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In a unanimous decision that could reshape how the government punishes securities fraud, the Supreme Court ruled that regulators can force wrongdoers to surrender their ill-gotten gains without proving that investors actually lost money. The ruling sounds technical, but it has real consequences. It gives the SEC a powerful tool to strip fraudsters of their profits, even in cases where victims escaped financial harm.

The Case: A Stock Scheme Gone Wrong

Ongkaruck Sripetch ran what's known as a pump-and-dump scheme. It starts with a fraudster artificially inflates a stock's price, sells their shares at the peak, and disappears. Other investors are left holding worthless stock. Sripetch did this with at least twenty low-priced stocks and made $4.1 million in the process.

When a court ordered him to give back that money, Sripetch fought back. He argued the SEC should have to prove that actual investors lost money before taking his profits. The Supreme Court disagreed.

What the Court Decided

Justice Neil Gorsuch, writing for all nine justices, explained the difference between two types of court orders. Damages are based on what the victim lost. Disgorgement, by contrast, is based on what the wrongdoer gained. The Court pointed to centuries of legal history showing that courts have stripped defendants of their profits even when nobody else suffered financial harm. Examples ranged from stolen coal mining rights to borrowed machinery to stolen crops.

The Court upheld the $4.1 million order against Sripetch. A person whose legal rights were violated can recover the wrongdoer's profits even if that person suffered no financial loss at all.

What the Court Left Unanswered

Here's where things get complicated. The Court deliberately avoided answering three major questions that will likely return to the Supreme Court soon.

First, Congress passed a law after an earlier Supreme Court decision that explicitly authorized disgorgement. Does that law free the SEC from older restrictions? Second, what happens when the SEC cannot identify the victims to pay them back? Can the government keep the money? Third, and most important, Justice Thomas raised a question in a separate opinion: Is disgorgement now a legal remedy that gives defendants the right to a jury trial?

That last question could be transformative. Thomas noted that in 2024 alone, the SEC collected $6.1 billion in disgorgement orders but returned only $345 million to actual victims. If disgorgement requires a jury trial, it would fundamentally change how the SEC prosecutes fraud cases. Lower courts are already split on this issue, so the Supreme Court will likely have to settle it soon.

A Clear Path to Punish Securities Fraud

The bottom line is the government now has a clearer path to punish securities fraud by taking away wrongdoers' profits. You don't need to be a victim who lost money to see that happen. That's good news if you believe fraudsters should not benefit from their crimes. But the decision also leaves open the possibility that the SEC could use this tool in ways that go beyond compensating victims, which is why Justice Thomas and others are watching closely for the next chapter of this legal saga.

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A unanimous Supreme Court decision this week protects thousands of delivery workers from being forced into secret arbitration proceedings, even when they never leave their home state. The ruling could reshape how companies handle disputes with the workers who get packages to your door.

What This Case Was Really About

Angelo Brock delivers Flowers Foods products around Colorado. He never crosses state lines. But the company tried to force him into private arbitration using a clause buried in his contract when he sued over being underpaid. Brock fought back, arguing that federal law protects transportation workers from forced arbitration. The Supreme Court agreed, unanimously.

The key insight: Brock's deliveries were the final step in a journey that began in out-of-state bakeries. Even though his wheels never left Colorado, he was moving goods across state lines. That made him protected under a 1925 federal law designed to shield workers from losing their right to sue in court.

Why Flowers Foods Lost

Flowers Foods wanted a simple rule: only workers who personally cross state lines or handle vehicles from other states deserve protection. The company argued this would be cleaner and easier for courts to apply.

Justice Gorsuch rejected that argument for the entire Court. He looked at what "interstate commerce" meant a century ago and found it included the final leg of a journey, even if that leg stayed within one state. He used a helpful example: imagine three drivers each handling one segment of a snack delivery, with one crossing the state border. Under Flowers's logic, only that middle driver would be protected. The Court said that makes no sense. All three drivers play a direct, necessary role in the same interstate journey.

The Court also drew on an old case about a steamboat that operated entirely within Michigan but still counted as part of interstate commerce because it carried goods from other states. The message was clear: the last mile matters.

What Happens Next

Here's where things get complicated. Flowers Foods raised two other arguments that the Court simply refused to address. First, that Brock runs his own company rather than working as an employee. Second, that he actually buys the products before reselling them, making him a merchant rather than a transportation worker.

Courts across the country are split on both questions. Some say the federal protection only applies to individual workers, not small business owners. Others disagree. Some courts say if you take ownership of goods, you are a buyer and seller, not a transportation worker. Others say that does not matter.

