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In a case that tests the fine line between a school’s curriculum choices and a family’s religious beliefs, the Supreme Court has stepped in on behalf of parents in Montgomery County, Maryland. At issue is a policy that added LGBTQ+-inclusive storybooks to elementary classrooms without telling parents or letting them opt out.

The justices said that forcing these lessons on students without notice steps on parents’ rights to guide their children’s faith and values. By granting a preliminary injunction, the Court put the Board on pause: schools must now alert families ahead of time and honor opt-out requests while the case moves forward.

This decision doesn’t decide the whole fight yet, but it shifts the power back toward parents for now. Stay tuned after the break to hear what comes next—and what it could mean for classrooms across the country.

Summary of the Case

During the 2022–23 school year, the Montgomery County (MD) Board of Education introduced five "LGBTQ+-inclusive" storybooks into its K–5 English curriculum. These books feature narratives of same-sex marriage, gender transition, and LGBTQ characters (e.g., Prince & Knight; Uncle Bobby's Wedding; Born Ready; Intersection Allies; Love, Violet). Parents from diverse religious backgrounds initially were allowed to opt their children out of lessons using the books. In March 2023, the Board rescinded that opt-out policy, citing administrative disruption and potential stigma for LGBTQ students. A group of parents and an associational plaintiff sued in federal court, arguing that withholding opt outs and mandating use of the books substantially interfered with their right to direct their children's religious upbringing under the Free Exercise Clause. They sought a preliminary injunction to restore advance notice and opt-out rights. The district court and Fourth Circuit denied relief, treating the Wisconsin v. Yoder case as unique and concluding that mere exposure to ideologically objectionable material doesn't coerce students to abandon parental religious teachings. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve whether the Board's "no-opt-out" policy unconstitutionally burdens parents' free exercise rights.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Alito, writing for a 6-3 majority (Roberts, Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett), reversed the lower courts. The Court held that parents possess a fundamental right to direct the religious upbringing of their children, which the Free Exercise Clause protects in both public and private school contexts. Under previous Supreme Court precedent, policies that "substantially interfere" with parental religious instruction or place children in an environment "hostile" to their faith and exert a "pressure to conform" trigger strict scrutiny even if facially neutral. Here, the Board's curricular mandate and denial of opt outs force parents to choose between public schooling and their religious convictions. The challenged storybooks present a normative viewpoint on same-sex marriage and gender that directly conflicts with petitioners' sincerely held beliefs and are taught in a manner fostering classroom discussion in which students who disagree may be labeled "hurtful." The Board's asserted interests—preserving classroom continuity and protecting LGBTQ students from isolation—are undermined by district policies allowing opt outs from other discrete units and extensive parallel programming for special-needs and emergent-English learners. The Board's policy is not narrowly tailored to a compelling interest. Because withholding opt outs imposes an irreparable burden on religious exercise, a preliminary injunction reinstating advance notice and opt-out rights pending full adjudication is warranted.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas concurred. He agreed that the Board's policy fails strict scrutiny but would ground the analysis in historical tradition: he argued that courts should identify whether public schooling historically included mandated instruction on the challenged subjects. Thomas would interpret Wisconsin v. Yoder to require a history-and-tradition inquiry and faulted Montgomery County for lacking any longstanding practice of teaching LGBTQ themes in early grades.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, dissented. She emphasized that "mere exposure" to ideas incongruent with parental faith does not amount to coercion or compulsion prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause. The dissent argued that the Board's curriculum and related teacher guidance were aimed at fostering mutual respect and inclusion, not at indoctrinating students or forcing them to reject parental teachings. She warned that the majority's unbounded "threat" test would saddle public schools with unworkable advance-notice and opt-out obligations for any curricular content potentially "contrary" to parents' religious views, risk persistent classroom disruption, and prompt self-censorship of public-school curricula, undermining the schools' role as "the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny."

When Does School Curriculum Cross the Line into Religious Coercion?

The key question under the Free Exercise Clause is whether government action "coerces" an individual to violate or abandon religious beliefs, not simply whether it exposes students to objectionable ideas. Under precedent, neutral, generally applicable policies that impose only incidental burdens on religious exercise survive unless they impose a substantial interference with the religious upbringing of children. When such a burden arises, strict scrutiny applies regardless of neutrality. To pass that test, the government must show its policy advances "interests of the highest order" and is narrowly tailored. Here, the Court found that the Board's no-opt-out rule, combined with the normative messaging and teacher guidance in the "LGBTQ+-inclusive" storybooks, posed a "very real threat" to parents' right to direct their children's religious development, and that the Board's asserted interests were not compellingly served by a blanket ban on religious opt outs. The decision reinforces the delicate balance between respecting parental religious liberty and ensuring an open, pluralistic public-education environment.

