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The Supreme Court just made it much harder for asylum seekers to get their cases heard. The Court ruled 6 to 3 that people waiting at the U.S. border don't have the right to request asylum unless they've already physically crossed into the country. That means border officers can turn people away at the gate without ever processing their claims, even if they're fleeing violence or persecution. The decision changes decades of immigration practice.

The Policy That Started It All

U.S. Customs and Border Protection used what it called "metering." Officers stationed at the border would limit how many people could enter for processing each day, leaving thousands stranded in Mexico for months at a time. Some waited in dangerous conditions. Some were raped, beaten, or drowned while waiting. An immigration advocacy group called Al Otro Lado sued on behalf of asylum seekers, arguing the government was breaking the law by refusing to even listen to their cases.

The lower courts agreed. But the Supreme Court reversed that decision, siding with the government.

What the Law Actually Says

The wording of the law mattered a lot in the decision. Federal immigration law says people can apply for asylum if they are "physically present in the United States" or if they "arrive in the United States." Those are two separate conditions connected by the word "or."

The asylum seekers argued this language matters. If "arrive in" just means the same thing as "physically present," then why mention it twice? They said "arrive in" must cover people who show up at the border but haven't been allowed to cross yet. The government disagreed, saying "arrive in" simply means you have to actually enter the country.

How the Court Decided

Justice Alito, writing for the majority, sided with the government. He used everyday examples to explain his thinking. A football player tackled at the one-yard line hasn't arrived in the end zone. A letter in the mail carrier's hand hasn't arrived in your mailbox. Same logic applies at the border.

The majority also noted that Congress used different language in different parts of the immigration law when it wanted to distinguish between people who actually enter versus those who just try to. That suggested Congress knew the difference and chose its words carefully.

The Court acknowledged the asylum seekers had a point about the redundancy problem. But it said the overlap made sense because Congress added the "arrive in" language in 1996 as part of a broader overhaul, and the two provisions were simply meant to work together.

What the Dissenters Said

The three dissenting justices, led by Justice Sotomayor, pushed back hard. They pointed out that Congress uses "arrives in" and "arrives at" interchangeably elsewhere in the same law. If the majority's reading were correct, those other parts wouldn't make sense.

More importantly, they documented the practical effects of metering. Asylum seekers turned away at the border faced rape, violence, and death while waiting in Mexico. Government investigators found the policy was being used even when processing facilities were only 20 percent full. Justice Jackson added the metering policy had already been canceled nearly five years before the Court decided this case, so the justices were essentially answering a question that no longer mattered in practice.

Presidential Power in Immigration

This decision gives the government broad power to turn people away at the border without hearing their asylum claims. It also signals that at least some justices may be willing to expand presidential power at the border even further. Justice Thomas wrote separately to suggest the President might have inherent constitutional authority to exclude noncitizens that Congress cannot override. That's not the law today, but it's a warning sign about where the Court might be heading.

For asylum seekers, presenting yourself at a port of entry no longer guarantees you'll get your day in court. The government can simply keep you on the other side of the line.

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The government now has a lower barrier to deporting longtime permanent residents. In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that border officers can treat green card holders as first-time visitors trying to enter the country, stripping away legal protections that have existed for decades, even if those officers have no solid evidence of wrongdoing at the moment. The consequences are tangible and can include confiscated green cards, lost jobs and years trapped in legal limbo. This case will affect how border agents treat millions of Americans with permanent resident status.

What Happened to Muk Choi Lau

Muk Choi Lau had lived legally in the United States for nearly 20 years with a green card. Before a brief trip to China, he had been accused of trademark counterfeiting in New Jersey. When he returned to JFK Airport, border officers didn't formally let him back in as a returning resident. Instead, they gave him a different status called parole. His case would proceed. Though he was accused of a crime, legal definitions agree he hadn't committed the crime at the time he was reentering. It meant losing his green card, losing work authorization, and facing removal proceedings. After more than a year, he pleaded guilty to the counterfeiting charge and the government moved to deport him. A federal appeals court said the government needed strong evidence of his crime before it could treat him this way. The Supreme Court disagreed.