The Supreme Court punted on these issues, which means lower courts will have to figure them out case by case. For the modern economy, that is significant. Companies relying on last-mile delivery workers, a massive and growing part of how goods reach consumers, cannot assume their arbitration clauses will hold up just because workers stay in one state. Each situation will be different.

Arbitration and Workers Rights

Arbitration clauses are designed to keep disputes private and out of court. Workers often lose their right to sue publicly, to appeal, or to join class action lawsuits with coworkers facing the same problem. This decision says that federal law protects at least some delivery workers from that fate.

The ruling is unanimous. Every justice agreed that workers moving goods across state lines deserve protection, even if their own route never crosses a border. That suggests the Court sees this as a straightforward application of a century-old law, not a close call.

The practical reality is that millions of delivery workers keep the American economy moving. The Supreme Court has now said that companies cannot simply bury arbitration clauses in contracts and assume they will stick. Whether those clauses are enforceable will depend on the specific facts of each worker's job. That uncertainty may push some companies to negotiate rather than litigate, and it gives workers leverage to have their day in court.

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The Supreme Court declared a First Amendment injury occurs when the government secretly demands the names and personal information of people who donate to advocacy groups. In a unanimous decision, the justices ruled that when a state official issues a formal demand for donor lists, the damage to free speech and free association happens immediately, even before anyone is punished for refusing. The case involved a New Jersey anti-abortion nonprofit, but the ruling protects donors to any cause, from civil rights groups to religious organizations.

The Case That Started It All

First Choice Women's Resource Centers is a religious nonprofit in New Jersey that has counseled pregnant women since 1985. The organization does not provide or refer for abortions. In 2022, New Jersey's Attorney General created a "Reproductive Rights Strike Force" and issued a public alert accusing organizations like First Choice of providing misleading information about abortion. No one had complained about First Choice. Yet the Attorney General sent the organization a legal demand for 28 categories of documents, including the names, phone numbers, home addresses, and employers of nearly all its donors.

First Choice sued in federal court, arguing the demand violated its First Amendment right to freedom of association. Lower courts dismissed the case, saying no real injury had occurred because the state would need a separate court order before actually forcing First Choice to hand over the information. The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling unanimously that First Choice suffered a real and ongoing injury the moment the demand was issued.

Why This Matters to Donors

First Choice's lawyer made a straightforward argument: any reasonable donor would think twice about giving money after learning the government had demanded their personal information, especially after the Attorney General had publicly labeled pro-life groups as extremists and launched an investigation without a single complaint. That chilling effect on donations is itself a constitutional injury, she argued. It does not matter that the state still needed a court order to enforce the demand.

The federal government agreed. New Jersey countered that allowing every recipient of a government investigative demand to immediately challenge it in federal court would flood the system with thousands of routine cases. But several justices were skeptical. Justice Alito pointed out that if First Choice had to fight the demand in state court first and lost, it could be permanently blocked from ever raising its federal constitutional claims. Justice Kagan asked plainly whether any donor would actually feel reassured knowing a court still had to sign off before their information was handed over.

What the Court Decided

Justice Gorsuch wrote for a unanimous Court. The decision rests on one principle: the government's demand caused First Choice a present and ongoing injury to its First Amendment right to freedom of association. The injury began the moment the demand was issued and continued for as long as it remained outstanding.

The Court pointed to decades of its own prior decisions establishing that when the government demands private information about an organization's donors or members, it inevitably deters people from associating with that organization. That deterrence is itself a constitutional injury. It does not matter whether the government can immediately punish noncompliance or must first go back to court. The Court used a vivid illustration: the value of a sword hanging over your head is that it hangs there, not that it eventually falls.

The Court also rejected New Jersey's arguments that the harm was minimal. Exempting one donation website from the demand did not cure the injury. A promise to keep the information confidential within the government would not eliminate the chilling effect on donors. And forcing First Choice to fight the demand in state court first would create a trap where losing in state court could permanently block the organization from ever raising its federal constitutional rights.

Maintaining Privacy Rights Within the First Amendment

The most important thing to understand is what the Court chose not to decide. Justice Gorsuch resolved the case entirely on the ground that the demand caused an immediate First Amendment injury, without ruling that every recipient of every government investigative demand can automatically challenge it in federal court. The decision applies specifically to organizations engaged in advocacy when the government demands information about their donors or members, because that kind of demand carries unique constitutional weight.

