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Trump invoked the Alien Enemies Act and The Supreme Court decided to lift temporary orders that had stopped deportations. The case, Trump v. J.G.G., rules on the jurisdiction district. This ruling means that if someone wants to challenge their removal under this law, they must do so in the district where they are being held, which in this case is Texas.

The decision was made by a group of justices, including Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh. They all agreed on this point, while Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson voiced their disagreement, joined by Justices Elena Kagan and Amy Coney Barrett.

This case highlights the nuances of how legal challenges are handled, especially when it comes to immigration and detention. It emphasizes the importance of where and how these challenges can be made, shaping the landscape of legal rights for those affected.

Summary of the Case

The case of Trump v. J. G. G. arose from the detention and removal of Venezuelan nationals believed to be affiliated with Tren de Aragua (TdA), a group designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department. President Trump invoked the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) to detain and remove these individuals. In response, five detainees and a putative class sought injunctive and declaratory relief against their removal, arguing that they were not removable under the AEA. The District Court issued temporary restraining orders (TROs) to prevent their removal, which the government sought to vacate, leading to the Supreme Court's involvement.

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, vacated the District Court's TROs, asserting that challenges to removal under the AEA must be brought through habeas corpus proceedings. The Court emphasized that the detainees' claims implied the invalidity of their confinement, thus falling within the "core" of habeas corpus. The Court ruled that venue for such claims lies in the district of confinement, which in this case is Texas, not the District of Columbia. The Court acknowledged that while judicial review is limited under the AEA, detainees are entitled to notice and an opportunity to challenge their removal. The Court's decision was framed as a means to avoid unnecessary delays in the legal process.

Separate Opinions

Justice Kavanaugh concurred with the Court's opinion, emphasizing that the use of habeas corpus for transfer claims is consistent with historical precedent. He noted that the Court's disagreement with the dissenters was not about the availability of judicial review but rather about the appropriate venue for such review.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, dissented, arguing that the Court's decision undermined due process protections for the detainees. She criticized the majority for intervening hastily and for failing to consider the potential harm to individuals being deported without adequate legal recourse. Justice Jackson also dissented, expressing concern over the Court's rushed decision-making process and the implications of using a wartime statute in a peacetime context.

Appropriate Use of Habeas Corpus

The case highlights the complexities surrounding the Alien Enemies Act, a law originally enacted in 1798 for wartime scenarios. The majority opinion underscored that the AEA precludes judicial review in many instances, yet it also allows for judicial scrutiny regarding the interpretation and constitutionality of the Act. The Court's ruling that habeas corpus is the appropriate vehicle for challenging removal under the AEA reflects a nuanced understanding of the interplay between statutory interpretation and constitutional rights. The dissenters raised critical concerns about the implications of applying a wartime statute in a peacetime context, emphasizing the need for careful judicial oversight to protect individual rights against potential government overreach.

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Who has the power to decide when government money gets paid out? In the case of Department of Education v. California, the Supreme Court looked at whether a lower court could stop the government from ending certain education grants and force it to keep paying. The lower court had put a temporary hold on the government’s decision, but the Supreme Court stepped in and said that the government was likely right: the lower court probably didn’t have the authority to order those payments in the first place.

The heart of the matter was whether the Administrative Procedure Act, a law that lets people challenge government actions, actually allows courts to order the government to pay money. The Supreme Court said that, because of rules about when you can sue the government—what’s called “sovereign immunity”—the lower court likely went too far. This means the government can move forward with its plan to end those grants, at least for now.

Summary of the Case

This case, Department of Education v. California, arose when the U.S. Department of Education abruptly terminated over 100 education-related grants awarded to public schools and universities under the Teacher Quality Partnership (TQP) and Supporting Effective Educator Development (SEED) programs. These grants, authorized by Congress, were intended to address teacher shortages and improve teacher quality, particularly in underserved areas. Eight states sued the Department, alleging that the mass termination was arbitrary, capricious, and violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The District Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) to halt the terminations and restore the status quo while considering a preliminary injunction. The Department of Education sought emergency relief from the Supreme Court to stay the TRO, arguing that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to order the payment of money under the APA and that the proper forum for such claims was the Court of Federal Claims.

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, granted the Department of Education’s application to stay the District Court’s TRO pending appeal. The Court reasoned that, although TROs are generally not appealable, the District Court’s order functioned as a preliminary injunction and thus was reviewable. The Court found that the government was likely to succeed in showing that the District Court lacked jurisdiction under the APA to order the payment of money, citing the APA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity, which does not extend to claims seeking money damages or to enforce contractual obligations to pay money (see 5 U.S.C. §702; Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002)). The Court also found that the government would be unlikely to recover disbursed funds if the TRO remained in effect, while the respondents (the states) would not suffer irreparable harm because they could recover any wrongfully withheld funds through other legal means. The stay will remain in effect pending the outcome of the appeal and any petition for certiorari.

