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This case shines a light on a small but important twist in the rules for people challenging their convictions in federal court. The Supreme Court said that as soon as a judge has made a final decision on a first petition, any new petition on the same issue counts as a “second or successive” filing.

That means a second petition faces extra hurdles, even if the first one is still on appeal. The Court made clear you can’t sidestep these gatekeeping rules just because your first appeal hasn’t wrapped up.

Summary of the Case

Danny Rivers was convicted in a Texas state court of continuous sexual abuse of a child, indecency with a child, and possession of child pornography. After unsuccessful direct review and state habeas proceedings, Rivers filed his first federal habeas corpus petition in August 2017, raising claims of prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, and other constitutional violations. The District Court denied relief in September 2018. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability solely on his ineffective-assistance claim.

While that appeal remained pending, Rivers discovered exculpatory material in his trial counsel's file and moved in the Fifth Circuit to supplement the record or remand for consideration of the new evidence. When that effort failed, Rivers filed a second habeas petition in the District Court based on the newly uncovered report. The District Court deemed this second-in-time petition a "second or successive application" for habeas relief and transferred it to the Fifth Circuit for authorization. Rivers challenged that transfer, arguing that because his first petition was still on appeal, the new filing should be treated as an amendment, not a successive application. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split over when the "second or successive" rule applies.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Jackson, writing for a unanimous Court, held that once a district court enters final judgment on an initial federal habeas petition, any "second-in-time" filing asserting new or previously unlitigated claims qualifies as a "second or successive" application, regardless of whether the first petition remains under appellate review. The Court relied on its precedents establishing that:

• An amended petition filed before final judgment is not "second or successive" because the original proceeding has not concluded.
• A motion filed after judgment that attacks the merits of a prior resolution or adds new grounds for relief is treated as a successive petition.

Rivers's contention that the pendency of his first-petition appeal insulated his second filing was rejected. The Court explained that the gatekeeping provisions were designed to conserve judicial resources, prevent piecemeal litigation, and ensure finality of state-court judgments, goals best served by drawing the successive-petition line at entry of final judgment. Historical practices before the law's enactment yielded no clear contrary rule. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit correctly classified and transferred Rivers's second petition.

When Habeas Petitions Become "Second or Successive": The Final Judgment Rule

The law establishes a specific meaning for "second or successive" habeas applications, distinct from mere chronological order. Under the law, relitigation of claims already denied is barred. A new claim is only allowed if it relies on a new, retroactive constitutional rule or alleges previously undiscoverable facts showing innocence. Before a district court may consider a successive petition, the petitioner must obtain approval from the court of appeals showing that one of these exceptions is met.

Critically, the distinction between first and successive applications hinges on finality of the initial proceeding. Motions filed before entry of judgment—such as amended petitions—are part of the original habeas action and don't trigger the restrictions. Motions to alter or amend judgment are likewise viewed as continuations of the initial proceeding because they "suspend finality" and merge into a single judgment. By contrast, any submission made after final judgment that seeks new substantive relief operates as a discrete application subject to strict limitations.

This interpretation balances the twin aims of allowing meaningful collateral review while safeguarding finality and judicial economy, preventing indefinite filings during appeal, and discouraging piecemeal litigation.

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At the heart of this decision is when the Tax Court can step in. Under federal law, the Tax Court can only review an IRS determination about whether it may seize assets to cover unpaid taxes — a process called a levy. In Commissioner v. Zuch, the IRS stopped its levy because the taxpayer’s debt was wiped out by earlier overpayments. The Supreme Court held there was no longer any “determination” for the Tax Court to review once the levy lost its basis.

That ruling reverses a Third Circuit decision that had sent the case back to the Tax Court. Now the dispute returns to the IRS without that extra layer of review. Stay with us to find out what this means for people who thought they still had a chance to challenge the IRS in Tax Court.

Summary of the Case

In 2012, Jennifer Zuch and her then-husband Patrick Gennardo each filed late tax returns for 2010. Gennardo submitted an offer-in-compromise to settle his tax debt, which prompted the IRS to apply $50,000 in estimated tax payments to his account. Later, Zuch amended her return to report additional income that generated $28,000 in tax liability. She claimed that the $50,000 should have been credited to her account instead, which would have entitled her to a $22,000 refund.