The Court also made clear that this ruling protects organizations across the entire political spectrum, from the ACLU to religious institutions. This is not a decision about abortion politics. It is a decision about whether the government can demand private donor information from an advocacy group and then claim no harm has been done simply because a court has not yet ordered compliance. Every single justice agreed it cannot.

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The Supreme Court has made it much harder for states to ban conversion therapy, the controversial practice of trying to change someone's sexual orientation or gender identity. In a decision that split the justices and alarmed civil rights advocates, the Court ruled that Colorado's ban on the practice violates free speech rights when applied to talk therapy. The ruling could affect similar laws in 25 other states and raises urgent questions about what protections minors have when seeking help from licensed counselors.

The Case: A Colorado Counselor Challenges a Ban

Kaley Chiles is a licensed mental health counselor in Colorado who provides talk therapy to minors. Some of her young clients come to her wanting to reduce same-sex attractions or align their gender identity with their biological sex. In 2019, Colorado banned licensed counselors from practicing conversion therapy with minors, defining it as any attempt to change sexual orientation or gender identity, including through talk alone.

Chiles sued, arguing the law violated her right to free speech. She said her work is pure speech because she uses only words, no medications or procedures. Lower courts disagreed, saying the law regulates professional conduct, not speech. The Supreme Court took the case to settle conflicting rulings among lower courts.

The Arguments: Free Speech Versus Medical Regulation

Chiles's lawyers made a straightforward claim: because she uses only words, her therapy is speech protected by the First Amendment. They argued Colorado's law unfairly takes sides in a debate by allowing therapists to affirm LGBTQ+ identities while banning efforts to change them. This is called viewpoint discrimination, and it's one of the most serious violations of free speech law.

Colorado countered that the law regulates medical treatment, not speech. States have long regulated healthcare professionals, the state argued, and a therapist's words function like a prescription. Colorado also pointed to statements from major medical organizations saying conversion therapy is ineffective and harmful.

The federal government sided with Chiles, offering a powerful historical argument: if Colorado's reasoning were correct, a state in the 1970s could have banned therapists from telling gay patients they were not sick, since homosexuality was then classified as a mental disorder. Everyone agrees that would have been unconstitutional. So the same standard must apply today.

What the Court Decided

Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion, joined by eight justices. The Court ruled that Colorado's law regulates speech based on viewpoint and must meet the highest level of constitutional scrutiny, called strict scrutiny. This is the hardest standard for any law to survive.

The Court's logic was direct: Chiles uses only words, so her therapy is speech. Colorado's law restricts that speech by allowing her to express one viewpoint while forbidding another. Calling speech a "treatment" doesn't change its constitutional protection. The Court also rejected the idea that the law only incidentally burdens speech. It directly targets what Chiles is allowed to say based on the message itself.

The Court dismissed Colorado's argument about regulating healthcare. State licensing of counselors only began in 1976 and traditionally focused on qualifications, not silencing particular viewpoints. The Court sent the case back to lower courts, instructing them to apply strict scrutiny. Colorado must now prove the law serves a compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve it, a very difficult standard to meet.

Where the Justices Disagreed

Justice Kagan agreed the law engages in viewpoint discrimination but wrote separately to flag an important limit. Not every content-based healthcare law automatically demands the highest scrutiny, she argued. A law that banned all talk therapy on sexual orientation for minors, covering both affirming and conversion approaches equally, might survive under a less demanding standard. Her concurrence essentially offers states a roadmap: regulate viewpoint-neutrally, and you might avoid this ruling.

Justice Jackson dissented alone. She argued the majority misunderstands what happens when states regulate medical care that involves speech. Chiles is a licensed medical professional subject to healthcare regulation, not a speaker being censored for her ideas. Jackson warned that the majority's reasoning could make it nearly impossible to regulate any therapy involving practitioner speech, since medical standards of care are inherently based on professional judgment about what helps patients.

Limited States' Power to Ban Conversion Therapy

The decision is both sweeping and incomplete. The Court established one clear rule: states cannot regulate talk therapy based on viewpoint. But it did not strike down Colorado's law or apply strict scrutiny itself. That falls to lower courts now.

The practical impact is significant. Twenty-five states have conversion therapy bans, many written like Colorado's. Those laws are now constitutionally vulnerable. States wanting to regulate in this area will likely need to draft laws that treat all approaches equally, rather than allowing some while banning others.

