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The Court’s decision turns on the idea that rules must be applied evenly. In this case, the city had a rule that street performers needed a permit. But it turned out that some acts got fast-tracked permits while others were put on a waiting list. The Supreme Court said that kind of unequal treatment raises a red flag under the Constitution’s equal protection guarantee.

Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, explained that the government cannot pick and choose who it favors without a good reason. If your dance team waits months for a permit while someone else walks right up and gets theirs in days, that’s not fair or lawful. The Court sent the case back to a lower court to make sure the city fixes its process and treats every performer the same way.

Summary of the Case

In 1999 Karyn Stanley began serving as a firefighter for the City of Sanford, Florida, under a policy that funded retiree health insurance through age sixty-five for both 25-year career retirees and those retiring early on disability. In 2003 the City revised its plan to preserve the age-65 subsidy only for 25-year retirees, limiting disability retirees to 24 months of coverage. Stanley, forced to retire on disability in 2018, sued under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging that this disparate treatment violated the law. The district court dismissed her ADA claim because it held that the law only protects "qualified individuals"—those who hold or seek employment—and Stanley was neither once she had retired. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve disagreement among circuit courts over whether Title I's protections extend to retirees who no longer hold or desire a job.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Gorsuch, writing for the Court, concluded that Title I prohibits discrimination only against a "qualified individual"—someone who "holds or desires" an employment position and "can perform the essential functions of the employment position with or without reasonable accommodation." The use of present-tense verbs and the statute's examples of "reasonable accommodation" (like job restructuring and facility modifications) all presume an ongoing employment relationship. By contrast, a retiree who no longer holds or seeks a job is not a "qualified individual" and thus cannot sue for discrimination in post-employment benefits. Gorsuch rejected Stanley's arguments, emphasizing that Congress could amend Title I if it wished to extend protection to retirees. Because Stanley fell outside the law's coverage, the Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's judgment.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Barrett, concurred in part and in the judgment. He stressed that the Court should not have entertained, at the merits stage, Stanley's alternative theory—namely, that she suffered discriminatory treatment while still employed—which the Eleventh Circuit deemed forfeited. He urged deference to lower-court rules about which arguments can be considered preserved and the Court's own practice of reviewing only the questions presented.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor for most of her opinion, dissented. She argued that Title I plainly forbids disability discrimination "in regard to employee compensation," and that retirement benefits are deferred compensation earned on the job. A unilateral reduction in those benefits, targeted at disability retirees, thus "discriminates against a qualified individual" who earned them while employed. Jackson would read the qualified-individual definition contextually—rather than as a rigid temporal bar—so as to cover post-employment actions affecting benefits that were earned in an employment relationship.

Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joining Justice Jackson's view that Title I reaches discriminatory changes to retiree health insurance earned on the job.

When ADA Protection Ends: The Debate Over Retiree Rights

The heart of this case revolves around when ADA protection stops. The law prohibits employers from discriminating "against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to compensation," and defines "qualified individual" as one "who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires."

The majority reads the statute's present-tense verbs ("holds," "desires," "can perform") and its examples of accommodation (job restructuring, modifying facilities, adjusting training materials) as inherently directed to current employees or applicants, not to retirees who hold no position. Thus, the majority concludes, the ADA does not protect against discrimination in post-retirement benefits.

In dissent, Justices Jackson and Sotomayor emphasize that retirement benefits are "deferred compensation" for service already rendered. They argue that reducing those benefits specifically for disability retirees inherently "discriminates against a qualified individual," contending that nothing in the law signals an intent to withdraw ADA protection the moment one leaves the workforce.