The IRS disagreed with Zuch's position and issued a levy to collect the unpaid taxes. Zuch requested a collection due process hearing, where the appeals officer rejected her argument about how the payments should be allocated and determined the levy could proceed. Zuch then appealed this decision to the Tax Court.

During the years-long legal proceedings that followed, Zuch overpaid her taxes in subsequent years. Rather than refunding these overpayments, the IRS repeatedly applied them against her 2010 tax liability. Once these offsets completely eliminated her 2010 balance, the IRS moved to dismiss the case as moot, arguing there was no longer any basis for a levy. The Tax Court agreed and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Third Circuit reversed this decision, but the Supreme Court ultimately granted review to resolve disagreements among circuit courts.

Supreme Court Limits Tax Court's Authority in Levy Cases

In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Barrett, the Supreme Court held that the Tax Court's jurisdiction in these cases is strictly limited to reviewing whether a levy may proceed. The Court explained that once Zuch's tax liability reached zero and there was no longer any levy to enforce, the Tax Court lost its jurisdiction over the case.

The majority emphasized that Congress established a default rule requiring taxpayers to pay their taxes first and then sue for a refund later. The special collection due process hearing provision is narrowly focused on issues related to proposed levies. The Court noted that the law doesn't authorize the Tax Court to award refunds or issue declaratory judgments beyond stopping a levy.

Because Zuch's liability had been paid in full through the IRS's application of her later overpayments, no levy remained at issue. The Court concluded that the Tax Court correctly dismissed the case, and that Zuch's proper remedy would be to file a separate refund lawsuit in a different court.

Justice Gorsuch was the lone dissenter. He argued that the Tax Court should have broader authority to review all aspects of the appeals officer's determination, including whether Zuch had any underlying tax liability at all. He warned that the majority's interpretation allows the IRS to escape judicial review simply by abandoning levies after receiving unfavorable determinations.

How Tax Collection Due Process Works Under Federal Law

The Supreme Court's decision clarifies the limited role Congress created for collection due process hearings. The law provides taxpayers with one hearing before the IRS can levy (seize) their property to satisfy unpaid taxes. These hearings are specifically focused on issues related to the proposed levy or, in certain cases, the existence or amount of the underlying tax if the taxpayer hasn't had a previous opportunity to dispute it.

Appeals officers must consider specific factors during these hearings—including whether the IRS followed proper procedures, any issues raised by the taxpayer, and whether the collection action is unnecessarily intrusive. After considering these factors, the officer makes a single determination: whether the levy may proceed.

The Tax Court can review this determination, but its power is limited to stopping the levy. It cannot transform these proceedings into refund cases or declaratory judgment actions. For taxpayers who want to dispute their tax liability outside the context of an ongoing levy, the traditional path remains: pay the tax first, then file a refund lawsuit.

This structure ensures that collection due process hearings remain focused on their intended purpose—providing taxpayers with procedural protections before the IRS seizes their property—rather than becoming an alternative route to challenge tax assessments more broadly.

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BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, Docket No. 23-1259

When the Supreme Court steps in to sort out a tight corner of court rules, it reminds us how every word counts. In Blom Bank v. Honickman, a bank asked to reopen a closed case so it could tweak its complaint. But there’s a rule that says you can only reopen a case for really rare, compelling reasons; so rare that they call them “extraordinary circumstances.”

The bank argued it should get a break because courts usually let you fix mistakes in your papers. The Second Circuit tried to balance that friendly approach with the strict reopening rule. The high court said no. Justice Thomas, writing for all nine justices, made clear you have to clear the high bar of "extraordinary circumstances" before you even think about making changes. Since the bank couldn’t show that kind of reason, its request stayed shut.

Summary of the Case

BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman arose after victims of Hamas terrorist attacks (2001–2003) sued BLOM Bank under the Anti-Terrorism Act, alleging the bank "aided and abetted" Hamas by providing financial services to allegedly affiliated customers. The District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to plead the required "general awareness" element of aiding-and-abetting liability and denied leave to amend when plaintiffs declined opportunities to replead. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal but granted relief to reopen and amend by "balancing" finality concerns against liberal amendment policy. The Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the "extraordinary circumstances" standard yields to more lenient amendment rules when a movant seeks to amend its complaint after final judgment.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Thomas, writing for an eight-Justice majority, held that relief to reopen a case remains governed by the "extraordinary circumstances" standard even when a party seeks to reopen for amendment. The Court emphasized that this relief provision is a narrow "catchall" only for grounds not covered by other specific provisions, and that a broad reading would undermine time limitations built into the rules. It rejected the Second Circuit's approach of "balancing" different procedural rules, explaining that the liberal amendment standard applies only to pre-trial amendments and cannot dilute the stringency of reopening requirements once judgment is final. The Court reversed the Second Circuit and reaffirmed that plaintiffs must demonstrate "extraordinary circumstances" before being allowed to reopen a case for repleading.