The deeper tension the Court left unresolved is real: medical standards of care are inherently based on professional judgment about what works and what harms patients. The majority's answer is that the First Amendment prevents the government from turning prevailing professional opinion into enforced conformity, especially given that professional consensus has been wrong before in ways that hurt real people. But Justice Jackson's dissent shows this reasoning has limits that remain unclear.

For everyday citizens, the bottom line is this: the Court has made it harder for states to protect minors from conversion therapy through licensing laws, at least when those laws single out one viewpoint while allowing another. Whether states can regulate the practice in other ways remains an open question.

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The Supreme Court just settled a question that affects thousands of people on probation every year: if you disappear while under court supervision, can the government simply extend your probation term to punish you for the time you were gone? The answer, in an 8-1 decision, is no. The ruling protects defendants from a legal trap where they could be punished for breaking probation rules during a period the government claims they were not actually on probation.

The Case: A Woman Who Vanished

Isabel Rico was supposed to finish her three-and-a-half-year probation in June 2021. But in early 2018, she disappeared without telling her probation officer where she was going. When authorities finally caught her in January 2023, nearly five years later, she had committed a drug offense in 2022. The question was simple but consequential: did that 2022 crime count as a probation violation, even though her probation should have ended a year earlier?

Lower courts said yes. They ruled that Rico's disappearance had paused her probation clock, keeping her legally bound by its terms the entire time she was gone. That meant her drug offense counted as a serious violation, which dramatically increased her recommended prison sentence. The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the decision.

Why This Matters

This case reveals a fundamental contradiction in how the government was treating probation. The government wanted it both ways: it claimed Rico was not actually serving probation while she was on the run, yet insisted she could still be punished for breaking probation rules during that same period. As Rico's lawyer pointed out, you cannot violate the terms of something you are not legally subject to. That logical impossibility is what ultimately doomed the government's argument.

The ruling also matters because it shows how courts interpret laws. When Congress created the modern probation system in 1984, it included specific rules for extending probation, specific rules for what happens when someone disappears, and specific rules for tolling time served. The fact that Congress said nothing about automatically extending probation when someone absconds suggested Congress deliberately chose not to allow it.

What the Court Decided

Justice Neil Gorsuch, writing for eight justices, focused on the actual language of the law. He noted that federal law specifies exactly when probation begins, sets maximum lengths for it, and gives courts specific tools to handle people who disappear, including revoking probation and sending them back to prison. But nowhere does the law say probation automatically extends when someone runs.

The Court rejected every argument the government made. The government compared the situation to old rules about escaped prisoners, but the Court noted that those rules applied to actual imprisonment, not probation. The government warned that without this power, courts might be helpless if a probation officer fails to catch someone before their term expires. The Court's response was direct: if there are gaps in the law, Congress should fix them, not the courts.

The Lone Dissent

Justice Samuel Alito disagreed, but his objection was narrow. He argued that even if the 2022 drug offense did not count as a probation violation, the judge could still consider it when deciding Rico's sentence anyway. Federal judges have broad power to weigh factors like public safety and deterrence, and those factors do not disappear just because probation has ended. Alito also noted that sentencing guidelines are advisory, not mandatory, so the judge had flexibility regardless.

What Happens When Someone Runs From Probation

If you or someone you know is on probation, this ruling protects you from a legal trap. It means the government cannot simply freeze your probation clock while you are on the run and then punish you for crimes committed during that frozen period. Your probation term still has a real endpoint.

That said, judges still have significant power. They can consider crimes you commit after probation ends when they decide your sentence. The difference is technical but real: the judge is not starting from a higher recommended range based on a probation violation. The practical effect on your actual sentence could be the same, but the legal path to get there is different. And if you disappear, the government can still revoke your probation and send you back to prison for the original offense.

The Court's message was ultimately about honest language and clear rules. Probation either applies to you or it does not. You cannot be simultaneously off probation and bound by its conditions. That clarity protects everyone involved in the criminal justice system.

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The Supreme Court took a close look at a part of Medicaid that says patients can see any approved doctor. But the justices said that nothing in the law clearly lets individual patients sue state officials if they don’t follow that rule.

Instead, the court reminded us that Medicaid works like a deal: states get federal money, and if they break the rules, the government can pull funding. That means people on Medicaid can’t bring private lawsuits when states limit which doctors they can see.

Justice Gorsuch wrote for a six-justice majority. They sent the case back to lower courts to figure out what comes next. Meanwhile, three justices, led by Justice Jackson, said they’d let patients have their day in court.