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Ruben Gutierrez wanted to test DNA evidence in his case after his conviction, but Texas law put up a high wall. The state said you have to prove you’re innocent before you can even ask for new DNA testing. That rule wasn’t about whether the test would show who did it, but about who gets to make the request in the first place.

Gutierrez claimed that keeping him from asking for DNA testing without first clearing himself was unfair and broke his right to due process. He sued in federal court under a law known as Section 1983, which lets people challenge government actions that violate their rights. At first, a lower court said he couldn’t bring the case because fixing the rule wouldn’t change anything for him.

But the Supreme Court disagreed. Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinion said Gutierrez does have the right to challenge that barrier in federal court. A declaration from a judge could wipe out the rule that stopped him, giving him the chance to get the testing he’s been denied.

Summary of the Case

In 1998, Texas prosecuted Ruben Gutierrez for capital murder in the stabbing death of Escolastica Harrison in her mobile home. The State's case relied on testimony that Gutierrez used one of two screwdrivers in the killing and on his own statements admitting participation in a planned robbery. A jury convicted and sentenced him to death. Over the next 15 years, Gutierrez twice sought post-conviction DNA testing under Texas law, arguing that favorable results would prove he was never in the trailer. Texas courts denied his requests, ruling that the state's DNA testing law applies only to challenges to convictions, not to death-eligibility, and that even favorable DNA wouldn't prove his innocence in the robbery-murder. Gutierrez then sued Cameron County District Attorney Luis Saenz under federal civil rights law, claiming that Texas's DNA-testing scheme denied him due process. The district court granted a declaratory judgment in his favor, but the Fifth Circuit vacated it, holding Gutierrez lacked legal standing to bring the case.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Sotomayor's opinion (joined by Roberts, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson) reversed the Fifth Circuit. The Court reaffirmed that state-convicted prisoners have a liberty interest in post-conviction proceedings and that federal civil rights law can address state law barriers to those procedures. Following recent precedent, the Court explained that a federal declaration that Texas's DNA testing law violates due process "would eliminate the state prosecutor's justification for denying DNA testing," thereby removing the obstacle to testing. The Court emphasized that standing analysis should focus on the complaint's challenge, not the district court's ultimate remedy. Therefore, dismissal for lack of standing was erroneous.

Separate Opinions

Justice Barrett concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, agreeing that recent precedent governs and that the Fifth Circuit misapplied it. However, she cautioned against extending standing analysis by analogy to administrative-law precedents, warning that such analogies might weaken standing doctrine.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Thomas dissented, joined by Justice Gorsuch, arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects only natural liberty—freedom from physical restraint—and not state-created entitlements to post-conviction procedures. Justice Alito also dissented, joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, applying a stricter redressability test: Texas courts have already determined that even favorable DNA would not negate Gutierrez's culpability or death-eligibility, and a declaratory judgment would not substantially increase the likelihood of testing.

How Texas Law Limits Post-Conviction DNA Testing Rights

Texas law allows post-conviction DNA testing only if the person requesting it can show that the evidence still exists in a testable condition, that identity was at issue during the trial, and that favorable results would probably have prevented conviction, without causing unreasonable delay. Texas courts have interpreted this framework narrowly, refusing to allow testing aimed solely at challenging death sentence eligibility—denying relief unless the person can also establish innocence of the underlying crime. The courts also limit review of new evidence in testing motions to the trial record's factual findings. This approach reflects Texas's legislative choice to reserve DNA testing primarily for challenges to wrongful convictions, rather than to reduce capital sentences for those who participated in the crime but may not have been the actual killer.

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The Supreme Court took a close look at a part of Medicaid that says patients can see any approved doctor. But the justices said that nothing in the law clearly lets individual patients sue state officials if they don’t follow that rule.

Instead, the court reminded us that Medicaid works like a deal: states get federal money, and if they break the rules, the government can pull funding. That means people on Medicaid can’t bring private lawsuits when states limit which doctors they can see.

Justice Gorsuch wrote for a six-justice majority. They sent the case back to lower courts to figure out what comes next. Meanwhile, three justices, led by Justice Jackson, said they’d let patients have their day in court.

Summary of the Case

In July 2018, South Carolina excluded Planned Parenthood South Atlantic (PPSAT) from its Medicaid program, citing a state ban on public funding for facilities that perform abortions. PPSAT and patient Julie Edwards sued state health officials, alleging that the State's action violated the Medicaid Act's "free-choice-of-provider" mandate, which requires that Medicaid beneficiaries "may obtain" services "from any qualified" provider. The district court ruled in favor of PPSAT, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. After a subsequent Supreme Court decision in a related case, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed its judgment. The Supreme Court then considered whether the Medicaid provision clearly gives individuals an enforceable right to choose their providers.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Gorsuch, writing for a six-justice majority, held that the Medicaid provision does not clearly and unambiguously give individuals rights they can enforce through lawsuits. The Court emphasized that programs like Medicaid function like contracts between the federal government and states. When states don't comply with requirements, the typical remedy is cutting off federal funding, not individual lawsuits.