Separate Opinions

Justice Jackson concurred in part and in the judgment, joining the majority except for one section. She agreed that the "extraordinary circumstances" standard governs motions to reopen but cautioned against reading precedent to bar reopening whenever a plaintiff previously declined to amend. Jackson emphasized that exercising a right to appeal does not automatically disqualify a movant from seeking relief to reopen and stressed that "due diligence" must be assessed in context.

When Final Means Final: The High Bar for Reopening Closed Cases

The Court's ruling reinforces that reopening a closed case is designed to preserve finality by permitting relief only in "extraordinary circumstances"—a principle established in earlier Supreme Court cases. This strict standard cannot be used to evade the one-year limit on relief for mistake, new evidence, or fraud. The Court clarified that the instruction to "freely give leave" to amend applies to pre-judgment amendments, not to cases closed by final judgment. By requiring movants to satisfy the extraordinary circumstances test before seeking amendment, the Court maintained the integrity of the Federal Rules—ensuring that a party's desire to amend does not weaken the high standard for reopening cases or render other procedural safeguards meaningless. This decision provides important guidance on the balance between finality in litigation and opportunities to correct pleadings.

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Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Comm’n., Docket No. 24-154

This case turns on a subtle point in the law: can a faith-based charity get the same tax break as any other charity even if it doesn’t push its faith or limit help to fellow believers? On June 5, the Supreme Court said yes. It unanimously found that Wisconsin ran afoul of the First Amendment by treating Catholic Charities differently just because they didn’t proselytize or serve only Catholics. The state court’s rule drew a line between religions based on how they practice their beliefs, triggering the toughest review—and Wisconsin couldn’t show a strong enough reason. The decision sends the case back to state court and leaves open big questions about how far government can go when it comes to faith-based service groups.

Summary of the Case

In 2016, Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc., and four affiliated nonprofit organizations (collectively "Catholic Charities") applied to Wisconsin's Department of Workforce Development for an exemption from state unemployment-compensation taxes. Wisconsin law allows nonprofits that are "operated primarily for religious purposes" and "operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church" to opt out of the state unemployment system. However, the department—and ultimately the Wisconsin Supreme Court—denied the exemption, reasoning that Catholic Charities, though under the Diocese of Superior's authority, didn't engage in "distinctively religious" activities like proselytizing or limiting services to fellow Catholics. Catholic Charities challenged this denial as a violation of the First Amendment's Religion Clauses.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Sotomayor, writing for a unanimous Court, reversed the Wisconsin decision. The Court held that Wisconsin's interpretation of its law imposed an impermissible denominational preference by differentiating religious organizations based on theological lines—specifically, by making the exemption contingent on proselytization or exclusive service to fellow Catholics.

Such distinctions "touch inherently religious choices," not neutral criteria with incidental religious impact, and therefore trigger strict scrutiny. Wisconsin failed to justify its approach:

• Its claimed interest in universal unemployment coverage wasn't advanced by theological distinctions. Catholic Charities already operates its own comparable benefit system, and Wisconsin exempts other religious entities providing identical services simply because they directly employ clergy.

• Wisconsin's argument about avoiding government entanglement with religion also failed. The exemption covers all employees of qualified organizations—many who don't teach or practice doctrine—while excluding identical charities under the same church umbrella unless they proselytize or limit service.

The Court reversed the Wisconsin Supreme Court's judgment and remanded the case.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas concurred but on broader church-autonomy grounds. He argued the Wisconsin Supreme Court also violated the First Amendment by treating Catholic Charities and its canonically integrated entities as separate, secular corporations rather than as an ecclesiastical arm of the Diocese.

Justice Jackson concurred in the judgment but emphasized statutory interpretation. She noted that the parallel federal exemption was designed to distinguish church-affiliated institutions by the nature of their functions (like training ministers or houses of study), not by the motivations driving them.

When Religious Tax Exemptions Cross Constitutional Lines

This case centers on when religious organizations qualify for tax exemptions and how governments can make those determinations without violating the Constitution. The federal unemployment law, which Wisconsin's statute mirrors, requires most charities to participate in state unemployment systems but exempts church-controlled entities "operated primarily for religious purposes."

