Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, Docket No. 24-1287

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Sometimes the hardest part of the law is what a law does not say. That’s the key to this Supreme Court ruling about whether a president can slap tariffs on imported goods during a declared national emergency under a law called the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA.

In a majority opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court said IEEPA does not give the president the power to impose tariffs. The justices said that even though the law uses broad language and talks about the power to “regulate” importation, that doesn’t clearly include the power to add tariffs.

This case combined two disputes: Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump and Trump v. V.O.S. Selections. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision in the V.O.S. Selections case. In the Learning Resources case, the Court wiped out the lower court ruling and sent it back with instructions to dismiss it because that court did not have jurisdiction.

The majority included Roberts along with Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson. Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh dissented, and Kavanaugh’s dissent was joined by Thomas and Alito.

Summary of the Case

The Supreme Court has ruled that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not give the President the power to impose tariffs on imported goods. This decision places a significant limit on presidential power during national emergencies.

In 2025, President Trump declared two national emergencies. One related to drug trafficking, and the other addressed trade deficits. He then tried to impose substantial tariffs as part of his response to these emergencies. Small importers challenged these tariffs, arguing that the President exceeded his legal authority. The Court agreed with the challengers in a 6 to 3 decision. While the majority was divided on their reasoning, they were united on the outcome.

Arguments Made By Counsel

The Government's Position

The government argued that the emergency powers law clearly allows the President to regulate importation, and tariffs are a classic way to regulate imports. The government made several key points.

First, they pointed to dictionary definitions. The word regulate has long meant to control or adjust by rule. Tariffs are a classic tool for controlling imports. From the founding era onward, this term has included tariffs as a regulatory mechanism.

Second, they cited historical precedent. President Nixon imposed 10 percent tariffs in 1971 under the predecessor to this law. These tariffs were upheld by federal courts. When Congress passed the current law just two years later in 1977, Congress clearly understood that the same language included tariffs.

Third, they referenced a Supreme Court case from one year before the law was enacted. In that case, the Court unanimously upheld the President's tariffs under a different trade law. That law authorized the President to adjust imports. The Court held this language included monetary charges like tariffs, not just quotas. The phrase regulate importation is even broader than adjust imports.

Fourth, they argued that the major questions doctrine should not apply to foreign affairs statutes. Congress regularly gives broad discretion to the President in foreign affairs.

Finally, they made a practical argument. The law clearly allows quotas and embargoes, which are complete blockages of imports. It would make no sense for Congress to allow the President to block all Chinese imports entirely but not impose even a one dollar tariff on those imports.

The Challengers' Position

The challengers mounted several arguments against the tariffs.

First, they argued that tariffs are fundamentally taxes, not regulatory tools. Tariffs raise revenue. The Constitution assigns taxation exclusively to Congress. The word regulate appears in hundreds of statutes, yet government lawyers could not identify a single instance where regulate included the power to tax.

Second, they pointed to congressional practice. When Congress intends to authorize tariffs, it uses explicit language like duty, tariff, or surcharge. These words do not appear in the emergency powers law. The trade code contains multiple tariff statutes, all of which expressly reference tariffs and include specific caps on rates, time limits, and procedural requirements. The emergency powers law contains none of these constraints.

Third, they raised a constitutional problem. The emergency powers law authorizes regulation of both importation and exportation. But the Constitution expressly forbids taxing exports. If regulate included tariffs, it would make part of the law unconstitutional.

Fourth, they invoked the major questions doctrine. This involves an extraordinary power: unlimited tariffs on any product from any country for unlimited duration. No President has claimed this power before. This exercise of power requires clear congressional authorization.

Fifth, they distinguished the Nixon tariffs. President Nixon did not initially cite the old emergency law when imposing tariffs. He relied on other statutes. He only invoked the emergency law later in litigation as a defensive position. The court decision supporting him was a single intermediate appellate court opinion, hardly a well settled interpretation Congress would incorporate by reference.

