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The Supreme Court took up a subtle question about who gets the benefit of newer, lighter penalties under a law called the First Step Act. The question wasn’t a big headline grabber—it was about whether a prison term counts as “imposed” if a judge later wiped it away. The justices said that if a sentence is vacated—meaning it’s erased—it’s treated like it never happened. That little detail means anyone who had an old sentence thrown out and needs to be resentenced now gets the chance to avoid harsh “stacked” minimums that used to hit first-time gun offenders with decades behind bars.

Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, noted that this reading lets people who went back to court after the law changed get the newer rules. Four other justices joined her opinion, while three judges on the other side—led by Justice Alito—disagreed.

Summary of the Case

In 2009, Tony Hewitt, Corey Duffey, and Jarvis Ross were convicted of bank robbery and related firearm charges in Texas. Under the mandatory "stacking" rules at that time, they received extraordinarily harsh sentences exceeding 325 years. After some convictions were vacated on appeal, they were resentenced in 2012 to 285-305 years.

Following a 2019 Supreme Court decision that invalidated part of the law's definition of "crime of violence," the defendants successfully challenged additional firearm convictions. The district court vacated all their firearm convictions and ordered new sentencing hearings.

At these hearings, they argued that the First Step Act of 2018, which reduced mandatory minimums for firearm offenses, should apply to them because their previous sentences had been vacated. The Act made these reduced penalties retroactive "if a sentence... has not been imposed" as of December 21, 2018. Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit disagreed, ruling they were ineligible because they had been sentenced before the Act's effective date. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve this issue.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Jackson delivered the Court's opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch. The Court held that under the First Step Act, a sentence "has... been imposed" only as long as it remains in effect. Once a sentence is vacated, it is legally void and no longer "imposed" for purposes of retroactivity.

The Court's analysis focused on Congress's choice of the present-perfect tense ("has been imposed") rather than simple past tense, which indicates continuing legal effect. Established legal principles confirm that vacating a sentence nullifies its ongoing operation, placing a defendant in the position of someone who was never sentenced.

Accordingly, the defendants whose pre-Act sentences were vacated must be treated as if "no sentence... has been imposed" as of the First Step Act's enactment and should be resentenced under the Act's more lenient 5-year mandatory minimum. The Court reversed the lower court's judgment and remanded the case.

Separate Opinions

Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, also wrote additional sections reviewing the political and legislative context: widespread judicial criticism of the harsh "stacking" penalties, the Sentencing Commission's calls for reform, and Congress's compromise in granting limited retroactivity. These sections highlighted the statute's objectives—balancing finality with ending excessive sentences—but didn't add new legal reasoning to the binding textual holding.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Alito, joined by Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, dissented. He interpreted the phrase "a sentence... has... been imposed as of [enactment]" to refer simply to the historical fact that a defendant was sentenced before December 21, 2018, regardless of later vacatur.

Alito argued that "imposed" refers to the court's pronouncement of judgment, and "a sentence" is indefinite—meaning any sentence at all—and need not be presently valid. He rejected the majority's "vacatur" rule, noting that neither common law nor precedents treat vacated sentences as never having occurred. He would have held the defendants ineligible for relief because each had been sentenced before the Act's effective date.

How the First Step Act's Retroactivity Provision Applies to Vacated Sentences

The key legal question centered on Section 403(b) of the First Step Act, which states that reduced mandatory minimums apply to pre-enactment offenses "if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date."

The majority emphasized Congress's deliberate choice of the present-perfect tense ("has been imposed")—unlike nearby provisions using simple past tense—signaling that only sentences still in force on December 21, 2018, would prevent retroactivity. This interpretation aligns with established legal principles: a vacated sentence is legally void and has no continuing effect, treating the defendant as if never sentenced.

By limiting retroactivity to those without valid sentences on the Act's effective date, Congress balanced the general presumption against retroactivity, the interest in finality of judgments, and the bipartisan goal of ending disproportionate "stacking" of firearm sentences that had resulted in extreme prison terms.

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Here’s a case that turns on a fine detail in immigration law. The justices decided that when the Board of Immigration Appeals says no to delaying someone’s deportation, that decision isn’t treated as a final removal order you can challenge right away.

The Court also clarified that the 30-day window to ask a court to review a removal decision is a processing deadline, not a hard limit that bars the court’s power if you miss it. In other words, missing that deadline doesn’t automatically shut the door on your review.

Because of these points, the Supreme Court wiped out the Fourth Circuit’s dismissal of Riley’s petition for review and sent the case back for another look.

Summary of the Case

Pierre Riley, a Jamaican national, entered the United States in 1995 on a tourist visa, overstayed, and later pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute marijuana and related firearms charges—convictions qualifying as aggravated felonies. Upon his release from prison in January 2021, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated expedited removal, issuing on January 26, 2021, a Final Administrative Removal Order (FARO) finding Riley deportable and ordering removal to Jamaica.