The legislative history shows that "religious purposes" was meant to cover institutions performing ministerial or doctrinal functions (like seminaries or religious colleges), not merely organizations inspired by religious faith (like church-affiliated orphanages or day-care centers).

This distinction reflects broader First Amendment principles: laws that differentiate based on theological grounds—like proselytization, sacramental practice, or doctrinal content—trigger stricter constitutional scrutiny than laws applying religiously neutral criteria. When eligibility for a benefit turns on expressly religious activities, "The First Amendment mandates government neutrality between religions," subjecting such schemes to strict scrutiny. Wisconsin's approach, as interpreted by its Supreme Court, failed to maintain this neutrality and couldn't survive the demanding test the Constitution requires.

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Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Davis, Docket No. 24-304

The Supreme Court was ready to weigh in on whether a lawsuit for damages could include people who were never hurt alongside those who actually suffered harm, but then it decided not to decide. After agreeing to hear the case, the Justices dismissed it as improvidently granted and sent it back without ruling on the question. That means there’s still no clear answer on whether a class action can pack together injured and uninjured members under the federal rules. Justice Brett Kavanaugh disagreed with that move and wrote a dissent. He would have liked the Court to tackle the issue head-on. What this all means is that lower courts and companies are still left guessing about how to handle these mixed classes in big lawsuits.

Summary of the Case

LabCorp, a national diagnostic laboratory provider, installed touchscreen "e-check-in" kiosks in its California patient centers. Because these kiosks weren't accessible to blind or visually impaired patients, several legally blind individuals sued LabCorp. They claimed the company denied them "full and equal enjoyment" of services under the Americans with Disabilities Act and California's Unruh Civil Rights Act.

The plaintiffs sought to certify a statewide class action that could potentially seek damages up to $500 million per year. This class would include all legally blind patients who "due to their disability, were unable to use" the kiosks.

LabCorp challenged the class certification, arguing that the definition included people who weren't actually harmed - specifically, blind individuals who wouldn't have used the kiosks anyway due to personal preference or habit. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed the class to proceed, applying its precedent that permits classes that "potentially include more than a de minimis number of uninjured class members." LabCorp then asked the Supreme Court to review whether a damages class action can include both injured and uninjured members.

Opinion of the Court

In a brief per curiam (by the court) order, the Supreme Court dismissed the case as "improvidently granted," meaning they decided not to rule on the issue after all. The Court provided no analysis of either the procedural questions or the class certification issues, leaving the Ninth Circuit's judgment intact without addressing the merits.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Kavanaugh dissented from the dismissal. He argued that:

• The case should not have been dismissed on procedural grounds. He rejected the plaintiffs' argument that LabCorp appealed the wrong certification order, noting that the later "clarification" order didn't materially change the original certification.

• On the merits, Justice Kavanaugh believed that the federal rules governing class actions prohibit certifying a damages class that "includes both injured and uninjured members." He argued that a class of uninjured individuals cannot share a common injury, which conflicts with several previous Supreme Court decisions.

• Allowing overly broad class certifications forces defendants into settlements and ultimately imposes costs on consumers, retirees, and workers by inflating liability exposure. He would have reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision.

When Class Actions Can Include Potentially Uninjured Members

This case highlights a tension in class action law about who can be included in a lawsuit seeking damages. Three key legal frameworks are at play:

1. The ADA and California's Unruh Act both require businesses to provide "full and equal" access to people with disabilities. The Unruh Act allows for $4,000 in damages per violation, regardless of actual harm suffered.

2. Federal class action rules require that common questions "predominate" over individual ones before a damages class can proceed. This requirement aims to ensure class treatment is both convenient and fair.

3. Federal rules allow immediate appeals of class certification decisions because certifying large classes with potentially uninjured members can create enormous liability risks and pressure to settle regardless of the merits.

The Ninth Circuit's approach allows certification even when more than a small number of class members may lack any injury, as long as "some evidence of injury" exists for others. Justice Kavanaugh viewed this exception as incompatible with class action rules and Supreme Court precedents, which he believes require each class member to share a common injury.

This case reflects the ongoing challenge of balancing the need to address widespread discrimination through class actions while preventing overly broad certifications that might lead to unfair settlements or violate defendants' due process rights.