The Government's Argument

The government said immigration law works in two steps. First, if a green card holder has committed certain crimes, he can be treated as someone seeking entry for the first time. Second, if he's been convicted of that crime, he can be deported. The government argued these are separate questions in each step. Border officers don't need proof at the airport, the government said. They just need to make a classification decision. The actual evidence comes later, at a removal hearing. Requiring officers to gather evidence at the border would slow everything down and essentially turn airports into courtrooms.

Lau's Counterargument

Lau said the law doesn't work that way. The statute uses the phrase "shall not," which he argued is a firm command. The government must prove he committed a crime before it can strip away his returning resident status. He also pointed out the practical consequences of losing his green card, losing the ability to work, and spending years in legal uncertainty while fighting deportation. Civil rights groups backed him up, warning that this ruling would give the government unchecked power to reclassify green card holders whenever it wanted.

What the Supreme Court Decided

Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, said the two-step process works the way the government described. A green card holder can be reclassified as a first-time visitor if that person committed a qualifying crime. A conviction for that crime makes him deportable. These are separate requirements met at different times. The majority rejected the idea that border officers need strong evidence before making the reclassification. The law doesn't say they do, the Court noted. And the immigration agency's own rules put the evidentiary burden at the removal hearing, not at the border.

The Court also made a linguistic point: "has committed" refers to the act of committing a crime, not to being formally convicted of one. As Justice Thomas wrote, "One does not commit a conviction." Because Lau's guilty plea satisfied the conviction requirement at his removal hearing, the deportation order was valid.

The Dissent's Warning

Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, saw a dangerous problem with timing. The government, she argued, must prove someone committed a crime before it takes away their returning resident status, not after. The law's language signals these questions should be answered at the border, by border officers, at the moment someone returns home. The majority's approach lets the government work backward, using a conviction months or years later to justify a border decision made without any real basis at the time.

Justice Jackson also highlighted what this means in real life. Lau carried a handwritten paper card as proof of his legal status for 14 years. Being paroled instead of admitted shifted the legal burden onto him, made his legal process harder, and affected his ability to work and find housing. The dissent warned that the majority's ruling gives the government essentially unlimited power to override the law's basic protection for returning residents.

Green Card Holders Traveling Between Countries

If you're a green card holder, the government can now treat you as a first-time visitor at the border based on suspicion alone, then justify that decision later with evidence gathered after the fact. The law used to require the government to prove its case before taking away your status. Now it doesn't. The Court left open the possibility that some evidentiary standard might apply at the border, but by allowing the government to use later evidence, it may have made any such standard meaningless. For millions of permanent residents, this decision means less protection when they travel and return home.

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A Louisiana inmate's head was forcibly shaved despite his Rastafarian faith requiring him to never cut his hair. When he tried to sue the prison officers responsible, the Supreme Court blocked his case. The decision means prisoners who suffer religious freedom violations in prison may have almost no way to get money damages, even when officials clearly violated federal law.

What Happened to Damon Landor

Damon Landor is a Rastafarian whose faith requires him to never cut his hair, a practice he had maintained for two decades. Near the end of his prison sentence in Louisiana in 2020, he was transferred to a new facility. Knowing there might be trouble, he brought a printed copy of a court ruling that said prisons generally cannot force Rastafarians to cut their hair. The intake officers threw his papers in the trash, handcuffed him to a chair, held him down, and shaved his head.

Landor sued the Louisiana Department of Corrections and several individual officers under a federal law called the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, or RLUIPA, seeking money damages. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that RLUIPA does not allow lawsuits against officers personally. The Supreme Court agreed, six to three.

Why the Court Sided With the Officers

The majority, led by Justice Gorsuch, decided the case on constitutional grounds. He reasoned Congress can attach conditions to federal funding and cut off that funding if those conditions are not met. But Congress cannot directly regulate people's behavior through the spending power unless those people voluntarily and knowingly agreed to be subject to those rules.

The Louisiana Department of Corrections accepted federal money and therefore agreed to follow RLUIPA's rules. But the individual officers never made any such agreement. Without that consent, the Court said, Landor's case against them cannot proceed, just as you cannot sue someone for breaking a contract they never signed.