Summary of the Case

In July 2018, South Carolina excluded Planned Parenthood South Atlantic (PPSAT) from its Medicaid program, citing a state ban on public funding for facilities that perform abortions. PPSAT and patient Julie Edwards sued state health officials, alleging that the State's action violated the Medicaid Act's "free-choice-of-provider" mandate, which requires that Medicaid beneficiaries "may obtain" services "from any qualified" provider. The district court ruled in favor of PPSAT, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. After a subsequent Supreme Court decision in a related case, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed its judgment. The Supreme Court then considered whether the Medicaid provision clearly gives individuals an enforceable right to choose their providers.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Gorsuch, writing for a six-justice majority, held that the Medicaid provision does not clearly and unambiguously give individuals rights they can enforce through lawsuits. The Court emphasized that programs like Medicaid function like contracts between the federal government and states. When states don't comply with requirements, the typical remedy is cutting off federal funding, not individual lawsuits.

The Court found that the Medicaid provision is written as a requirement for state plans addressing overall compliance, not as language creating individual rights. Additionally, since states maintain control over provider qualifications, this undermines the interpretation that individuals have an absolute right to choose any provider. The Court concluded that funding termination, administrative appeals, and state judicial review remain the principal enforcement mechanisms, not individual lawsuits.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas agreed with the majority but wrote separately to question the Court's broader approach to these types of cases. He argued that spending programs like Medicaid, which operate as contracts between the federal government and states, fundamentally cannot create individual rights that people can enforce through lawsuits. He also suggested that the Court should reconsider its entire framework for determining when individuals can sue to enforce rights under federal programs.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, dissented. She argued that the Medicaid provision clearly gives beneficiaries a right to choose their providers for three main reasons: (1) its text focuses on individuals—"any individual may obtain from any qualified provider"; (2) it uses mandatory language under a heading about "Free Choice by Individuals"; and (3) Congress knew how to create private enforcement rights and did so here. Jackson also pointed to previous Court decisions that described the provision as conferring a "right" and to later amendments that she believed confirmed Congress's intent to create enforceable rights.

Can Medicaid Patients Sue When States Limit Their Provider Choices?

The case hinges on how courts should interpret laws passed under Congress's spending power. Medicaid operates as a partnership: states receive federal funds if they follow certain rules, including the requirement that patients can choose any qualified provider. The majority viewed this as primarily a deal between governments, with the federal government's ability to withhold funding as the main enforcement mechanism.

For a provision to create rights that individuals can enforce through lawsuits, the Court requires "clear and unambiguous" evidence that Congress intended this result. The majority found that the Medicaid provision lacks the explicit "rights-creating language" found in other laws where Congress clearly intended to create individual rights. Instead, it appears in a list of requirements for state plans and focuses on state duties rather than individual entitlements.

The majority also emphasized that states maintain control over determining which providers are "qualified," which they saw as incompatible with an absolute individual right. They concluded that Congress intended enforcement through funding termination, administrative reviews, and state courts—not through individual lawsuits in federal court.

The dissent countered that the provision's focus on what "any individual may obtain" clearly creates individual rights, especially when compared to other provisions where Congress has recognized similar rights.

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The Court’s decision turns on the idea that rules must be applied evenly. In this case, the city had a rule that street performers needed a permit. But it turned out that some acts got fast-tracked permits while others were put on a waiting list. The Supreme Court said that kind of unequal treatment raises a red flag under the Constitution’s equal protection guarantee.

Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, explained that the government cannot pick and choose who it favors without a good reason. If your dance team waits months for a permit while someone else walks right up and gets theirs in days, that’s not fair or lawful. The Court sent the case back to a lower court to make sure the city fixes its process and treats every performer the same way.