Riley didn't contest his deportability but sought relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming that a Jamaican drug kingpin—backed by corrupt officials—posed a credible threat to his life. An Immigration Judge found Riley credible and granted him protection under CAT; however, DHS appealed, and on May 31, 2022, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) vacated the Immigration Judge's decision and reinstated the removal order.

Riley filed a petition for review in the Fourth Circuit three days after the BIA's decision. That court dismissed his case, reasoning that (1) the FARO was the "final order of removal" and the 30-day deadline to appeal it had expired in February 2021; and (2) this 30-day filing deadline was jurisdictional, meaning the court had no power to hear the case.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Alito, writing for a 5–4 Court, reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision. First, the Court held that only an order determining that someone is deportable or ordering deportation may constitute a "final order of removal." The FARO of January 26, 2021, was that order. A CAT protection order is not a removal order because it neither finds deportability nor commands deportation; it "does not affect the validity" of a prior removal order. Because Riley didn't file his petition within 30 days of the FARO, he missed the deadline relative to that final order.

Second, the Court held that the 30-day filing requirement is a claims-processing rule—not a jurisdictional prerequisite. Without a "clear" statement from Congress, time limits "telling aliens what to do to obtain judicial review" don't limit a court's power to hear a case. The relevant law lacks any reference to a court's "power," and its placement amid non-jurisdictional provisions shows that it governs only litigant conduct. Because the Government didn't seek dismissal on this ground, Riley's petition may proceed on remand.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment but noted that Riley's petition challenged only the BIA's CAT order, not the FARO, and that an order denying CAT relief is reviewable "only as part of the review of a final order of removal." He urged the Fourth Circuit on remand to confirm it has jurisdiction to review a CAT order when there's no petition against the removal order itself.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson (and Justice Gorsuch except for one part), dissented in part. Although she agreed that the 30-day deadline is non-jurisdictional, she would hold that a removal order doesn't become "final" for purposes of appeal until the conclusion of all related proceedings, including CAT review.

She argued that Congress's instruction to pursue CAT claims "as part of the review of a final order of removal" and the longstanding "policy against piecemeal litigation" require tying appellate finality to the BIA's disposition of the withholding claim, not to the initial FARO. Requiring immigrants to appeal removal orders before CAT relief is denied would spawn meritless "protective appeals" and conflict with precedent under other laws, she warned.

When Immigration Appeals Become Final: The Supreme Court's Interpretation of Removal Orders

Congress designed modern immigration removal provisions to "streamline judicial review" by channeling all "questions of law or fact arising from any action taken to remove an alien" into a single court of appeals petition. Under the law, that petition "must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal."

An "order of removal" is defined as one "concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation." CAT orders—which grant or deny protection from removal to a particular country—differ from removal orders: they don't determine deportability and don't "affect the validity" of a removal order, so they can't themselves be considered final removal orders.

In expedited removal cases like Riley's, the removal order becomes "final" as soon as it's issued, because there's no further opportunity for agency review. The majority treats the 30-day deadline as reflecting only the immigrant's obligation to file within 30 days of the removal order—not limiting a court's power to hear the case.

By contrast, the dissent would align finality for appeal with the policy against piecemeal litigation—and with the requirement that CAT relief be reviewed "as part of the review of a final order of removal"—so that no petition would be due until both removal and protection claims have been fully decided.

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When does sending legal papers by email count as proper notice? The Supreme Court has now answered that in the Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization case. A family in Washington, D.C., sued the PLO over the tragic death of a loved one in a terror attack. They tried handing the complaint to the PLO’s U.S. office but came up empty. So the judge said, “Okay, you can mail it and even email it to their New York representative.” The PLO argued that wasn’t a real way to serve papers, but the Supreme Court disagreed. It said that under the law governing suits against foreign entities, courts can allow these alternate methods when personal service isn’t possible.

This ruling sends the case back to lower court and means the family’s lawsuit can move forward. It also sheds light on how judges balance the right to fair notice against victims’ need for access to justice.

Summary of the Case

American citizens (and their estates) who were injured or killed in terrorist attacks abroad sued the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990. After winning jury verdicts worth over $650 million in one case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals overturned these victories, ruling that US courts lacked personal jurisdiction over these organizations because their alleged support for terrorism occurred overseas and didn't create sufficient connection to the United States.

In response, Congress passed the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 (PSJVTA). This law specifically names the PA and PLO and establishes that they are considered to have consented to US court jurisdiction in terrorism cases if they either: (1) pay salaries or death benefits to convicted terrorists or their families, or (2) maintain any offices, facilities, or conduct any activities in the United States.

Lower courts found this law unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, but the Supreme Court has now reversed that decision.

