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What did Congress mean when it carved out an exception for problems with the mail?

In United States Postal Service v. Lebene Konan, the Supreme Court read a federal law that lets people sue the government for certain wrongs, but keeps the government off the hook for claims tied to the “loss,” “miscarriage,” or “negligent transmission” of mail. The Court said that even if mail is not delivered on purpose, that still counts as a “loss” or “miscarriage” under the law’s ordinary meaning. So, the United States keeps its immunity from these kinds of lawsuits.

The Court threw out the lower court’s ruling and sent the case back, without deciding whether every one of Konan’s claims is blocked or which arguments were properly kept for review. The Justices split 5 to 4, with Justice Thomas writing for the majority and Justice Sotomayor dissenting, joined by Justices Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson.

Summary of the Case

The Supreme Court decided that the Federal Tort Claims Act's postal exception shields the federal government from lawsuits when postal employees intentionally fail to deliver mail. The case required the Court to interpret whether the postal exception, which protects the government from claims arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter, covers only negligent conduct or both negligent and intentional misconduct.

Lebene Konan, a Texas property owner who rents rooms to tenants, alleged that postal employees intentionally withheld her mail for two years as part of a harassment campaign, allegedly motivated by racial discrimination. After administrative remedies failed, she sued for conversion, nuisance, tortious interference with prospective business relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The District Court dismissed the case, invoking the postal exception. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the postal exception's terms don't encompass intentional nondelivery. The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit.

Arguments Made By Counsel

Postal Service's Case

Frederick Liu argued that the postal exception uses three overlapping terms: loss, miscarriage, and negligent transmission. All three are designed to protect postal operations from litigation. The government emphasized that:

First, historical meaning matters. In 1946, miscarriage simply meant any failure of mail to arrive, without distinguishing between intentional and unintentional conduct. Historical dictionaries and newspaper usage confirmed this broad meaning.

Second, loss encompasses all deprivation. The word loss ordinarily means any deprivation of property, regardless of how it occurred. People can suffer loss from theft, intentional acts, or accidents.

Third, overlapping terms serve a purpose. Congress intentionally used three broad, overlapping terms to ensure comprehensive protection for postal operations. This is a belt and suspenders approach to legal drafting.

Fourth, practical consequences matter. The Postal Service handles over 300 million pieces of mail daily. Without this broad exception, postal workers would be hauled into court constantly, with people simply alleging intentional conduct rather than negligence to escape immunity.

Konan's Case

Easha Anand argued that the postal exception protects only against negligent conduct, not intentional misconduct. Her key arguments:

First, plain language matters. Ordinary people don't use loss to describe intentional taking. You lose your keys when you misplace them. You don't lose them when someone steals them.

Second, there's a surplusage problem. If all three terms mean the same thing, why did Congress bother using three different words? The inclusion of negligent before transmission suggests Congress was distinguishing negligent from intentional conduct.

Third, Congressional knowledge is relevant. Congress knew how to write broad exceptions when it wanted to, as shown in other sections of the Federal Tort Claims Act. The postal exception's specificity indicates intentional narrowness.

Fourth, contextual limitations apply. Miscarriage suggests accident or mistake, not deliberate wrongdoing. If Congress meant to cover intentional conduct, it could have used different language.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Thomas, writing for the 5 member majority, which included Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, adopted a textualist, historically grounded approach to statutory interpretation.

On miscarriage, the majority held that when Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946, miscarriage of mail simply meant any failure of mail to properly arrive at its intended destination, regardless of cause. Dictionary definitions from that era confirm this breadth. The majority rejected the argument that miscarriage is limited to negligent failures, noting that contemporary dictionaries imposed no such limitation. Newspapers from the era used miscarriage to describe mail that failed to arrive even when caused by intentional misconduct, such as theft or burning. Courts historically used the term without inquiring into whether the carrier's conduct was intentional.

On loss, the majority reasoned that loss ordinarily means deprivation of property, regardless of the cause. A person can suffer a loss from intentional conduct as well as negligence. Konan's allegations, that the Postal Service converted her mail, meaning she was deprived of the use and possession of the property, constitute a loss of mail. The majority rejected the notion that loss requires inadvertence.

On the negligent transmission problem, Konan argued that negligent modifies not just transmission but implicitly qualifies loss and miscarriage as well. The majority rejected this, applying a principle from an earlier case called Barnhart v. Thomas. An adjective before the final noun in a list cannot be transplanted to qualify the preceding nouns. Congress intentionally limited negligent to transmission for a specific purpose: to foreclose claims involving mail even though nothing went wrong with its transport.

On surplusage, the majority acknowledged that all three terms overlap substantially, but rejected the presumption against surplusage as subordinate to the cardinal rule that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. Congress likely used broad, overlapping language to comprehensively protect postal operations from litigation.