The majority worried that allowing lawsuits against individual officers would give Congress essentially unlimited power. If simply receiving a paycheck from a federally funded employer counted as consent, then virtually every American who works for any organization that touches federal money could be directly regulated by Congress. The Court offered vivid examples of where that logic could lead, including coaches forced to allow transgender athletes to compete or doctors barred from administering vaccines, all under threat of personal lawsuits.

The Court acknowledged that Congress can criminalize bribery of officials at federally funded organizations without their personal consent. But the majority distinguished that as protecting federal dollars from being stolen. RLUIPA's cause of action, by contrast, advances a policy goal around religious liberty rather than protecting the integrity of federal funds.

What the Dissenters Said

Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, argued the majority got it wrong on every level. The Supreme Court had already ruled unanimously that a nearly identical federal religious freedom law called RFRA allows damages against federal officials personally. RLUIPA should be read the same way, Jackson argued.

On the constitutional question, Jackson said the majority invented a new requirement that appears nowhere in the Court's prior spending power cases. She pointed to earlier decisions that upheld federal regulation of state employees and even private individuals who were not direct recipients of federal money.

Jackson also warned that the decision leaves prisoners who suffer religious liberty violations with almost no practical remedy. An earlier Supreme Court ruling already blocked money damages against states under RLUIPA. Now individual officers are protected too. That leaves only injunctive relief, meaning a court order to stop the violation, which is often rendered meaningless when a prisoner is transferred to a different facility before the case is resolved.

Regulating Conduct Through Federal Funding

Is a spending power law more like a law or more like a contract? The majority treats spending power laws as fundamentally consensual. The Court draws a sharp line between organizations that accept federal money and the individuals who work for them.

The practical gap left by this decision is significant. Prisoners who suffer religious freedom violations may have almost no way to get money damages, even when officials clearly violated federal law. The majority noted that Congress could restructure RLUIPA to require individual officers to sign separate agreements, or could condition funding on states passing their own damages laws. Whether either of those alternatives is realistic in practice remains to be seen.

The Supreme Court has made it much harder to hold individual government employees personally accountable for violating federal civil rights laws, even when those laws are designed to protect fundamental freedoms like religious practice. The decision reflects a deep disagreement about how much power Congress has to regulate conduct through federal funding.

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For decades, foreign governments had implicit immunity from being sued in American courts. The Supreme Court punched a major hole in that shield, ruling that Americans can now sue Cuban government agencies for property seized more than 60 years ago. The decision could reshape how the U.S. handles disputes with hostile nations and could have ripple effects far beyond Cuba.

What Happened and Why It Matters

In 1960, Fidel Castro's government seized an Exxon oil refinery, fuel terminals, and gas stations worth billions in today's dollars. For decades, those assets sat in Cuban hands while American companies and citizens watched from the sidelines, blocked by a legal wall that said foreign governments cannot be sued in U.S. courts. Then in 1996, Congress passed a law specifically designed to tear down that wall for Cuba. It said Americans could sue anyone profiting from confiscated Cuban property, including the Cuban government itself.

But there was a catch. Another law, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, created a separate set of rules for suing foreign governments. It said you could only sue them under specific circumstances, and those circumstances basically didn't apply to Cuba because of the U.S. trade embargo. For 23 years, courts blocked these lawsuits, saying the older immunity law still applied. This week, the Supreme Court said no. By a vote of six to three, the justices ruled that when Congress created the right to sue Cuba, it automatically stripped away Cuba's legal protection from those suits.

Exxon immediately filed a lawsuit seeking more than one billion dollars.

Why the Court Sided with Exxon

Justice Brett Kavanaugh, writing for the majority, gave four reasons for the decision. First, he pointed to a recent Supreme Court ruling that said when Congress creates a law allowing people to sue government agencies, that law automatically removes their immunity, even if Congress never explicitly says so. The Cuba law does exactly that.

Second, requiring companies to jump through extra legal hoops would make the Cuba law pointless. The trade embargo makes it nearly impossible to meet the immunity law's requirements, so forcing Exxon to satisfy both laws would be like giving someone the right to sue with one hand while taking it away with the other.

Third, the Cuba law routes lawsuits through general federal courts rather than through the special process the immunity law created. The Court read that as a signal Congress wanted the immunity law to stay out of these cases.

Fourth, the law gives the President power to pause or allow these lawsuits, which is how foreign disputes were handled before the immunity law even existed.

