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Is an agency is really the state itself, or just a separate organization the state created? That difference matters because states can sometimes avoid being sued in another state’s courts.

In Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corporation, the Supreme Court said New Jersey Transit is not an “arm of the State” of New Jersey. That means NJ Transit does not get to share New Jersey’s protection from being sued in the courts of another state.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote for a unanimous Court. The justices pointed to how New Jersey set up NJ Transit as its own legal entity with the usual powers that corporations have. In legal language, a “body corporate and politic.” The Court also noted that, under New Jersey law, the state is not formally on the hook for NJ Transit’s debts or court judgments, and the state’s control over NJ Transit didn’t change the bottom line.

The Court affirmed the New York Court of Appeals and reversed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, sending the cases back down.

Summary of the Case

Two people were injured in separate accidents involving New Jersey Transit buses. One was struck by a bus in Manhattan, and another was hit when a bus collided with his car in Philadelphia. Both victims sued NJ Transit in their home state courts: one in New York, the other in Pennsylvania.

NJ Transit asked both courts to dismiss the lawsuits. The transit agency argued it was legally an arm of the State of New Jersey and therefore protected by sovereign immunity, which generally prevents people from suing state governments.

This created a problem. The New York Court of Appeals disagreed with NJ Transit's claim and allowed the lawsuit to proceed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with NJ Transit and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court stepped in to resolve this conflict and establish clear rules for determining when a state-created entity qualifies as an arm of the state for immunity purposes.

The Court ruled unanimously that NJ Transit is not an arm of New Jersey and therefore cannot claim the state's sovereign immunity. The New York judgment was affirmed, and the Pennsylvania judgment was reversed.

Arguments Made By Counsel

NJ Transit's position rested on several grounds. First, the agency argued that formal corporate status should not be the deciding factor. What mattered was the state's intent and the entity's function. Second, NJ Transit argued it served essential governmental functions, specifically transportation infrastructure, while being heavily controlled and funded by New Jersey. Third, the agency pointed out that New Jersey's own characterization of NJ Transit as an instrumentality of the state should carry significant weight. Fourth, NJ Transit emphasized practical realities. The state provided between 15 and 46 percent of its operating budget over decades, demonstrating financial integration with the state.

The victims' counter-argument, supported by New York's highest court, emphasized formal legal structure. NJ Transit was incorporated as a body corporate and politic with traditional corporate powers: the right to sue and be sued, to contract, and to acquire property. The state's statute explicitly disclaimed liability for the corporation's debts. These formal characteristics, they argued, signaled a legally separate entity regardless of how much control the state exercised.

At stake was a fundamental tension in administrative law. Can a state use corporate form as a strategic tool to shield itself from liability while maintaining operational control? Or does the choice of corporate form carry irrevocable legal consequences?

Opinion of the Court

Justice Sotomayor's opinion traced the Court's entire history on this question back to 1824, establishing a clear framework for when an organization remains part of the state versus when it's legally separate.

The key question is whether the state has created a truly independent legal entity. The Court identified three main factors. First, legal structure: Is it set up as a corporation with standard corporate powers—like the ability to sue and be sued? This is the strongest evidence of independence, and states often deliberately choose this form to shield themselves from liability. Second, formal liability: Under state law, is the state legally responsible for the entity's debts? If the state is on the hook, it's more likely part of the government. Third, state control: While this matters somewhat, the Court warned it's an unreliable indicator since states control many genuinely independent entities like cities and counties.

Applying these factors to NJ Transit, the Court found it was clearly independent. NJ Transit is legally structured as a corporation with full corporate powers. New Jersey's law explicitly states that NJ Transit's debts are not the state's debts. Although New Jersey has substantial control through appointments and board representation, state law simultaneously requires NJ Transit to operate independently. This combination of legal separation and formal non-liability outweighed the state's control, making NJ Transit legally distinct from New Jersey itself.

When Corporate Form Determines Sovereign Immunity Status

The real sophistication in this opinion lies in what the Court rejected and why. These rejections reveal what this case is fundamentally about.

Most importantly, the Court rejected the idea that how much a state funds an entity should determine its status. New Jersey's funding of NJ Transit varied wildly over 35 years from 15 to 46 percent of the budget. Where would you draw the line? And it would be absurd if NJ Transit was part of the state in 2010 (when funding was high) but not in 2015 (when funding was lower). The relevant question is formal legal responsibility, not whether the state happens to pay its bills.

Twenty-three states urged the Court to let states decide the issue simply by labeling an entity. If New Jersey calls NJ Transit an instrumentality of the state, case closed. The Court refused because it would let states game the system. They could change an entity's status whenever convenient by rewriting their laws. Beyond that, NJ Transit's own statute used contradictory labels (calling it both an "instrumentality" and a "body corporate"), so even a label-based test wouldn't actually resolve uncertainty. Courts would still need to dig deeper.

NJ Transit argued that operating transit systems is a core government responsibility, proving it should be part of the state. The Court rejected this too. The problem is that "essential" is vague and subjective. Cities and counties perform essential functions but aren't arms of the state. The American Red Cross does essential work in disasters but has no sovereign immunity. The real question isn't whether an entity does something important. It's whether the state runs it directly or created it as a legally separate organization to do the job.

Underlying all these rejections is a clearer principle: sovereign immunity protects a state's control over its own budget decisions. If an entity is formally responsible for its own judgments, the money comes from that entity's budget, not the state's. The state can choose to bail it out afterward, but it hasn't automatically committed its treasury. That preserves what immunity is really meant to protect—the state's freedom to decide how to spend its resources.

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The question answered by a unanimous Supreme Court was about asylum and the word "persecution." When the facts aren’t in dispute, who gets the last word on whether those facts add up to persecution under the immigration law: the immigration agency or the federal appeals court? The Court said the Immigration and Nationality Act requires appeals courts to use a “substantial evidence” standard when reviewing the Board of Immigration Appeals on that point. In other words, the appeals court must defer not only to the agency’s fact findings, but also to the agency’s application of the persecution standard to those facts.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson writes for the Court affirming the First Circuit, which had upheld the agency’s denial of the petitioners’ asylum applications.

Summary of the Case

Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana and his family fled El Salvador and came to the United States seeking asylum. They had been targeted by a hitman for years. When they appeared before an immigration judge, they told their story: death threats, a shooting that killed two of Douglas's half-brothers, having to move repeatedly to escape danger, and constant intimidation. The judge believed every single word they said. The judge found their testimony completely credible.

But here's where things get complicated. Even though the judge believed everything the family said was true, the judge still denied their asylum claim. The reason? The judge decided that what happened to them, while terrible, didn't legally count as persecution under federal immigration law.

Think about that for a moment. The facts weren't in dispute. The judge believed the family. But the judge concluded that these true facts didn't meet the legal definition of persecution.

The family appealed, arguing that once everyone agrees on the facts and the testimony is credible, federal appeals courts should be able to independently decide whether those facts meet the legal definition of persecution. The First Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and upheld the denial. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case because different federal appeals courts around the country had been answering this question differently.

Arguments Made By Counsel

Nicholas Rosellini represented the Urias-Orellana family. He argued that persecution is a specialized legal term that comes from international refugee law. It's not just an ordinary word that anyone can define. Unlike everyday terms that judges deal with all the time, persecution requires specialized legal interpretation. The immigration statute says that courts should defer only to findings of fact. Once the facts are undisputed and everyone agrees the testimony is credible, deciding whether those facts constitute persecution becomes a purely legal question. And legal questions, Rosellini argued, should get fresh review by appeals courts without any deference to the immigration judge's conclusion.

Rosellini compared this to copyright law. When courts decide whether something is fair use under copyright law, they independently review whether undisputed facts satisfy the fair use standard, even though that analysis involves looking at lots of specific facts. He also pointed out that the Board of Immigration Appeals, the administrative body that reviews immigration judge decisions, reviews persecution determinations with fresh eyes internally. This suggests, he argued, that even the agency itself recognizes this as fundamentally a legal question rather than a factual one.

Joshua Dos Santos represented the government. He argued that the persecution determination is primarily about facts, even though it has legal components. Applying the persecution standard to specific facts requires weighing evidence, drawing inferences about the totality of circumstances, and evaluating patterns over time. These are all classic factfinding tasks. Immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals have reviewed thousands of these cases over the years. They've developed superior judgment about what constitutes persecution.

Most importantly, dos Santos emphasized the historical context. Back in 1992, the Supreme Court decided a case called INS v. Elias-Zacarias. That case established that persecution determinations get deferential review, meaning appeals courts should give significant weight to what immigration judges decide. Congress knew about this decision. In 1996, Congress passed a major immigration reform law called the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. The language Congress used in that law tracked the language from Elias-Zacarias. The overall thrust of that 1996 law was to restrict judicial review throughout immigration law. Given that context, dos Santos argued, it would be inconsistent with what Congress intended to allow fresh, independent review of persecution determinations.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson wrote an opinion that all nine justices supported unanimously. The Court upheld a lower court's decision and clarified how courts should review asylum cases. Under federal law, courts must defer to immigration judges' factual findings unless no reasonable decision maker would reach the same conclusion. The Court ruled that this standard applies to the entire asylum determination—both the facts and how those facts are legally analyzed.