The majority did not decide whether all of Konan's claims are barred, remanding for further proceedings.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Sotomayor filed a forceful dissent, joined by Justices Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson. Sotomayor argued that the postal exception's text shows Congress intended to exclude intentional misconduct. Further, even if ruling for Konan means more lawsuits, that is Congress's choice to make, not the Court's. The judiciary cannot rewrite statutes because a different rule would have preferable consequences. Her key points:

First, the negligent transmission signal is the most important clue. Congress's express inclusion of negligent before transmission is critical. If Congress intended to cover all conduct, both negligent and intentional, it would have either omitted negligent or added negligent and wrongful transmission. Instead, Congress made a deliberate choice to limit only transmission with negligent, implying intentional conduct falls outside the exception.

Second, loss and miscarriage ordinarily connote negligence. Sotomayor emphasized that ordinary speakers understand loss as unintentional deprivation. You lose your keys when you misplace them. You don't lose them when they're stolen. The Fifth Circuit correctly observed that no one intentionally loses something. Similarly, miscarriage suggests mistake or accident, not deliberate wrongdoing.

Third, there's a shifting perspective problem. The majority, to reach its conclusion about loss, must shift from asking whether the mail suffered a loss, which would be parallel to miscarriage and negligent transmission, to asking whether Konan suffered a loss. This inconsistency disappears if all three terms describe the Postal Service's conduct rather than harms to the mail.

Fourth, the postal exception is narrower than other exceptions. Earlier cases established that the postal exception is narrower than broader Federal Tort Claims Act exceptions. Congress could have granted immunity for all claims arising from the mail activities of the Postal Service but instead identified specific conduct. This specificity indicates intentional limitation.

Fifth, contextual evidence matters. Before the Federal Tort Claims Act, postal regulations distinguished between miscarriage and detention. When mail was intentionally held back, regulations used detention, not miscarriage, even though on the majority's reading, miscarriage would have sufficed. This suggests the terms were understood to have different meanings.

Sixth, the historical evidence is inadequate. Sotomayor critiqued the majority's historical examples as weak. The majority cited only cherry picked newspaper references almost 20 years apart, and at least 30 years before the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act, using miscarried, the verb, rather than miscarriage, the noun. The government failed to identify even one example of miscarriage being used to describe mail intentionally withheld or destroyed.

Sotomayor rejected the majority's floodgates argument. The 335,000 annual complaints to the Postal Service include everything from rude employee behavior to vehicle parking complaints, not serious tort claims. Filing a Federal Tort Claims Act suit requires exhausting administrative remedies and navigating federal court, whereas submitting a complaint requires only typing into an online form.

The Federal Tort Claims Act contains additional safeguards. Liability arises only when intentional conduct is tortious, falls within employment scope, and falls outside the discretionary function exception. Most intentional torts like theft likely fall outside scope of employment under agency law. Litigation tools like Rule 11 and modern pleading standards already prevent frivolous suits and effectively guard against abuse.

Whether Intent Matters When the Postal Service Fails to Deliver Mail

This case comes down to a simple question: if a postal worker deliberately withholds your mail, can you sue the government? The Supreme Court says no. By reading "loss" and "miscarriage" broadly enough to cover intentional conduct, the majority effectively closes the courthouse door on people like Konan, regardless of how badly a postal employee behaves.

The dissent's concern is practical. If the postal exception covers everything including intentional misconduct then there's no legal accountability when a postal worker targets someone's mail on purpose. The majority counters that Congress designed it this way to protect the massive machinery of mail delivery from a flood of litigation. But as Sotomayor points out, the law already has plenty of built-in filters to keep frivolous suits from clogging the courts.

What's left is a gap. The government can be sued for most intentional torts committed by federal employees, but not when those torts involve the mail. Whether that's what Congress actually intended in 1946 is now a question only Congress can answer.

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This case turned on a key detail in the law: it only places a small hurdle on adults, while giving the state room to protect kids from seeing explicit material online.

Texas passed a law that says certain websites with sexually explicit content need to check IDs or use data from a purchase to confirm you’re at least 18. The Supreme Court’s majority said that requirement touches adults’ speech only lightly. Under a middle‐of‐the‐road level of review, the law meets the test because it serves Texas’s important goal of keeping children from exposure to harmful material.

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote for the six justices who agreed that stopping kids from stumbling onto explicit sites is a worthy aim, and the law is carefully written so it doesn’t go too far. But a dissent by Justice Elena Kagan, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, warned this could chill online speech and set a dangerous precedent.