Summary of the Case

In 1999 Karyn Stanley began serving as a firefighter for the City of Sanford, Florida, under a policy that funded retiree health insurance through age sixty-five for both 25-year career retirees and those retiring early on disability. In 2003 the City revised its plan to preserve the age-65 subsidy only for 25-year retirees, limiting disability retirees to 24 months of coverage. Stanley, forced to retire on disability in 2018, sued under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging that this disparate treatment violated the law. The district court dismissed her ADA claim because it held that the law only protects "qualified individuals"—those who hold or seek employment—and Stanley was neither once she had retired. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve disagreement among circuit courts over whether Title I's protections extend to retirees who no longer hold or desire a job.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Gorsuch, writing for the Court, concluded that Title I prohibits discrimination only against a "qualified individual"—someone who "holds or desires" an employment position and "can perform the essential functions of the employment position with or without reasonable accommodation." The use of present-tense verbs and the statute's examples of "reasonable accommodation" (like job restructuring and facility modifications) all presume an ongoing employment relationship. By contrast, a retiree who no longer holds or seeks a job is not a "qualified individual" and thus cannot sue for discrimination in post-employment benefits. Gorsuch rejected Stanley's arguments, emphasizing that Congress could amend Title I if it wished to extend protection to retirees. Because Stanley fell outside the law's coverage, the Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's judgment.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Barrett, concurred in part and in the judgment. He stressed that the Court should not have entertained, at the merits stage, Stanley's alternative theory—namely, that she suffered discriminatory treatment while still employed—which the Eleventh Circuit deemed forfeited. He urged deference to lower-court rules about which arguments can be considered preserved and the Court's own practice of reviewing only the questions presented.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor for most of her opinion, dissented. She argued that Title I plainly forbids disability discrimination "in regard to employee compensation," and that retirement benefits are deferred compensation earned on the job. A unilateral reduction in those benefits, targeted at disability retirees, thus "discriminates against a qualified individual" who earned them while employed. Jackson would read the qualified-individual definition contextually—rather than as a rigid temporal bar—so as to cover post-employment actions affecting benefits that were earned in an employment relationship.

Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joining Justice Jackson's view that Title I reaches discriminatory changes to retiree health insurance earned on the job.

When ADA Protection Ends: The Debate Over Retiree Rights

The heart of this case revolves around when ADA protection stops. The law prohibits employers from discriminating "against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to compensation," and defines "qualified individual" as one "who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires."

The majority reads the statute's present-tense verbs ("holds," "desires," "can perform") and its examples of accommodation (job restructuring, modifying facilities, adjusting training materials) as inherently directed to current employees or applicants, not to retirees who hold no position. Thus, the majority concludes, the ADA does not protect against discrimination in post-retirement benefits.

In dissent, Justices Jackson and Sotomayor emphasize that retirement benefits are "deferred compensation" for service already rendered. They argue that reducing those benefits specifically for disability retirees inherently "discriminates against a qualified individual," contending that nothing in the law signals an intent to withdraw ADA protection the moment one leaves the workforce.

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Every so often, the Court takes a magnifying glass to a small but powerful part of a law. In Martin v. United States, the justices looked at one section of the Federal Tort Claims Act—the rule about when someone can sue the federal government. They said the special “law enforcement” safety net only applies if an officer meant to do harm. It doesn’t wipe out other rules that protect government choices or other exceptions. They also made clear that the Supremacy Clause—often used to shield federal actions—can’t be used here to block claims. The case goes back to the Eleventh Circuit to sort out whether government decisions or mistakes can still be challenged under state law.

Summary of the Case

On October 18, 2017, FBI agents made a serious mistake. Intending to execute warrants at 3741 Landau Lane, they instead raided 3756 Denville Trace in suburban Atlanta. The agents deployed a SWAT team, detonated a flash-bang grenade, handcuffed the occupants, and assaulted them before realizing they were at the wrong address. Curtrina Martin, Hilliard Toi Cliatt, and their child sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging both negligent and intentional wrongdoing.

The district court granted summary judgment for the Government, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed using a unique approach. The Supreme Court then agreed to hear the case to decide two key questions: (1) whether the FTCA's "law enforcement proviso" applies beyond just intentional torts, and (2) whether the Supremacy Clause gives the Government any defense in these types of lawsuits.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Gorsuch, writing for a unanimous Court, held:

1. The law enforcement proviso in the FTCA only limits the intentional-tort exception in that same subsection, not the discretionary-function exception or any other exceptions. The proviso appears in the same sentence as the intentional-tort clause, refers only to "this subsection," and specifically addresses claims for assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution by "investigative or law enforcement officers."

2. The Supremacy Clause does not provide the United States a defense under the FTCA. The FTCA itself is the "supreme" federal law on tort liability for federal employees, making the Government liable under state law on the same terms as private individuals. No federal statute or constitutional provision displaces Georgia tort law in this case.

The Court vacated the lower court's decision and sent the case back to the Eleventh Circuit to determine which claims survive without reference to the law enforcement proviso, and for remaining claims, whether Georgia law would impose liability on a private person "under like circumstances."

Separate Opinions

Justice Sotomayor (joined by Justice Jackson) filed a concurrence emphasizing that the Eleventh Circuit must apply a two-step test when reevaluating the discretionary-function exception. First, ask whether the acts involve "judgment or choice" not limited by specific federal directives; second, determine whether the judgment involved "public policy" considerations that Congress intended to shield. She highlighted the ambiguity in lower courts over whether careless conduct or constitutional violations fall outside the exception and urged the court to consider the FTCA's legislative history—especially its enactment in response to "wrong-house" raids—to ensure victims of law enforcement misconduct have proper remedies.