The Court found that the Medicaid provision is written as a requirement for state plans addressing overall compliance, not as language creating individual rights. Additionally, since states maintain control over provider qualifications, this undermines the interpretation that individuals have an absolute right to choose any provider. The Court concluded that funding termination, administrative appeals, and state judicial review remain the principal enforcement mechanisms, not individual lawsuits.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas agreed with the majority but wrote separately to question the Court's broader approach to these types of cases. He argued that spending programs like Medicaid, which operate as contracts between the federal government and states, fundamentally cannot create individual rights that people can enforce through lawsuits. He also suggested that the Court should reconsider its entire framework for determining when individuals can sue to enforce rights under federal programs.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, dissented. She argued that the Medicaid provision clearly gives beneficiaries a right to choose their providers for three main reasons: (1) its text focuses on individuals—"any individual may obtain from any qualified provider"; (2) it uses mandatory language under a heading about "Free Choice by Individuals"; and (3) Congress knew how to create private enforcement rights and did so here. Jackson also pointed to previous Court decisions that described the provision as conferring a "right" and to later amendments that she believed confirmed Congress's intent to create enforceable rights.

Can Medicaid Patients Sue When States Limit Their Provider Choices?

The case hinges on how courts should interpret laws passed under Congress's spending power. Medicaid operates as a partnership: states receive federal funds if they follow certain rules, including the requirement that patients can choose any qualified provider. The majority viewed this as primarily a deal between governments, with the federal government's ability to withhold funding as the main enforcement mechanism.

For a provision to create rights that individuals can enforce through lawsuits, the Court requires "clear and unambiguous" evidence that Congress intended this result. The majority found that the Medicaid provision lacks the explicit "rights-creating language" found in other laws where Congress clearly intended to create individual rights. Instead, it appears in a list of requirements for state plans and focuses on state duties rather than individual entitlements.

The majority also emphasized that states maintain control over determining which providers are "qualified," which they saw as incompatible with an absolute individual right. They concluded that Congress intended enforcement through funding termination, administrative reviews, and state courts—not through individual lawsuits in federal court.

The dissent countered that the provision's focus on what "any individual may obtain" clearly creates individual rights, especially when compared to other provisions where Congress has recognized similar rights.

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The Supreme Court took up a subtle question about who gets the benefit of newer, lighter penalties under a law called the First Step Act. The question wasn’t a big headline grabber—it was about whether a prison term counts as “imposed” if a judge later wiped it away. The justices said that if a sentence is vacated—meaning it’s erased—it’s treated like it never happened. That little detail means anyone who had an old sentence thrown out and needs to be resentenced now gets the chance to avoid harsh “stacked” minimums that used to hit first-time gun offenders with decades behind bars.

Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, noted that this reading lets people who went back to court after the law changed get the newer rules. Four other justices joined her opinion, while three judges on the other side—led by Justice Alito—disagreed.

Summary of the Case

In 2009, Tony Hewitt, Corey Duffey, and Jarvis Ross were convicted of bank robbery and related firearm charges in Texas. Under the mandatory "stacking" rules at that time, they received extraordinarily harsh sentences exceeding 325 years. After some convictions were vacated on appeal, they were resentenced in 2012 to 285-305 years.

Following a 2019 Supreme Court decision that invalidated part of the law's definition of "crime of violence," the defendants successfully challenged additional firearm convictions. The district court vacated all their firearm convictions and ordered new sentencing hearings.

At these hearings, they argued that the First Step Act of 2018, which reduced mandatory minimums for firearm offenses, should apply to them because their previous sentences had been vacated. The Act made these reduced penalties retroactive "if a sentence... has not been imposed" as of December 21, 2018. Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit disagreed, ruling they were ineligible because they had been sentenced before the Act's effective date. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve this issue.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Jackson delivered the Court's opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch. The Court held that under the First Step Act, a sentence "has... been imposed" only as long as it remains in effect. Once a sentence is vacated, it is legally void and no longer "imposed" for purposes of retroactivity.

The Court's analysis focused on Congress's choice of the present-perfect tense ("has been imposed") rather than simple past tense, which indicates continuing legal effect. Established legal principles confirm that vacating a sentence nullifies its ongoing operation, placing a defendant in the position of someone who was never sentenced.

Accordingly, the defendants whose pre-Act sentences were vacated must be treated as if "no sentence... has been imposed" as of the First Step Act's enactment and should be resentenced under the Act's more lenient 5-year mandatory minimum. The Court reversed the lower court's judgment and remanded the case.

Separate Opinions

Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, also wrote additional sections reviewing the political and legislative context: widespread judicial criticism of the harsh "stacking" penalties, the Sentencing Commission's calls for reform, and Congress's compromise in granting limited retroactivity. These sections highlighted the statute's objectives—balancing finality with ending excessive sentences—but didn't add new legal reasoning to the binding textual holding.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Alito, joined by Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, dissented. He interpreted the phrase "a sentence... has... been imposed as of [enactment]" to refer simply to the historical fact that a defendant was sentenced before December 21, 2018, regardless of later vacatur.