Jackson based her decision on two foundations: prior Supreme Court precedent and the original intent of Congress. A 1992 case established this exact standard, even if it didn't use the phrase "substantial evidence." Jackson invoked a principle called the "aware legislator canon"—the idea that Congress knows about Supreme Court decisions when it passes new laws. When Congress rewrote immigration law in 1996 using similar language, it signaled that it meant to adopt the same approach, not change it.

Jackson tackled a key objection directly: asylum decisions involve legal judgment, not just facts. But she explained that asylum determinations are fundamentally factual. Immigration judges assess whether witnesses are credible, evaluate testimony, and weigh evidence about conditions in other countries. Credibility is itself a factual finding that courts should respect. It would make no sense, Jackson wrote, to defer to the factual findings while independently second-guessing whether those facts satisfy a legal standard. The asylum determination requires judges to make crucial factual assessments about each applicant's actual experiences.

Jackson also distinguished two other recent cases the family cited. Those cases dealt with whether courts can hear cases at all. This case is about how closely courts examine decisions they do review. These are separate questions, and one doesn't determine the other. This distinction was central to Jackson's reasoning.

When Facts Are Clear But Legal Conclusions Get Deference

The decision resolves disagreement among federal appeals courts but leaves some boundaries unclear.

Courts must defer to immigration judges' decisions on asylum cases in their entirety. These courts decide both the facts and whether those facts meet the legal standard for persecution. It codifies what courts were already doing. Justice Jackson treated the 1996 immigration law as maintaining that earlier practice, reflecting respect for continuity.

There's an important exception: pure challenges to the persecution standard itself get independent review. But the line between "these facts don't satisfy your standard" and "your standard is wrong" blurs in practice, and courts will struggle to draw it consistently.

The decision prioritizes agency expertise over independent judicial development of law. Rather than letting courts build sophisticated legal principles through reviewing cases (as they do in tort law), Jackson deferred to Congress's judgment about agency authority. When statutes set review standards, courts enforce them even if other arrangements might seem better.

The opinion relies on the "aware legislator canon." This canon assumes Congress knows about Supreme Court precedent when passing laws. When Congress reused similar language in 1996, it signals intent to maintain the earlier approach. But Congress often reuses language for convenience without fully considering its implications, so this assumption risks reading false precision into legislative intent.

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Tiny wording choices can change who gets a say, and when. That’s what this Supreme Court order is about: what schools can keep from parents, and what they must say out loud, when a student is transitioning at school. The Court said schools aren't able to keep information from parents about their child's gender transition and schools cannot override parental instructions on the name and pronoun to use with their child.

The Court said the parent plaintiffs are likely to win their claims tied to religious freedom and to parents’ rights under the Constitution. But the Court would not grant the same relief for the teacher plaintiffs.

The ruling was unsigned, and Justice Amy Coney Barrett wrote a separate opinion agreeing with the result. Justice Elena Kagan dissented, and Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined her.

Summary of the Case

It's one of those rare moments when the Supreme Court intervenes in the middle of an ongoing appeal, not after full briefing and oral argument, but through an emergency application to vacate a stay. Elizabeth Mirabelli and other California parents sued to challenge state education policies that, as administered, prevent schools from disclosing to parents information about their children's gender identity transitions at school and require schools to use students' preferred pronouns regardless of parental wishes. The District Court granted summary judgment for the parents and entered a permanent injunction. The Ninth Circuit stayed that injunction pending appeal. The parents then asked the Supreme Court to vacate the stay, and six Justices granted that request, but only as to the parents, not as to the teachers.

The case presented two constitutional theories. First, that the policies violate the Free Exercise Clause as applied to parents with sincere religious beliefs about gender. Second, that the policies violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by excluding parents from consequential decisions about their children's mental health. This second theory becomes crucial because it applies to all objecting parents, not just those motivated by religion.

Arguments Made By Counsel

The official Supreme Court record provided here contains no oral argument summary. The Court resolved this application on an abbreviated schedule without live argument before the Justices, a procedural posture that Justice Kagan's dissent heavily criticizes. However, we can reconstruct the competing positions from the opinions themselves.

The parents' counsel emphasized two things. First, that California's policy operates as a blanket prohibition. School officials testified they cannot disclose information about gender transitions even when parents directly ask. Second, the plaintiffs' factual narratives are emotionally compelling. The Poe family's daughter attempted suicide. Her parents learned she had been presenting as a boy at school only from a hospital psychiatrist, not from school officials. Even after hospitalization, when the child moved schools, administrators continued withholding information and using the chosen identity against parental instruction.

The state's counsel, represented by California's Attorney General Rob Bonta, grounded its defense in student safety and privacy. The Ninth Circuit, which stayed the injunction, appeared sympathetic to this argument, suggesting that a blanket parental notification policy might expose vulnerable transgender students to abuse by unsupportive parents. The state also raised structural objections: the class certification was insufficiently rigorous, the injunction was overbroad, and some class members lacked standing because they weren't actually injured by the policy.

Opinion of the Court

The per curiam majority, six Justices, granted the application as to the parents only, meaning the injunction requiring parental disclosure and respect for parental directives on names and pronouns can take effect while the Ninth Circuit continues its appeal.

On the merits, and this is important, the Court did not finally decide these cases. It instead applied a test for emergency relief, which has four factors: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest. A preliminary assessment suffices.

On the Free Exercise Claim, the majority reasoned that parents with sincere religious beliefs about sex and gender are likely to succeed. California's policies substantially interfere with the right of parents to guide the religious development of their children, according to the most recent precedent expanding free exercise protections. Importantly, the Court analogized that the intrusion here, unconsented facilitation of social gender transition, exceeds what it found sufficient in a recent case involving the mere presence of LGBTQ storybooks in curriculum. The state's compelling interests in student safety and privacy don't survive strict scrutiny because they cut out the primary protectors of children's best interests: their parents. Moreover, the Court noted that a narrower policy, allowing exemptions while still protecting children from abusive parents through enforcement of existing child abuse laws, would advance the state's interests with less burden on religious liberty.

On the Substantive Due Process Claim, here the Court invoked bedrock precedents establishing that parents, not the state, have primary authority over the upbringing and education of children. The Court drew a crucial distinction: gender dysphoria is a mental health condition, and prior precedent specifically protected parental participation in decisions about children's mental health. California's policy conceals this information from parents and facilitates social transition during school hours, thereby excluding parents from participation in a consequential mental health decision. This is likely unconstitutional.

On Irreparable Harm, the majority treated the denial of asserted constitutional rights during a protracted appellate process as irreparable by definition.

On Balance of Equities, the Court held that child safety actually favors the parents' position because fit parents advancing their judgment promotes wellbeing, while the state retains its ability to protect children from unfit parents through child welfare law and custody removal.

Separate Opinions

Justice Barrett's Concurrence, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh, agrees with the result but adds a methodological clarification about substantive due process, a doctrine generating significant contemporary controversy on this Court.

Barrett emphasizes that substantive due process, while controversial, is not newly invented. It requires rights to be deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. The parental right to direct children's upbringing, and specifically to participate in mental health decisions, has been part of constitutional law for a century. This is not judicial overreach. It's straightforward application of existing precedent.

Critically, Barrett addresses Justice Kagan's implicit concern. How can the Court recognize parental rights here when it eliminated abortion rights in Dobbs based on the identical framework? The concurrence replies that Dobbs didn't repudiate substantive due process doctrine generally. Rather, it applied the test to conclude that abortion specifically is not deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. That targeted elimination doesn't undermine the parental rights cases, which face no such challenge. No party disputes those precedents' continued validity.

Barrett also defends the Court's decision to accompany the stay vacation order with a substantive per curiam opinion rather than issuing a terse, reasoned judgment. In her view, the Ninth Circuit significantly misunderstood recent precedent, and brief correction serves efficiency. Moreover, because Justice Kagan raises the Dobbs tension, it would be unwise to issue an unreasoned order on the substantive due process claim.

Finally, she emphasizes that likely is the operative word. This is a preliminary merits assessment to inform the emergency relief question, not a conclusive resolution. The litigation continues in the Ninth Circuit and potentially here.

Justice Thomas and Justice Alito noted separately that they would grant the application in full, meaning they would vacate the stay as to the teachers as well. The per curiam denied relief for the teachers, perhaps on grounds that their claims differ from the parents' in doctrinally relevant ways.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Jackson, dissented, mounting a structural critique of how the Court handled this case rather than disagreeing with the ultimate merits assessment.

Her core grievance: This is precisely the kind of novel, high stakes issue the emergency docket was never designed to resolve. The ordinary appellate process had barely begun. Only the district court had ruled on the merits. The Court received minimal briefing, held no oral argument, conducted no conference deliberation, and decided the matter in weeks. Yet it issued a per curiam opinion that, despite the word likely sprinkled throughout, will inevitably be read by lower courts, state officials, and the public as conclusively resolving the dispute.