Summary of the Case

Free Speech Coalition, Inc., along with several commercial porn‐site operators and a performer, challenged Texas's 2023 H. B. 1181, which requires websites that publish content "obscene for minors" to verify users' ages before granting access. Petitioners argued that while Texas may bar minors from such speech, it may not condition adults' access to speech protected by the First Amendment. The U.S. District Court preliminarily enjoined enforcement, concluding that H. B. 1181 imposes a content‐based restriction on protected speech and thus must—and could not—survive strict scrutiny. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that H. B. 1181 regulates only minors' access to speech obscene to them (unprotected to minors) and imposes at most an incidental burden on adults' access; it applied rational‐basis review and upheld the law. The Supreme Court granted review to decide the proper First Amendment standard and whether H. B. 1181 is facially unconstitutional.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, held that H. B. 1181 triggers intermediate scrutiny. Although adults have a right to access speech that is not obscene by adult standards, the statute's age‐verification requirement "only incidentally burdens" that right, because the law principally serves to prevent minors from accessing content obscene to them. Under Supreme Court precedents, content‐based laws that directly target protected speech require strict scrutiny, but laws that regulate unprotected speech (or have only an incidental effect on protected speech) receive, respectively, no heightened or intermediate review. Because age verification is an "ordinary and appropriate means" of enforcing a state's traditional power to shield minors from sexual material—akin to requiring ID for alcohol or firearms—and does not directly forbid any adult speech, intermediate scrutiny applies. The Court then held that H. B. 1181 survives intermediate scrutiny. By adapting a longstanding in-person approach to the digital age and limiting verification to government IDs or transactional data, the statute advances Texas's important interest in protecting children without burdening substantially more speech than necessary.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, dissented. She argued that H. B. 1181 "directly burdens" adults' First Amendment right to access speech that is not obscene for them but only for minors, and it does so "because of" the speech's content. Under the content‐based framework, such a law must meet strict scrutiny—the least‐restrictive‐means test—regardless of its aim to protect children. Kagan contended that treating age verification as merely incidental "eviscerates" prior holdings that applied strict scrutiny to analogous burdens on protected speech, and she would remand for strict‐scrutiny review of whether Texas has adopted the least burdensome means.

The First Amendment Balancing Act: Age Verification vs. Adult Free Speech

When sexual material is "obscene for minors" but not for adults, it occupies a hybrid category: unprotected when offered to children, but protected when offered to consenting adults. States may bar minors from that speech without heightened First Amendment scrutiny, yet they cannot wholly prohibit adults from viewing it. A statute that conditions adults' access to otherwise protected content on age verification thus constitutes a content‐based regulation of protected speech.

Traditionally, content‐based restrictions on protected speech invoke strict scrutiny, requiring the government to prove it used the "least restrictive means" possible. The majority here departs by classifying such verification requirements as incidental to regulating minors' access and subjecting them to intermediate scrutiny—asking only whether the law "does not burden substantially more speech than necessary" to further an important non-suppressive interest. Critics warn that this test may permit burdensome age‐verification schemes so long as they serve the interest in preventing minors' access, potentially weakening protections for adult free speech.

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At the heart of this case is a fine point of law: whether the EPA’s decisions to reject Oklahoma’s and Utah’s air-quality plans should be treated as separate, local actions or lumped together into one big, national rule. The Supreme Court said these are individual, state-by-state decisions, based on detailed, local facts—and so they belong in the regional courts, not in Washington’s D.C. Circuit. By breaking up what the EPA calls an “omnibus” rule into its pieces, the justices made clear that each plan needs its own fresh look. They also ruled that because the agency focused on state-specific data rather than on a broad, countrywide impact, the exception that would force review in D.C. doesn’t apply. Stay tuned after the break to find out what this means for future challenges to environmental rules and how it could shape the battle over clean air.

Summary of the Case

In 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) strengthened the air quality standard for ground-level ozone. Under the Clean Air Act's "Good Neighbor" provision, states must submit plans showing how they'll prevent their emissions from affecting neighboring states' ability to meet these standards. The EPA reviewed plans from 21 states, disapproved them, and published all these disapprovals in a single document. In this document, the EPA stated that any challenges should be filed in the D.C. Circuit Court.

Several states, including Oklahoma and Utah, along with industry groups, sued in their regional circuit courts instead. When the Tenth Circuit transferred Oklahoma and Utah's challenges to the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court stepped in to resolve a key question: Should challenges to EPA's disapprovals of state plans be heard in the D.C. Circuit or in the appropriate regional circuit courts?

Opinion of the Court

Justice Thomas, writing for a six-Justice majority, applied a two-step framework from a recent case (EPA v. Calumet). First, courts must identify whether the EPA's action is "nationally applicable" or just "locally or regionally applicable." Second, if the action is only locally or regionally applicable, courts must determine if there's an exception because the action is "based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect."

The Court held that each state plan disapproval is a separate action under the law. The Clean Air Act specifically treats actions on state implementation plans as locally or regionally applicable. The EPA's decision to bundle 21 disapprovals into one document doesn't transform them into a single nationwide action.

The Court also rejected the EPA's argument that these disapprovals fell within the "nationwide scope or effect" exception. Although the EPA used some common approaches across all reviews, these were just tools in what remained state-specific analyses. No single nationwide determination drove all the disapprovals. Therefore, challenges to the Oklahoma and Utah disapprovals must proceed in their regional circuit courts, not the D.C. Circuit.

Separate Opinions

Justice Gorsuch, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, agreed with the outcome but disagreed with the majority's approach. He would have relied strictly on the text of the Clean Air Act without adopting the two-step framework. Gorsuch believed the statute clearly indicates that state plan denials should be reviewed in regional courts unless the law explicitly says otherwise.