Alito argued that "imposed" refers to the court's pronouncement of judgment, and "a sentence" is indefinite—meaning any sentence at all—and need not be presently valid. He rejected the majority's "vacatur" rule, noting that neither common law nor precedents treat vacated sentences as never having occurred. He would have held the defendants ineligible for relief because each had been sentenced before the Act's effective date.

How the First Step Act's Retroactivity Provision Applies to Vacated Sentences

The key legal question centered on Section 403(b) of the First Step Act, which states that reduced mandatory minimums apply to pre-enactment offenses "if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date."

The majority emphasized Congress's deliberate choice of the present-perfect tense ("has been imposed")—unlike nearby provisions using simple past tense—signaling that only sentences still in force on December 21, 2018, would prevent retroactivity. This interpretation aligns with established legal principles: a vacated sentence is legally void and has no continuing effect, treating the defendant as if never sentenced.

By limiting retroactivity to those without valid sentences on the Act's effective date, Congress balanced the general presumption against retroactivity, the interest in finality of judgments, and the bipartisan goal of ending disproportionate "stacking" of firearm sentences that had resulted in extreme prison terms.

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Here’s a case that turns on a fine detail in immigration law. The justices decided that when the Board of Immigration Appeals says no to delaying someone’s deportation, that decision isn’t treated as a final removal order you can challenge right away.

The Court also clarified that the 30-day window to ask a court to review a removal decision is a processing deadline, not a hard limit that bars the court’s power if you miss it. In other words, missing that deadline doesn’t automatically shut the door on your review.

Because of these points, the Supreme Court wiped out the Fourth Circuit’s dismissal of Riley’s petition for review and sent the case back for another look.

Summary of the Case

Pierre Riley, a Jamaican national, entered the United States in 1995 on a tourist visa, overstayed, and later pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute marijuana and related firearms charges—convictions qualifying as aggravated felonies. Upon his release from prison in January 2021, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated expedited removal, issuing on January 26, 2021, a Final Administrative Removal Order (FARO) finding Riley deportable and ordering removal to Jamaica.

Riley didn't contest his deportability but sought relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming that a Jamaican drug kingpin—backed by corrupt officials—posed a credible threat to his life. An Immigration Judge found Riley credible and granted him protection under CAT; however, DHS appealed, and on May 31, 2022, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) vacated the Immigration Judge's decision and reinstated the removal order.

Riley filed a petition for review in the Fourth Circuit three days after the BIA's decision. That court dismissed his case, reasoning that (1) the FARO was the "final order of removal" and the 30-day deadline to appeal it had expired in February 2021; and (2) this 30-day filing deadline was jurisdictional, meaning the court had no power to hear the case.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Alito, writing for a 5–4 Court, reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision. First, the Court held that only an order determining that someone is deportable or ordering deportation may constitute a "final order of removal." The FARO of January 26, 2021, was that order. A CAT protection order is not a removal order because it neither finds deportability nor commands deportation; it "does not affect the validity" of a prior removal order. Because Riley didn't file his petition within 30 days of the FARO, he missed the deadline relative to that final order.

Second, the Court held that the 30-day filing requirement is a claims-processing rule—not a jurisdictional prerequisite. Without a "clear" statement from Congress, time limits "telling aliens what to do to obtain judicial review" don't limit a court's power to hear a case. The relevant law lacks any reference to a court's "power," and its placement amid non-jurisdictional provisions shows that it governs only litigant conduct. Because the Government didn't seek dismissal on this ground, Riley's petition may proceed on remand.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment but noted that Riley's petition challenged only the BIA's CAT order, not the FARO, and that an order denying CAT relief is reviewable "only as part of the review of a final order of removal." He urged the Fourth Circuit on remand to confirm it has jurisdiction to review a CAT order when there's no petition against the removal order itself.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson (and Justice Gorsuch except for one part), dissented in part. Although she agreed that the 30-day deadline is non-jurisdictional, she would hold that a removal order doesn't become "final" for purposes of appeal until the conclusion of all related proceedings, including CAT review.

She argued that Congress's instruction to pursue CAT claims "as part of the review of a final order of removal" and the longstanding "policy against piecemeal litigation" require tying appellate finality to the BIA's disposition of the withholding claim, not to the initial FARO. Requiring immigrants to appeal removal orders before CAT relief is denied would spawn meritless "protective appeals" and conflict with precedent under other laws, she warned.

When Immigration Appeals Become Final: The Supreme Court's Interpretation of Removal Orders

Congress designed modern immigration removal provisions to "streamline judicial review" by channeling all "questions of law or fact arising from any action taken to remove an alien" into a single court of appeals petition. Under the law, that petition "must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal."

