender-affirming care. The law specifically bans these treatments when used to help minors identify with a gender different from their birth sex or to treat distress from gender incongruence. However, the same medications remain available for adults and for minors with other medical conditions like precocious puberty or certain diseases.

Three transgender minors, their parents, and a physician challenged the law as unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, and the U.S. government joined their case. Initially, a federal district court blocked the law, ruling that it discriminated based on sex and transgender status. However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision, accepting Tennessee's argument that medical uncertainty provided a rational basis for the law.

The Supreme Court then took up the case to determine whether Tennessee's law violates equal protection rights.

How the Supreme Court Ruled on Gender-Affirming Care Restrictions

In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court upheld Tennessee's law. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and partially by Justice Alito.

The majority ruled that the law doesn't trigger heightened scrutiny because it classifies people based on two non-suspect grounds: age (adults versus minors) and medical purpose (gender dysphoria treatment versus other medical conditions). The Court determined that the law doesn't discriminate based on sex or transgender status.

According to the majority, merely referring to sex in defining a medical procedure doesn't automatically require intermediate scrutiny. They found that the law applies equally to all minors regardless of sex and doesn't reveal any discriminatory intent.

The Court also rejected the argument that the law classifies based on transgender status, stating that it excludes certain diagnoses from covered medical conditions rather than targeting transgender people themselves. The majority distinguished this case from Bostock v. Clayton County (an employment discrimination case), saying that changing a patient's sex wouldn't alter how the law operates since it focuses on diagnosis, not identity.

Under the less stringent rational-basis review, the Court found that Tennessee's concerns about medical risks, minors' maturity, potential regret, and alternative treatments provided sufficient justification for the law's restrictions.

Separate Opinions

Several justices wrote separate opinions:

Justice Thomas concurred but declined to extend the reasoning from Bostock beyond employment discrimination cases. He also warned against excessive deference to medical experts in constitutional cases.

Justice Barrett agreed that transgender status is not a suspect class warranting heightened scrutiny.

Justice Alito joined parts of the majority opinion but wrote separately to say he would have upheld the law even under heightened scrutiny.

In dissent, Justice Sotomayor (joined by Justices Jackson and Kagan) argued that the law clearly classifies based on sex and transgender status because it allows these medications only when they align with birth sex. She contended that intermediate scrutiny should apply, and under that standard, Tennessee failed to show its ban was substantially related to protecting minors' health.

Justice Kagan wrote a separate dissent (joined by Justices Jackson and Sotomayor) agreeing that intermediate scrutiny should apply.

The Medical and Legal Debate Behind Gender-Affirming Care Bans

Tennessee's law reflects the legislature's concerns about the growing use of puberty blockers and hormones for treating gender dysphoria in minors. The state cited worries about potential irreversible effects, including sterility, health risks, and psychological consequences. The law also referenced minors' limited capacity to fully understand long-term outcomes and reports of regret.

The law makes a critical distinction: it permits these medications for traditional medical conditions but prohibits them when used to facilitate gender identity different from birth sex or to treat distress related to gender dysphoria.

The dissenting justices argued that this distinction itself reveals the sex-based nature of the law, as the same treatment is allowed or banned depending on whether it preserves or challenges birth sex alignment. This fundamental disagreement about how to classify the law's restrictions formed the core of the Court's split decision.

Listen to the episode on Spotify

Here’s a twist in the way the law works: when a prisoner sues under the rule that says you must try every step inside prison before going to court, who decides if those steps really happened — a judge or a jury? The Supreme Court says that when those questions get mixed up with the heart of the case, a jury must decide. That’s because the law on prisoner complaints doesn’t spell out who sorts that out, and normally any factual fight tied to the main claim goes to a jury. This ruling settles a fight where different appeals courts had different answers. Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the five-justice majority, joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson. Justice Barrett, joined by three colleagues, disagreed and would have left those decisions to judges.

Summary of the Case

Kyle Richards, a Michigan state inmate, sued prison officer Thomas Perttu, alleging that Perttu had sexually harassed him and other inmates and then destroyed Richards's grievance forms when he tried to complain. Perttu moved for summary judgment, arguing that Richards failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The Magistrate Judge held an evidentiary hearing, found Richards's witnesses not credible, and recommended dismissal without prejudice for failure to exhaust. The District Court adopted that recommendation. On appeal, a three-judge Sixth Circuit panel reversed, holding that the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial whenever resolution of a PLRA-exhaustion dispute is "intertwined" with a claim that itself entitles the plaintiff to a jury. That decision conflicted with other circuit court precedent. The Supreme Court granted review to resolve whether prisoners have a right to jury trial on PLRA exhaustion when that question overlaps with the merits of their claim.