No Justice dissented. Justice Alito did not participate in the case.

Understanding Venue Rules in Clean Air Act Challenges

The Clean Air Act creates specific rules about where EPA actions can be challenged in court. It draws a clear line between "nationally applicable" actions (which can only be challenged in the D.C. Circuit) and "locally or regionally applicable" actions (which must be challenged in the regional circuit court where the affected state is located).

There's an exception: if a local or regional action is "based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect," and the EPA officially declares this in its publication, then the case can go to the D.C. Circuit instead.

This structure ensures that challenges are directed to the appropriate court based on the nature of the EPA's action, not on how the EPA packages its decisions. The law recognizes that some regional decisions might have national implications, but it requires the EPA to explicitly state when a decision is primarily driven by factors that apply uniformly across all states.

This approach balances the Clean Air Act's design as a cooperative federal-state program with the occasional need for uniform national regulation. In this case, the Court determined that the EPA's disapprovals of state plans remained separate state-specific actions, despite being published together, and therefore challenges should be heard in the regional circuit courts.

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Courts often wrestle with subtle rules about where a case should be heard. Here, the debate was over a single refinery’s request for relief under the Clean Air Act and whether the EPA’s denial should land in a local court or in Washington.

The Supreme Court noted that saying “no” to one refinery is a decision about that one plant. But because the EPA used nationwide rules to reach its decision, the case belongs in the D.C. Circuit instead of the Fifth Circuit in Texas. In the end, the Justices wiped out the Fifth Circuit’s ruling and sent the whole matter back for another look under those national guidelines.

Summary of the Case

In 2022, the Environmental Protection Agency issued two omnibus notices denying 105 small refineries' petitions for hardship exemptions under the Clean Air Act's Renewable Fuel Program (RFP). Small refineries, defined as those processing no more than 75,000 barrels per day, may petition EPA for an exemption from blending obligations "for the reason of disproportionate economic hardship." EPA's denials rested on (1) a uniform interpretation that hardship must be caused by RFP compliance, and (2) an economic model—its "RIN passthrough" theory—presuming no small refinery bears a disproportionate cost. EPA characterized its denials as reviewable only in the D.C. Circuit, either as "nationally applicable" actions or, alternately, as locally applicable actions "based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect." Petitions were filed instead in multiple regional circuits. All but the Fifth Circuit either dismissed or transferred the cases; the Fifth retained venue, rejected EPA's statutory arguments on venue, and vacated EPA's denials on the merits. EPA sought the Supreme Court's review to resolve a circuit split over venue under the Clean Air Act.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Thomas, writing for a 7–2 majority (Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, Jackson), held that EPA's denials of individual exemption petitions are "locally or regionally applicable" actions that nonetheless fall within the Clean Air Act's "nationwide scope or effect" exception, thus channeling venue to the D.C. Circuit. First, the "action" at issue is EPA's denial of each refinery's petition, as defined by the RFP exemption provision, not EPA's choice to aggregate denials. Those denials are locally applicable because each applies only to a particular refinery. Second, although locally applicable actions generally go to regional circuits, the law directs that any locally applicable action "based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect" (and accompanied by EPA's published finding) must be reviewed in the D.C. Circuit. A "determination" is any agency conclusion, and it is of nationwide scope or effect if it applies across the country and forms the core driver of the action. Here, EPA's uniform interpretation of "disproportionate economic hardship" and its RIN passthrough theory apply to all refineries and served as the primary basis for its denials (with refinery-specific facts considered only to confirm a presumption). The Fifth Circuit therefore erred in retaining venue. Judgment vacated; remanded for transfer and further proceedings.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Gorsuch, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, dissented. He agreed the individual petition denials are locally applicable. But he would confine the "nationwide scope or effect" exception to cases in which a substantive Clean Air Act provision itself calls on EPA to make a nationwide determination. Since the small-refinery exemption scheme requires only refinery-specific determinations—whether each petitioning facility would suffer disproportionate economic hardship—Gorsuch would leave venue in the Fifth Circuit and employ a bright-line, text-rooted test rather than the majority's multistep "core driver" inquiry.

Understanding Venue Rules for EPA Decisions: When Local Cases Go National

The Clean Air Act establishes a three-part framework for determining where challenges to EPA decisions must be heard:

1. Nationally applicable actions (like setting new air quality standards) must be challenged in the D.C. Circuit Court
2. Locally or regionally applicable actions (like approving a state's implementation plan) ordinarily go to the appropriate regional circuit court
3. However, any locally applicable action "based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect," if EPA publishes that finding, must also be heard in the D.C. Circuit

To identify what constitutes an "action," courts look to the specific Clean Air Act provision authorizing it—in this case, EPA's duty to respond to small refinery exemption petitions. An action is "based on" a nationwide determination only if that determination is the primary, "core" justification driving the agency's decision—not just one of many factors considered. The term "determination" simply means an agency's settled conclusion.