Separate Opinions

The Chief Justice (John Roberts) would have denied the application for a stay, but did not write a separate opinion.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Kagan dissented, arguing that the Court’s intervention was unwarranted and premature. She emphasized that the government did not defend the legality of the grant cancellations and that the states had shown concrete harm from the loss of funding. Kagan contended that the APA generally allows district courts to review agency actions, even when monetary relief may result, and that the majority’s reliance on Great-West was misplaced because that case did not involve the APA. She criticized the Court for acting on an emergency basis without full briefing or argument, suggesting that the dispute should have proceeded in the ordinary course.

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, also dissented. She argued that the TRO was a standard, time-limited order preserving the status quo and causing no concrete harm to the government, while the grant terminations would inflict significant harm on grantees. Jackson maintained that the government’s claims of irreparable harm were speculative and that the lower courts were better positioned to resolve the merits. She further argued that the Department’s mass termination of grants was likely arbitrary and capricious under the APA, as it lacked individualized reasoning and failed to follow required procedures. Jackson criticized the majority for intervening on technical jurisdictional grounds and for potentially shifting the forum for such disputes from district courts to the Court of Federal Claims.

Sovereign Immunity

The legal nuance in this case centers on the scope of the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity and the proper forum for challenging agency actions involving monetary relief. The APA allows for judicial review of agency actions and waives sovereign immunity for certain claims, but this waiver does not apply if another statute “forbids the relief which is sought” or if the claim seeks “money damages” (5 U.S.C. §702). The Supreme Court has distinguished between claims for specific relief (such as setting aside agency action) and claims for money damages, with the latter generally falling under the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims via the Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. §1491(a)(1)). In Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988), the Court held that district courts could order the release of funds wrongfully withheld by an agency, but not to enforce a contractual obligation to pay money. The majority here interpreted the District Court’s order as effectively enforcing a contractual obligation, thus exceeding the APA’s waiver and requiring the case to be heard in the Court of Federal Claims. The dissenters, however, viewed the relief as within the APA’s scope, emphasizing the need for reasoned agency decision-making and the appropriateness of district court review. This case thus highlights the complex interplay between administrative law, sovereign immunity, and the allocation of judicial authority between district courts and the Court of Federal Claims.

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In the case of Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn, the Supreme Court looked at whether people can get extra damages for business or property losses, even if those losses started with a personal injury. The law in question is called RICO, which is usually used to fight organized crime, but it can also be used in civil lawsuits.

The Court decided that if someone loses money or property because of something that started as a personal injury, they can still ask for triple damages under RICO. This goes against what some lower courts had said before, which was that you couldn’t get these damages if your business or property loss was tied to a personal injury. This decision could change how some lawsuits are handled, especially when business losses are connected to personal injuries.

Summary of the Case

Douglas Horn, a long-haul truck driver, began using “Dixie X,” a cannabidiol (CBD) tincture marketed as THC-free by Medical Marijuana, Inc., to treat chronic pain. After a workplace drug test detected THC, Horn was fired and sued under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), alleging that Medical Marijuana’s misrepresentations constituted mail and wire fraud predicates. The District Court granted summary judgment for Medical Marijuana, holding that Horn’s lost employment flowed from a personal injury (the ingestion of THC) and that §1964(c) forecloses recovery for personal injuries or for business or property losses derived from them. The Second Circuit reversed (80 F.4th 130 (2023)), holding that §1964(c) authorizes treble-damages suits for business or property losses even if they “derive from a personal injury,” and adopting a broad definition of “business” to include employment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the Circuits over whether RICO bars suit for business or property harms that result from personal injury.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Barrett, for a 5–3 majority, addressed “whether civil RICO categorically bars recovery for business or property losses that derive from a personal injury”. Relying on the ordinary meaning of “injure” (“to cause harm or damage to”), she held that §1964(c) plainly authorizes suits by any person “injured in his business or property,” implicitly excluding personal injuries but not business or property harms that stem from them. The majority rejected petitioners’ term-of-art argument that “injured” requires invasion of a “legal right” in business or property, observing that context favors the ordinary definition and that “damages” must mean monetary redress, not “harm”. It found support in civil RICO precedent to import a common-law “situs” rule into §1964(c). Antitrust precedents construing identical language in the Clayton Act (§4, 38 Stat. 731) do not govern RICO. Finally, the majority stressed that RICO’s other limits — its proximate-cause requirement and “pattern” element — mitigate any over-federalization, and it left further policy refinements to Congress.