Kagan notes several procedural irregularities. First, the Ninth Circuit's en banc process was already underway when the plaintiffs simultaneously filed a motion there and an application here. Sound practice would counsel waiting for the Ninth Circuit to complete its work before the Supreme Court jumps in. Second, and more galling to Kagan, a petition for certiorari raising essentially identical legal issues has been pending since November in a First Circuit case with the same policy structure. The Court could have granted it, heard full briefing, held oral arguments, deliberated properly, and issued a considered opinion come next fall. Instead, it chose the truncated emergency docket. Kagan notes approximately 40 cases raising similar due process and free exercise challenges to school policies are currently in the judicial pipeline, so the Court would not wait long if it did the work properly.

Critically, Kagan raises a tension the per curiam tries to finesse: the substantive due process problem. The Court derives its holding from parental rights rooted in substantive due process doctrine, yet this Court, particularly the majority coalition, has expressed deep skepticism toward substantive due process in recent years. Justice Thomas has called for overruling all substantive due process precedents. Justice Gorsuch criticized the judicial misuse of substantive due process. Justice Kavanaugh's Dobbs concurrence emphasized that the Constitution does not grant the nine unelected Members of this Court the unilateral authority to rewrite the Constitution.

The dissonance is stark. In Dobbs, the Court repudiated a woman's right to make consequential decisions about her own health, abortion, based on it not being deeply rooted in American tradition.

The Tension Between Parental Rights and Student Privacy

This case sits at the intersection of two deeply held values: the right of parents to be involved in their children's lives, and the interest in protecting vulnerable students who may not be safe at home. The Court sided with the parents, finding that California's blanket policy of withholding information about a child's gender transition likely violates both religious freedom and the constitutional right of parents to direct their children's upbringing. But the word "likely" is doing a lot of work here. This is preliminary relief, not a final answer.

The dissent's objection isn't really about who should win. It's about how the Court chose to decide. By resolving this on the emergency docket the majority issued what looks like a major constitutional ruling through a process designed for urgent but narrow interventions. With dozens of similar cases working through the courts, the question of whether schools can keep gender-transition information from parents was going to reach the Court eventually. The dissent says the Court should have let that process play out.

What makes this case hard is that both sides are trying to protect children. Parents argue they can't fulfill that role if schools are keeping secrets from them. The state argues that some children need protection from their own parents. The Court's answer, for now, is that fit parents are presumed to act in their children's best interests, and the state can use existing child welfare laws to handle the exceptions. The Ninth Circuit has a tenuous framework to consider their decision. Cases currently working their way through the court system now is signaling that the Supreme Court will have to further deliberate substantive due process again soon.

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In Villarreal v. Texas, the Supreme Court looked at a rule a trial judge used during an overnight break, right in the middle of the defendant’s testimony. It highlights an area of law defining what you’re allowed to talk about, and when.

The judge told Villarreal’s lawyers they could not talk with him about his ongoing testimony during that overnight recess. But the order was limited. It still let Villarreal and his lawyers discuss other protected topics, like trial strategy and sentencing issues. The question was whether that kind of limited “don’t talk about the testimony itself” rule violates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

A majority of the Court, in an opinion by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, said it does not. The Court said that talking about testimony “for its own sake” is not constitutionally protected while the defendant is on the stand, and that this kind of qualified order can balance the right to counsel with the goal of getting unaltered trial testimony. The Court affirmed the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.

There were no dissents. Justice Samuel Alito wrote separately. Justice Clarence Thomas agreed with the outcome in a separate opinion joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch. Stick around—we’ll talk about what this kind of courtroom rule can mean for defendants, lawyers, and the way trials search for the truth.

When Can a Judge Stop a Defendant from Talking to Their Lawyer During Trial?

The Supreme Court just decided an important case about what happens when a defendant testifies at their own trial. The question was simple but tricky: Can a judge tell a defendant they can't talk to their lawyer about their testimony during an overnight break?

David Villarreal was on trial for murder in Texas. He took the witness stand to testify in his own defense. This was actually the only evidence his defense team presented. After Villarreal finished answering questions from his own lawyer, the judge called a recess for 24 hours before the prosecutor could start cross examining him.

The judge was worried that during this overnight break, Villarreal's lawyers might coach him on how to change or improve his testimony. So the judge issued a special order. Villarreal could still talk to his attorneys, but they couldn't help him "manage" his ongoing testimony. The judge made it clear that Villarreal still had a constitutional right to discuss other things with his lawyers, like possible plea deals or sentencing issues.

Villarreal was convicted and sentenced to 60 years in prison. He appealed, arguing that the judge's order violated his constitutional right to have a lawyer help him. The Texas courts said the order was fine. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to clarify the rules.

What the Lawyers Argued

Villarreal's lawyer argued that the Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants can talk to their lawyers without restrictions during overnight breaks, even when they're in the middle of testifying. He gave several important examples of why this matters. What if the defendant is about to mention evidence the judge already ruled inadmissible? What if a plea bargain offer comes in? What if the lawyer needs to stop the defendant from lying under oath? He said there's a big difference between improper "coaching," where you change the substance of truthful testimony, and legitimate "counseling" where you discuss testimony to make sure the defendant follows the rules and makes smart decisions. He argued that the line Texas wanted to draw between discussing "strategy" and discussing "testimony" was impossible to follow in practice. Responsible lawyers would be too scared to give necessary advice for fear of being held in contempt of court.

Texas's lawyer proposed a middle ground. He said courts can prohibit "managing" or "coaching" testimony, like rehearsing how to present yourself, picking specific words, or practicing questions and answers. But courts should still allow discussion of other matters. He relied on the idea that witnesses who haven't been coached are more likely to tell the truth, and this applies to defendants just like any other witness. He said lawyers should ask themselves whether they're discussing the testimony itself or the consequences of that testimony. For example, lawyers can't say "stop mumbling," but they can say "I think you should take the plea bargain," though not by explaining it's because the testimony went poorly.

The United States government filed a brief supporting Texas and argued for the broadest restriction. They said courts can prohibit any discussion of testimony during breaks. They argued this creates a simple, workable rule. Topics that would be discussed regardless of whether the defendant was testifying are allowed. Everything else is not. They called this a "preventive" rule but defended it as appropriate given how broadly courts can restrict Sixth Amendment rights in general.

What the Supreme Court Decided

The ruling clarifies the ways in which judges can limit what defendants discuss with their lawyers during overnight breaks in testimony. A judge can prohibit discussion of the testimony itself, as long as the defendant can still talk to their lawyer about other important matters like trial strategy, plea deals, and how to follow the judge's evidence rules. This balances the defendant's right to legal advice against the need for honest testimony.

The Court rejected the idea that the length of a break should determine what can be discussed. Instead, what matters is the content of the conversation. Before and after testifying, defendants have full freedom to discuss their testimony with their lawyers. While testifying, that freedom is limited—but only for conversations focused purely on the testimony itself, like practicing it or getting feedback to improve performance. Defendants still have the right to discuss strategy and other matters, even if those conversations happen to reference the testimony. The Court compared this to the traditional practice of separating witnesses from each other to prevent them from tailoring their stories based on what others said. This limited restriction achieves the same goal—ensuring testimony reflects the truth rather than constant adjustment—while respecting the defendant's constitutional right to work with their lawyer.

Recognizing concerns about whether such rules can work in practice, the Court clarified that judges cannot restrict lawyers from advising clients on plea bargains, including explaining how testimony affects the chances of winning at trial. The key distinction is between discussing the strategic importance of testimony, which is protected, and discussing testimony as a tool to refine or practice it, which is not. The judge's order in this case met these standards by preventing only the unprotected discussions while explicitly preserving the right to discuss sentencing, plea negotiations, and strategy.

The trial judge's order in this case, which prohibited "managing" Villarreal's "ongoing testimony," fell within constitutional bounds. It prevented only unprotected discussion while explicitly preserving the constitutional right to discuss sentencing, plea negotiations, and other strategic matters.

Additional Perspectives from the Justices

Justice Alito wrote separately to provide additional framework, though no other justice joined his opinion. He explained that when a defendant testifies, "the jury is entitled to hear the defendant's own story in his own words, not a version crafted or edited by counsel." He pointed out the practical difficulty of enforcing limited restrictions during brief daytime recesses. With little time and high stakes, judges can't reliably determine whether defendants and counsel obeyed an instruction not to discuss testimony, and must heavily rely on attorney good faith. Crucially, Alito emphasized that discussion becomes improper coaching if it seeks to shape future testimony "in light of past testimony," regardless of how the advice is framed. Strategic language doesn't transform unprotected coaching into protected strategic advice if the core function is adjusting testimony.

Justice Thomas wrote separately, joined by Justice Gorsuch, agreeing the trial judge's order was constitutional but criticizing the majority for going too far. Thomas argued the majority "opines on hypothetical situations not before the Court" and announces new rules about discussion of testimony "incidental to other topics" that earlier cases never endorsed.

Thomas emphasized that the 1989 case stated in "straightforward terms" that defendants have no constitutional right to discuss testimony "while it is in process." That case endorsed orders that categorically "forbid discussion of ongoing testimony" and never stated that such categorical orders become forbidden overnight.

When Can a Judge Stop a Defendant from Talking to Their Lawyer During Trial?