Courts independently review whether EPA's action truly rested on such a nationwide determination, while giving EPA discretion to invoke the exception. This structure ensures that nationally significant policy decisions are centralized in the D.C. Circuit, while truly local matters remain in regional courts unless they genuinely rest on a nationwide policy determination.

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A little-known detail about how one law can push another out of the way is the subject of this case. The Supreme Court looked at two rules for paying special combat benefits to veterans. One law, the Combat-Related Special Compensation statute, says the Secretary of Defense gets to decide who qualifies and how much they receive. An older law, called the Barring Act, set up its own claim process and a six-year deadline.

The justices, speaking through Justice Thomas in a unanimous opinion, said the CRSC rule stands on its own. Because it’s a separate law, it replaces the Barring Act’s steps and time limit. In plain terms, veterans seeking these extra payments will follow the newer CRSC path and won’t be blocked by the old six-year window.

Summary of the Case

Petitioner Simon Soto, a Marine Corps veteran medically retired in 2006 with a 100 percent VA disability rating for post-traumatic stress disorder, applied in 2016 for "combat-related special compensation" (CRSC). Although the Navy approved his CRSC status, it limited retroactive payments to six years, citing the six-year statute of limitations in the "Barring Act." Soto filed a nationwide class-action suit arguing that the CRSC law itself provides authority to settle claims, thereby displacing the Barring Act's default procedures and time limits. The district court ruled in favor of Soto's class, but the Federal Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court then agreed to hear the case to resolve whether the CRSC law displaces the Barring Act.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed that the CRSC law provides an independent settlement mechanism and thus displaces the Barring Act. The Court defined "settlement" of Government claims as involving two key powers: determining if a claim is valid and calculating the amount owed. The Court emphasized that Congress doesn't need to use the specific word "settle" to grant settlement authority.

The CRSC law gives military department Secretaries authority to administer these benefits: it directs them to consider whether each applicant is eligible (resolving claim validity) and prescribes how to determine the monthly amount payable. Read as a whole, the CRSC law establishes a "self-contained, comprehensive compensation scheme" that authorizes the Secretary to perform both settlement functions, thereby displacing the six-year limitation period.

The Court rejected the Federal Circuit's insistence on requiring explicit settlement language or a specific limitations period. Congress can create a compensation scheme without including a time limit; the absence of such a period reflects a deliberate choice appropriate for a narrowly defined class of beneficiaries. The Court also dismissed the Government's policy concerns, finding that the statutory text and structure were sufficient to resolve the case.

How Veterans' Benefits Laws Override General Time Limits

At the heart of this case is the relationship between the Barring Act's default claims-settlement system and the special law Congress created for combat-related compensation. The Barring Act serves as a fallback—authorizing government agencies to "settle" certain military-pay claims and imposing a six-year deadline—unless "another law" provides settlement authority.

Congress doesn't need to explicitly label a statute as a "settlement" law. Instead, courts look at whether the law assigns an agency to (1) evaluate if claims are valid and (2) calculate how much is owed. The CRSC law includes both elements: it directs the Secretary to "consider" eligibility and instructs how to "determine" the monthly payment amount.

The absence of a time limit in the CRSC law is significant: it shows Congress chose not to impose deadlines for this special category of combat-disabled veterans. This structure indicates a legislative decision to completely replace the Barring Act's framework, even without using the word "settle" or specifying an alternative time limit.

The Court's analysis highlights an important principle of statutory interpretation: when Congress creates a specific, self-contained benefits system that includes both elements of settlement authority, that law governs—regardless of whether it contains traditional legal terminology or deadlines. The Soto decision reinforces that a law's effect comes from its text, context, and structure, not from specific magic words.

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BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, Docket No. 23-1259

When the Supreme Court steps in to sort out a tight corner of court rules, it reminds us how every word counts. In Blom Bank v. Honickman, a bank asked to reopen a closed case so it could tweak its complaint. But there’s a rule that says you can only reopen a case for really rare, compelling reasons; so rare that they call them “extraordinary circumstances.”

The bank argued it should get a break because courts usually let you fix mistakes in your papers. The Second Circuit tried to balance that friendly approach with the strict reopening rule. The high court said no. Justice Thomas, writing for all nine justices, made clear you have to clear the high bar of "extraordinary circumstances" before you even think about making changes. Since the bank couldn’t show that kind of reason, its request stayed shut.

Summary of the Case

BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman arose after victims of Hamas terrorist attacks (2001–2003) sued BLOM Bank under the Anti-Terrorism Act, alleging the bank "aided and abetted" Hamas by providing financial services to allegedly affiliated customers. The District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to plead the required "general awareness" element of aiding-and-abetting liability and denied leave to amend when plaintiffs declined opportunities to replead. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal but granted relief to reopen and amend by "balancing" finality concerns against liberal amendment policy. The Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the "extraordinary circumstances" standard yields to more lenient amendment rules when a movant seeks to amend its complaint after final judgment.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Thomas, writing for an eight-Justice majority, held that relief to reopen a case remains governed by the "extraordinary circumstances" standard even when a party seeks to reopen for amendment. The Court emphasized that this relief provision is a narrow "catchall" only for grounds not covered by other specific provisions, and that a broad reading would undermine time limitations built into the rules. It rejected the Second Circuit's approach of "balancing" different procedural rules, explaining that the liberal amendment standard applies only to pre-trial amendments and cannot dilute the stringency of reopening requirements once judgment is final. The Court reversed the Second Circuit and reaffirmed that plaintiffs must demonstrate "extraordinary circumstances" before being allowed to reopen a case for repleading.