Separate Opinions

Justice Jackson concurred, emphasizing that Congress directed in §904(a), 84 Stat. 947, that RICO “shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.” She argued that a broad reading of the statute’s private-action provision is especially warranted given RICO’s “remedial” design and its civil provision’s purpose of enabling private enforcement of racketeering prohibitions.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Thomas, joined by no other Justice, would have dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. He argued that we cannot know whether Horn suffered a personal injury because the District Court and parties disagreed below. He urged resolution of that threshold issue first and contended that no party fully briefed the definition of “injured in his business or property.”

Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, dissented on the merits. He maintained that “injured” is a term of art importing the tort-law definition—“the invasion of any legally protected interest”—and that RICO’s text, modeled on the Clayton Act, precludes personal-injury suits. Lost wages and medical costs, in his view, are merely damages flowing from a personal injury, not distinct business or property invasions.

RICO and Definition of Injury

When Congress added §1964(c) in 1970, it deliberately limited private RICO actions to persons “injured in [their] business or property,” implicitly excluding personal injuries. In American tort law, “injury” denotes the invasion of a legal right—personal, property, or business—distinct from the economic “damages” a victim sustains. By contrast, the majority reads “injured” in its ordinary sense (“harmed or damaged”), allowing recovery for business or property harm regardless of its source. This interpretation subverts RICO’s text and historic tort categories, which this Court and earlier antitrust decisions recognized when construing the identical “injured in his business or property” language. The statutory choice of the disjunctive “business or property” (not “and”), its modeling on Clayton Act §4, and the placement of “damages” as separate relief for a proved “injury” all underscore that Congress did not intend to federalize garden-variety personal-injury torts simply because they yield lost-wages or medical-expense damages.

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The Supreme Court looked at a case involving the Food and Drug Administration and a company that wanted to sell flavored e-cigarettes. The lower court had said the FDA was wrong to deny the company’s request to sell these products, calling the agency’s actions unfair and inconsistent. But the Supreme Court disagreed, saying the FDA had actually followed its own rules and guidance when it made its decision.

The justices explained that the FDA’s process for reviewing these e-cigarette products was in line with what it had told companies to expect, especially when it came to the kind of scientific evidence and comparisons it wanted to see. The Court also said that the FDA didn’t break any rules by sticking to its earlier positions. However, the Supreme Court didn’t end the case there. Instead, it sent the case back to the lower court to take another look at whether the FDA made a harmless mistake by not reviewing the company’s marketing plans. This case shows how the courts look closely at whether government agencies are following their own guidelines, and what happens if they don’t.

Summary of the Case

In FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, LLC (No. 23-1038), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) denied premarket tobacco product applications (PMTAs) submitted by two e-liquid manufacturers, Wages and White Lion (dba Triton) and Vapetasia. Under the Tobacco Control Act of 2009 (TCA), any “new tobacco product”—including most flavored e-liquids sold after February 15, 2007—may not be marketed absent FDA authorization, which must be granted only if the product “would be appropriate for the protection of the public health.” 21 U.S.C. § 387j(c)(2)(A). The FDA concluded the applicants had not submitted sufficient scientific evidence—including randomized controlled trials or longitudinal cohort studies—to demonstrate benefits for adult smokers that would outweigh youth-initiation risks, nor did it review their marketing-plan commitments (Syllabus, pp. 2–3; App. 177a, 285a).

The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by applying standards different from those announced in pre-decision guidance concerning (1) types of scientific evidence, (2) cross-flavor comparisons, (3) device types, and (4) marketing plans, and it rejected the agency’s harmless-error defense (90 F. 4th 357, 376–384). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve conflicts among the circuits and to clarify whether the FDA’s denials complied with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

Opinion of the Court

Justice Alito, writing for a unanimous Court, vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded. The Court first declined to decide whether the FDA was required to issue notice-and-comment regulations rather than guidance. It then applied the “change-in-position” doctrine, under which an agency may change policy so long as it “provide[s] a reasoned explanation,” “display[s] awareness that it is changing position,” and considers “serious reliance interests.”

1. Scientific Evidence
   The TCA contemplates both “well-controlled investigations” and “other valid scientific evidence.” The FDA’s guidance made clear that, absent randomized trials or cohort studies, manufacturers must submit “robust” alternative evidence bridged to their specific products. The Court held the agency’s denial orders simply applied that approach: respondents offered literature reviews and surveys, but not evidence sufficiently tied to their flavored products. No unacknowledged “change” occurred.

2. Comparative Efficacy
   The TCA requires comparisons of new products to other tobacco products and the FDA’s guidance recommended comparing health risks “within the same category and … different categories as appropriate”. Its later emphasis on dessert-, candy-, and fruit-flavors over tobacco flavors naturally flowed from data showing those flavors disproportionately appeal to youth. The denial orders tracked that guidance, not a repudiation of it.

3. Device Type
   A 2020 guidance prioritized enforcement against flavored, cartridge-based products, but it also covered any products “targeted to, or whose marketing is likely to promote use by, minors”. The FDA reasonably concluded youth demand shifted from disposable cartridges to other flavored devices, justifying scrutiny of all flavored products regardless of cartridge status.