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Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, Docket No. 23-1039

This case is a perfect example of how a small twist in the law can change the playing field for those who believe they've been treated unfairly at work. The Supreme Court looked at a rule from the Sixth Circuit that said people in the majority group had to show more proof than others to win a discrimination case under Title VII.

In a unanimous vote, the justices said that Title VII doesn't draw that line – it protects anyone from discrimination, no matter what group they belong to. They wiped out the old ruling and sent the case back so it can be judged by the right standard.

Summary of the Case

Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, has worked for the Ohio Department of Youth Services since 2004. In 2019 she applied for a newly created management position but the agency instead hired a lesbian candidate. Days later, Ames was demoted from her program-administrator role—at significant loss of pay—and a gay man was hired to fill that vacancy. Ames sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging disparate treatment on account of her sexual orientation.

Both the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio and the Sixth Circuit granted summary judgment for the State. Relying on Sixth Circuit precedent, they held that a plaintiff who belongs to a so-called "majority group" must also show "background circumstances" indicating the employer is the "rare" one to discriminate against the majority. Because Ames presented no such evidence, her Title VII claim failed. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve disagreement among different federal courts over this heightened burden.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Jackson, writing for a unanimous Court, vacated the lower court's decision and sent the case back for reconsideration. The opinion holds that Title VII's disparate-treatment provision—which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual because of their sex—draws no distinction between majority-group and minority-group plaintiffs. As the Court explained, the law focuses on individuals, not groups, and Congress provided a uniform standard for all. The Court also noted that judges shouldn't rigidly apply inflexible formulas when evaluating discrimination claims. The Sixth Circuit's "background circumstances" requirement has no basis in the law or in the Supreme Court's previous decisions. Because that extra burden dictated the decision in Ames's case, it must be reconsidered under the proper standard.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, concurred. He emphasized the broader risks of judge-created rules that aren't based on the actual text of laws. Beyond rejecting the "background circumstances" doctrine, Thomas noted that the framework courts use to evaluate discrimination claims itself lacks a textual foundation and has generated decades of confusion. He suggested that, in an appropriate future case, the Court should reconsider and possibly overrule this framework as it's applied in summary judgment decisions.

Equal Protection Under Employment Discrimination Law

Title VII bars intentional employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Under the standard legal framework, a plaintiff must first establish a basic case—typically by showing they applied for a job for which they were qualified, were rejected, and that rejection occurred under circumstances suggesting discrimination. If that minimal burden is met, the employer must provide a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, after which the plaintiff may prove that reason is just a pretext for discrimination.

Importantly, Title VII's text makes no distinctions among protected-class members; it forbids discrimination "against any individual." Previous Supreme Court decisions affirm that Title VII prohibits discriminatory preference for "any group, minority or majority," and that courts should avoid rigid formulations when evaluating discrimination claims. The Sixth Circuit's extra "background circumstances" hurdle for majority plaintiffs thus conflicted with both the law's text and the Supreme Court's guidance for flexible standards when evaluating evidence of discrimination.

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Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Docket No. 23-1141

The Supreme Court had to decide just how far a federal law shields gun makers from lawsuits when their products end up in the wrong hands. That law, known as the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, bars most claims against firearm manufacturers—unless a plaintiff can show the makers knowingly helped illegal dealers break the law.

On June 5th, Justice Elena Kagan wrote for a unanimous Court in Smith & Wesson Brands v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos. Mexico sued seven U.S. gun makers, saying they aided and abetted dealers who sold weapons to traffickers. But the justices found that the complaint didn’t show the manufacturers consciously joined any criminal scheme. Knowing a few dealers slipped guns across the border or choosing to market certain products, the Court said, falls short of the “helping hand” needed to open the door to a lawsuit under the law. With that requirement unmet, the Court ended the case. So Mexico’s challenge is off the table for now. What happens next—and whether other efforts can succeed—remains to be seen.

Supreme Court Blocks Mexico's Lawsuit Against U.S. Gun Manufacturers

The Government of Mexico filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court against seven American firearms manufacturers under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA). Mexico claimed that its widespread gun violence problem is fueled by weapons trafficked from the United States to Mexican drug cartels, and it sought to hold the manufacturers civilly liable for harms resulting from criminal misuse by these third parties.