Opinion of the Court

Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court in judgment, made three key rulings:

First, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause (which applies to federal power) doesn't incorporate the same "minimum contacts" test used for state courts under the Fourteenth Amendment. This is because the Fourteenth Amendment concerns relationships between states, while the Fifth Amendment deals with federal authority, which can extend beyond US borders.

Second, Congress acted within its constitutional authority when creating the PSJVTA, which links jurisdiction over the PLO and PA to conduct that meaningfully relates to the United States and involves critical foreign policy decisions made by the political branches of government.

Third, even if applying a "reasonableness" standard from Fourteenth Amendment cases, the PSJVTA easily passes constitutional muster. The Court noted the strong interest of American victims in having a US forum, the nation's compelling interest in fighting terrorism, and the absence of any unfair burden on the defendants.

The Court reversed the lower court's decision and sent the cases back for further proceedings.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas (joined partly by Justice Gorsuch) agreed with the outcome but offered different reasoning. He argued that the Fifth Amendment, as originally understood, places no territorial limit on Congress's power to extend federal jurisdiction. In his view, the Due Process Clause never imposed substantive restrictions on extraterritorial federal jurisdiction in the first place.

How Congress Tailored the Law to Combat Terrorism Financing

The PSJVTA carefully amends the Anti-Terrorism Act's jurisdictional rules in two specific ways.

First, it targets "incentive" programs like salaries paid to terrorists serving prison terms in Israel and benefits paid to families of terrorists killed while carrying out attacks. Congress had previously condemned these payments in the Taylor Force Act.

Second, the law subjects the PLO and PA to US court jurisdiction if they maintain any offices, facilities, or physical presence in the United States. This provision builds on existing restrictions on PLO/PA operations on American soil.

Importantly, the law applies only to terrorism claims and specifically excludes the Palestinian mission to the United Nations. Unlike broader jurisdictional provisions, Congress crafted the PSJVTA to target two specific non-sovereign organizations already involved in US counter-terrorism policy. The law gives clear notice that continuing these specific activities will be treated as consent to being sued in American courts.

The statute reflects a careful legislative balance between deterring support for terrorism, respecting diplomatic and foreign policy concerns, and ensuring fairness to defendants who have known connections to the United States.

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The Court’s decision turns on the idea that rules must be applied evenly. In this case, the city had a rule that street performers needed a permit. But it turned out that some acts got fast-tracked permits while others were put on a waiting list. The Supreme Court said that kind of unequal treatment raises a red flag under the Constitution’s equal protection guarantee.

Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, explained that the government cannot pick and choose who it favors without a good reason. If your dance team waits months for a permit while someone else walks right up and gets theirs in days, that’s not fair or lawful. The Court sent the case back to a lower court to make sure the city fixes its process and treats every performer the same way.

Summary of the Case

In 1999 Karyn Stanley began serving as a firefighter for the City of Sanford, Florida, under a policy that funded retiree health insurance through age sixty-five for both 25-year career retirees and those retiring early on disability. In 2003 the City revised its plan to preserve the age-65 subsidy only for 25-year retirees, limiting disability retirees to 24 months of coverage. Stanley, forced to retire on disability in 2018, sued under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging that this disparate treatment violated the law. The district court dismissed her ADA claim because it held that the law only protects "qualified individuals"—those who hold or seek employment—and Stanley was neither once she had retired. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve disagreement among circuit courts over whether Title I's protections extend to retirees who no longer hold or desire a job.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Gorsuch, writing for the Court, concluded that Title I prohibits discrimination only against a "qualified individual"—someone who "holds or desires" an employment position and "can perform the essential functions of the employment position with or without reasonable accommodation." The use of present-tense verbs and the statute's examples of "reasonable accommodation" (like job restructuring and facility modifications) all presume an ongoing employment relationship. By contrast, a retiree who no longer holds or seeks a job is not a "qualified individual" and thus cannot sue for discrimination in post-employment benefits. Gorsuch rejected Stanley's arguments, emphasizing that Congress could amend Title I if it wished to extend protection to retirees. Because Stanley fell outside the law's coverage, the Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's judgment.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Barrett, concurred in part and in the judgment. He stressed that the Court should not have entertained, at the merits stage, Stanley's alternative theory—namely, that she suffered discriminatory treatment while still employed—which the Eleventh Circuit deemed forfeited. He urged deference to lower-court rules about which arguments can be considered preserved and the Court's own practice of reviewing only the questions presented.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor for most of her opinion, dissented. She argued that Title I plainly forbids disability discrimination "in regard to employee compensation," and that retirement benefits are deferred compensation earned on the job. A unilateral reduction in those benefits, targeted at disability retirees, thus "discriminates against a qualified individual" who earned them while employed. Jackson would read the qualified-individual definition contextually—rather than as a rigid temporal bar—so as to cover post-employment actions affecting benefits that were earned in an employment relationship.

Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joining Justice Jackson's view that Title I reaches discriminatory changes to retiree health insurance earned on the job.