Understanding When the Government Can Be Sued for Law Enforcement Mistakes

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) allows people to sue the federal government for wrongdoing by its employees, but with important limitations. The Act contains several exceptions that protect the government from liability in certain situations.

At issue in this case was how two of these exceptions interact. The "intentional-tort exception" normally prevents lawsuits against the government for intentional wrongdoing like assault or false imprisonment. However, a special provision (the "law enforcement proviso") creates an exception to this exception, allowing people to sue when law enforcement officers commit these specific acts.

Separately, the "discretionary-function exception" protects the government from liability when employees exercise judgment in their official duties.

The Court clarified that the law enforcement proviso only modifies the intentional-tort exception, not the discretionary-function exception. This means that while victims can sue for intentional misconduct by law enforcement officers, the government might still be protected if the actions involved discretionary judgment.

The Court also rejected the government's argument that the Supremacy Clause provides additional protection beyond what's specifically listed in the FTCA. Instead, the government is subject to the same liability standards as private individuals under state law, with only limited defenses specifically provided in the law.

This framework preserves both the right of victims to sue individual officers and their right to recover damages from the United States under state law standards that Congress chose to adopt in the FTCA.

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Sometimes, the law comes down to the smallest details — like the exact timing of when someone is called to serve. In the case of Feliciano v. Department of Transportation, the Supreme Court looked at whether federal civilian employees who are also reservists should get extra pay when they’re called to active duty during a national emergency. The question was: does their service have to be directly tied to the specific emergency, or is it enough that their service just happens to overlap with a declared national emergency?

The Court decided that if a federal employee is called up under any law during a national emergency, they’re entitled to that extra pay, even if their service isn’t directly connected to the emergency itself. Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote the opinion, and he was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, as well as Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. There was a dissent, led by Justice Thomas and joined by Justices Alito, Kagan, and Jackson. This case is a reminder of how the wording of a law, and the timing of events, can make a big difference in people's lives.

Summary of the Case

Feliciano v. Department of Transportation (No. 23–861) concerns the interpretation of federal statutes governing "differential pay" for federal civilian employees who are also military reservists. When reservists are called to active duty, they often earn less than in their civilian roles. Congress enacted a statute (5 U.S.C. §5538(a)) requiring the government to pay the difference in certain circumstances, including when reservists are called to active duty "during a national emergency." The dispute arose over whether this language entitles a reservist to differential pay simply because their service coincides with a declared national emergency, or whether there must be a substantive connection between the reservist’s service and the specific emergency. Nick Feliciano, a federal air traffic controller and Coast Guard reservist, was denied differential pay for his active duty service under 10 U.S.C. §12301(d) during a period of declared national emergency. After the Merit Systems Protection Board and the Federal Circuit denied his claim—holding that a substantive connection was required—Feliciano sought Supreme Court review.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, held that a federal civilian employee called to active duty under "any other provision of law... during a national emergency" is entitled to differential pay if their service temporally coincides with a declared national emergency, without needing to prove a substantive connection to a particular emergency. The Court emphasized the ordinary meaning of "during," which denotes a temporal, not substantive, link. The majority found that when Congress intends to require both temporal and substantive connections, it does so explicitly (e.g., "during and in relation to"). The Court also noted that requiring a substantive connection would create interpretive difficulties, as the statute provides no guidance on what such a connection would entail. The Court rejected arguments that a temporal-only reading would render the statute meaningless, pointing out that Congress sometimes uses temporal conditions even if they are often satisfied. The judgment of the Federal Circuit was reversed and remanded (Slip Op. at 4–16).

Separate Opinions

No separate concurring opinions were issued. All justices in the majority joined Justice Gorsuch’s opinion.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Alito, Kagan, and Jackson, dissented. The dissent argued that the statutory context and the ordinary meaning of "contingency operation" require a substantive connection between the reservist’s service and the national emergency. Justice Thomas emphasized that the term "contingency operation" in military parlance refers to operations responding to specific exigencies, not all military activity during a national emergency. He warned that the majority’s reading would render much of the statutory language superfluous, as national emergencies are almost always ongoing, and would have unintended consequences for other statutes that use the same definition. The dissent also pointed to legislative history and subsequent amendments as evidence that Congress intended a narrower reading (Thomas, J., dissenting, Slip Op. at 4–17).