Since the PLCAA generally shields gun manufacturers from lawsuits based on such downstream misuse, Mexico tried to use the law's "predicate exception," which allows lawsuits when a manufacturer knowingly violated a law related to the sale or marketing of firearms, and that violation directly caused harm. Mexico alleged that the manufacturers aided and abetted unlawful sales by: (1) continuing to supply dealers known to traffic guns to Mexico; (2) failing to implement distribution controls; and (3) designing and marketing weapons (like military-style rifles or models with Spanish names) intended to appeal to cartel members.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Kagan, writing for a unanimous Court, reversed the lower court's decision and ruled that Mexico's complaint did not convincingly allege the level of conscious, affirmative participation needed for aiding-and-abetting liability under federal law. The Court emphasized three key principles:

• Aiding and abetting typically requires involvement in a specific wrongful act, not just general industry practices, unless participation is "pervasive, systemic, and culpable."
• Liability usually requires affirmative actions rather than failures to act or omissions.
• Routine, generally legal business conduct that "incidentally" helps criminals doesn't qualify.

Mexico's allegations about industry-wide knowledge, passive distribution policies, or legal design and marketing choices showed mere "indifference" rather than the active joining of "mind and hand" required for aiding and abetting. Since no plausible violation was alleged, the PLCAA's protection remains in force and the lawsuit is barred.

Separate Opinions

• Justice Thomas (concurring): Highlighted that the PLCAA's requirement of a "violation" might itself require a prior finding of a statutory breach, so civil plaintiffs can't effectively determine criminal guilt without proper criminal-law protections.

• Justice Jackson (concurring): Emphasized that Mexico's complaint never identified any specific violation of a firearms statute; the PLCAA's exception requires actual statutory violations, not just questionable business practices.

How Gun Manufacturer Liability Shields Work Under Federal Law

The PLCAA was created to protect firearms manufacturers and sellers from being sued when their legally sold products are later misused by criminals. However, Congress included a narrow exception that allows lawsuits when a gun manufacturer knowingly breaks a law related to selling or marketing firearms, and that violation directly causes someone's injury.

Congress provided examples of what might qualify, such as falsifying transfer paperwork or knowingly selling to prohibited persons, but broadly tied the exception to "any" applicable statute. This reflects a careful legislative compromise: blocking lawsuits based on how criminals later use firearms, while still allowing claims when gun makers themselves break clear legal duties.

The Court's ruling clarifies that to overcome this immunity, plaintiffs must show that manufacturers actively participated in illegal activity with the specific intent to further crimes—not just that they conducted business in ways that might indirectly enable criminal activity.

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CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., Docket No. 23-1201

The Supreme Court has waded into a subtle wrinkle in a law that decides when you can take a foreign government to court here in the United States. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, a country generally can’t claim immunity when the law itself lists clear exceptions—and when the papers are served properly. The question before the justices was whether you also had to prove some extra connection, or “minimum contacts,” as a separate step.

In a unanimous opinion, the Court said no. Once an exception in the law applies and service of process is done right, courts don’t get to add another hurdle. The decision removes the extra test the Ninth Circuit had imposed and sends the case back for proceedings under the straightforward rule Congress wrote.

Summary of the Case

In January 2005 Devas Multimedia Private Ltd., an Indian‐incorporated company, entered into a satellite‐leasing agreement with Antrix Corporation Ltd., the commercial arm of India's Department of Space, to obtain capacity on two new S-band satellites. When the Government of India later reallocated that spectrum for its own use, Antrix invoked a force-majeure clause and terminated the contract. Devas initiated arbitration in India; the panel unanimously found that Antrix had wrongfully repudiated the agreement and awarded Devas $562.5 million plus interest. After obtaining enforcement in France and the United Kingdom, Devas sought confirmation of the award in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's arbitration exception. The District Court confirmed the award and entered a $1.29 billion judgment. A Ninth Circuit panel reversed, ruling that Antrix lacked sufficient connections to the United States. Devas petitioned the Supreme Court to resolve whether the FSIA requires such connections for jurisdiction.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Alito, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act grants personal jurisdiction over a foreign state "whenever an immunity exception applies and service of process has been accomplished," without any additional due-process or minimum-contacts inquiry. The Court reasoned that the law imposes just two prerequisites—(1) an applicable exception to sovereign immunity and (2) proper service—and then mandates jurisdiction by the unambiguous "shall exist" language. Although the immunity exceptions themselves require certain connections to the United States, there is no textual basis to read the law as requiring a separate contacts test. To do so would undermine the FSIA's "comprehensive framework" linking immunity waivers and jurisdictional grants. Legislative history confirms that Congress viewed the exceptions as meeting due-process norms. The Court reversed and remanded.