4. Harmless Error and Marketing Plans
   Although the FDA admitted it did not review marketing plans—contrary to its guidance—it did not seek plenary review of that finding. Instead, the agency asked the Court to clarify the proper harmless-error standard. Noting tension between the remand rule of SEC v. Chenery Corp. and the APA’s harmless-error directive the Court held the Fifth Circuit misread Calcutt v. FDIC by treating its sole exception to the remand rule as universal. The Court vacated and remanded for the Fifth Circuit to apply a proper blend of remand-and-harmless-error principles.

Separate Opinions

Justice Sotomayor filed a brief concurrence emphasizing that the record shows the FDA provided consistent, clear guidance on the need for rigorous product-specific evidence that benefits to adult smokers outweigh youth risks. She stressed that e-cigarette regulation under the TCA served a core public-health purpose and did not support any suggestion that the FDA “was unable or unwilling to say in clear and specific terms precisely what applicants would have to provide.”

Nuance of the Law

The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 (TCA) brought tobacco products within the FDA’s ambit for the first time while preserving the FDCA’s existing premarket approval scheme for “new drugs”. A “new tobacco product” is any tobacco product not marketed in the U.S. before February 15, 2007 and the TCA mandates FDA authorization before sale. To approve a PMTA, the agency must find the product “appropriate for the protection of the public health,” weighing “risks and benefits to the population as a whole” and the likelihood of adult cessation versus youth initiation. Those findings “when appropriate” rely on “well-controlled investigations” or “other valid scientific evidence,” but the statute leaves to the FDA’s discretion what studies or data suffice.

This delegation reflects Congress’s judgment that tobacco products pose unique, shifting risks—particularly because of rapidly proliferating flavors and devices—requiring individualized review rather than blanket standards. At the same time, Congress bounded the FDA’s power by insisting on a public-health test rather than an outright ban and by providing judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 706 via the TCA’s review provision. In turn, the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard demands agency consistency or, if it changes course, “a reasoned explanation,” awareness of reliance interests, and consideration of serious reliance. Finally, the remand rule of SEC v. Chenery must be harmonized with the APA’s harmless-error directive to permit courts to remand when an agency “rested decision on an unsustainable reason,” but also to excuse harmless errors that “had no bearing” on the outcome.

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Here’s a twist on how our high court sees a gun law. In Bondi v. Vanderstok, the justices looked at a rule from the agency that enforces our gun laws. They said that some kits you can buy, which come with every piece needed to build a gun, act like real weapons because you can put them together quickly and they’ll fire a bullet. They also ruled that half-finished gun bodies count, if only a bit more work is needed to make them fire. By a 7-to-2 vote, the court reversed a lower court decision that had tossed out this rule.

Summary of the Case

In 2022, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) adopted a rule interpreting the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA) to cover (1) “weapon parts kits … that may readily be completed … to expel a projectile” and (2) “partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional” frames or receivers, including “frame or receiver parts kits”. Before ATF could enforce the rule, manufacturers and hobbyists filed pre-enforcement APA challenges, contending that (a) no kit can qualify as a “weapon” under § 921(a)(3)(A), and (b) unfinished frames/receivers fall outside § 921(a)(3)(B). The District Court and, on appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed and vacated the rule in its entirety. The Government sought certiorari, warning that the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation would eviscerate the GCA’s core provisions and leave regulators unable to trace an exploding rise in “ghost guns.” This Court granted review.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Gorsuch, for seven Justices, held that ATF’s rule is not facially inconsistent with the GCA. On subsection (A), he explained that “artifact nouns” like “weapon” can embrace unfinished items whose intended function is plain. Polymer80’s “Buy Build Shoot” kit—containing all the parts needed to build a semiautomatic pistol in about 20 minutes with common tools—plainly qualifies as a “weapon … readily … converted to expel a projectile.” On subsection (B), he held that “frame” and “receiver” may cover partially complete items. Decades of ATF practice, the GCA’s serialization requirements in § 923(i) for incomplete silencers and destructive devices, and the absence of any dispute about pre-rule enforcement all confirm that some unfinished frames/receivers fall squarely within the statute. The Court rejected litigants’ linguistic-difference arguments, NFA-machinegun fears, and invoked neither the rule of lenity nor avoidance because “text, context, and structure” unambiguously authorize regulation of at least some kits and partial frames. The Fifth Circuit’s judgment was reversed and remanded.