Temporal and/or Substantive Connections

The legal nuance in this case centers on statutory interpretation, particularly the meaning of "during a national emergency" in 10 U.S.C. §101(a)(13)(B) as incorporated by 5 U.S.C. §5538(a). The majority applied a textualist approach, focusing on the ordinary, dictionary meaning of "during" as temporal, and found no evidence that Congress intended a specialized or substantive meaning. The Court contrasted this with other statutes where Congress explicitly requires a substantive connection (e.g., "during and in relation to"). The dissent, by contrast, relied on the context of the statutory scheme, the military’s use of "contingency operation," and the structure of the statute, arguing that the catchall provision should be read in harmony with the more specific enumerated provisions and the overall purpose of the law. The case thus illustrates the tension between plain meaning and contextual or purposive statutory interpretation, as well as the challenges of applying general statutory language to complex, real-world situations involving overlapping legal regimes and administrative practice.

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Trump's immigration policies are in the Supreme Court once again in the case of Velazquez v. Bondi. The case questions deadlines! The justices had to decide what happens when a deadline for voluntary departure falls on a weekend or a holiday. The Court ruled that if the deadline lands on one of those days, it actually extends to the next business day.

This decision overturned a previous ruling from the Tenth Circuit, which had treated the deadline as a strict calendar day. Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion, and he was joined by Justices Roberts, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. On the other side, Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett disagreed, with Kavanaugh joining parts of their dissent.

This ruling is important because it clarifies how deadlines are interpreted in immigration cases, ensuring that individuals have a fair chance to respond, especially when those deadlines coincide with weekends or holidays. The Court's decision means that people won't be unfairly penalized for timing that is out of their control.

Summary of the Case

The case of Monsalvo Velázquez v. Bondi arose from the federal government's initiation of removal proceedings against Monsalvo, who sought to suspend these efforts or to leave the United States voluntarily. An immigration judge found him removable but granted him a 60-day period for voluntary departure. After the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) rejected his appeal, it granted him a new 60-day period, which ended on a Saturday. Monsalvo filed a motion to reopen his case on the following Monday, which the BIA rejected as untimely, asserting that the deadline had expired on Saturday. The Tenth Circuit upheld the BIA's decision, leading to the Supreme Court's review of the interpretation of the statutory deadline under 8 U.S.C. §1229c(b)(2).

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court, in a decision authored by Justice Gorsuch, held that the Tenth Circuit erred in interpreting the voluntary departure deadline as strictly referring to calendar days without extending to the next business day when the deadline falls on a weekend or holiday. The Court reasoned that the term "days" in legal contexts often carries a specialized meaning that allows for such extensions. The Court emphasized that Congress enacted §1229c(b)(2) against a backdrop of longstanding administrative practices that recognized this interpretation. The Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's ruling, allowing for the possibility that Monsalvo's motion to reopen was timely filed.

Separate Opinions

Justice Kavanaugh joined the dissenting opinions of Justices Thomas and Alito, which focused on jurisdictional issues rather than the merits of the case. Justice Barrett also dissented, agreeing with Justice Thomas on jurisdiction but providing a different rationale. She argued that Monsalvo did not challenge any aspect of the final order of removal, thus the Tenth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to hear his case.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, dissented on the grounds that the Court should have remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit to address a jurisdictional objection raised by the government. He contended that Monsalvo's petition did not seek judicial review of a final order of removal, as he did not contest his removability. Justice Alito's dissent emphasized that the ordinary meaning of "days" should apply, arguing that the statutory deadline was clear and that extending it would create inconsistencies. Justice Barrett's dissent focused on the lack of a challenge to the final order of removal, asserting that the Tenth Circuit lacked jurisdiction regardless of how broadly one interprets the final order.

Scrutinizing "Days" As a Legal Term

The case highlights the complexities of statutory interpretation within immigration law, particularly regarding deadlines. The Court's decision underscores the principle that statutory terms can carry specialized meanings in legal contexts, which may differ from their ordinary usage. The ruling also illustrates the importance of administrative practices and historical context in interpreting legislative provisions. The dissenting opinions raise critical questions about jurisdiction and the scope of judicial review under the Immigration and Nationality Act, emphasizing the need for clarity in how courts interpret "final orders of removal" and the implications of procedural deadlines. The case ultimately reflects the tension between strict statutory interpretation and the need for flexibility in legal proceedings, particularly in immigration contexts where individuals face significant consequences.