An "order of removal" is defined as one "concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation." CAT orders—which grant or deny protection from removal to a particular country—differ from removal orders: they don't determine deportability and don't "affect the validity" of a removal order, so they can't themselves be considered final removal orders.

In expedited removal cases like Riley's, the removal order becomes "final" as soon as it's issued, because there's no further opportunity for agency review. The majority treats the 30-day deadline as reflecting only the immigrant's obligation to file within 30 days of the removal order—not limiting a court's power to hear the case.

By contrast, the dissent would align finality for appeal with the policy against piecemeal litigation—and with the requirement that CAT relief be reviewed "as part of the review of a final order of removal"—so that no petition would be due until both removal and protection claims have been fully decided.

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When does sending legal papers by email count as proper notice? The Supreme Court has now answered that in the Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization case. A family in Washington, D.C., sued the PLO over the tragic death of a loved one in a terror attack. They tried handing the complaint to the PLO’s U.S. office but came up empty. So the judge said, “Okay, you can mail it and even email it to their New York representative.” The PLO argued that wasn’t a real way to serve papers, but the Supreme Court disagreed. It said that under the law governing suits against foreign entities, courts can allow these alternate methods when personal service isn’t possible.

This ruling sends the case back to lower court and means the family’s lawsuit can move forward. It also sheds light on how judges balance the right to fair notice against victims’ need for access to justice.

Summary of the Case

American citizens (and their estates) who were injured or killed in terrorist attacks abroad sued the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990. After winning jury verdicts worth over $650 million in one case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals overturned these victories, ruling that US courts lacked personal jurisdiction over these organizations because their alleged support for terrorism occurred overseas and didn't create sufficient connection to the United States.

In response, Congress passed the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019 (PSJVTA). This law specifically names the PA and PLO and establishes that they are considered to have consented to US court jurisdiction in terrorism cases if they either: (1) pay salaries or death benefits to convicted terrorists or their families, or (2) maintain any offices, facilities, or conduct any activities in the United States.

Lower courts found this law unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, but the Supreme Court has now reversed that decision.

Opinion of the Court

Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court in judgment, made three key rulings:

First, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause (which applies to federal power) doesn't incorporate the same "minimum contacts" test used for state courts under the Fourteenth Amendment. This is because the Fourteenth Amendment concerns relationships between states, while the Fifth Amendment deals with federal authority, which can extend beyond US borders.

Second, Congress acted within its constitutional authority when creating the PSJVTA, which links jurisdiction over the PLO and PA to conduct that meaningfully relates to the United States and involves critical foreign policy decisions made by the political branches of government.

Third, even if applying a "reasonableness" standard from Fourteenth Amendment cases, the PSJVTA easily passes constitutional muster. The Court noted the strong interest of American victims in having a US forum, the nation's compelling interest in fighting terrorism, and the absence of any unfair burden on the defendants.

The Court reversed the lower court's decision and sent the cases back for further proceedings.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas (joined partly by Justice Gorsuch) agreed with the outcome but offered different reasoning. He argued that the Fifth Amendment, as originally understood, places no territorial limit on Congress's power to extend federal jurisdiction. In his view, the Due Process Clause never imposed substantive restrictions on extraterritorial federal jurisdiction in the first place.

How Congress Tailored the Law to Combat Terrorism Financing

The PSJVTA carefully amends the Anti-Terrorism Act's jurisdictional rules in two specific ways.

First, it targets "incentive" programs like salaries paid to terrorists serving prison terms in Israel and benefits paid to families of terrorists killed while carrying out attacks. Congress had previously condemned these payments in the Taylor Force Act.

Second, the law subjects the PLO and PA to US court jurisdiction if they maintain any offices, facilities, or physical presence in the United States. This provision builds on existing restrictions on PLO/PA operations on American soil.

Importantly, the law applies only to terrorism claims and specifically excludes the Palestinian mission to the United Nations. Unlike broader jurisdictional provisions, Congress crafted the PSJVTA to target two specific non-sovereign organizations already involved in US counter-terrorism policy. The law gives clear notice that continuing these specific activities will be treated as consent to being sued in American courts.

The statute reflects a careful legislative balance between deterring support for terrorism, respecting diplomatic and foreign policy concerns, and ensuring fairness to defendants who have known connections to the United States.

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The Court’s decision turns on the idea that rules must be applied evenly. In this case, the city had a rule that street performers needed a permit. But it turned out that some acts got fast-tracked permits while others were put on a waiting list. The Supreme Court said that kind of unequal treatment raises a red flag under the Constitution’s equal protection guarantee.

Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, explained that the government cannot pick and choose who it favors without a good reason. If your dance team waits months for a permit while someone else walks right up and gets theirs in days, that’s not fair or lawful. The Court sent the case back to a lower court to make sure the city fixes its process and treats every performer the same way.