Separate Opinions

Justice Jackson concurred in part and in the judgment, joining the majority except for one section. She agreed that the "extraordinary circumstances" standard governs motions to reopen but cautioned against reading precedent to bar reopening whenever a plaintiff previously declined to amend. Jackson emphasized that exercising a right to appeal does not automatically disqualify a movant from seeking relief to reopen and stressed that "due diligence" must be assessed in context.

When Final Means Final: The High Bar for Reopening Closed Cases

The Court's ruling reinforces that reopening a closed case is designed to preserve finality by permitting relief only in "extraordinary circumstances"—a principle established in earlier Supreme Court cases. This strict standard cannot be used to evade the one-year limit on relief for mistake, new evidence, or fraud. The Court clarified that the instruction to "freely give leave" to amend applies to pre-judgment amendments, not to cases closed by final judgment. By requiring movants to satisfy the extraordinary circumstances test before seeking amendment, the Court maintained the integrity of the Federal Rules—ensuring that a party's desire to amend does not weaken the high standard for reopening cases or render other procedural safeguards meaningless. This decision provides important guidance on the balance between finality in litigation and opportunities to correct pleadings.

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Wrestling with a subtle twist in federal law the high court rules on the question: Can failing to act still count as using physical force against someone?

In Delligatti v. United States, Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by six other justices, said yes. If you knowingly cause serious injury or death, even by omission, you “use” physical force under the law. So a crime like New York second-degree murder, which can happen by ignoring a legal duty, still counts as a crime of violence.

Summary of the Case

Salvatore Delligatti, a member of the Genovese crime family, was indicted for recruiting associates to murder a suspected informant and supplying them with a loaded revolver. The Government charged him under a law which imposes a mandatory consecutive five-year sentence for using or carrying a firearm “during and in relation to any crime of violence.” VICAR attempted murder was grounded in New York second-degree murder, defined as intentionally causing death. Delligatti moved to dismiss on the ground that second-degree murder, as defined in New York which can be committed by omission of a legal duty, does not “have as an element the use…of physical force” within the elements clause. The District Court denied the motion, and the Second Circuit affirmed, relying on United States v. Castleman to hold that intentional causation involves the use of physical force and thus qualifies as a crime of violence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari “to decide whether an individual who…causes bodily injury or death by failing to take action uses physical force within the meaning of the elements clause.”

Opinion of the Court

Justice Thomas, writing for a 7–2 majority, affirmed. Applying the categorical approach, the Court held that “the knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the ‘use of physical force’”. Relying on Castleman, the majority extended its two-step reasoning: (1) deliberate causation of bodily harm cannot occur without force, and (2) intentional application of force—direct or indirect—is a “use” of force. Although Castleman involved misdemeanor-level battery force and § 924(c) requires “violent force,” another case, Stokeling, established that any force sufficient to cause injury or death meets § 924(c)’s threshold. The Court then rejected Delligatti’s challenge that omissions lack “use” of force “against” another: ordinary usage permits one to “use” a preexisting force by inaction like if a parent were to with food, and “against the person” simply specifies the force’s conscious object. Finally, the historic meaning of “crime of violence,” encompassing causes-and-results offenses like murder by omission, confirmed that indictments for New York second-degree murder fall squarely within § 924(c).

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Jackson, dissented. They argued that the statute’s text—“use…of physical force against the person…of another”—contemplates only active, “violent” physical acts, not omissions. The dissent emphasized that “use” carries an active meaning, that omissions do not involve employing force, and that, contrary to the majority, a statutory definition must prevail over presumed legislative purpose or selective precedential readings.

Physical Force

Section 924(c) defines “crime of violence” through two clauses:
• Elements clause: a federal felony that “has as an element the use…of physical force against the person or property of another.”
• Residual clause: an offense that “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force…may be used.”

In Davis, the Court invalidated the residual clause for vagueness, leaving only the elements clause. Courts apply the categorical approach, comparing the statutory elements—not a defendant’s conduct—to § 924(c). Dispute centers on “use of physical force”: is it restricted to affirmative, violent acts, or does it encompass knowing causation by omission? The majority embraces a holistic reading—grounded in Castleman, Stokeling, and historical common-law definitions of violent offenses—while the dissent remains faithful to a text-first approach that sees “use” as necessarily active. This interpretive divide reflects broader tensions in criminal law between textual precision, ordinary meaning, and purposive alignment with “prototypical” violent crimes.