When ADA Protection Ends: The Debate Over Retiree Rights

The heart of this case revolves around when ADA protection stops. The law prohibits employers from discriminating "against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to compensation," and defines "qualified individual" as one "who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires."

The majority reads the statute's present-tense verbs ("holds," "desires," "can perform") and its examples of accommodation (job restructuring, modifying facilities, adjusting training materials) as inherently directed to current employees or applicants, not to retirees who hold no position. Thus, the majority concludes, the ADA does not protect against discrimination in post-retirement benefits.

In dissent, Justices Jackson and Sotomayor emphasize that retirement benefits are "deferred compensation" for service already rendered. They argue that reducing those benefits specifically for disability retirees inherently "discriminates against a qualified individual," contending that nothing in the law signals an intent to withdraw ADA protection the moment one leaves the workforce.

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The heart of this decision turns on a fine line in federal drug rules—does simply handing out samples count as selling drugs to a non-patient? A group of chiropractors, who received free medicine samples to give directly to their patients, said “no.” The FDA’s rule says drug distributors must register and meet certain safety steps if they sell to anyone other than the patient. But these clinics never bought or sold the drugs at all. They only received samples from drug companies.

In a majority opinion, the Court agreed with the chiropractors. It said the rule only applies when someone actually sells or transfers ownership of a drug, not when a doctor or therapist simply dispenses samples for treatment. That means these clinics don’t have to jump through the FDA’s distributor requirements just because they hand out free samples to help patients.

Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, pointed out that interpreting “distribution” to cover free samples stretches the rule past its plain meaning. In other words, the FDA can’t treat every free hand-off as a wholesale sale. Justice Sotomayor joined the outcome but raised a note of caution about how far courts should read agency rules in general.

The Court’s decision draws a clearer boundary around federal oversight. Health providers who pass along complimentary samples can breathe easier, at least for now. Stick around—you’ll want to hear more about what this means for clinics, pharmacists, and the FDA’s power over drug flows.

Summary of the Case

In 2014, McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates sued McKesson Corporation in California federal court, claiming McKesson violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by sending unsolicited fax advertisements without the required opt-out notices. These faxes were sent to both traditional fax machines and online fax services. McLaughlin sought $500 in damages for each fax (the minimum under the TCPA) and asked the court to certify a class action for all recipients. The court initially certified the class without distinguishing between how recipients received the faxes.

While the lawsuit was ongoing, the FCC issued the Amerifactors ruling, which determined that online fax services don't qualify as "telephone facsimile machines" under the TCPA. Following Ninth Circuit precedent, the trial court considered this FCC ruling binding, granted partial summary judgment to McKesson for the online-fax claims, decertified the class, and limited recovery to just 12 traditional faxes. The Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision. The Supreme Court then agreed to hear the case to determine whether lower courts in enforcement proceedings can challenge an agency's legal interpretation.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Kavanaugh, writing for a six-justice majority, held that the Hobbs Act does not prevent district courts from independently interpreting statutes in enforcement proceedings. The Court established a "default rule": when a law is silent about whether courts can review agency interpretations during enforcement proceedings, district courts may decide for themselves if an agency's interpretation is correct, while giving "appropriate respect" to the agency's view.

The Court identified three types of pre-enforcement review statutes: 1. Those explicitly preventing review during enforcement proceedings 2. Those explicitly allowing both pre-enforcement and enforcement review 3. Those silent on enforcement-proceeding review, like the Hobbs Act

The majority determined that the Hobbs Act's "exclusive jurisdiction" language only governs pre-enforcement challenges seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, not enforcement proceedings where courts determine liability under a statute's correct interpretation.

The Court distinguished this case from earlier precedents and rejected policy arguments about potential circuit splits, emphasizing that statutory text and traditional administrative law principles must prevail. The judgment was reversed and sent back for further proceedings.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, dissented. She interpreted the Hobbs Act's grant of "exclusive jurisdiction" to appeals courts to "determine the validity" of FCC orders as preventing district courts from later challenging those orders' validity. She argued that the majority's new "default rule" lacks textual, historical, and precedential support.

Justice Kagan warned that allowing challenges during enforcement proceedings would undermine the Hobbs Act's purpose of ensuring prompt, centralized judicial review, disrupt regulated parties' reliance on agency decisions, and deny the government a meaningful role in defending agency actions.

When Can Courts Challenge Agency Interpretations? The Supreme Court Clarifies

The key legal question in this case involves when courts can question an agency's interpretation of a law. The Hobbs Act gives appeals courts "exclusive" authority to review and determine the validity of certain agency orders, including those from the FCC. Meanwhile, administrative law generally presumes that parties facing enforcement actions can challenge an agency's interpretation of a statute unless Congress clearly says otherwise.