This case matters because it draws a line that affects every criminal defendant who takes the stand. If testimony stretches across an overnight break, your lawyer can still advise on whether to take a plea deal, how to handle the judge's evidence rules, and what overall trial strategy should be. But a lawyer cannot use that break to help polish, practice, or rework what is already said or what is about to be said.

The practical tension is real. As Villarreal's lawyers pointed out, the line between "strategy" and "testimony" isn't always clean. A conversation about whether to accept a plea deal might naturally touch on how the testimony is going. The Court acknowledged this by protecting discussions that reference testimony incidentally, while drawing the line at conversations whose purpose is to refine the testimony itself. Whether trial judges can consistently enforce that distinction remains to be seen.

The bigger picture is about what trials are for. The Court is saying that when a defendant chooses to testify, the jury deserves to hear that person's own account—not a version workshopped overnight with a legal team. That principle comes with a tradeoff: defendants get less help from their lawyers at the exact moment they may need it most. Congress didn't create this rule, and it isn't going to change it. This is the Court defining, case by case, where the right to counsel ends and the search for truth begins.

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In a case called GEO Group v. Menocal, the Supreme Court focused on that timing question for federal contractors who say they were just following lawful government authorization.

Justice Elena Kagan wrote for the Court that the rule from an older case, Yearsley, gives contractors a defense they can use to fight liability on the merits. But it is not a free pass that shields them from having to stay in the case at all. And that matters, because the Court said if a trial judge rejects that Yearsley protection before trial, the contractor usually cannot take an immediate appeal right then.

Instead, the Court said that kind of denial is not one of those rare “appeal-now” orders under federal law and the collateral-order doctrine. It can be reviewed after the case reaches a final judgment.

The Chief Justice and Justices Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined Justice Kagan’s opinion. Justice Thomas agreed with parts of it and the final result, and Justice Alito agreed with the result.

Summary of the Case

The Supreme Court recently tackled a question that sounds simple but has major legal consequences. When a federal contractor like GEO Group claims it should be dismissed from a lawsuit because it was just following government orders, and the trial judge says no, can the contractor appeal right away? Or does it have to wait until the entire trial is finished?

The Court's answer was clear: wait until trial. Justice Kagan, writing for six justices, explained that the legal protection contractors claim, known as the Yearsley doctrine, is a defense against being found liable. It is not immunity from being sued in the first place. This distinction matters a lot when deciding whether someone can appeal immediately.

Here's what happened. GEO operated a detention facility for Immigration and Customs Enforcement in Colorado. People detained there filed a lawsuit. They claimed GEO's work policies violated federal laws against forced labor. These policies included unpaid cleaning duties and a so-called voluntary work program that paid just one cent per day. GEO argued it should be protected because ICE had authorized these policies. The trial court disagreed, finding that GEO's contract didn't actually require these specific policies. GEO tried to appeal immediately. The Tenth Circuit said it didn't have jurisdiction to hear the appeal yet. The Supreme Court agreed with that decision.

Arguments Made By Counsel

The oral arguments showed the real tension in this case. Dominic Draye, representing GEO, made an argument about fairness that got several justices thinking. He asked: Why should GEO, doing exactly the same work as ICE employees in the same facility, be unable to appeal immediately when those ICE employees could appeal right away if they claimed qualified immunity? This practical unfairness particularly resonated with Justices Alito and Kavanaugh.

Draye pointed to a long tradition in common law. He said that agents acting under valid government authority have always enjoyed immunity from being sued. He made a distinction between whether Congress has the constitutional power to authorize something and whether a specific authorization was lawful under existing statutes. Under his reading, a contractor could have immunity even if it violated a statute, as long as Congress had the constitutional power to authorize the underlying activity. This proved controversial.

Jennifer Bennett represented Menocal and the other detainees. The government also supported her position. She argued that Yearsley simply lets contractors show they acted lawfully. That's a defense on the merits, not immunity. She walked through historical cases showing that agents have never had derivative sovereign immunity. The fact that the government opposed GEO, even though it acknowledged Yearsley's importance, carried substantial weight. As Justice Kavanaugh noted, this seemed like a big hurdle for GEO to overcome. If the government itself didn't believe immediate appeals were necessary, perhaps they weren't.

Bennett also highlighted a practical problem with GEO's theory. Figuring out what the government actually authorized and directed requires digging deep into the facts. You have to compare what the contractor actually did against what the contract said, what the regulations required, what emails instructed, and what verbal directions were given. Justice Sotomayor suggested this factual complexity provided a simple answer for denying immediate appeals without having to resolve deeper immunity questions.

The most revealing moment in oral argument came when Justice Jackson posed a logical puzzle. In the original Yearsley case, the government had waived sovereign immunity because takings require compensation. She asked, wouldn't we have a very odd scenario in which the contractor would somehow be given immunity, but the government itself wouldn't? This exposed a fundamental problem with the theory that contractors get immunity derived from the government.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Kagan's majority opinion builds a clean framework for distinguishing between defenses on the merits and immunities.

The Supreme Court's decision draws an important distinction between two different ways defendants can avoid liability. A defense on the merits argues that the defendant acted lawfully and therefore shouldn't be held responsible. An immunity, by contrast, is a shield that protects someone even if they did break the law. This distinction matters because it determines whether a defendant can appeal a court's decision right away or must wait until the case is fully resolved.

The timing of appeals depends on the type of protection at stake. With immunity, waiting for a full trial defeats the whole purpose—immunity is meant to avoid trial altogether. So when a court denies immunity, that decision can be appealed immediately. With a defense on the merits, however, there's no rush. If a defendant loses at trial but had a valid defense, an appeals court can simply overturn the verdict. The defendant's rights are fully protected even after the trial concludes, so waiting for final judgment doesn't cause any harm.

The Court concluded that the legal doctrine in question operates as a defense on the merits, not as immunity. The key reasons: the doctrine only protects conduct that was actually authorized and lawful; historical legal precedent doesn't support extending government immunity to private contractors; and an earlier court decision explicitly described similar protections as a defense rather than immunity. Because it's a defense on the merits—not immunity—the normal rules apply: defendants must wait for the case to conclude before appealing.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas's Separate View

Justice Thomas agreed with the outcome but objected to the Court's broader reasoning about when appeals can happen before a case is fully resolved. Thomas has long worried that judges are making too many exceptions to the rule requiring cases to finish before appeal. He believes Congress and not individual judges should decide when those exceptions apply. Congress has already established specific exceptions through law and authorized the Court to create more through formal rulemaking procedures. Allowing judges to create exceptions case-by-case through their written opinions, Thomas argues, bypasses the proper process. Since previous court decisions never allowed immediate appeals in situations like this one, Thomas would have kept the final judgment rule in place without exception.

Justice Alito's Different Approach

Justice Alito also disagreed with the majority's reasoning but agreed with the final decision. Rather than focusing on whether a defense requires proving lawful conduct, Alito suggested courts should ask whether delaying an appeal would harm an important public interest. For some protections, like qualified immunity for government officials, immediate appeals do serve the public interest. They ensure officials aren't overly cautious. But Alito saw no such compelling public interest for this particular doctrine. He noted that contractors already have qualified immunity, which offers even stronger protection. Since that broader protection already exists and doesn't require immediate appeals, there's no urgent reason to make exceptions for this narrower doctrine.

When Can Federal Contractors Appeal? The Supreme Court Draws a Clear Line

This case answers a narrow but important question: if you're a private company doing work for the federal government and you get sued, you can't immediately appeal to a higher court just because you say the government told you to do it. You have to go through the trial first, make your case there, and appeal afterward like everyone else.

The practical impact falls squarely on companies that run federal facilities, build federal projects, or carry out federal programs. These contractors may still argue they were following lawful government direction. They may win on that argument. But they don't get to treat that argument as a get-out-of-court-free card that lets them skip the trial process entirely. That privilege is reserved for true immunities, like the qualified immunity government employees themselves enjoy.

The deeper issue is about accountability. When the government outsources work to private companies, those companies step into a gray zone between public authority and private responsibility. The Court is saying that operating in that zone doesn't entitle you to the same legal shortcuts the government gets. If a contractor's conduct was lawful, the trial will bear that out. But the people bringing the lawsuit are entitled to their day in court first.

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What did Congress mean when it carved out an exception for problems with the mail?

In United States Postal Service v. Lebene Konan, the Supreme Court read a federal law that lets people sue the government for certain wrongs, but keeps the government off the hook for claims tied to the “loss,” “miscarriage,” or “negligent transmission” of mail. The Court said that even if mail is not delivered on purpose, that still counts as a “loss” or “miscarriage” under the law’s ordinary meaning. So, the United States keeps its immunity from these kinds of lawsuits.

The Court threw out the lower court’s ruling and sent the case back, without deciding whether every one of Konan’s claims is blocked or which arguments were properly kept for review. The Justices split 5 to 4, with Justice Thomas writing for the majority and Justice Sotomayor dissenting, joined by Justices Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson.

Summary of the Case

The Supreme Court decided that the Federal Tort Claims Act's postal exception shields the federal government from lawsuits when postal employees intentionally fail to deliver mail. The case required the Court to interpret whether the postal exception, which protects the government from claims arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter, covers only negligent conduct or both negligent and intentional misconduct.