Summary of the Case

In 1999 Karyn Stanley began serving as a firefighter for the City of Sanford, Florida, under a policy that funded retiree health insurance through age sixty-five for both 25-year career retirees and those retiring early on disability. In 2003 the City revised its plan to preserve the age-65 subsidy only for 25-year retirees, limiting disability retirees to 24 months of coverage. Stanley, forced to retire on disability in 2018, sued under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging that this disparate treatment violated the law. The district court dismissed her ADA claim because it held that the law only protects "qualified individuals"—those who hold or seek employment—and Stanley was neither once she had retired. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve disagreement among circuit courts over whether Title I's protections extend to retirees who no longer hold or desire a job.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Gorsuch, writing for the Court, concluded that Title I prohibits discrimination only against a "qualified individual"—someone who "holds or desires" an employment position and "can perform the essential functions of the employment position with or without reasonable accommodation." The use of present-tense verbs and the statute's examples of "reasonable accommodation" (like job restructuring and facility modifications) all presume an ongoing employment relationship. By contrast, a retiree who no longer holds or seeks a job is not a "qualified individual" and thus cannot sue for discrimination in post-employment benefits. Gorsuch rejected Stanley's arguments, emphasizing that Congress could amend Title I if it wished to extend protection to retirees. Because Stanley fell outside the law's coverage, the Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's judgment.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Barrett, concurred in part and in the judgment. He stressed that the Court should not have entertained, at the merits stage, Stanley's alternative theory—namely, that she suffered discriminatory treatment while still employed—which the Eleventh Circuit deemed forfeited. He urged deference to lower-court rules about which arguments can be considered preserved and the Court's own practice of reviewing only the questions presented.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor for most of her opinion, dissented. She argued that Title I plainly forbids disability discrimination "in regard to employee compensation," and that retirement benefits are deferred compensation earned on the job. A unilateral reduction in those benefits, targeted at disability retirees, thus "discriminates against a qualified individual" who earned them while employed. Jackson would read the qualified-individual definition contextually—rather than as a rigid temporal bar—so as to cover post-employment actions affecting benefits that were earned in an employment relationship.

Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joining Justice Jackson's view that Title I reaches discriminatory changes to retiree health insurance earned on the job.

When ADA Protection Ends: The Debate Over Retiree Rights

The heart of this case revolves around when ADA protection stops. The law prohibits employers from discriminating "against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to compensation," and defines "qualified individual" as one "who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires."

The majority reads the statute's present-tense verbs ("holds," "desires," "can perform") and its examples of accommodation (job restructuring, modifying facilities, adjusting training materials) as inherently directed to current employees or applicants, not to retirees who hold no position. Thus, the majority concludes, the ADA does not protect against discrimination in post-retirement benefits.

In dissent, Justices Jackson and Sotomayor emphasize that retirement benefits are "deferred compensation" for service already rendered. They argue that reducing those benefits specifically for disability retirees inherently "discriminates against a qualified individual," contending that nothing in the law signals an intent to withdraw ADA protection the moment one leaves the workforce.

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The heart of this decision turns on a fine line in federal drug rules—does simply handing out samples count as selling drugs to a non-patient? A group of chiropractors, who received free medicine samples to give directly to their patients, said “no.” The FDA’s rule says drug distributors must register and meet certain safety steps if they sell to anyone other than the patient. But these clinics never bought or sold the drugs at all. They only received samples from drug companies.

In a majority opinion, the Court agreed with the chiropractors. It said the rule only applies when someone actually sells or transfers ownership of a drug, not when a doctor or therapist simply dispenses samples for treatment. That means these clinics don’t have to jump through the FDA’s distributor requirements just because they hand out free samples to help patients.

Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, pointed out that interpreting “distribution” to cover free samples stretches the rule past its plain meaning. In other words, the FDA can’t treat every free hand-off as a wholesale sale. Justice Sotomayor joined the outcome but raised a note of caution about how far courts should read agency rules in general.

The Court’s decision draws a clearer boundary around federal oversight. Health providers who pass along complimentary samples can breathe easier, at least for now. Stick around—you’ll want to hear more about what this means for clinics, pharmacists, and the FDA’s power over drug flows.

Summary of the Case

In 2014, McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates sued McKesson Corporation in California federal court, claiming McKesson violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by sending unsolicited fax advertisements without the required opt-out notices. These faxes were sent to both traditional fax machines and online fax services. McLaughlin sought $500 in damages for each fax (the minimum under the TCPA) and asked the court to certify a class action for all recipients. The court initially certified the class without distinguishing between how recipients received the faxes.