The majority concluded that the Hobbs Act only restricts pre-enforcement challenges (those filed directly against the agency before any enforcement action) but doesn't prevent courts from independently interpreting statutes during actual enforcement proceedings between private parties. This means that when someone sues under a law like the TCPA, the district court can reach its own conclusion about what the law means, even if that differs from the FCC's interpretation.

This ruling has significant implications for regulatory enforcement across federal agencies, as it empowers district courts to exercise independent judgment when applying statutes in enforcement cases, rather than being bound by agency interpretations that weren't directly challenged within the timeframe for pre-enforcement review.

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In a close look at how the Clean Air Act treats pollution from burning plants and trees, the court decided whether the government can treat those emissions differently from the smokestacks of a coal plant. The justices focused on the law’s fine print, asking if Congress meant to give regulators a special pass for “biogenic” carbon dioxide. Under the act, major facilities need permits when they pollute, but the EPA decided that burning biomass didn’t count the same way.

That decision split the court. A slim majority said the Clean Air Act doesn’t let the EPA carve out a special rule for biomass emissions. They pointed to the statutory language saying all carbon dioxide from “any” source must be regulated when it crosses a permit threshold. So a factory burning wood chips has to get the same kind of permit as a factory burning oil.

Summary of the Case

Under the Clean Air Act (CAA), EPA granted California a special waiver allowing it to impose stricter vehicle-emissions standards than federal rules. California's 2012 regulations set fleet-wide greenhouse-gas limits and required automakers to include a minimum percentage of electric vehicles (EVs) in their sales. Several fuel producers sued, claiming California's regulations would hurt their business by reducing demand for gasoline and diesel. While EPA didn't contest the fuel producers' right to sue, intervening States argued the producers couldn't show that winning the case would actually help them, claiming automakers would produce the same share of EVs regardless. The D.C. Circuit dismissed the case, but the Supreme Court agreed to review whether the fuel producers have the legal right to sue.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Kavanaugh, writing for the majority, reversed the lower court's decision. He explained that the fuel producers met all three requirements to bring a lawsuit: they suffered an injury (lost sales), the injury was caused by EPA's action (approving California's regulations), and a court decision could likely remedy their situation. The Court found that reduced fuel sales resulting from California's regulations constitute a real injury to the producers. The connection between EPA's approval and the harm was clear: the agency's action authorized California (and 17 other States that follow California's lead) to enforce rules that lower emissions and reduce fuel consumption.

On the critical question of whether invalidating the waiver would actually increase fuel sales, Justice Kavanaugh relied on "commonsense economic principles" and evidence in the record. This included California's own predictions of billions in reduced fuel revenues, California's statements that fewer EVs would be sold without the regulations, EPA's assertions that California "needs" these standards, and automakers' warnings that competitors would produce more gas-powered vehicles if the regulations were removed. The Court specifically noted that even a minimal increase in revenue would be enough to satisfy the legal requirements for standing.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Sotomayor dissented, pointing out that the D.C. Circuit's analysis was partly based on a misunderstanding about when California's standards would expire. She suggested sending the case back to the lower court to reconsider with the correct information.

Justice Jackson wrote her own dissent, arguing that the Court shouldn't have taken this case in the first place, especially since the dispute might become moot once EPA withdraws the waiver. She criticized the majority's "commonsense" approach to analyzing how third parties (automakers) would behave, arguing that previous Supreme Court cases had required a much higher standard of proof in similar situations.

How the Clean Air Act's California Exception Creates Legal Uncertainty

The Clean Air Act generally prevents states from setting their own vehicle emission standards, creating a uniform national system. However, the law makes a special exception for California due to its historic air pollution problems. If California can show "compelling and extraordinary conditions" and that its standards are "at least as protective" as federal requirements, the EPA can grant it a waiver to set stricter rules. Other states can then choose to follow either the federal standards or California's stricter ones.

This unique arrangement has created tension between addressing local air quality issues and global climate change. The EPA's position has shifted with different administrations—Bush and Trump denied certain waivers, while Obama and Biden approved them. The current legal debate centers on whether invalidating California's waiver would actually change automakers' manufacturing decisions enough to help fuel producers—a question that isn't clearly addressed in the Clean Air Act itself but has significant implications for who can challenge these environmental regulations in court.

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Sometimes a single phrase in a law can change everything. In this case, the Supreme Court looked at the rule that lets “any person adversely affected” by an FDA decision ask a judge to review it. The FDA had said no to a new tobacco product, blocking not only the maker but also the shops that wanted to sell it.

The Court said those shops count as “adversely affected” and can challenge the FDA’s denial in court. It also agreed that the case can stay in the home circuit where the stores are located. Seven justices, led by Justice Barrett, sided with the retailers and allowed the challenge to move forward. Two justices, including Justice Jackson joined by Justice Sotomayor, disagreed and felt only the product maker should have that right.