Opinion of the Court

Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the 5–4 majority (joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson), affirmed the Sixth Circuit. The Court first applied the constitutional-avoidance principle, asking whether the PLRA can be read to confer a jury trial right and thereby avoid resolving whether Congress could have required judge-only factfinding without violating the Seventh Amendment. The majority held that PLRA exhaustion is an affirmative defense subject to the "usual practice" under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that under that background practice, courts send factual disputes intertwined with the merits to a jury. The PLRA is "silent" on whether a judge or jury must decide exhaustion and contains no indication that Congress intended to change these common-law principles. Nor does the PLRA's purpose of conserving judicial resources overcome the weight of this usual practice. Historical precedents confirm that factual questions intertwined with the merits belong before a jury. Accordingly, the Court interpreted the PLRA to require a jury trial on exhaustion when it overlaps with a claim that carries a Seventh Amendment right.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Barrett, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh, dissented. She argued that the Court improperly reframed a purely constitutional question as a statutory one, creating out of thin air a rule that the PLRA "implicitly" confers a jury right. She maintained that neither the text nor the history of the PLRA supports such an inference, and that the majority misapplied precedents designed only to guide judicial sequencing of legal and equitable claims, not to expand the jury-trial right itself.

When Prison Grievances and Jury Rights Collide: The Supreme Court's PLRA Decision

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires inmates to exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing lawsuits. But what happens when the very person an inmate is suing allegedly prevented them from filing grievances? This case addressed exactly that situation. The Court determined that when factual disputes about whether an inmate properly exhausted administrative remedies overlap with the merits of their underlying claim, those disputes must be decided by a jury rather than a judge.

This ruling is significant because it recognizes that in cases where the same facts are central to both whether an inmate followed proper grievance procedures and whether their rights were violated, those factual questions should be decided together by a jury. The Court interpreted the PLRA's silence on who decides exhaustion disputes as incorporating the traditional legal practice of having juries resolve factual issues when those issues are intertwined with claims that carry a constitutional right to jury trial.

By ruling this way, the Court avoided directly addressing whether Congress could have required judges to decide these factual disputes without violating the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of jury trials. Instead, the Court found that the PLRA itself, properly interpreted, preserves the jury's traditional role in resolving factual disputes central to the merits of a case.

Listen to the episode on Spotify

At the center of a subtle change in disability law, the Supreme Court has said that students claiming their schools discriminated against them don’t have to prove that officials acted in “bad faith or gross misjudgment.” Instead, those students use the same straightforward rules that apply to other cases of disability discrimination.

This ruling overturns a higher bar set by the Eighth Circuit, which had made it tougher for students to bring their claims forward. Now the Supreme Court sent the case back to that court to be handled under the usual standards.

With this decision, families will face a clearer path when they say their children were denied equal access in the classroom. Stay tuned—we’ll break down what this means for schools and for kids across the country.

Summary of the Case

A. J. T. is a teenage student with a severe form of epilepsy whose seizures preclude her from attending school before noon but leave her able to learn from noon to 6 p.m. After moving to Osseo Area Schools (Dist. No. 279), her parents twice sought to include evening instruction in her IEP; the district denied those requests, cutting her instructional day to 4.25 hours versus 6.5 for nondisabled peers. They prevailed on an IDEA administrative complaint and in federal court, securing compensatory education and after-hours instruction. They then sued under Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the district on the ground that educational discrimination claims require a heightened showing of "bad faith or gross misjudgment" (Monahan v. Nebraska), which A. J. T. had not made. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split over whether ADA/§ 504 claims involving public-school services must satisfy that elevated standard.

Opinion of the Court

Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court, held that Title II and § 504 claimants relating to educational services are subject to the same requirements applied elsewhere under those statutes—no showing of intent to discriminate is required to obtain injunctive relief, and intentional discrimination (often shown by "deliberate indifference") is required only for compensatory damages. The Court observed that both statutes prohibit discrimination "by reason of" disability and confer remedies on "any person." It rejected the Eighth Circuit's Monahan-derived "bad faith or gross misjudgment" rule as incompatible with IDEA's non-exclusivity provision, and vacated and remanded the judgment.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Kavanaugh) concurred in full but stated that, in a future case properly presented, he would revisit whether ADA/§ 504 should uniformly require intent to discriminate—contending that "discrimination" necessarily implies intent and that Title II's prescriptions on States implicate Spending- and Fourteenth-Amendment limits.

Justice Sotomayor (joined by Justice Jackson) emphasized that the statutes' text and legislative history refute any improper-purpose gloss, underscoring that discrimination "most often" stems from "benign neglect" and that passive-voice drafting and affirmative-accommodation duties confirm no animus requirement.

How Disability Discrimination Standards Apply in Education Settings

The relationship between different disability laws is crucial to understanding this case. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act broadly prohibit discrimination based on disability and allow for both injunctive relief and monetary damages. Meanwhile, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) specifically ensures appropriate education through individualized programs.

After a previous Supreme Court case limited disability rights, Congress clarified that IDEA procedures don't restrict rights available under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. The Eighth Circuit's requirement for showing "bad faith or gross misjudgment" in education cases improperly narrowed the protections that should be available under disability discrimination laws.

The Court's ruling confirms that the standards for proving discrimination should be consistent across different contexts - whether in schools, workplaces, or public services. For injunctive relief (like ordering a school to provide evening instruction), no proof of discriminatory intent is needed. Only when seeking monetary damages must a plaintiff show intentional discrimination, typically through evidence of "deliberate indifference" to their rights.