The Dissent's Concerns

Justice Elena Kagan, joined by two other justices, warned the majority had made a dangerous mistake. She argued the majority confused having a right to sue with actually being able to sue. Under the immunity law, she noted, companies can still sue Cuban agencies if they meet one of the law's exceptions. So the right to sue is not truly blocked.

Her dissent notes that even if Exxon wins, another part of the immunity law still protects Cuban government assets from being seized to pay the judgment. That means Exxon might win in court but collect nothing, making the majority's promise of relief hollow.

Most damaging to the majority's position, Kagan pointed out, Congress had actually considered removing immunity from Cuba but decided against it after the State Department warned it would give American courts too much power over foreign governments worldwide.

Americans Suing Foreign Governments

This decision represents a significant shift in how the U.S. handles disputes with foreign governments. For 40 years, the immunity law was treated as the final word on suing foreign nations. Now, Congress can override it simply by creating a law that names foreign government agencies as defendants, without explicitly saying immunity is removed.

The Court hasn't settled if this reasoning applies only to Cuba, or to other foreign governments too. That uncertainty could invite Congress to pass more laws targeting specific countries, potentially destabilizing diplomatic relationships.

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The Supreme Court has ruled that companies cannot be sued under federal law for knowingly providing the tools and technology that governments use to identify, arrest, and torture religious minorities. The case involved Cisco Systems, accused of selling surveillance technology to China that helped authorities persecute Falun Gong practitioners. The ruling means victims of state-sponsored torture have lost a crucial legal avenue for justice.

What Happened

Falun Gong practitioners sued Cisco Systems, claiming the company designed and sold surveillance technology called the "Golden Shield" to the Chinese government. That system allegedly helped authorities identify, track, arrest, and torture thousands of religious minorities. The plaintiffs used two federal laws to bring their case. The first, the Alien Tort Statute from 1789, allows foreign nationals to sue in U.S. courts for serious violations of international law. The second, the Torture Victim Protection Act, lets torture victims sue those responsible for their abuse.

A federal appeals court allowed the case to proceed. But the Supreme Court reversed that decision on both counts, effectively closing the courthouse door to these victims.

The Court's Reasoning

Justice Barrett, writing for six justices, made two key rulings. First, she said courts cannot recognize any new types of claims under the Alien Tort Statute beyond a tiny handful of offenses recognized centuries ago. The majority worried that allowing new claims would interfere with foreign policy decisions that belong to Congress and the President.

Second, on the torture law, the Court said the word "subjects" in the statute means only those who directly commit torture can be sued. Someone who knowingly provides the technology or tools that make torture possible falls outside the law's reach. This means Cisco, even if it knowingly helped enable torture, cannot be held liable.

The Dissenters' Concerns

Justice Sotomayor wrote a sharp dissent, joined largely by Justices Kagan and Jackson. She argued the majority essentially rewrote a prior Supreme Court decision without admitting it. She pointed to historical evidence showing the Alien Tort Statute was always meant to cover more than just a handful of ancient offenses.

On the torture law, Sotomayor highlighted a striking contradiction in the majority's logic. Everyone agrees the law covers a military commander who fails to stop subordinates from torturing prisoners. Yet the majority excludes someone who actively provided the actual tools used to carry out torture. That, she argued, gets justice exactly backwards. She also noted the U.S. government had already publicly condemned China's persecution of Falun Gong, so this lawsuit would not actually harm American foreign relations.

What This Means for Torture Victims

The practical impact is significant. Under this ruling, torture victims can only sue those who directly commit torture or give direct orders to torture. They cannot sue companies or individuals who knowingly provide the surveillance systems, technology, or other means that make torture possible. This creates a gap in accountability: the technology companies and suppliers that enable state torture can operate with legal immunity in U.S. courts.

The decision reflects a broader tension in law. The majority prioritized keeping courts out of foreign policy decisions. But as the dissenters pointed out, refusing to provide a legal remedy also affects foreign policy. The founders understood that protecting victims of abuse was itself an important foreign policy value. The Court's decision prioritizes one concern over the other without fully explaining why.