Summary of the Case

In 2016 the FDA determined that e-cigarettes are "new tobacco products" under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA) and deferred enforcement while manufacturers sought premarket approval. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. (RJR Vapor) applied to market its Vuse Alto e-cigarettes but the FDA denied the application for failure to show that marketing the product would be "appropriate for the protection of the public health." RJR Vapor joined with Texas and Mississippi retailers to petition the Fifth Circuit for judicial review under the TCA's "any person adversely affected" clause, thereby invoking Fifth-Circuit venue. The FDA moved to dismiss or transfer the petition, contending only the denied applicant has a statutory right to sue. A divided Fifth Circuit denied that motion, and the FDA sought certiorari.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Barrett, writing for a 7-Justice majority, held that the phrase "any person adversely affected" must be construed consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act's similarly worded cause of action, which the Court has interpreted to grant review to anyone "arguably within" a statute's zone of interests. Retailers who lose the opportunity to sell a denied product and risk enforcement penalties plainly fall within that zone. The FDA's structural argument—that only manufacturers have statutory rights to participation and notice—cannot override the TCA's grant of review to any adversely affected person. Moreover, Congress's use of the narrower term "holder of [the] application" in one section and the broader "any person adversely affected" in another signals differing scopes. Because at least one proper petitioner had venue in the Fifth Circuit, the Court affirmed the denial of dismissal or transfer.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissented. They argued that the TCA's premarket-approval regime establishes an adjudicatory process exclusively between the FDA and the manufacturer, who alone bears the burden to submit detailed product studies, components lists, manufacturing controls, and samples. Retailers have no procedural rights to comment, receive notice, or develop the record; when the FDA withdraws an existing approval, only the "holder of [the] application" may sue, reflecting Congress's intent to limit review to manufacturers. The dissenters would confine "any person adversely affected" to those within the regulated class—in this case, denied applicants—and would bar retailers from invoking the judicial review provision.

Who Can Challenge FDA Decisions: Manufacturers, Retailers, or Both?

This dispute centers on who has the legal right to challenge FDA decisions about tobacco products. The Court needed to determine whether retailers, not just manufacturers, can sue when the FDA denies approval for products they want to sell.

The majority ruled that the phrase "any person adversely affected" should be interpreted broadly, consistent with similar language in other laws. When retailers lose the ability to sell a product and face potential penalties for selling unapproved items, they clearly fall within the group of people Congress intended to protect.

The Court found it significant that Congress used different language in different parts of the law—specifically choosing broader language ("any person adversely affected") in the section about who can seek judicial review, while using narrower language ("holder of the application") elsewhere. This deliberate word choice suggests Congress intended to allow a wider group of affected parties to challenge FDA decisions.

The venue provision in the law further reflects Congress's judgment about where these challenges should be heard, though the Court didn't address whether each individual challenger must independently satisfy venue requirements.

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The law often draws fine lines that can mean the difference between freedom and prison, and the Supreme Court just drew one of those lines in a case called Esteras versus United States. Here's what happened and why it matters for anyone who's ever been on probation or supervised release.

When someone gets out of prison early on supervised release, they have to follow certain rules. If they break those rules, a judge can send them back to prison. But what should the judge think about when making that decision? Should they focus on punishing the person for their original crime all over again, or should they think about helping that person stay on the right track?

In a 7-to-2 decision written by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, the Court said judges cannot use the desire to punish someone for their original crime when deciding whether to revoke supervised release. The majority explained that supervised release is supposed to be about rehabilitation and moving forward, not about looking backward and seeking revenge for old crimes.

Summary of the Case

Edgardo Esteras pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute heroin and received 12 months in prison followed by six years of supervised release. While on supervised release, he was arrested for domestic violence. At his revocation hearing, the court found he violated his release conditions and sentenced him to 24 months in prison—higher than the recommended 6-12 months—citing his criminal history and a need "to promote respect for the law." Esteras's lawyer objected that using "retribution" as a factor was improper, though acknowledged existing precedent allowed it. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision, and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve disagreements among different circuit courts.

Opinion of the Court

In a 7-2 decision, Justice Barrett ruled that courts may not consider retributive purposes when deciding to revoke supervised release. The law governing sentencing (Section 3553(a)) lists ten factors for courts to consider. However, the section dealing with supervised release (Section 3583(e)) only references eight of those factors, notably excluding the retribution factor. Using the legal principle that specifically listing certain items implies the exclusion of others, the Court determined Congress intentionally left out retribution from supervised release decisions.

This interpretation aligns with the rehabilitative purpose of supervised release, as confirmed in previous Supreme Court cases. The Court rejected the government's arguments that the omission merely made consideration optional or that considering the "nature and circumstances" of violations inevitably involves considering their "seriousness." For future cases, the Court clarified that standard review principles apply: unpreserved claims face a higher bar for reversal, while properly preserved objections receive more favorable review.