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The heart of this case is a fine difference in how a veteran’s disability claim gets reviewed. When the Department of Veterans Affairs decides that evidence for a service-related injury is in “approximate balance,” that call is treated as mostly a factual finding. The Supreme Court said appeals courts must give deference to that factual decision; checking only for clear mistakes while still reviewing any legal questions from scratch. Petitioners had argued for a full, fresh look at all the evidence, but the Court rejected that. In practical terms, the VA’s tie-breaking “benefit-of-the-doubt” rule stands unless a court can point to a clear error.

Summary of the Case

Veterans Joshua Bufkin and Norman Thornton appealed adverse VA determinations of their service-connected PTSD claims. Bufkin, discharged for hardship, sought VA benefits for PTSD allegedly caused by marital distress in service; the VA denied service connection after three conflicting medical examinations. Thornton, already rated for PTSD and unemployability, sought an increase in his PTSD disability rating; the VA declined to impose more severe symptom findings. Both veterans petitioned the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, which applied the “benefit-of-the-doubt” rule and found that neither record was in “approximate balance,” so neither veteran prevailed. The Veterans Court affirmed applying a “[t]aking due account” standard. The Federal Circuit rejected arguments that “take due account” requires full de novo review of approximate-balance determinations. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the scope of the subsection defining "taking due account."

Opinion of the Court

Justice Thomas, writing for a seven-justice majority, held that "taking due account" simply directs the Veterans Court to apply established standards of review. Standards include de novo for legal issues and clear-error for factual issues, to the VA’s benefit-of-the-doubt determinations. The Court parsed the statute's language to “take due account” as an instruction to “give appropriate attention” to the VA’s work “in making the determinations under subsection (a).” Because the “approximate balance” inquiry comprises two steps—(1) assigning weight to individual pieces of evidence (a factual finding) and (2) determining whether the record as a whole meets the “approximate balance” legal standard—it is at most a mixed question. And where a question is predominantly factual, clear-error review is appropriate. The Court rejected analogies to constitutional probable-cause review or criminal sufficiency challenges, which pose principally legal questions warranting de novo review, and found this matter to have considered the essential information.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Gorsuch, dissented. She argued that § 7261(b)(1) was intended to counteract the Veterans Court’s historically deferential handling of benefit-of-the-doubt issues and to require independent, nondeferential review of those determinations. According to the dissent, deciding whether evidence is in “approximate balance” poses a mixed question of law and fact analogous to probable-cause or sufficiency inquiries and thus demands de novo review. She viewed the majority’s reading as rendering subsection (b)(1) superfluous and at odds with Congress’s amendment.

Nuance of the Law

At issue is the interplay among (1) the VA’s statutory “benefit-of-the-doubt” rule, which entitles a veteran to favorable resolution when record evidence is in “approximate balance”; (2) the Veterans Court’s basic review standards; and (3) § 7261(b)(1), which commands the Veterans Court to “take due account” of the VA’s application of § 5107(b). The Court’s holding delineates that challenges to the VA’s benefit-of-the-doubt determinations must be reviewed under the same standards used for other issues under § 7261(a): factual weight assignments are reviewed for clear error, whereas purely legal questions remain subject to de novo review. This preserves Congress’s pro-veteran policy by ensuring that Veterans Courts give due attention to the VA’s benefit-of-the-doubt work without upending the established standard-of-review framework.

Get ready for a deep dive into a fascinating Supreme Court case that's shaking up the legal world. We're about to unpack Diaz v. United States, a ruling that's stirring debate about expert testimony in courtrooms across the nation. At the heart of this decision lies a provocative question: How far can experts go when discussing group behavior without stepping over the line? Stay tuned as we break down the Court's nuanced stance on this delicate balance between expert insight and legal boundaries. You won't want to miss this exploration of justice in action.

In simpler terms, the Court ruled that saying "most people" think or feel a certain way is different from saying that a specific person, like the defendant, thinks or feels that way. This distinction is important because it allows the jury to make their own judgment about the defendant's knowledge and intentions based on the evidence presented.

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the majority opinion, and he was joined by several other justices, including John Roberts and Amy Coney Barrett. However, there was a dissenting opinion from Justice Neil Gorsuch, who had some concerns about this approach.

This case highlights the nuances of how we understand expert testimony in court and the careful balance the law tries to maintain when it comes to a defendant's rights.

Summary of the Case

The case of Diaz v. United States arose from the conviction of Delilah Diaz for importing methamphetamine across the U.S.-Mexico border. During a routine stop, border patrol officers discovered over 54 pounds of methamphetamine hidden in her vehicle. Diaz claimed she was unaware of the drugs, asserting a "blind mule" defense. The government sought to introduce expert testimony from Homeland Security Investigations Special Agent Andrew Flood, who would testify that most drug couriers are aware they are transporting drugs. Diaz objected to this testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), which prohibits expert witnesses from stating opinions about a defendant's mental state. The trial court allowed Flood to testify that most couriers know they are transporting drugs, leading to Diaz's conviction. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the conviction, stating that Flood's testimony did not violate Rule 704(b) because it did not explicitly address Diaz's mental state.