Separate Opinions

Justice Sotomayor (joined by Kagan and Barrett) wrote to emphasize that regulated parties have long known they must comply with the GCA’s licensing, recordkeeping, and serialization requirements and that ATF itself encourages submission of products for classification to avoid confusion.
Justice Kavanaugh concurred to note that ATF must prove “willfulness” to impose criminal penalties under § 924(a)(1)(D), and that background-check violations under § 924(a)(5) require knowledge of the facts constituting the offense—thus guarding against unfair prosecutions.
Justice Jackson concurred to stress that the sole judicial task is to determine whether Congress authorized ATF’s rulemaking under § 926(a), not to rewrite the statute.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Thomas dissented on text-and-structure grounds. He argued that “frame” and “receiver” in § 921(a)(3)(B) cannot reasonably cover unfinished or nonfunctional components, and that “weapon” in subsection (A) excludes kits that lack a finished frame or receiver. He warned that the majority’s approach could enable ATF to classify semiautomatic AR-15 receivers as machinegun receivers under the NFA.
Justice Alito dissented on review-standard grounds. He challenged the Court’s use of the “facial challenge” test: “No set of circumstances” under which the rule is valid. He argued that respondents never conceded to that demanding standard.

Boundaries of the Gun Control Act

The GCA’s expansive definition of “firearm” in § 921(a)(3) unfolds in four parts:

A. “any weapon … which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile”; B. “the frame or receiver of any such weapon”; C. “any firearm muffler or firearm silencer”; D. “any destructive device.”

Congress omitted “readily … converted” from part (B), signaling that only items already fitting the ordinary meaning of “frame or receiver” qualify—unlike subsections (A), (C), and (D), which expressly reach incomplete or convertible devices. But interpretation must also heed § 923(i)’s serialization mandates for incomplete silencers and destructive devices, ATF’s consistent pre-rule practice of regulating certain unfinished frames/receivers, and ordinary principles of consistent usage across a single statutory scheme. The majority holds that these structural and historical cues authorize regulation of kits and partial components at the outer boundary of the GCA’s reach—while leaving for another day the precise line between regulated and unregulated items.

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In United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court zeroed in on a fine detail in bankruptcy law. Section 106(a) says you can sue the federal government in certain bankruptcy fights. But the justices made clear that waiver only applies to the federal claim created by the bankruptcy code. It does not reach the state-law claims that a trustee might borrow to build that case.

Summary of the Case

All Resort Group, a Utah‐based business, became insolvent after its shareholders diverted $145,000 of corporate funds to pay personal federal tax obligations. When the company filed bankruptcy, its trustee, David L. Miller, sued the United States under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b). Section 544(b) allows a trustee to avoid transfers “voidable under applicable law” — here, Utah’s fraudulent-transfer statute. The Government argued that sovereign immunity barred any state-law suit to invalidate federal tax payments. The Bankruptcy Court, District Court, and Tenth Circuit each held that § 106(a)’s waiver of sovereign immunity “with respect to” § 544 extended both to the federal § 544(b) cause of action and to the underlying Utah statutory elements, allowing the trustee’s claim to proceed.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Jackson, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, reversed. The Court explained that sovereign-immunity waivers are jurisdictional. They permit courts to hear suits against the United States but do not themselves create or expand substantive rights. Section 106(a)(1) therefore waives immunity only for the federal § 544(b) claim, not for nested state-law causes of action. Section 106(a)(5) unambiguously provides that nothing in § 106 “shall create any substantive claim for relief or cause of action not otherwise existing”. Moreover, § 544(b) expressly requires the trustee to identify an “actual creditor” capable of avoiding the transfer under external law—a requirement Congress omitted in § 544(a). Construing § 106(a) to obliterate that element would undermine decades of practice and run headlong into the canon that waivers of sovereign immunity must be construed narrowly.

Separate Opinions

There were no separate concurrences. The Court declined to decide an alternative theory pressed by the trustee—that an “actual creditor” under Utah law might have avoided the transfers by suing the individual shareholders rather than the United States—and remanded that question for further proceedings.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Gorsuch dissented. He argued that § 106(a)(1)’s unqualified waiver of sovereign immunity “with respect to” § 544 must permit trustees to bring any § 544(b) claim free from immunity defenses, including those to the state-law elements. Denying that remedy, in his view, conflates the defense of sovereign immunity with the merits of the underlying claim and departs from Congress’s intent to let trustees “step into the shoes” of creditors under “applicable law”.

Bankruptcy, State Governments and Immunity Claims

Section 544(b) empowers trustees to avoid transfers that unsecured creditors could void under external “applicable law,” typically state fraudulent-transfer statutes. That “actual-creditor” requirement aligns the trustee’s powers with those of private creditors and limits disruptive clawbacks. By contrast, § 544(a) allows avoidance without an actual-creditor prerequisite, reflecting a deliberate congressional design. Section 106(a) waives sovereign immunity jurisdictionally to permit avoidance actions against government-held tax liens under § 544(a) (where no actual creditor is needed) and § 544(b) suits against consenting state governments. It does not, however, alter § 544(b)’s substantive contours or negate state-law conditions for avoidance; a result compelled by the text, structure, and longstanding rule that immunity waivers must be construed narrowly.