Separate Opinions

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Jackson, agreed with the main ruling but emphasized that retribution should play no role in supervised release decisions—whether related to the original crime or the violation itself. Justice Jackson wrote separately to note that the Court didn't need to define "offense" in the relevant statute, as the key question was simply whether retribution was excluded from supervised release considerations.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Alito, joined by Justice Gorsuch, disagreed with the majority. They argued that omitting factors from the list doesn't prohibit courts from considering them—it just means they aren't mandatory. The dissenters pointed to other parts of the Sentencing Reform Act where Congress explicitly forbids certain factors, noting no such prohibition exists here. They highlighted practical problems with the majority's approach: courts must consider the "nature and circumstances" of violations and "adequate deterrence," yet cannot account for the "seriousness" or "respect for the law"—concepts that often overlap. They warned this would create unworkable practices and micromanage how judges explain their decisions.

When Punishment and Rehabilitation Collide: The Supreme Court's Supervised Release Decision

The Supreme Court's ruling clarifies an important distinction in federal sentencing. When judges initially sentence defendants, they consider ten factors, including both forward-looking goals (deterrence, public safety, rehabilitation) and backward-looking punishment (retribution). However, supervised release serves a different purpose. When deciding whether to revoke someone's supervised release, judges should focus only on rehabilitation and preventing future crimes—not on punishing past behavior.

This distinction matters because it affects how courts handle violations of supervised release conditions. The Court determined that Congress intentionally excluded retribution from these decisions, consistent with supervised release's rehabilitative purpose. This interpretation maintains sentencing uniformity: punishment for the original crime happens at the initial sentencing, while supervised release decisions focus on helping the person reintegrate into society and preventing new offenses.

For defendants, this means courts cannot extend their imprisonment after a supervised release violation simply to punish them more for their original crime. For judges, it means focusing on whether additional prison time serves rehabilitation or public safety—not retribution. The ruling doesn't create technical traps for judges but ensures they apply the law as Congress intended, with appropriate review by appellate courts when mistakes occur.

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At the heart of this case is a fine point of law: whether the EPA’s decisions to reject Oklahoma’s and Utah’s air-quality plans should be treated as separate, local actions or lumped together into one big, national rule. The Supreme Court said these are individual, state-by-state decisions, based on detailed, local facts—and so they belong in the regional courts, not in Washington’s D.C. Circuit. By breaking up what the EPA calls an “omnibus” rule into its pieces, the justices made clear that each plan needs its own fresh look. They also ruled that because the agency focused on state-specific data rather than on a broad, countrywide impact, the exception that would force review in D.C. doesn’t apply. Stay tuned after the break to find out what this means for future challenges to environmental rules and how it could shape the battle over clean air.

Summary of the Case

In 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) strengthened the air quality standard for ground-level ozone. Under the Clean Air Act's "Good Neighbor" provision, states must submit plans showing how they'll prevent their emissions from affecting neighboring states' ability to meet these standards. The EPA reviewed plans from 21 states, disapproved them, and published all these disapprovals in a single document. In this document, the EPA stated that any challenges should be filed in the D.C. Circuit Court.

Several states, including Oklahoma and Utah, along with industry groups, sued in their regional circuit courts instead. When the Tenth Circuit transferred Oklahoma and Utah's challenges to the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court stepped in to resolve a key question: Should challenges to EPA's disapprovals of state plans be heard in the D.C. Circuit or in the appropriate regional circuit courts?

Opinion of the Court

Justice Thomas, writing for a six-Justice majority, applied a two-step framework from a recent case (EPA v. Calumet). First, courts must identify whether the EPA's action is "nationally applicable" or just "locally or regionally applicable." Second, if the action is only locally or regionally applicable, courts must determine if there's an exception because the action is "based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect."

The Court held that each state plan disapproval is a separate action under the law. The Clean Air Act specifically treats actions on state implementation plans as locally or regionally applicable. The EPA's decision to bundle 21 disapprovals into one document doesn't transform them into a single nationwide action.

The Court also rejected the EPA's argument that these disapprovals fell within the "nationwide scope or effect" exception. Although the EPA used some common approaches across all reviews, these were just tools in what remained state-specific analyses. No single nationwide determination drove all the disapprovals. Therefore, challenges to the Oklahoma and Utah disapprovals must proceed in their regional circuit courts, not the D.C. Circuit.

Separate Opinions

Justice Gorsuch, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, agreed with the outcome but disagreed with the majority's approach. He would have relied strictly on the text of the Clean Air Act without adopting the two-step framework. Gorsuch believed the statute clearly indicates that state plan denials should be reviewed in regional courts unless the law explicitly says otherwise.

No Justice dissented. Justice Alito did not participate in the case.

Understanding Venue Rules in Clean Air Act Challenges

The Clean Air Act creates specific rules about where EPA actions can be challenged in court. It draws a clear line between "nationally applicable" actions (which can only be challenged in the D.C. Circuit) and "locally or regionally applicable" actions (which must be challenged in the regional circuit court where the affected state is located).