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court, in a decision delivered by Justice Thomas, affirmed the Ninth Circuit's ruling. The Court held that expert testimony regarding the mental state of "most people" in a group does not constitute an opinion about the specific defendant's mental state, thus not violating Rule 704(b). The Court clarified that Rule 704(b) is narrowly tailored to prohibit expert opinions that directly address whether a defendant had the requisite mental state for the crime charged. Since Agent Flood's testimony did not assert that Diaz herself knowingly transported drugs, but rather that most couriers do, it did not infringe upon the rule. The Court emphasized that the ultimate determination of Diaz's mental state was left to the jury, which could consider Flood's testimony as part of the evidence.

Separate Opinions

Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion, agreeing with the Court's decision but emphasizing that Rule 704(b) is party-agnostic. She noted that both the prosecution and defense can present expert testimony regarding the likelihood of a defendant's mental state based on group characteristics, as long as it does not directly address the defendant's specific mental state.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, dissented. He argued that the Court's ruling undermines the intent of Rule 704(b) by allowing expert testimony that indirectly addresses a defendant's mental state through generalizations about a group. Gorsuch contended that this approach could lead to a slippery slope where expert opinions about the mental states of groups could effectively replace the jury's role in determining a defendant's culpability. He stressed that the government should not be permitted to use expert testimony to suggest that a defendant is likely to share the mental state of "most" individuals in a similar situation.

Federal Rule of Evidence

The case highlights the complexities surrounding Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), which was designed to prevent expert witnesses from usurping the jury's role in determining a defendant's mental state. The rule reflects a balance between allowing relevant expert testimony and preserving the jury's exclusive function in assessing a defendant's culpability. The Court's interpretation emphasizes that while expert testimony can inform the jury about general trends or behaviors within a group, it must not directly address the specific mental state of the defendant. This distinction is crucial in maintaining the integrity of the jury's decision-making process in criminal trials, ensuring that the burden of proof remains with the prosecution and that defendants are not unfairly prejudiced by generalized assumptions about their behavior.

The Supreme Court recently dove into the balance between personal rights and free speech. In the case of Vidal versus Elster, the Court looked at a part of the Lanham Act, which is a law that deals with trademarks. This specific part, known as the names clause, says you can't register a trademark that includes the name of a living person unless you have their permission.

The justices decided that this rule does not go against the First Amendment, which protects our freedom of speech. They explained that while this rule does regulate speech, it does so in a way that is fair and neutral. The Court pointed out that this names clause has a long history in our legal system, which helps support its constitutionality.

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the majority opinion, and he was joined by several other justices, including Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch. They all agreed that protecting individuals from having their names used without consent is an important principle that aligns with our traditions.

So, in essence, the Court affirmed that while we cherish free speech, there are also important boundaries in place to protect people's identities and personal rights.

Summary of the Case

The case of Vidal v. Elster arose when Steve Elster sought to register the trademark "Trump too small" for use on apparel, referencing a 2016 presidential debate exchange. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) denied the application based on the "names clause" of the Lanham Act, which prohibits the registration of trademarks that consist of or comprise a name identifying a living individual without their consent. Elster argued that this prohibition violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board upheld the PTO's decision, but the Federal Circuit reversed, leading to the Supreme Court's review.

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court held that the names clause of the Lanham Act does not violate the First Amendment. The Court distinguished between content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech, noting that while the names clause is content-based, it is not viewpoint-based. The Court emphasized that the clause does not discriminate against any particular viewpoint; it simply prohibits the registration of trademarks that use another person's name without consent. The Court also noted the historical context of trademark law, which has always included content-based restrictions, and concluded that such restrictions coexist with First Amendment protections. The judgment of the Federal Circuit was reversed, affirming the constitutionality of the names clause.

Separate Opinions

Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, agreeing with the Court's conclusion that the names clause is constitutional but expressing that a viewpoint-neutral, content-based trademark restriction might be constitutional even without a historical pedigree. Justice Barrett, while concurring in part, disagreed with the Court's reliance on historical tradition as the sole basis for its decision, advocating for a standard that assesses whether such restrictions are reasonable in light of trademark law's purpose.

Dissenting Opinions

There were no dissenting opinions in this case. All Justices agreed on the outcome that the names clause does not violate the First Amendment, although they differed in their reasoning and methodology.

The First Amendment and Trademark Law

The case highlights the nuanced relationship between trademark law and the First Amendment. The names clause is a content-based regulation that restricts the registration of trademarks based on the presence of a person's name. The Court's analysis revealed that while content-based regulations are generally subject to heightened scrutiny, the historical context of trademark law, which has long included such restrictions, suggests that they do not inherently conflict with free speech principles. The Court's decision underscores the importance of historical precedent in evaluating the constitutionality of regulations that, while content-based, do not discriminate against viewpoints. This case sets a precedent for future challenges to trademark restrictions, indicating that historical tradition may play a significant role in determining their constitutionality.

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