Lebene Konan, a Texas property owner who rents rooms to tenants, alleged that postal employees intentionally withheld her mail for two years as part of a harassment campaign, allegedly motivated by racial discrimination. After administrative remedies failed, she sued for conversion, nuisance, tortious interference with prospective business relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The District Court dismissed the case, invoking the postal exception. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the postal exception's terms don't encompass intentional nondelivery. The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit.

Arguments Made By Counsel

Postal Service's Case

Frederick Liu argued that the postal exception uses three overlapping terms: loss, miscarriage, and negligent transmission. All three are designed to protect postal operations from litigation. The government emphasized that:

First, historical meaning matters. In 1946, miscarriage simply meant any failure of mail to arrive, without distinguishing between intentional and unintentional conduct. Historical dictionaries and newspaper usage confirmed this broad meaning.

Second, loss encompasses all deprivation. The word loss ordinarily means any deprivation of property, regardless of how it occurred. People can suffer loss from theft, intentional acts, or accidents.

Third, overlapping terms serve a purpose. Congress intentionally used three broad, overlapping terms to ensure comprehensive protection for postal operations. This is a belt and suspenders approach to legal drafting.

Fourth, practical consequences matter. The Postal Service handles over 300 million pieces of mail daily. Without this broad exception, postal workers would be hauled into court constantly, with people simply alleging intentional conduct rather than negligence to escape immunity.

Konan's Case

Easha Anand argued that the postal exception protects only against negligent conduct, not intentional misconduct. Her key arguments:

First, plain language matters. Ordinary people don't use loss to describe intentional taking. You lose your keys when you misplace them. You don't lose them when someone steals them.

Second, there's a surplusage problem. If all three terms mean the same thing, why did Congress bother using three different words? The inclusion of negligent before transmission suggests Congress was distinguishing negligent from intentional conduct.

Third, Congressional knowledge is relevant. Congress knew how to write broad exceptions when it wanted to, as shown in other sections of the Federal Tort Claims Act. The postal exception's specificity indicates intentional narrowness.

Fourth, contextual limitations apply. Miscarriage suggests accident or mistake, not deliberate wrongdoing. If Congress meant to cover intentional conduct, it could have used different language.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Thomas, writing for the 5 member majority, which included Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, adopted a textualist, historically grounded approach to statutory interpretation.

On miscarriage, the majority held that when Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946, miscarriage of mail simply meant any failure of mail to properly arrive at its intended destination, regardless of cause. Dictionary definitions from that era confirm this breadth. The majority rejected the argument that miscarriage is limited to negligent failures, noting that contemporary dictionaries imposed no such limitation. Newspapers from the era used miscarriage to describe mail that failed to arrive even when caused by intentional misconduct, such as theft or burning. Courts historically used the term without inquiring into whether the carrier's conduct was intentional.

On loss, the majority reasoned that loss ordinarily means deprivation of property, regardless of the cause. A person can suffer a loss from intentional conduct as well as negligence. Konan's allegations, that the Postal Service converted her mail, meaning she was deprived of the use and possession of the property, constitute a loss of mail. The majority rejected the notion that loss requires inadvertence.

On the negligent transmission problem, Konan argued that negligent modifies not just transmission but implicitly qualifies loss and miscarriage as well. The majority rejected this, applying a principle from an earlier case called Barnhart v. Thomas. An adjective before the final noun in a list cannot be transplanted to qualify the preceding nouns. Congress intentionally limited negligent to transmission for a specific purpose: to foreclose claims involving mail even though nothing went wrong with its transport.

On surplusage, the majority acknowledged that all three terms overlap substantially, but rejected the presumption against surplusage as subordinate to the cardinal rule that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. Congress likely used broad, overlapping language to comprehensively protect postal operations from litigation.

The majority did not decide whether all of Konan's claims are barred, remanding for further proceedings.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Sotomayor filed a forceful dissent, joined by Justices Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson. Sotomayor argued that the postal exception's text shows Congress intended to exclude intentional misconduct. Further, even if ruling for Konan means more lawsuits, that is Congress's choice to make, not the Court's. The judiciary cannot rewrite statutes because a different rule would have preferable consequences. Her key points:

First, the negligent transmission signal is the most important clue. Congress's express inclusion of negligent before transmission is critical. If Congress intended to cover all conduct, both negligent and intentional, it would have either omitted negligent or added negligent and wrongful transmission. Instead, Congress made a deliberate choice to limit only transmission with negligent, implying intentional conduct falls outside the exception.

Second, loss and miscarriage ordinarily connote negligence. Sotomayor emphasized that ordinary speakers understand loss as unintentional deprivation. You lose your keys when you misplace them. You don't lose them when they're stolen. The Fifth Circuit correctly observed that no one intentionally loses something. Similarly, miscarriage suggests mistake or accident, not deliberate wrongdoing.

Third, there's a shifting perspective problem. The majority, to reach its conclusion about loss, must shift from asking whether the mail suffered a loss, which would be parallel to miscarriage and negligent transmission, to asking whether Konan suffered a loss. This inconsistency disappears if all three terms describe the Postal Service's conduct rather than harms to the mail.

Fourth, the postal exception is narrower than other exceptions. Earlier cases established that the postal exception is narrower than broader Federal Tort Claims Act exceptions. Congress could have granted immunity for all claims arising from the mail activities of the Postal Service but instead identified specific conduct. This specificity indicates intentional limitation.

Fifth, contextual evidence matters. Before the Federal Tort Claims Act, postal regulations distinguished between miscarriage and detention. When mail was intentionally held back, regulations used detention, not miscarriage, even though on the majority's reading, miscarriage would have sufficed. This suggests the terms were understood to have different meanings.

Sixth, the historical evidence is inadequate. Sotomayor critiqued the majority's historical examples as weak. The majority cited only cherry picked newspaper references almost 20 years apart, and at least 30 years before the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act, using miscarried, the verb, rather than miscarriage, the noun. The government failed to identify even one example of miscarriage being used to describe mail intentionally withheld or destroyed.

Sotomayor rejected the majority's floodgates argument. The 335,000 annual complaints to the Postal Service include everything from rude employee behavior to vehicle parking complaints, not serious tort claims. Filing a Federal Tort Claims Act suit requires exhausting administrative remedies and navigating federal court, whereas submitting a complaint requires only typing into an online form.

The Federal Tort Claims Act contains additional safeguards. Liability arises only when intentional conduct is tortious, falls within employment scope, and falls outside the discretionary function exception. Most intentional torts like theft likely fall outside scope of employment under agency law. Litigation tools like Rule 11 and modern pleading standards already prevent frivolous suits and effectively guard against abuse.

Whether Intent Matters When the Postal Service Fails to Deliver Mail

This case comes down to a simple question: if a postal worker deliberately withholds your mail, can you sue the government? The Supreme Court says no. By reading "loss" and "miscarriage" broadly enough to cover intentional conduct, the majority effectively closes the courthouse door on people like Konan, regardless of how badly a postal employee behaves.

The dissent's concern is practical. If the postal exception covers everything including intentional misconduct then there's no legal accountability when a postal worker targets someone's mail on purpose. The majority counters that Congress designed it this way to protect the massive machinery of mail delivery from a flood of litigation. But as Sotomayor points out, the law already has plenty of built-in filters to keep frivolous suits from clogging the courts.

What's left is a gap. The government can be sued for most intentional torts committed by federal employees, but not when those torts involve the mail. Whether that's what Congress actually intended in 1946 is now a question only Congress can answer.

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Sometimes the hardest part of a lawsuit isn’t who wins on the facts, but whether the case was ever in the right court to begin with. That’s the core of what the Supreme Court sorted out in Hain Celestial Group v. Palmquist.

In certain kinds of cases, the parties have to be completely from different states. Here, the lawsuit was removed to federal court even though Whole Foods, the defendant, broke the “complete diversity” rule at the time of removal.

The district court later dismissed Whole Foods, but the Supreme Court said that dismissal was a mistake. Because Whole Foods should have stayed in the case, complete diversity was never actually established. That means the federal court never had the power to enter a final decision in the first place.

The justices were unanimous, in an opinion written by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, with Justice Clarence Thomas also writing separately. The bottom line: the judgment for Hain Celestial has to be wiped out. The case goes back for more proceedings consistent with that ruling, including being sent back to state court.

Summary of the Case

The Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision addressing a complex question: when can a federal court overlook a jurisdictional problem, even if it made a mistake in dismissing a defendant? The case involves a heartbreaking situation. The Palmquist family sued baby food manufacturer Hain Celestial and Whole Foods after their young son developed serious neurological conditions they believe were caused by heavy metals in the baby food.

The family made a strategic choice when filing their lawsuit. They filed in Texas state court and named both an out of state defendant, Hain, and a Texas defendant, Whole Foods. This ensured that federal diversity jurisdiction would not exist. Under federal law, all defendants must be from different states than all plaintiffs for a case to be heard in federal court based on diversity of citizenship.

Hain removed the case to federal court anyway. They argued that Whole Foods had been improperly joined. This is a legal doctrine that permits federal courts to dismiss defendants whose claims lack merit, even if their presence would normally prevent federal jurisdiction. The district court agreed with Hain, dismissed Whole Foods from the case, and the case proceeded to trial in federal court. Hain won at trial.