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The Pung family's home in Michigan was worth nearly $200,000. They owed the county $2,242 in property taxes. The county foreclosed and sold the house at auction for $76,000. Pung sued to argue that he should have received fair market value for the forced sale of his home. The Supreme Court has ruled selling at auction price is constitutional. The decision raises urgent questions about how far government can go when collecting debts from ordinary Americans.

What Happened to the Pung Family

Isabella county assessed Michael Pung with $2,242 in additional property taxes. He disagreed, sued and had won his case in state court. But the county ignored that ruling and moved forward with foreclosure anyway. They sold his home at a public auction for $76,008. The county kept all the money from the sale at first but eventually returned the sale price minus the tax assessment.

For tax purposes, the county had recently assessed the home at $194,400.

Pung sued in federal court, arguing the Constitution requires the government to pay him the difference between the auction price and the fair market value. He pointed to the Fifth Amendment, which says the government must pay "just compensation" when it takes private property. He also cited the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits excessive fines. The lower courts agreed he deserved the auction money back, but they refused to require the county to pay him fair market value of the home.

The Supreme Court's Decision

The Supreme Court agreed the Constitution does not require the government to pay fair market value when it sells a home to collect unpaid taxes. As long as the sale is conducted fairly, returning whatever money is left over after paying the debt is enough.

Justice Alito, writing for the majority, based this conclusion on centuries of legal tradition. English common law and early American tax laws all followed the same pattern: return the surplus, but don't guarantee the homeowner gets what the property might sell for on the open market. The Court said tax sales are different from cases where the government takes your land to build a highway. In those situations, fair market value is required. But tax sales, the Court reasoned, are a debt collection tool, and homeowners have years to pay the debt, refinance, or sell the property themselves before losing it.

The Court worried that requiring fair market value would make tax sales impossible to conduct. Local governments would have to manage properties and absorb financial losses in ways that would break the system. The case was sent back to lower courts to decide whether the county's sale process was actually fair.

What One Justice Said That Matters

Justice Thomas agreed with the outcome but wrote separately with serious concerns. He described how the tax assessor in this case defied a court order, imposed an unauthorized tax, and pursued foreclosure even though the Pungs claimed they never received proper notice. The assessor reportedly said, "I don't care what he says," referring to the judge who had ruled in the family's favor.

Thomas argued that fair market value should normally be required by the Constitution, with only narrow exceptions. He believed the county's conduct was likely unconstitutional. Three other justices signaled they may agree that strong protections for homeowners are needed when these cases return to lower courts.

Can the Government Take Your Home?

The Supreme Court deliberately left the biggest question unanswered: what does "fairly conducted" actually mean? Must the government try to collect the debt another way first? Must the auction be designed to attract bidders and get the best price? Must notice to the homeowner be genuinely effective?

Those questions now go back to lower courts with almost no guidance. In the Pung case, a $2,242 debt led to the loss of a home worth nearly $200,000. Eighteen months after the sale, the new owner resold it for $195,000, almost exactly what it had been assessed for. That $118,000 difference represents a real financial loss to the Pung family.

The Constitution allows the government to keep that difference, but only if the process was fair. What counts as fair is still being decided. If lower courts adopt Justice Thomas's framework, which requires governments to exhaust other collection methods before seizing homes, tax sale practices in many states could face serious legal challenges. For now, homeowners facing tax foreclosure should know that the Supreme Court has given them less protection than they might have expected, but the fight over what "fair" means is far from over.

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A man convicted of killing a child in one of America's most famous missing-person cases will stay in prison after the Supreme Court sided with prosecutors over concerns about his confession. The decision matters far beyond this one case. It sets limits on when federal courts can step in to fix problems in state trials, and it shows how confessions obtained through police interrogation can be harder to challenge than many people realize.

The Case: A Decades-Old Crime and Multiple Confessions

Pedro Hernandez was convicted in New York for the 1979 kidnapping and murder of six-year-old Etan Patz, whose disappearance captivated the nation and helped launch the modern missing-children movement. In 2012, police questioned Hernandez without first telling him his rights, and he confessed. After officers then read him his Miranda rights (the warning that tells suspects they can stay silent and have a lawyer), he waived those rights and confessed again on video. He went on to confess multiple times to family members and psychiatrists.