While the lawsuit was ongoing, the FCC issued the Amerifactors ruling, which determined that online fax services don't qualify as "telephone facsimile machines" under the TCPA. Following Ninth Circuit precedent, the trial court considered this FCC ruling binding, granted partial summary judgment to McKesson for the online-fax claims, decertified the class, and limited recovery to just 12 traditional faxes. The Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision. The Supreme Court then agreed to hear the case to determine whether lower courts in enforcement proceedings can challenge an agency's legal interpretation.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Kavanaugh, writing for a six-justice majority, held that the Hobbs Act does not prevent district courts from independently interpreting statutes in enforcement proceedings. The Court established a "default rule": when a law is silent about whether courts can review agency interpretations during enforcement proceedings, district courts may decide for themselves if an agency's interpretation is correct, while giving "appropriate respect" to the agency's view.

The Court identified three types of pre-enforcement review statutes: 1. Those explicitly preventing review during enforcement proceedings 2. Those explicitly allowing both pre-enforcement and enforcement review 3. Those silent on enforcement-proceeding review, like the Hobbs Act

The majority determined that the Hobbs Act's "exclusive jurisdiction" language only governs pre-enforcement challenges seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, not enforcement proceedings where courts determine liability under a statute's correct interpretation.

The Court distinguished this case from earlier precedents and rejected policy arguments about potential circuit splits, emphasizing that statutory text and traditional administrative law principles must prevail. The judgment was reversed and sent back for further proceedings.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, dissented. She interpreted the Hobbs Act's grant of "exclusive jurisdiction" to appeals courts to "determine the validity" of FCC orders as preventing district courts from later challenging those orders' validity. She argued that the majority's new "default rule" lacks textual, historical, and precedential support.

Justice Kagan warned that allowing challenges during enforcement proceedings would undermine the Hobbs Act's purpose of ensuring prompt, centralized judicial review, disrupt regulated parties' reliance on agency decisions, and deny the government a meaningful role in defending agency actions.

When Can Courts Challenge Agency Interpretations? The Supreme Court Clarifies

The key legal question in this case involves when courts can question an agency's interpretation of a law. The Hobbs Act gives appeals courts "exclusive" authority to review and determine the validity of certain agency orders, including those from the FCC. Meanwhile, administrative law generally presumes that parties facing enforcement actions can challenge an agency's interpretation of a statute unless Congress clearly says otherwise.

The majority concluded that the Hobbs Act only restricts pre-enforcement challenges (those filed directly against the agency before any enforcement action) but doesn't prevent courts from independently interpreting statutes during actual enforcement proceedings between private parties. This means that when someone sues under a law like the TCPA, the district court can reach its own conclusion about what the law means, even if that differs from the FCC's interpretation.

This ruling has significant implications for regulatory enforcement across federal agencies, as it empowers district courts to exercise independent judgment when applying statutes in enforcement cases, rather than being bound by agency interpretations that weren't directly challenged within the timeframe for pre-enforcement review.

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In a close look at how the Clean Air Act treats pollution from burning plants and trees, the court decided whether the government can treat those emissions differently from the smokestacks of a coal plant. The justices focused on the law’s fine print, asking if Congress meant to give regulators a special pass for “biogenic” carbon dioxide. Under the act, major facilities need permits when they pollute, but the EPA decided that burning biomass didn’t count the same way.

That decision split the court. A slim majority said the Clean Air Act doesn’t let the EPA carve out a special rule for biomass emissions. They pointed to the statutory language saying all carbon dioxide from “any” source must be regulated when it crosses a permit threshold. So a factory burning wood chips has to get the same kind of permit as a factory burning oil.

Summary of the Case

Under the Clean Air Act (CAA), EPA granted California a special waiver allowing it to impose stricter vehicle-emissions standards than federal rules. California's 2012 regulations set fleet-wide greenhouse-gas limits and required automakers to include a minimum percentage of electric vehicles (EVs) in their sales. Several fuel producers sued, claiming California's regulations would hurt their business by reducing demand for gasoline and diesel. While EPA didn't contest the fuel producers' right to sue, intervening States argued the producers couldn't show that winning the case would actually help them, claiming automakers would produce the same share of EVs regardless. The D.C. Circuit dismissed the case, but the Supreme Court agreed to review whether the fuel producers have the legal right to sue.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Kavanaugh, writing for the majority, reversed the lower court's decision. He explained that the fuel producers met all three requirements to bring a lawsuit: they suffered an injury (lost sales), the injury was caused by EPA's action (approving California's regulations), and a court decision could likely remedy their situation. The Court found that reduced fuel sales resulting from California's regulations constitute a real injury to the producers. The connection between EPA's approval and the harm was clear: the agency's action authorized California (and 17 other States that follow California's lead) to enforce rules that lower emissions and reduce fuel consumption.

On the critical question of whether invalidating the waiver would actually increase fuel sales, Justice Kavanaugh relied on "commonsense economic principles" and evidence in the record. This included California's own predictions of billions in reduced fuel revenues, California's statements that fewer EVs would be sold without the regulations, EPA's assertions that California "needs" these standards, and automakers' warnings that competitors would produce more gas-powered vehicles if the regulations were removed. The Court specifically noted that even a minimal increase in revenue would be enough to satisfy the legal requirements for standing.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Sotomayor dissented, pointing out that the D.C. Circuit's analysis was partly based on a misunderstanding about when California's standards would expire. She suggested sending the case back to the lower court to reconsider with the correct information.