How Foreign Sovereign Immunity Works in US Courts: No Extra Hurdles Required

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act created a clear system for determining when foreign governments can be sued in American courts. It replaced the previous case-by-case diplomatic determinations with specific exceptions to immunity (such as commercial activity, tort, property seizure, and arbitration) and gave federal courts jurisdiction when these exceptions apply and proper service is made.

The Supreme Court clarified that while traditional personal jurisdiction rules require showing "minimum contacts" with the United States, the FSIA doesn't add this as a separate requirement. Instead, the immunity exceptions themselves already define what connections to the US are necessary. The Court found that adding an extra, judge-made contacts test would disrupt the carefully designed system Congress created.

This decision respects both the law's goal of providing clear standards and the principle of international courtesy that underlies sovereign immunity. By letting the statutory exceptions themselves define when jurisdiction exists, the Court preserved the straightforward framework Congress intended.

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The Supreme Court’s decision turns on a fine point of environmental law: when a federal agency studies a project’s effects, it only has to look at the project itself. Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v Eagle County involved an 88-mile railroad line in Utah’s Uinta Basin. The Surface Transportation Board wrote its environmental report on that rail project and chose not to analyze separate oil drilling or refining plans. The Court said that was enough and sent the case back, reversing the lower court.

Under the law at issue—the rule that makes federal agencies study environmental impacts—courts are meant to trust agencies when they stick to the work Congress set out. Agencies don’t have to guess at every possible side project beyond their control.

Summary of the Case

The Seven County Infrastructure Coalition applied to the Surface Transportation Board (STB) in 2020 to build an 88-mile freight railroad from Utah's oil-rich Uinta Basin to the national rail network, thereby easing crude-oil transport to Gulf-Coast refineries. As required by NEPA, the Board prepared a 3,600-page Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) analyzing the line's construction and operation—wetlands, wildlife, noise, air quality, and local land-use effects—but declined to "detailed[ly]" assess two categories of indirect impacts: (1) additional upstream oil drilling in the Basin and (2) increased downstream refining along the Gulf Coast. In December 2021, the Board approved the line, finding its transportation and economic benefits outweighed its environmental costs. Petitioners in the D.C. Circuit—Eagle County and environmental organizations—argued that NEPA's "hard look" mandate required fuller analysis of those foreseeable upstream and downstream effects. The D.C. Circuit agreed, vacating both the EIS and the Board's approval. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether NEPA compels an agency to analyze the environmental impacts of separate projects that are distinct in time, place, or regulatory authority from the "proposed action."

Opinion of the Court

Justice Kavanaugh, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed. He first reiterated that NEPA is a purely procedural statute: it requires agencies to prepare an adequate EIS but does not prescribe substantive results. Courts reviewing NEPA claims must defer to agencies' fact-intensive judgments—on the scope, detail, and breadth of an EIS—so long as those choices fall within a "broad zone of reasonableness." Under NEPA's text, the focus is the "proposed action," here the 88-mile rail line, not separate upstream wells or downstream refineries. Even if those indirect effects are foreseeable, the causal chain is too attenuated when another agency controls drilling or refining. Moreover, courts must not, "under the guise of judicial review," delay or block projects by importing into NEPA the environmental assessment of unrelated undertakings. The Board's EIS adequately addressed the environmental consequences of the railway itself; it was neither arbitrary nor capricious to omit a second-order inquiry into separate oil-industry projects.

Separate Opinions

Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment. She agreed that the Board need not analyze effects of drilling and refining because its organic statute gives it no authority to deny or condition rail approval on those consequences. In her view, the majority's broad deference framework risks understating NEPA's information-forcing purpose; yet this case's outcome follows inexorably from the Board's lack of power over oil development. Justices Kagan and Jackson joined her concurrence.

How Far Does Environmental Review Extend? The Limits of NEPA's Reach

NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for major actions affecting the environment. But there's an important boundary: agencies only need to analyze environmental impacts they have the power to address. The law functions as a transparency tool, making agencies consider environmental concerns before proceeding with projects.

When courts review these environmental statements, they must give substantial deference to agencies' decisions about what to include and at what level of detail. The focus must remain on the specific project being proposed—in this case, the railway itself—not on separate projects that might be connected but are different in time, location, or under different regulatory authority.