However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the improper joinder dismissal. The appeals court found that Whole Foods should have remained in the case. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit vacated the entire judgment because the federal court never had proper subject matter jurisdiction in the first place.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision. The Court held that the district court's mistaken dismissal could not fix the jurisdictional problem because the dismissal was interlocutory. In other words, it was reversible on appeal. Therefore, the jurisdictional defect persisted all the way through the final judgment.

Arguments Made By Counsel

Hain's Core Arguments

Sarah Harrington's arguments centered on two main points. First, she drew a distinction between creating jurisdiction and preserving a judgment despite a jurisdictional irregularity. She urged that Caterpillar, the leading precedent in this area, permitted courts to preserve final judgments when complete diversity existed at the time of judgment, even if jurisdiction was questionable at removal. This was not about creating jurisdiction retroactively. Rather, it was about recognizing that the jurisdictional problem had been solved.

Second, she emphasized efficiency. After a full trial with extensive discovery, it would be wasteful to return the case to state court. The doctrine of fraudulent joinder itself, which permits dismissal of defendants with weak claims, would be rendered meaningless if courts could not rely on those dismissals to create stable federal jurisdiction.

Harrington also presented a practical incentive problem. If defendants cannot rely on improper joinder doctrine to secure federal jurisdiction, they lose a tool that Congress implicitly authorized through the removal statute.

The Palmquist's Core Arguments

Russell Post's position was fundamentally about jurisdictional integrity. Federal courts possess only the power Congress grants them, and that power cannot be created through judicial error. The critical distinction, in Post's view, was that Whole Foods was not gone for good. The dismissal was interlocutory, meaning Whole Foods remained a party to the case until the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Since the Fifth Circuit reversed, Whole Foods never actually left the litigation. At no point did complete diversity exist in a final, irreversible way.

Post also invoked plaintiff's forum choice as a constitutional principle. The Palmquists had exercised their right to select their forum by properly joining Whole Foods as a defendant. Allowing a defendant to override that choice through a dismissal would strip plaintiffs of a fundamental procedural entitlement.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Sotomayor, writing for a unanimous Court, grounded the decision in first principles about federal jurisdiction.

The opinion begins with the foundational rule. Federal courts have limited jurisdiction, and appellate courts must satisfy themselves not only of their own jurisdiction but also of the trial court's jurisdiction. The general rule is that courts assess jurisdiction based on the state of facts that existed at the time of filing. If jurisdiction was lacking then, the judgment must be vacated, unless a jurisdictional defect was cured before final judgment.

Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis from 1996 is the critical precedent. There, a defendant was properly and consensually dismissed via partial final judgment before trial commenced. The jurisdictional defect was thus cured. The Supreme Court held that finality, efficiency, and economy concerns then became overwhelming, justifying preservation of the verdict despite the District Court's earlier erroneous denial of the motion to remand.

But Caterpillar is fundamentally different here. Whole Foods's dismissal was, first, erroneous. The Fifth Circuit found the claim against Whole Foods was plausibly stated. Second, the dismissal was interlocutory, meaning it did not dispose of the whole case and merged into the final judgment for appellate review. Under the general rule governing interlocutory orders, they are not immediately appealable but instead remain subject to review from the final judgment.

This interlocutory character proved decisive. Because the dismissal could be, and was, reversed on appeal, Whole Foods was only temporarily and erroneously removed from the case. It was not gone for good. When the Fifth Circuit reversed, it restored Whole Foods, and thus the jurisdictional defect that had lingered.

The Court rejected Hain's efficiency argument. While Caterpillar acknowledged that finality and economy concerns become compelling after a trial, those concerns apply only after a jurisdictional defect is properly cured. They do not override the jurisdictional requirement itself. To hold otherwise would permit courts to create jurisdiction through their own mistakes, a principle the Court traced back to 1809 and identified as fundamentally inconsistent with limited federal jurisdiction.

As a fallback, Hain invoked Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, which permits courts to add or drop parties on just terms. The Court distinguished Newman Green v. Alfonzo Larrain, where a plaintiff sought dismissal of a party, from this case, where a defendant seeks to dismiss an opponent. The master of the complaint principle, that plaintiffs control which defendants to sue and where, is critical. The Palmquists had purposefully and properly joined Whole Foods to avoid federal jurisdiction, and they diligently asserted that right by promptly moving to remand the case to state court. Rule 21 cannot override that choice.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion entirely but wrote separately to express deep skepticism about the improper joinder doctrine itself. His concern is that the doctrine permits federal courts to enlarge their jurisdiction by assessing the merits of claims against defendants, asking whether those claims are sufficiently weak to warrant dismissal.

Thomas argues that this represents an exercise of power beyond what federal courts are authorized to do. Federal courts must determine they have jurisdiction as a threshold matter, before proceeding to the merits. To dismiss a party based on a merits assessment inverts that principle. He distinguishes the modern improper joinder doctrine, which turns on claim strength, from the historical fraudulent joinder cases, which concerned actual fraud or bad faith, such as lying about a defendant's citizenship or conduct.

Thomas notes that other circuits adopt similar approaches, but he contends they lack support in this Court's precedents. He suggests that in a future case where the issue is fully briefed, the Court should reconsider whether federal courts can constitutionally dismiss defendants based on merits assessments. However, he agrees the case must be vacated because the Fifth Circuit correctly found the Palmquists had plausibly stated a claim against Whole Foods.

When Can a Jurisdictional Defect Be Cured?

The nuance here lies in understanding what curing a jurisdictional defect actually means, and how that doctrine interacts with the concepts of finality and interlocutory orders.

The Court's holding establishes that a jurisdictional defect can be cured only when the curative action is, first, proper, not erroneous, and second, final, not subject to reversal on appeal. In Caterpillar, the defendant was dismissed with consent via a partial final judgment. That dismissal was both correct and final. It established complete diversity, and there was no risk on appeal that the defendant would be restored to the case. The defect was cured before trial, and thus efficiency concerns could justify preserving the post trial verdict.

Here, by contrast, the dismissal was reversible because it was interlocutory. The general rule is that interlocutory orders merge into the final judgment and are reviewable from it. This created jurisdictional uncertainty. Until the Fifth Circuit affirmed or reversed the improper joinder dismissal, no one could be certain whether complete diversity actually existed.

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Sometimes the hardest part of the law is what a law does not say. That’s the key to this Supreme Court ruling about whether a president can slap tariffs on imported goods during a declared national emergency under a law called the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA.

In a majority opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court said IEEPA does not give the president the power to impose tariffs. The justices said that even though the law uses broad language and talks about the power to “regulate” importation, that doesn’t clearly include the power to add tariffs.

This case combined two disputes: Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump and Trump v. V.O.S. Selections. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision in the V.O.S. Selections case. In the Learning Resources case, the Court wiped out the lower court ruling and sent it back with instructions to dismiss it because that court did not have jurisdiction.

The majority included Roberts along with Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson. Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh dissented, and Kavanaugh’s dissent was joined by Thomas and Alito.

Summary of the Case

The Supreme Court has ruled that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not give the President the power to impose tariffs on imported goods. This decision places a significant limit on presidential power during national emergencies.

In 2025, President Trump declared two national emergencies. One related to drug trafficking, and the other addressed trade deficits. He then tried to impose substantial tariffs as part of his response to these emergencies. Small importers challenged these tariffs, arguing that the President exceeded his legal authority. The Court agreed with the challengers in a 6 to 3 decision. While the majority was divided on their reasoning, they were united on the outcome.

Arguments Made By Counsel

The Government's Position

The government argued that the emergency powers law clearly allows the President to regulate importation, and tariffs are a classic way to regulate imports. The government made several key points.

First, they pointed to dictionary definitions. The word regulate has long meant to control or adjust by rule. Tariffs are a classic tool for controlling imports. From the founding era onward, this term has included tariffs as a regulatory mechanism.

Second, they cited historical precedent. President Nixon imposed 10 percent tariffs in 1971 under the predecessor to this law. These tariffs were upheld by federal courts. When Congress passed the current law just two years later in 1977, Congress clearly understood that the same language included tariffs.

Third, they referenced a Supreme Court case from one year before the law was enacted. In that case, the Court unanimously upheld the President's tariffs under a different trade law. That law authorized the President to adjust imports. The Court held this language included monetary charges like tariffs, not just quotas. The phrase regulate importation is even broader than adjust imports.

Fourth, they argued that the major questions doctrine should not apply to foreign affairs statutes. Congress regularly gives broad discretion to the President in foreign affairs.

Finally, they made a practical argument. The law clearly allows quotas and embargoes, which are complete blockages of imports. It would make no sense for Congress to allow the President to block all Chinese imports entirely but not impose even a one dollar tariff on those imports.

The Challengers' Position

The challengers mounted several arguments against the tariffs.

First, they argued that tariffs are fundamentally taxes, not regulatory tools. Tariffs raise revenue. The Constitution assigns taxation exclusively to Congress. The word regulate appears in hundreds of statutes, yet government lawyers could not identify a single instance where regulate included the power to tax.