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Wrestling with a subtle twist in federal law the high court rules on the question: Can failing to act still count as using physical force against someone?

In Delligatti v. United States, Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by six other justices, said yes. If you knowingly cause serious injury or death, even by omission, you “use” physical force under the law. So a crime like New York second-degree murder, which can happen by ignoring a legal duty, still counts as a crime of violence.

Summary of the Case

Salvatore Delligatti, a member of the Genovese crime family, was indicted for recruiting associates to murder a suspected informant and supplying them with a loaded revolver. The Government charged him under a law which imposes a mandatory consecutive five-year sentence for using or carrying a firearm “during and in relation to any crime of violence.” VICAR attempted murder was grounded in New York second-degree murder, defined as intentionally causing death. Delligatti moved to dismiss on the ground that second-degree murder, as defined in New York which can be committed by omission of a legal duty, does not “have as an element the use…of physical force” within the elements clause. The District Court denied the motion, and the Second Circuit affirmed, relying on United States v. Castleman to hold that intentional causation involves the use of physical force and thus qualifies as a crime of violence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari “to decide whether an individual who…causes bodily injury or death by failing to take action uses physical force within the meaning of the elements clause.”

Opinion of the Court

Justice Thomas, writing for a 7–2 majority, affirmed. Applying the categorical approach, the Court held that “the knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the ‘use of physical force’”. Relying on Castleman, the majority extended its two-step reasoning: (1) deliberate causation of bodily harm cannot occur without force, and (2) intentional application of force—direct or indirect—is a “use” of force. Although Castleman involved misdemeanor-level battery force and § 924(c) requires “violent force,” another case, Stokeling, established that any force sufficient to cause injury or death meets § 924(c)’s threshold. The Court then rejected Delligatti’s challenge that omissions lack “use” of force “against” another: ordinary usage permits one to “use” a preexisting force by inaction like if a parent were to with food, and “against the person” simply specifies the force’s conscious object. Finally, the historic meaning of “crime of violence,” encompassing causes-and-results offenses like murder by omission, confirmed that indictments for New York second-degree murder fall squarely within § 924(c).

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Jackson, dissented. They argued that the statute’s text—“use…of physical force against the person…of another”—contemplates only active, “violent” physical acts, not omissions. The dissent emphasized that “use” carries an active meaning, that omissions do not involve employing force, and that, contrary to the majority, a statutory definition must prevail over presumed legislative purpose or selective precedential readings.

Physical Force

Section 924(c) defines “crime of violence” through two clauses:
• Elements clause: a federal felony that “has as an element the use…of physical force against the person or property of another.”
• Residual clause: an offense that “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force…may be used.”

In Davis, the Court invalidated the residual clause for vagueness, leaving only the elements clause. Courts apply the categorical approach, comparing the statutory elements—not a defendant’s conduct—to § 924(c). Dispute centers on “use of physical force”: is it restricted to affirmative, violent acts, or does it encompass knowing causation by omission? The majority embraces a holistic reading—grounded in Castleman, Stokeling, and historical common-law definitions of violent offenses—while the dissent remains faithful to a text-first approach that sees “use” as necessarily active. This interpretive divide reflects broader tensions in criminal law between textual precision, ordinary meaning, and purposive alignment with “prototypical” violent crimes.

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When does a half‐truth cross the line into a punishable lie? That’s what the Supreme Court asked when it looked at a law banning “knowingly mak[ing] any false statement” on loan documents. The justices unanimously agreed that a statement can be misleading yet still be true, and the law only reaches statements that are actually false.

Because of that narrow reading, the Court sent the case back to the lower court to decide whether Thompson’s statements were outright lies or just clever ways to spin the facts.

Summary of the Case

Patrick Thompson borrowed three sums from Washington Federal Bank. $110,000 in 2011, $20,000 in 2013 and $89,000 in 2014 — totaling $219,000. When the bank failed in 2017, the FDIC, as receiver, sought repayment. During two debt-collection calls, Thompson disputed an invoice showing a $269,120.58 balance, telling FDIC contractors that he “had no idea where the 269 number comes from” and that he “borrowed . . . $110,000”. The Government indicted him under 18 U.S.C. § 1014 for “knowingly mak[ing] any false statement” to influence the FDIC’s handling of a loan. A jury convicted, and Thompson moved for acquittal, arguing his statements were literally true. He had in fact borrowed $110,000, albeit misleading by omitting subsequent borrowings. Both the District Court and the Seventh Circuit held that § 1014 also covers misleading statements, affirmed the convictions, and rejected the claim of literal truth. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether § 1014 reaches misleading but true statements.