Justice Jackson wrote her own dissent, arguing that the Court shouldn't have taken this case in the first place, especially since the dispute might become moot once EPA withdraws the waiver. She criticized the majority's "commonsense" approach to analyzing how third parties (automakers) would behave, arguing that previous Supreme Court cases had required a much higher standard of proof in similar situations.

How the Clean Air Act's California Exception Creates Legal Uncertainty

The Clean Air Act generally prevents states from setting their own vehicle emission standards, creating a uniform national system. However, the law makes a special exception for California due to its historic air pollution problems. If California can show "compelling and extraordinary conditions" and that its standards are "at least as protective" as federal requirements, the EPA can grant it a waiver to set stricter rules. Other states can then choose to follow either the federal standards or California's stricter ones.

This unique arrangement has created tension between addressing local air quality issues and global climate change. The EPA's position has shifted with different administrations—Bush and Trump denied certain waivers, while Obama and Biden approved them. The current legal debate centers on whether invalidating California's waiver would actually change automakers' manufacturing decisions enough to help fuel producers—a question that isn't clearly addressed in the Clean Air Act itself but has significant implications for who can challenge these environmental regulations in court.

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Sometimes a single phrase in a law can change everything. In this case, the Supreme Court looked at the rule that lets “any person adversely affected” by an FDA decision ask a judge to review it. The FDA had said no to a new tobacco product, blocking not only the maker but also the shops that wanted to sell it.

The Court said those shops count as “adversely affected” and can challenge the FDA’s denial in court. It also agreed that the case can stay in the home circuit where the stores are located. Seven justices, led by Justice Barrett, sided with the retailers and allowed the challenge to move forward. Two justices, including Justice Jackson joined by Justice Sotomayor, disagreed and felt only the product maker should have that right.

Summary of the Case

In 2016 the FDA determined that e-cigarettes are "new tobacco products" under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA) and deferred enforcement while manufacturers sought premarket approval. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. (RJR Vapor) applied to market its Vuse Alto e-cigarettes but the FDA denied the application for failure to show that marketing the product would be "appropriate for the protection of the public health." RJR Vapor joined with Texas and Mississippi retailers to petition the Fifth Circuit for judicial review under the TCA's "any person adversely affected" clause, thereby invoking Fifth-Circuit venue. The FDA moved to dismiss or transfer the petition, contending only the denied applicant has a statutory right to sue. A divided Fifth Circuit denied that motion, and the FDA sought certiorari.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Barrett, writing for a 7-Justice majority, held that the phrase "any person adversely affected" must be construed consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act's similarly worded cause of action, which the Court has interpreted to grant review to anyone "arguably within" a statute's zone of interests. Retailers who lose the opportunity to sell a denied product and risk enforcement penalties plainly fall within that zone. The FDA's structural argument—that only manufacturers have statutory rights to participation and notice—cannot override the TCA's grant of review to any adversely affected person. Moreover, Congress's use of the narrower term "holder of [the] application" in one section and the broader "any person adversely affected" in another signals differing scopes. Because at least one proper petitioner had venue in the Fifth Circuit, the Court affirmed the denial of dismissal or transfer.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissented. They argued that the TCA's premarket-approval regime establishes an adjudicatory process exclusively between the FDA and the manufacturer, who alone bears the burden to submit detailed product studies, components lists, manufacturing controls, and samples. Retailers have no procedural rights to comment, receive notice, or develop the record; when the FDA withdraws an existing approval, only the "holder of [the] application" may sue, reflecting Congress's intent to limit review to manufacturers. The dissenters would confine "any person adversely affected" to those within the regulated class—in this case, denied applicants—and would bar retailers from invoking the judicial review provision.

Who Can Challenge FDA Decisions: Manufacturers, Retailers, or Both?

This dispute centers on who has the legal right to challenge FDA decisions about tobacco products. The Court needed to determine whether retailers, not just manufacturers, can sue when the FDA denies approval for products they want to sell.

The majority ruled that the phrase "any person adversely affected" should be interpreted broadly, consistent with similar language in other laws. When retailers lose the ability to sell a product and face potential penalties for selling unapproved items, they clearly fall within the group of people Congress intended to protect.

The Court found it significant that Congress used different language in different parts of the law—specifically choosing broader language ("any person adversely affected") in the section about who can seek judicial review, while using narrower language ("holder of the application") elsewhere. This deliberate word choice suggests Congress intended to allow a wider group of affected parties to challenge FDA decisions.

The venue provision in the law further reflects Congress's judgment about where these challenges should be heard, though the Court didn't address whether each individual challenger must independently satisfy venue requirements.