Second, they pointed to congressional practice. When Congress intends to authorize tariffs, it uses explicit language like duty, tariff, or surcharge. These words do not appear in the emergency powers law. The trade code contains multiple tariff statutes, all of which expressly reference tariffs and include specific caps on rates, time limits, and procedural requirements. The emergency powers law contains none of these constraints.

Third, they raised a constitutional problem. The emergency powers law authorizes regulation of both importation and exportation. But the Constitution expressly forbids taxing exports. If regulate included tariffs, it would make part of the law unconstitutional.

Fourth, they invoked the major questions doctrine. This involves an extraordinary power: unlimited tariffs on any product from any country for unlimited duration. No President has claimed this power before. This exercise of power requires clear congressional authorization.

Fifth, they distinguished the Nixon tariffs. President Nixon did not initially cite the old emergency law when imposing tariffs. He relied on other statutes. He only invoked the emergency law later in litigation as a defensive position. The court decision supporting him was a single intermediate appellate court opinion, hardly a well settled interpretation Congress would incorporate by reference.

Finally, they argued that Congress enacted the emergency powers law in 1977 specifically to constrain emergency powers after Watergate and Vietnam. The statute's careful procedural requirements and emergency declaration requirements suggest Congress intended to limit, not expand, executive authority. Using a vaguely worded emergency statute to claim unlimited tariff power contradicts this legislative purpose.

Opinion of the Court

Chief Justice Roberts delivered the lead opinion. Six Justices join parts of it, while only three Justices join other parts.

Article One of the Constitution vests the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises exclusively in Congress. The Framers deliberately withheld this power from the Executive Branch. As Roberts emphasizes, the Framers gave Congress alone access to the pockets of the people. This reflects hard won principles from the American Revolution against taxation without representation. Tariffs are unquestionably a branch of the taxing power.

For foreign affairs, the Framers gave Congress, not the President, the tariff power notwithstanding the obvious foreign affairs implications of tariffs. While the President enjoys some independent constitutional authority in foreign affairs, tariffs present no overlap with any such independent power. The government concedes the President has no inherent peacetime authority to impose tariffs. When core congressional powers are at stake, the fact that they implicate foreign affairs does not license ambiguous delegation. When Congress has delegated tariff powers, it has done so in explicit terms and with strict limits.

The President has no inherent authority to impose tariffs during peacetime and seeks authority purely from the emergency powers law. The government cannot identify any statute in the entire U.S. Code in which the definition of regulate includes the power to tax. When Congress addresses both regulatory and taxing powers, it treats them separately and expressly. The Court also identified an export clause problem. Because the emergency law authorizes regulating both importation and exportation, reading regulate to include tariffs would render the statute partly unconstitutional. The Constitution explicitly forbids taxing exports.

In the emergency law's nearly 50 year existence, no President until Trump invoked the statute to impose tariffs. Presidents regularly invoked the law for other purposes but consistently looked to other statutes for tariff authority. This lack of historical precedent, combined with the breadth of authority claimed, indicates the power exceeds the President's legitimate reach. Emergency powers tend to kindle emergencies, and the Framers understood emergencies could afford a ready pretext for usurpation of congressional power.

The Nixon and Ford Tariffs Distinguished

The Court rejected the government's reliance on President Nixon's 1971 tariffs and President Ford's 1975 tariffs. For the Nixon tariffs, the Court noted that a single, expressly limited opinion from one specialized intermediate appellate court does not establish a well-settled meaning that Congress would have incorporated into later legislation. Nixon did not initially invoke the emergency law to justify the tariffs; he relied on other statutes and only cited it later as a litigation defense.

For the Ford tariffs, the Court found a similar lack of precedent. The 1977 legislative history itself acknowledged that earlier Presidents had exploited the open-ended nature of the old law, transforming it far beyond its original purpose of sanctioning foreign belligerents. Congress enacted IEEPA specifically to rein in these overreaches. Reading the new law as silently preserving unlimited tariff authority would contradict the very reform Congress intended.

Does a National Emergency Unlock Unlimited Tariff Power?

This decision establishes that broad emergency language does not automatically encompass the power to tax. The Court drew a firm line: even sweeping terms like "regulate importation" do not include tariffs absent clear congressional authorization, particularly when core Article I taxing powers are at stake.

The ruling preserves presidential flexibility in other respects. The Court did not disturb the President's ability to impose sanctions, block transactions, or freeze assets under IEEPA. It also did not question the validity of tariffs imposed under other statutes that expressly grant that authority with specific procedural limits and rate caps.

However, the 6–3 split reveals a significant fault line. The dissenters argued that the plain meaning of "regulate" naturally encompasses tariffs, and that the majority imposed an artificially narrow reading on a foreign affairs statute. Justice Kavanaugh's dissent warned that the decision hamstrings presidential responses to genuine emergencies. This tension suggests future disputes over how broadly courts should read delegations of power in foreign affairs and emergency contexts.

The practical impact is immediate: tariffs imposed solely under IEEPA authority lack legal basis, and importers who paid those tariffs may seek refunds.

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In this case, the hard part isn’t just what the Constitution requires. It’s how much room federal judges have to second-guess what state courts already decided. That’s the nuance here: even if you think a trial should have gone differently, federal law sets a high bar before a federal court can step in and order a new trial.

Klein v. Martin involves a state prisoner convicted of attempted murder. The dispute centers on a forensic computer report that was not turned over to the defense. The question is whether keeping that report back would have changed the outcome.

The Supreme Court, in a short ruling, said the Fourth Circuit went too far when it granted federal habeas relief. The Justices said the Fourth Circuit didn’t give enough deference to the Maryland state appellate court under AEDPA, the federal law that limits when federal courts can undo state convictions. The Supreme Court said a fair-minded judge could reasonably decide the missing report would not have changed the verdict, given the strength of the other evidence.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson dissented and said she would have denied the petition.

Understanding Federal Court Limits in State Criminal Cases

Charles Brandon Martin was convicted in a Maryland state court for his role in the attempted murder of his pregnant girlfriend, Jodi Torok. The prosecution built their case on several pieces of evidence. They had DNA evidence linking Martin to a modified Gatorade bottle found at the crime scene, which prosecutors claimed was a homemade silencer. Witnesses testified they saw Martin at the location where this device was built. The prosecution also presented evidence that Martin had a motive: he wanted Torok to end her pregnancy. Finally, text messages showed that Martin knew where Torok would be on the day of the shooting.

After his conviction, Martin challenged the verdict during state postconviction proceedings. He argued that prosecutors had violated his constitutional rights by hiding important evidence. Specifically, the prosecution never disclosed a forensic report about a laptop Martin owned. This report showed the laptop contained no searches for terms like "handgun" or "silencer." This mattered because a prosecution witness named Sheri Carter had testified that she saw Martin researching silencers on that very laptop.

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals reviewed this claim and decided the hidden evidence was not important enough to have changed the verdict. They reasoned that even without Carter's testimony, plenty of other evidence pointed to Martin's guilt. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with Maryland's decision and granted Martin relief. The Fourth Circuit believed Maryland had applied the wrong legal test when evaluating whether the hidden evidence mattered.

The State of Maryland argued that the Fourth Circuit had failed to give proper respect to the state court's decision. Maryland contended that their appellate court had correctly applied the legal test for determining whether hidden evidence matters. They emphasized that substantial evidence connected Martin to the crime, even setting aside what Carter said about the laptop searches. Martin's side argued that the forensic report would have seriously damaged the prosecution's theory that the Gatorade bottle was a silencer. They believed this evidence could have cast the entire case in a different light and undermined confidence in the guilty verdict.

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court issued what's called a per curiam opinion. This is a unanimous ruling that doesn't identify which justice wrote it. The Court summarily reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision.

The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Circuit made two fundamental mistakes. First, the Fourth Circuit wrongly concluded that Maryland's appellate court had applied the wrong legal test. The Supreme Court emphasized that the state court had accurately summarized the relevant legal precedents, correctly stated the governing rule, and explicitly applied that rule to the facts of the case. The Fourth Circuit had criticized the state court's analysis for not being sufficiently detailed or for failing to discuss certain pieces of evidence. The Supreme Court said this criticism violated an important principle: federal courts cannot impose their own standards for how state courts should write their opinions.

Second, the Supreme Court found that the Fourth Circuit erred when it decided that no reasonable judge could agree with Maryland's conclusion. The Supreme Court pointed to the substantial evidence against Martin: his DNA on the bottle, eyewitness testimony from Michael Bradley about how the bottle was constructed, Martin's motive for wanting Torok harmed, his text message that established where Torok would be, his ownership of the right caliber weapon, and his suspicious behavior after the shooting. Even if the forensic report had completely destroyed Carter's credibility, a reasonable judge could still conclude that all this other evidence strongly supported the conviction.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Jackson noted that she would have denied the petition for review, but she provided no explanation for her position. This notation indicates disagreement with the Court's decision to hear the case at all, not necessarily disagreement about who should win. Justices sometimes take this position when they believe a case does not warrant the Supreme Court's attention, perhaps because it involves applying settled law to specific facts rather than resolving a disagreement between different courts or addressing a novel legal question.