Opinion of the Court

Chief Justice Roberts, for a unanimous Court, held that § 1014’s reference to “false statement[s]” does not encompass statements that are merely misleading. First, the statute’s text uses only the adjective “false,” which unambiguously means “not true,” and omits the word “misleading”. A misleading statement can be true, and a true statement is not false; “any false statement” does not expand the category to include all misleading statements. Second, context confirms this narrow reading: other federal criminal and regulatory provisions in Title 18 expressly prohibit “false or misleading” statements, so interpreting § 1014 to cover all misleading statements would render that language superfluous. Third, precedent is in accord: in United States v. Wells, the Court declined to graft a materiality requirement into § 1014 because Congress omitted it; similarly, Williams v. United States, held that a check cannot be a “false statement” at all. Kay v. United States does not aid the Government, as its references to “misleading” describe intent, not substantive scope. Finally, the Court recognized that context is relevant to determining whether a given statement is false, and remanded for the Seventh Circuit to assess whether a reasonable jury could find Thompson’s statements false in their factual setting.

Separate Opinions

Justice Alito concurred to emphasize five key takeaways: (1) § 1014 reaches only untrue statements; (2) “false” bears its ordinary meaning of “not true”; (3) falsity must be assessed in context; (4) overlap between “false” and “misleading” does not require reference to “misleading” in jury instructions; and (5) on remand, the Seventh Circuit should apply the Jackson v. Virginia sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard. Justice Jackson also concurred, noting that because the jury was correctly instructed to find only false statements, the Seventh Circuit should simply affirm the verdict if a rational factfinder could find falsity.

False Vs. Misleading

When Congress recodified the federal criminal statutes in 1948, it consolidated eleven predecessor provisions into § 1014—all penalizing “false statements” without mentioning “misleading.” By contrast, contemporaneous statutes that targeted misleading or deceptive conduct patently used the phrase “false or misleading”. The omission of “misleading” in § 1014 is thus deliberate, not inadvertent. Further, adding “any” before “false statement” broadens only within the class of untrue statements, not to encompass true but misleading assertions. Precedents like Wells, declining to import materiality, and Williams, limiting § 1014 to assertions analyzable as true or false, reinforce that § 1014’s ambit is confined to statements that can legitimately be called false. Although contextual nuance informs whether particular words are untrue, the statute itself turns solely on falsity, not misleadingness.

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The heart of this case is a fine difference in how a veteran’s disability claim gets reviewed. When the Department of Veterans Affairs decides that evidence for a service-related injury is in “approximate balance,” that call is treated as mostly a factual finding. The Supreme Court said appeals courts must give deference to that factual decision; checking only for clear mistakes while still reviewing any legal questions from scratch. Petitioners had argued for a full, fresh look at all the evidence, but the Court rejected that. In practical terms, the VA’s tie-breaking “benefit-of-the-doubt” rule stands unless a court can point to a clear error.

Summary of the Case

Veterans Joshua Bufkin and Norman Thornton appealed adverse VA determinations of their service-connected PTSD claims. Bufkin, discharged for hardship, sought VA benefits for PTSD allegedly caused by marital distress in service; the VA denied service connection after three conflicting medical examinations. Thornton, already rated for PTSD and unemployability, sought an increase in his PTSD disability rating; the VA declined to impose more severe symptom findings. Both veterans petitioned the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, which applied the “benefit-of-the-doubt” rule and found that neither record was in “approximate balance,” so neither veteran prevailed. The Veterans Court affirmed applying a “[t]aking due account” standard. The Federal Circuit rejected arguments that “take due account” requires full de novo review of approximate-balance determinations. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the scope of the subsection defining "taking due account."

Opinion of the Court

Justice Thomas, writing for a seven-justice majority, held that "taking due account" simply directs the Veterans Court to apply established standards of review. Standards include de novo for legal issues and clear-error for factual issues, to the VA’s benefit-of-the-doubt determinations. The Court parsed the statute's language to “take due account” as an instruction to “give appropriate attention” to the VA’s work “in making the determinations under subsection (a).” Because the “approximate balance” inquiry comprises two steps—(1) assigning weight to individual pieces of evidence (a factual finding) and (2) determining whether the record as a whole meets the “approximate balance” legal standard—it is at most a mixed question. And where a question is predominantly factual, clear-error review is appropriate. The Court rejected analogies to constitutional probable-cause review or criminal sufficiency challenges, which pose principally legal questions warranting de novo review, and found this matter to have considered the essential information.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Gorsuch, dissented. She argued that § 7261(b)(1) was intended to counteract the Veterans Court’s historically deferential handling of benefit-of-the-doubt issues and to require independent, nondeferential review of those determinations. According to the dissent, deciding whether evidence is in “approximate balance” poses a mixed question of law and fact analogous to probable-cause or sufficiency inquiries and thus demands de novo review. She viewed the majority’s reading as rendering subsection (b)(1) superfluous and at odds with Congress’s amendment.