Finally, they argued that Congress enacted the emergency powers law in 1977 specifically to constrain emergency powers after Watergate and Vietnam. The statute's careful procedural requirements and emergency declaration requirements suggest Congress intended to limit, not expand, executive authority. Using a vaguely worded emergency statute to claim unlimited tariff power contradicts this legislative purpose.

Opinion of the Court

Chief Justice Roberts delivered the lead opinion. Six Justices join parts of it, while only three Justices join other parts.

Article One of the Constitution vests the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises exclusively in Congress. The Framers deliberately withheld this power from the Executive Branch. As Roberts emphasizes, the Framers gave Congress alone access to the pockets of the people. This reflects hard won principles from the American Revolution against taxation without representation. Tariffs are unquestionably a branch of the taxing power.

For foreign affairs, the Framers gave Congress, not the President, the tariff power notwithstanding the obvious foreign affairs implications of tariffs. While the President enjoys some independent constitutional authority in foreign affairs, tariffs present no overlap with any such independent power. The government concedes the President has no inherent peacetime authority to impose tariffs. When core congressional powers are at stake, the fact that they implicate foreign affairs does not license ambiguous delegation. When Congress has delegated tariff powers, it has done so in explicit terms and with strict limits.

The President has no inherent authority to impose tariffs during peacetime and seeks authority purely from the emergency powers law. The government cannot identify any statute in the entire U.S. Code in which the definition of regulate includes the power to tax. When Congress addresses both regulatory and taxing powers, it treats them separately and expressly. The Court also identified an export clause problem. Because the emergency law authorizes regulating both importation and exportation, reading regulate to include tariffs would render the statute partly unconstitutional. The Constitution explicitly forbids taxing exports.

In the emergency law's nearly 50 year existence, no President until Trump invoked the statute to impose tariffs. Presidents regularly invoked the law for other purposes but consistently looked to other statutes for tariff authority. This lack of historical precedent, combined with the breadth of authority claimed, indicates the power exceeds the President's legitimate reach. Emergency powers tend to kindle emergencies, and the Framers understood emergencies could afford a ready pretext for usurpation of congressional power.

The Nixon and Ford Tariffs Distinguished

The Court rejected the government's reliance on President Nixon's 1971 tariffs and President Ford's 1975 tariffs. For the Nixon tariffs, the Court noted that a single, expressly limited opinion from one specialized intermediate appellate court does not establish a well-settled meaning that Congress would have incorporated into later legislation. Nixon did not initially invoke the emergency law to justify the tariffs; he relied on other statutes and only cited it later as a litigation defense.

For the Ford tariffs, the Court found a similar lack of precedent. The 1977 legislative history itself acknowledged that earlier Presidents had exploited the open-ended nature of the old law, transforming it far beyond its original purpose of sanctioning foreign belligerents. Congress enacted IEEPA specifically to rein in these overreaches. Reading the new law as silently preserving unlimited tariff authority would contradict the very reform Congress intended.

Does a National Emergency Unlock Unlimited Tariff Power?

This decision establishes that broad emergency language does not automatically encompass the power to tax. The Court drew a firm line: even sweeping terms like "regulate importation" do not include tariffs absent clear congressional authorization, particularly when core Article I taxing powers are at stake.

The ruling preserves presidential flexibility in other respects. The Court did not disturb the President's ability to impose sanctions, block transactions, or freeze assets under IEEPA. It also did not question the validity of tariffs imposed under other statutes that expressly grant that authority with specific procedural limits and rate caps.

However, the 6–3 split reveals a significant fault line. The dissenters argued that the plain meaning of "regulate" naturally encompasses tariffs, and that the majority imposed an artificially narrow reading on a foreign affairs statute. Justice Kavanaugh's dissent warned that the decision hamstrings presidential responses to genuine emergencies. This tension suggests future disputes over how broadly courts should read delegations of power in foreign affairs and emergency contexts.

The practical impact is immediate: tariffs imposed solely under IEEPA authority lack legal basis, and importers who paid those tariffs may seek refunds.