There's an exception: if a local or regional action is "based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect," and the EPA officially declares this in its publication, then the case can go to the D.C. Circuit instead.

This structure ensures that challenges are directed to the appropriate court based on the nature of the EPA's action, not on how the EPA packages its decisions. The law recognizes that some regional decisions might have national implications, but it requires the EPA to explicitly state when a decision is primarily driven by factors that apply uniformly across all states.

This approach balances the Clean Air Act's design as a cooperative federal-state program with the occasional need for uniform national regulation. In this case, the Court determined that the EPA's disapprovals of state plans remained separate state-specific actions, despite being published together, and therefore challenges should be heard in the regional circuit courts.

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Courts often wrestle with subtle rules about where a case should be heard. Here, the debate was over a single refinery’s request for relief under the Clean Air Act and whether the EPA’s denial should land in a local court or in Washington.

The Supreme Court noted that saying “no” to one refinery is a decision about that one plant. But because the EPA used nationwide rules to reach its decision, the case belongs in the D.C. Circuit instead of the Fifth Circuit in Texas. In the end, the Justices wiped out the Fifth Circuit’s ruling and sent the whole matter back for another look under those national guidelines.

Summary of the Case

In 2022, the Environmental Protection Agency issued two omnibus notices denying 105 small refineries' petitions for hardship exemptions under the Clean Air Act's Renewable Fuel Program (RFP). Small refineries, defined as those processing no more than 75,000 barrels per day, may petition EPA for an exemption from blending obligations "for the reason of disproportionate economic hardship." EPA's denials rested on (1) a uniform interpretation that hardship must be caused by RFP compliance, and (2) an economic model—its "RIN passthrough" theory—presuming no small refinery bears a disproportionate cost. EPA characterized its denials as reviewable only in the D.C. Circuit, either as "nationally applicable" actions or, alternately, as locally applicable actions "based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect." Petitions were filed instead in multiple regional circuits. All but the Fifth Circuit either dismissed or transferred the cases; the Fifth retained venue, rejected EPA's statutory arguments on venue, and vacated EPA's denials on the merits. EPA sought the Supreme Court's review to resolve a circuit split over venue under the Clean Air Act.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Thomas, writing for a 7–2 majority (Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, Jackson), held that EPA's denials of individual exemption petitions are "locally or regionally applicable" actions that nonetheless fall within the Clean Air Act's "nationwide scope or effect" exception, thus channeling venue to the D.C. Circuit. First, the "action" at issue is EPA's denial of each refinery's petition, as defined by the RFP exemption provision, not EPA's choice to aggregate denials. Those denials are locally applicable because each applies only to a particular refinery. Second, although locally applicable actions generally go to regional circuits, the law directs that any locally applicable action "based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect" (and accompanied by EPA's published finding) must be reviewed in the D.C. Circuit. A "determination" is any agency conclusion, and it is of nationwide scope or effect if it applies across the country and forms the core driver of the action. Here, EPA's uniform interpretation of "disproportionate economic hardship" and its RIN passthrough theory apply to all refineries and served as the primary basis for its denials (with refinery-specific facts considered only to confirm a presumption). The Fifth Circuit therefore erred in retaining venue. Judgment vacated; remanded for transfer and further proceedings.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Gorsuch, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, dissented. He agreed the individual petition denials are locally applicable. But he would confine the "nationwide scope or effect" exception to cases in which a substantive Clean Air Act provision itself calls on EPA to make a nationwide determination. Since the small-refinery exemption scheme requires only refinery-specific determinations—whether each petitioning facility would suffer disproportionate economic hardship—Gorsuch would leave venue in the Fifth Circuit and employ a bright-line, text-rooted test rather than the majority's multistep "core driver" inquiry.

Understanding Venue Rules for EPA Decisions: When Local Cases Go National

The Clean Air Act establishes a three-part framework for determining where challenges to EPA decisions must be heard:

1. Nationally applicable actions (like setting new air quality standards) must be challenged in the D.C. Circuit Court
2. Locally or regionally applicable actions (like approving a state's implementation plan) ordinarily go to the appropriate regional circuit court
3. However, any locally applicable action "based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect," if EPA publishes that finding, must also be heard in the D.C. Circuit

To identify what constitutes an "action," courts look to the specific Clean Air Act provision authorizing it—in this case, EPA's duty to respond to small refinery exemption petitions. An action is "based on" a nationwide determination only if that determination is the primary, "core" justification driving the agency's decision—not just one of many factors considered. The term "determination" simply means an agency's settled conclusion.

Courts independently review whether EPA's action truly rested on such a nationwide determination, while giving EPA discretion to invoke the exception. This structure ensures that nationally significant policy decisions are centralized in the D.C. Circuit, while truly local matters remain in regional courts unless they genuinely rest on a nationwide policy determination.