Nuance of the Law

At issue is the interplay among (1) the VA’s statutory “benefit-of-the-doubt” rule, which entitles a veteran to favorable resolution when record evidence is in “approximate balance”; (2) the Veterans Court’s basic review standards; and (3) § 7261(b)(1), which commands the Veterans Court to “take due account” of the VA’s application of § 5107(b). The Court’s holding delineates that challenges to the VA’s benefit-of-the-doubt determinations must be reviewed under the same standards used for other issues under § 7261(a): factual weight assignments are reviewed for clear error, whereas purely legal questions remain subject to de novo review. This preserves Congress’s pro-veteran policy by ensuring that Veterans Courts give due attention to the VA’s benefit-of-the-doubt work without upending the established standard-of-review framework.

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Here’s a case that turns on a small but important twist in the way we protect our waterways. In City and County of San Francisco v. Environmental Protection Agency, the Supreme Court took up the question of whether the EPA can issue pollution permits that simply say, “Make sure the river stays clean,” without spelling out exactly what steps a company must take. The Court said no. Under the Clean Water Act, the EPA has to give clear, step-by-step limits on how much of a pollutant can go into the water. It can’t leave a business guessing or hold it liable only when water quality slips.

Summary of the Case

In 2019, EPA renewed San Francisco’s NPDES permit for its Oceanside combined-sewer overflow facility and, for the first time, included two “receiving-water limitations.” One provision barred any discharge that “contribute[s] to a violation of any applicable water quality standard,” and the other prohibited discharges that “create pollution, contamination, or nuisance” under California law. San Francisco petitioned for review in the Ninth Circuit, arguing that Clean Water Act does not authorize these “end-result” requirements—conditions that hold permittees liable for the quality of the receiving waters rather than prescribing specific practices or numeric effluent limits. The Ninth Circuit upheld EPA, construing the legal authorization of “any more stringent limitation . . . necessary to meet or implement any applicable water quality standard” to encompass end-result provisions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether EPA may condition permit compliance on receiving-water quality.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Alito delivered a unanimous opinion reversing the Ninth Circuit. The Court held that current law does not authorize “end-result” requirements in NPDES permits. Its analysis rested on three pillars:
1. Text and structure. Subsections (A) and (B) of § 1311(b)(1) refer expressly to “effluent limitations”which are numeric or definitional caps on discharges. Whereas subsection (C) authorizes only “any more stringent limitation” that is “necessary to meet” or “required to implement” water quality standards. The ordinary meaning of “limitation,” and the verbs “meet” and “implement,” point to specific, externally imposed restrictions on quantities, practices, or methods, not open-ended liability for end results.
2. Statutory history. Congress deliberately abandoned the pre-1972 enforcement model, suing polluters after water bodies failed to meet quality standards, in favor of a forward-looking permit regime. Allowing EPA to reintroduce abatement-style, receiving-water requirements would contravene that design.
3. Permitting scheme. End-result provisions undermine the CWA’s “permit shield”, which protects permittees who adhere to all permit terms, and they offer no mechanism for allocating responsibility when multiple dischargers contribute to a water quality violation. EPA has ample alternative tools including numeric and narrative effluent limitations, best-management practices, information-gathering authority and emergency powers to safeguard water quality.
Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Barrett filed a partial dissent, joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. While she agreed with the majority that EPA laws are not confined to numeric effluent limitations, she disputed the Court’s restrictive interpretation of what counts as a “limitation.” Barrett argued that prohibitions on discharges that violate water quality standards are “limitations” in ordinary and statutory usage. She maintained that any concerns about vagueness or multiple polluters can be addressed through arbitrary-and-capricious review or by EPA crafting clearer permit terms, and she would have affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s broader reading of the law in question.

Dual Structures of Authority

The CWA’s NPDES program rests on carefully calibrated statutory language. Section 1311(b)(1) draws a distinction between technology-based “effluent limitations” which cap pollutant quantities, rates or concentrations and the broader authority in (C) to impose “any more stringent limitation” needed “to meet” or “implement” state or federal water quality standards. By omitting the word “effluent” before “limitation” in (C), Congress signaled that EPA may employ non-numeric measures—best-management practices, narrative restrictions, or other operational controls—to achieve water quality goals. At the same time, the 1972 amendments discarded the WPCA’s retrospective abatement actions in favor of a proactive permit regime and enshrined a “permit shield” to insulate compliant permittees from liability. This dual structure empowers EPA to balance uniform technology floors with site-specific water quality objectives, requiring clear, enforceable permit terms while respecting state standards. Where ambiguity or attribution issues arise—such as multiple dischargers—EPA and the courts can resolve them through regulatory guidance or judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.