At trial, the jury asked the judge a crucial question: if they decided the first confession was coerced or unreliable, did they have to throw out all the confessions that followed? The judge said no. Hernandez was convicted. After losing in state courts, a federal appeals court agreed with him and threw out his conviction. But the Supreme Court reversed that decision.

What the Supreme Court Decided

The Court made three key rulings. First, the Constitution does not require juries to decide whether a confession was voluntary. That is a protection New York state created on its own, not something the federal Constitution demands. Second, the Supreme Court precedent Hernandez relied on addressed only what judges must do before trial, not what judges must tell juries during deliberations. Third, if a jury was never required to decide something in the first place, a judge has no obligation to explain it to them.

The decision reinforces a basic rule: federal courts have limited power to overturn state convictions. They can only step in for serious problems, not simply because a federal judge might have done things differently.

Why Three Justices Disagreed

Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson stated they would not have heard this case at all. They did not fully explain their reasoning, but their position suggests concern about whether Hernandez's many confessions were truly reliable, or that the lower court's decision deserved more careful review. The three justices did not write a full dissent, which means the Court's decision stands unchallenged in the official record.

What This Means for Confessions and Fair Trials

This case sits at the intersection of two competing concerns. On one hand, confessions are powerful evidence. A person admitting to a crime can seem like the strongest proof of guilt. On the other hand, police interrogation tactics can be coercive. A suspect might confess to something they did not do to escape a stressful situation, or because they are confused or vulnerable.

The Supreme Court has long recognized this tension. It has created rules about how police must conduct interrogations and when judges must throw out confessions obtained through improper tactics. But this decision shows those protections have limits. If a state creates its own additional protections for defendants, those state protections do not automatically trigger federal constitutional rules. And federal courts cannot easily override state court decisions about how to apply state law.

Confessions matter enormously in criminal cases, but the rules about when they can be challenged are complicated and vary by state. A confession that seems questionable might still be admissible in court, and federal courts may not be able to fix the problem even if they wanted to. That is why the reliability of confessions, and the circumstances under which they are given, remain central to debates about criminal justice.

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A woman forced to take psychiatric medications against her will thought she had found a way out. After signing a settlement agreement to end her case in Maryland state court, she hired a new lawyer and rushed to federal court, hoping a federal judge would declare the state court agreement unconstitutional. In a decision that crosses unusual ideological lines, the Court ruled that once you lose in state court, you cannot simply run to federal court to overturn that decision while your state appeal is still pending. The ruling means millions of Americans may find their only path to federal review is through the Supreme Court itself, a nearly impossible hurdle for ordinary people.

What Happened to T.M.

T.M. has a rare condition where eating gluten triggers psychosis. After accidental gluten exposure in March 2023, she was involuntarily committed to Baltimore Washington Medical Center for three months and given forced antipsychotic injections. A Maryland state court approved a settlement releasing her with the conditions that she had to keep taking medication and drop all legal claims against the hospital.

Ten days later, T.M. hired a new lawyer and filed a federal lawsuit, arguing the settlement was unconstitutional and signed under duress. She also appealed in state court while asking that appeal be paused to avoid conflicting rulings. The federal court dismissed her case without even waiting for her to respond, citing a legal doctrine called Rooker-Feldman that generally prevents federal courts from reviewing state court decisions.

The Core Question

The real issue was simple but important: can you challenge a state court decision in federal court while your state appeal is still ongoing, or must you wait until the state process completely finishes?

T.M.'s lawyers argued the doctrine should only apply after state courts have fully finished their work. Seven federal appeals courts agreed with them. They also pointed out that other legal tools already exist to prevent abuse, making Rooker-Feldman unnecessary.

The hospital disagreed. They argued that federal district courts are trial courts, not appeals courts. Once you lose in state court, they said, federal trial courts have no power to overturn that decision, period. The only federal court that can review state decisions is the Supreme Court.

What the Supreme Court Decided

Justice Sotomayor, writing for five justices, sided with the hospital. The Court ruled that federal district courts cannot hear cases where someone lost in state court and is asking a federal judge to reverse that loss, even if state appeals are still pending.

The majority gave two reasons. First, asking a federal trial court to reverse a state court decision essentially asks it to act as an appeals court, which it cannot do. Second, only the Supreme Court has power to review state court decisions. The majority rejected the argument that other legal tools could handle the same job, noting those tools might not apply when directly challenging a court judgment.