Federal Court Review of State Convictions

This decision illustrates an important limitation on federal courts' power to overturn state court criminal convictions. Congress created this limitation through a law called the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, or AEDPA.

The critical legal distinction involves two different tests that might sound similar but work quite differently. One test asks: "Is there enough evidence remaining to support a conviction?" This is called a sufficiency of the evidence test. The other test asks something more nuanced: "Would the undisclosed evidence have put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict?" This second test comes from a famous case called Brady v. Maryland, which established that prosecutors must share evidence that could help prove a defendant's innocence.

The Fourth Circuit believed Maryland's court had confused these two tests. The Fourth Circuit thought Maryland was claiming to apply the Brady test while actually just asking whether enough evidence remained for conviction. The Supreme Court disagreed and found that Maryland followed the Brady standard correctly.

But there's another layer of complexity here. AEDPA requires what courts call "doubly deferential" review. Under this law, federal courts cannot grant relief to a state prisoner merely because they would have decided the case differently. Instead, they must find that the state court's decision was contrary to clearly established federal law or involved an unreasonable application of that law. The Supreme Court has described this standard as protecting only against extreme failures in state court decision making. The test asks whether any reasonable judge could have reached the state court's conclusion, not whether the federal court agrees with that conclusion.

In practical terms, this means that even if the undisclosed forensic report might have changed the outcome of Martin's trial, federal habeas relief is unavailable unless no reasonable judge could conclude otherwise. The Supreme Court found plenty of room for reasonable disagreement in this case. Given the circumstantial but substantial evidence tying Martin to the modified bottle and the shooting, a reasonable judge could conclude that hiding the forensic report did not undermine confidence in the verdict.

This case reinforces that federal courts must give considerable deference to state court decisions, even when reviewing claims that constitutional rights were violated. The system tolerates significant disagreement among judges about the right outcome, as long as the state court's decision falls within the range of reasonable interpretations of federal law.

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Sometimes the toughest legal questions turn on how you label something: is it meant to make a victim whole, or is it part of a person’s punishment? The Supreme Court just faced that exact line-drawing problem in Ellingburg v. United States, a case about money a defendant is ordered to pay back and whether it counts as criminal punishment.

The Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, said restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 is criminal punishment when it comes to the Constitution’s ban on retroactive punishment. In other words, if you treat restitution like punishment, you can’t use the MVRA to reach back and apply it to conduct that happened before the law existed.

The Justices pointed to the law’s own design: it calls restitution a “penalty,” it’s placed in the criminal code, it’s imposed at sentencing alongside other punishments, and it’s enforced by the government. The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and sent the case back for more proceedings. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate concurrence, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch.

When Does Court-Ordered Repayment Count as Criminal Punishment? Supreme Court Weighs In

Holsey Ellingburg, Jr. committed a federal crime in early 1996. A few months later, Congress passed a new law called the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, which required convicted criminals to pay back their victims. Even though Ellingburg's crime happened before this law existed, he was sentenced under it later that year and ordered to pay $7,567.25 to his victim.

Fast forward nearly thirty years. Ellingburg is still being held to this repayment obligation. He challenged it, arguing that the Constitution prohibits the government from retroactively applying criminal punishments to conduct that occurred before a law was passed. This protection is called the Ex Post Facto Clause.

The Supreme Court took up the case to settle this fundamental question: Is mandatory restitution a criminal punishment, or is it something else?

In an unusual twist, both Ellingburg and the federal government agreed that the lower court got it wrong. Because both sides agreed, the Supreme Court appointed a lawyer named John F. Bash to argue in favor of the Eighth Circuit's decision. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court, reversing the Eighth Circuit's ruling against Ellingburg.

Arguments Made By Counsel

Ellingburg and the Justice Department made a united front. They argued that everything about the restitution law screams "criminal punishment." The law itself is found in the criminal code's section on sentencing. It calls restitution a "penalty" for a criminal "offense." And here's the kicker: if someone doesn't pay, they can be sent back to prison. As Justice Jackson pointed out during the hearing, regardless of what happened at Ellingburg's original sentencing three decades ago, he's being held accountable today under a law that didn't exist when he committed his crime. That's the constitutional problem.

Court-appointed lawyer Bash put up a strong defense of the lower court's ruling. He argued that the restitution law actually works more like a civil lawsuit than criminal punishment. In civil cases, you pay based on the harm you caused, not based on how bad you were or whether you can afford it. Bash pointed out that when Congress made restitution mandatory instead of optional, it was making the system more about compensating victims. This sounds more civil than criminal. Justice Kagan seemed intrigued by this argument. She noted that some provisions of the law like allowing victims to keep asking for money years later when they discover new damages, or allowing offsets when victims win civil lawsuits "seem very odd if the statute is primarily punitive."

Justice Alito highlighted the government's difficult position: it was trying to avoid constitutional protections that apply to both criminal and civil cases. In criminal cases, defendants have a right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment. In major civil cases, there's a right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. The government seemed to be arguing that restitution was avoiding both protections. Justice Gorsuch questioned whether the Court should bail the government out of this strategic corner it had painted itself into.

Opinion of the Court

Justice Kavanaugh, writing for all nine justices, held that "restitution under the MVRA is plainly criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause."

The Court followed a straightforward approach: to determine whether a law violates the constitutional ban on retroactive criminal laws, you first look at what the law actually says and how it's structured. Does it look like criminal punishment or does it look like something else?

The Court found overwhelming evidence that restitution under this law is criminal punishment. First, the law itself uses the language of criminal law by calling restitution a "penalty" for a criminal "offense." Second, only people who have been convicted of crimes can be ordered to pay. Third, restitution is imposed at sentencing, right alongside prison time and fines. Fourth, the government, not the victim, is the opposing party in the case. Fifth, for less serious crimes, restitution can be imposed instead of jail time or fines, making it potentially the only punishment. Sixth, the law is located in the criminal code in sections specifically about sentencing. And seventh, people who don't pay can be sent to prison.

The Court noted that it has consistently described this type of restitution as criminal punishment in previous cases. In one case, the Court said the law requires courts "to impose restitution as part of the sentence." In another, restitution was described as designed "to mete out appropriate criminal punishment."

The Court addressed Bash's argument that a previous case about sex offender registration should control here. In that case, the Court found that registration requirements were civil, not criminal. But the Court distinguished that situation: sex offender registration used clearly civil procedures, while restitution under this law has every characteristic of criminal punishment.

The Court acknowledged that Congress had a goal to help crime victims. A goal that isn't about punishment. But this just showed "that Congress intended restitution under the MVRA to both punish and compensate." When the text and structure of a law show that Congress intended to impose punishment, that settles the question.

Importantly, the Court noted that its ruling "does not mean that a restitution statute can never be civil." Congress could potentially design a victim compensation system that truly operates as a civil remedy. The Court sent the case back to the lower court to consider other arguments the government had made.

Separate Opinions

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, wrote separately while agreeing with the majority's conclusion. He wanted to address deeper questions about how courts should determine what counts as criminal punishment.

Justice Thomas argued that the modern legal test for distinguishing criminal from civil laws "has little basis in history" and "is unnecessarily convoluted." The current approach means legislatures could potentially dodge constitutional protections just by using the right labels. Under the current framework, Justice Thomas observed, a legislature might impose a retroactive $10,000 fine on previously innocent conduct like "drinking coffee or going to the gym" simply by calling the law "civil," putting it in the civil code, and having a health agency enforce it.

Thomas proposed returning to the original understanding from a 1798 case. Back then, a "crime" meant a "public wrong" while "punishment" meant any forced penalty like taking away life, liberty, or property that addressed that wrong. Under this approach, what matters isn't what legislators call something but "what the law does": if it punishes a wrong against society enforced by the government, constitutional protections apply; if it merely adjusts disputes between private citizens, they don't.

This understanding, Thomas argued, would extend constitutional protections to many things currently labeled as civil, including fines imposed by government agencies, enforcement actions by regulators, and even municipal penalties like speeding tickets. Anywhere the government enforces a penalty for an injury to the community.

Can Court-Ordered Repayment Ever Be Considered Civil Rather Than Criminal?

This decision establishes that determining whether the constitutional ban on retroactive criminal laws applies depends primarily on what the law says and how it's structured, not just on what effects it has in practice. The Court explicitly avoided a more complicated analysis of the statute's effects because the text so clearly showed Congress intended it as punishment.

The decision preserves flexibility in two important ways. First, the Court emphasized it wasn't saying these features are always necessary for something to count as criminal punishment. Second, the majority explicitly stated that restitution statutes can be designed as civil remedies; future legislatures could create victim compensation programs that genuinely operate outside the criminal system if they use sufficiently civil mechanisms.

Justice Thomas's separate opinion, however, suggests constitutional protection expansion by applying all government-enforced penalties for wrongs against society, regardless of civil labels. This would include administrative fines, civil forfeitures, and even traffic tickets. A substantial departure from current law that treats these as outside constitutional retroactivity protections. While this position didn't command a majority, it signals potential future developments and alerts lawyers that nominally civil government enforcement actions may face heightened constitutional scrutiny.

The practical impact is that defendants sentenced under this restitution law for crimes committed before 1996 may be able to challenge the retroactive application.