This approach maintains NEPA's original purpose: ensuring informed decision-making without allowing judges to substitute their own policy preferences for the expertise and discretion of government agencies. The law requires thorough environmental analysis of the proposed action, but doesn't force agencies to analyze impacts beyond their control or authority to mitigate.

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You might think fraud only matters if someone loses money, but the Supreme Court dug into a finer point of the law. In this case, a painting company and its owner, Stamatios Kousisis, were tried for wire fraud after they persuaded a customer to start a deal with false promises. The Court said it doesn’t matter whether the customer ended up losing cash. What counts is that important lies were used to get them into the deal.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett and six other justices agreed that tricking someone into a transaction itself meets the federal fraud law. They said it’s enough that the lie was “material,” meaning it was big enough to matter to the deal. No proof of real financial harm is required.

Summary of the Case

In December 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Kousisis v. United States to resolve a disagreement among federal courts about wire fraud convictions. The key question: Can someone be convicted of wire fraud when they trick a government agency into paying them money, even if the agency doesn't suffer a financial loss?

The case involves Stamatios Kousisis and his company, Alpha Painting and Construction. They won two Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) contracts worth about $86 million. These contracts, funded with federal money, required subcontracting with disadvantaged business enterprises (DBEs). When bidding, Kousisis falsely claimed that a qualified DBE called Markias would supply over $6 million in paint. In reality, Markias was just a "pass-through" for Alpha's non-DBE suppliers, violating both regulations and a material contract term.

After completing the work and making $20 million in profit, Kousisis and his company were convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy under a "fraudulent-inducement" theory. They argued for acquittal, claiming PennDOT suffered no financial loss and therefore couldn't have been defrauded "of money or property." The Third Circuit rejected this argument, and the Supreme Court agreed to review the case.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Barrett, writing for a 7-Justice majority, affirmed the conviction. The wire fraud statute punishes any "scheme for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses." The Court found that the law's text doesn't require proof of net economic loss. To "obtain" simply means "to gain or attain possession," even if the victim receives something in return.

The Court noted that common law didn't generally require pecuniary loss in all fraud actions. Some fraud remedies focused on whether the victim received "property of a different character or condition than promised," not whether they suffered a net loss. The wire fraud statute's "money-or-property" requirement therefore covers fraudulent-inducement schemes as long as money or property was an object of the fraud.

Previous Supreme Court cases like Carpenter v. United States and Shaw v. United States confirm that wire fraud liability doesn't depend on causing economic loss. False statements that induce payment—even if the victim receives value—fall within the statute, provided they are "material" (meaning important to the transaction). The Court emphasized that materiality remains a "demanding" element and held that the Third Circuit correctly applied the law in affirming the convictions.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, agreeing that a net loss isn't required but taking no position on the case's outcome under a more demanding materiality test. He wrote separately to emphasize that materiality deserves rigorous analysis but declined to define its exact boundaries here.

Justice Gorsuch also concurred in part and in the judgment. He agreed that the statute doesn't require victim economic loss but objected to the majority's suggestion that any "obtaining" of money or property is sufficient regardless of whether the victim received what they bargained for. He urged adherence to the common-law rule that fraud requires proof that the victim lost "what he bargained for."

Wire Fraud and the "Fraudulent Inducement" Theory Explained

The wire fraud statute prohibits schemes to "obtain money or property by means of false pretenses." It has three key elements: (1) a scheme to defraud; (2) an objective to obtain money or property; and (3) use of interstate wires to further the scheme.

Under the "fraudulent-inducement" theory upheld by the Court, a person violates the law by making important misrepresentations to induce someone to pay them—even if they deliver value and don't intend to cause financial loss. The Court clarified that "obtain" simply means "gain possession," without considering exchange value.

Historical context supports this interpretation. At common law, certain fraud prosecutions and contract cancellations focused on schemes that deprived victims of promised property, not on proving financial loss. The only common-law fraud action requiring economic loss was the tort of misrepresentation, not the criminal offense of false pretenses.

The Court's decision, consistent with previous cases, rejects requiring proof of net financial loss in wire fraud cases. However, the "materiality" requirement remains important—it distinguishes actionable misrepresentations from minor ones. The fraudulent inducement theory doesn't extend to mere interference with regulatory power, nor does it blur distinctions with other federal fraud statutes. It protects only money or property, not intangible interests.