The Court also worried about fairness. Allowing federal courts to review pending state appeals would disrupt the relationship between state and federal courts and encourage losing parties to strategically flee to federal court.

An Unusual Alliance

What makes this case striking is who sided with whom. Justice Sotomayor, considered one of the Court's more liberal members, wrote the majority opinion joined by conservative Justices Thomas and Alito. Meanwhile, Justice Barrett dissented alongside Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan and Gorsuch, a mix that crosses typical ideological lines.

This unusual split suggests the decision turned on how courts should be structured and how federal and state systems should interact, not on familiar political divisions.

Justice Thomas wrote separately to provide historical grounding, arguing that reviewing another court's judgment has always been considered an appellate power, regardless of the legal form used to challenge it.

Federal and State Lawsuits

Under this ruling, if you lose in state court, you cannot file a federal lawsuit challenging that decision while your state appeal is still pending. Your only option is to wait until your state process completely finishes, then ask the Supreme Court to review it. For most people, getting the Supreme Court to hear your case is nearly impossible.

The dissent warned lower courts not to expand this doctrine further, suggesting future battles over its exact boundaries are likely. The unresolved tensions between the majority and dissent mean this issue will return to the Court again.

In plain terms the Supreme Court has reinforced that state courts get the first and last word on state law matters, and federal courts must stay out of the middle.

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In a stunning unanimous decision, the Supreme Court has ruled that the federal government went too far when it prosecuted a Texas man solely for owning a gun while using marijuana regularly. The case, United States v. Hemani, decided June 18, 2026, shows that even in our deeply divided country, nine justices agreed that the government cannot strip away constitutional rights without a much stronger justification than it offered here.

What Happened to Ali Hemani

Ali Hemani is a Texas native and dual U.S. and Pakistani citizen. In 2022, federal agents searched his family home based on terrorism suspicions. Hemani cooperated fully, handing over a firearm and admitting he used marijuana roughly every other day. He was not charged with terrorism, drug dealing, or any act of violence. Instead, the government charged him with the crime of possessing a gun while being a regular marijuana user. He faced up to 15 years in prison and a lifetime ban on owning firearms.

The trial court disagreed with the prosecution and threw out the charges. An appeals court agreed. The Supreme Court has unanimously sided with Hemani.

The Government's Argument

The government tried to justify the law by pointing to old American laws that restricted gun ownership for chronic drunkards. These included vagrancy laws and laws allowing courts to commit heavy drinkers to institutions. The government's logic was straightforward: if America has a long history of disarming people who regularly use intoxicants, then disarming regular marijuana users fits that tradition.

But the government made a critical claim that troubled the justices. It said it did not need to prove that Hemani's marijuana use actually made him dangerous or impaired his judgment. Simply using a controlled substance regularly was enough to strip him of his gun rights.

Why the Court Said No

Justice Gorsuch, writing for eight justices, explained that the government's historical examples simply did not match Hemani's situation. A founding era habitual drunkard was someone so consumed by alcohol that they could barely function. Hemani, by contrast, lived a normal life while using marijuana regularly. That gap was too wide to bridge.

The old laws also worked differently. They required some kind of process before stripping rights away, such as a court hearing or a conviction. The law used against Hemani stripped rights automatically, with no hearing and no individualized finding that he was actually dangerous. The old laws also served different purposes, like promoting productivity or preventing public scandal, not preventing violence.

The Court also noted the practicality that the federal government itself had largely stopped enforcing marijuana laws, most states had legalized marijuana in some form, and the government had reclassified certain marijuana products. Using a law based on outdated drug policy to take away constitutional rights did not make sense.

The Court was careful to keep its ruling narrow. It did not say the government can never restrict gun ownership based on drug use. Congress could still write a law that requires proof of actual dangerousness, or that more closely matches historical restrictions on people who were genuinely unable to function.

Why Every Justice Agreed

What makes this case remarkable is that no justice dissented. Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, who typically support gun restrictions, joined the main opinion. Justices Alito and Kagan, who often disagree, joined together on a narrower reasoning. This unusual lineup shows that prosecuting a cooperative man for having a gun in his home, based solely on marijuana use with no claim he was dangerous, struck every single justice as unconstitutional.

Justice Thomas raised a separate concern about whether Congress even has the power to make this a federal crime in the first place. Justice Jackson criticized the historical test the Court uses in gun cases, suggesting a better approach would weigh the government's reasons against how much the law burdens gun rights. But these disagreements were about how to explain the ruling, not about the result itself.

Prinicpled Constitutional Rights

This decision does not strike down the entire law. It simply says the government cannot use it the way it did against Hemani. Congress still has room to write firearm restrictions connected to drug use, as long as those restrictions are grounded in closer historical comparisons or include some individualized finding that a person is actually dangerous.

The ruling reflects a basic principle. A unanimous Court agreed the government cannot take away your constitutional rights based on a sweeping theory that requires no proof you actually pose a danger. In Hemani's case, that principle won the day.

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A man facing 300 years in prison made a deal with the government: plead guilty to one crime, drop nine others, and give up the right to appeal. But the Supreme Court just said there are limits to how far that deal can go. In a decision that affects thousands of criminal cases every year, the justices ruled that defendants cannot be forced to accept sentences that are so fundamentally unfair they shake public confidence in the courts, even if they signed away their appeal rights.

The Case: A Deal Gone Wrong

Munson Hunter III faced ten counts of bank and wire fraud. Rather than risk a 300-year sentence, he took a plea deal to admit guilt to one count, and have the rest disappear. As part of the agreement, he gave up his right to appeal, with one exception for cases where his lawyer failed him.

At sentencing, the judge ordered 51 months in prison plus three years of supervised release. One condition required Hunter to take any mental health medications his doctor prescribed. Hunter objected. Then the judge mistakenly told Hunter he could appeal anyway. The prosecutor heard this but said nothing.

Hunter appealed the medication requirement, claiming it violated his rights. The lower court rejected his appeal, saying his waiver was binding. The Supreme Court took the case to settle conflicting rulings across the country about when these waivers should actually hold up.

What Each Side Argued

Hunter's lawyers said appeal waivers should not apply when a sentence violates fundamental constitutional rights. They also argued the judge's mistake, combined with the prosecutor staying silent, changed the deal. The government disagreed completely. They said any knowing and voluntary waiver should always be enforced, no exceptions. When justices asked about extreme scenarios during oral arguments, the government refused to budge.

The Court's Decision

Justice Kagan wrote the opinion for eight of nine justices. The Court ruled the judge's mistake did not change Hunter's plea agreement. The original deal required any changes in writing and signed by everyone. The prosecutor's silence did not count as giving up the waiver either.

On the bigger question, the Court said appeal waivers cannot be enforced when doing so would be a "miscarriage of justice." This is a very high bar. The error must be obvious and so serious that it damages public trust in courts. It's also a narrow exception. Routine sentencing mistakes do not qualify.

The Court gave three examples of situations that might qualify: a sentence exceeding the legal maximum, a sentence tainted by racial bias, and a sentence handed down without basic fair procedures. The Court sent Hunter's case back to the lower court to decide whether his medication condition meets this standard.

What This Actually Means for Real People

This decision creates a safety valve for extreme cases, not a wide-open door. Most sentencing errors will not overcome a waiver. The Court deliberately left the exact boundaries fuzzy, offering only examples rather than a precise rulebook.

The justices who voted together disagreed on how broad this exception should be. Justice Gorsuch suggested it should cover unreasonable sentences and unfair conditions. Justice Kavanaugh warned against reading it too broadly, signaling that at least five justices want to keep the exception truly rare. Lower courts will now navigate this tension, likely erring on the side of caution.

Justice Thomas dissented, arguing that appeal rights are a modern invention, that defendants already give up more important rights in plea deals, and that even a high bar is easy to claim. With tens of thousands of guilty pleas entered yearly, he warned this decision could trigger waves of new litigation.

Tension in Criminal Law

This decision reflects a genuine tension in criminal law that weighs respecting the deals defendants make versus protecting the basic fairness of the justice system. The Court sided with fairness, but only in the most extreme situations. If you plead guilty and waive your appeal rights, that waiver will almost certainly hold. But if your sentence is so fundamentally broken that it threatens the integrity of the courts themselves, you may get a second chance.